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Abstract. 
Despite claims that state terrorism has been more of a problem than the
insurgent variety, the evidence provided by both a content analysis of
bibliographies on the topic of terrorism and the opinions of a great
number of academics suggests that there is a far smaller amount of
academic literature on state terrorism than there is on insurgency
terrorism. In addition it has been noted that the literature on state
terrorism, like that on terrorism generally, suffers from a lack of work
on the definition of the term. Whilst it is difficult to think of any author
who has methodically applied a definition to the actions of a particular
actor in order to assess whether each constitutes an act of terrorism.
This thesis attempts to address each of these issues. However before
doing either of these things it attempts to show that the suggested
reasons as to why the State cannot commit acts of terrorism can be at
least questioned, whilst simultaneously showing that some authors
believe that state terrorism has produced far more victims and than the
sub-state variety. Then after revealing the explanations for academia's
neglect of state terrorism the thesis investigates the notion of (sub-
state) terrorism in order to identify its core meaning, before attempting
to incorporate this into a 'comprehensive' definition of terrorism which
would enable the political analyst to identify acts of state terrorism
committed within the area of the state's jurisdiction and abroad.
This definition, along with other definitions of terrorism taken from
both the literature and legislation, are then tested by being applied to
the 'counter-terrorist' activities of Israel, form which concluding
comments on each and the general notion are made. The decision to
concentrate solely upon counter-terrorist actions can also be seen to be
addressing a gap in the literature, as can the choice of a Western state.
The application of various definitions of state terrorism to the counter-
terrorist actions of Israel within Israel, the administered West Bank and
abroad, therefore means that this area provides a novel testing ground
for any definition.
By examining the issue of state terrorism the thesis aims to raise, if not
answer several important questions and issues surrounding the concept
of state terrorism. In addition to illustrating the problems facing the
production of any definition of the word 'terrorism' such an
examination will hopefully illustrate the problems of applying any
definition of terrorism. Finally the thesis aims to further the cause of
knowledge by accurately describing the legalities of various aspects of
Israel's counter-terrorist policies since Israel took over the
administration of the West Bank in 1967.
As well as using the existing literature this thesis contains both the
quantitative and qualitative replies of 120 academics to a pointed
questionnaire on the topic. Many of the results of this are scattered
throughout the conceptual parts of the thesis including this
introductory chapter, and all the quantifiable results and the sampling
technique are described in Appendix A.
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Part 1 
An Investigation of the Concept of State 
Terrorism. 
"...it is perhaps worth giving a word of warning that the results of a conceptual
inquiry sometimes seem disappointingly meagre. The clarification of concepts is
like cleaning the house. When you have cleaned the house, there is not much to be
seen for your work. You have not acquired any new possessions, though you will
have thrown out some things that are not wanted and are just a nuisance. What you
will have at the end of it is a tidier house, in which you can move around more
easily and in which you can find things when you need them."
D. D. Raphael.'
"Rigorous or broad, rigid or sloppy, definitions are in themselves and important
discursive practise of the terrorism industry. Often they appear to be yet another
weapon in the vast arsenal of counter-terrorism, aiming to re-establish order and
meaning in international relations practice and discourse at a time when both are
undergoing extensive and intensive assaults".
J. Der Derian.2
1 Raphael D.D. Problems of Political Philosophy (2nd.ed. Macmillan Basingstoke.1990.).
p20. He goes on to say, "The analogy is apt in another repect also. Cleaning the house is
not a job that can be done once and for all. You have to do it every week" p20.
2 Der Derian J. Anti - Diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War. (Blackwell. Oxford.
1992). p81. 6
Chapter 1.
Introduction.
"It can be argued - and there are good reasons for it - that state terrorism is the
main terrorist problem in the world".
A.P. Schmid and J. de Graaf.3
The Neglect of State Terrorism. 
The decision to investigate the concept of state terrorism can be traced
to this author's reading on terrorism for a Master's degree course4.
3 Schmid A.P. and De Graaf J. Violence as Communication. (SAGE. London.1982.). p2.
Unfortunately they do not explain them.
4 An altogether seperate reason for studying the terrorism of those in power is that it
might actually contribute to the study of 'non-state' terrorism. Wilkinson, for example
wrote, "some of the best historical case-studies of the use of factional terrorism as a
weapon vividly demonstrate how state violence often helps to provoke and fuel the
violence of terrorist movements" Wilkinson P. 'Can A State Be Terrorist ?'.
International Affairs. Vol. 57.(3). Summer 1981. pp 467-472. p467. More specifically
Crelinsten noted that the main problem with the existing truncated view of terrorism
was that it precludes the possibility of comparative analysis. Crelinsten R.D.
'Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between Controller and
Controlled' in Wilkinson P. and Stewart A.M. Contemporary Research on Terrorism.
(Aberdeen University Press. Aberdeen. 1987.). pp3-21. p4. Whilst Maxwell Taylor
wrote,"[a] consideration of state terrorism allows us to examine the problem of
insurgency terrorism] from a different and rather less familiar perspective. In doing so
we will see more clearly some of the considerations inherent in the term. We will also,
and more importantly, develop a more sophisticated notion of the nature of terrorism.
By 'peeling' away the complications arising out of our everyday view of terrorism as
the activity of a secret or underground society, we can better come to look at
terrorism as a process, and attempt to identify the particular kind of acts that
characterise it". Taylor M. The Terrorist. (Brassey's Defence Publishers. London.
1988). p40. Others have claimed that there is at least an instrumental 'moral' effect of
such violence by the state. Falk for example asserted that so long as terrorist methods
are relied upon by states to avoid defeat or hasten victory in war, bolstered by the
claim of saving lives, terrorists of all persuasions gain validation. Falk R.
Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism. (E.P.Dutton. New York.
1988). p.XIV. Or as the former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark noted
"anyone truly concerned for the horrors of terrorism must direct their intelligence and
energies to prevent police state terrorism". Clark R. 'The Dimensions of Terrorism' in
Kochler H. (ed.). Terrorism and National Liberation. (International Progress
Organisation. Peter Lang. Frankfurt. 1988). pp41-46. p.44. According to R.W. Smith
state terror along with political repression and genocide "is likely to claim millions of
lives unless major efforts are undertaken to prevent such state imposed deaths" Smith
R.W. Review of Bushnell et al State Organized Terror. American Political Science
Review Dec. Vol.86.(4). 1992. p.1078. 7
From this it appeared that there were a number of 'gaps' within the
literature, the most relevant of which to this author's mind was the lack
of work on state terrorism, especially when compared to the extensive
literature on 'sub-state' or 'insurgency' terrorism. This claim was
subsequently found to be supported by both the opinions of various
academics and statistical evidence. For example, in the preface to his
book Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution, Noel O'Sullivan suggested that
the second area of agreement within the field of terrorism studies was
the fact that the recent study of terrorism has tended to concentrate
heavily on opposition groups at the expense of neglecting its use by
regimes5 . The emphasis is mine for it helps to support the conclusion of
Stohl, who in 1984 claimed that prior to the last decade, the finest
analytical work on the nature of terrorism had been conducted by
scholars who were primarily interested in the use of terrorism by
governments6.
Others can be seen to have gone further than N.O'Sullivan in their
relative claims. O'Kane for example wrote that the literature
concentrates on "insurgent terrorism rather than state terrorism"7.
This view is echoed within the existing literature by authors such as
Boire 8 , Perdue 9 and Hocking- 0 and it was also shared by an
overwhelming majority of respondents to this author's questionnaire
on the topic. Of the 117 academics who responded to the question,
5 O'Sullivan N. (ed.). Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Book. Brighton.
1986). px.
6 Stohl M. 'National Interests and State Terrorism'. Political Science. Vol 36 (1) July.
1984. pp37-52. p37.
7 O'Kane R.T.H. The Revolutionary Reign of Terror. (Elgar. Aldershot. 1991). p16.
8 Boire claimed, "[w]ritings on the subject frequently focus on the complicated legal
and political problems of achieving international cooperation as a means of suppressing
terrorism. In doing so they treat all terrorism as if there is but a single form, that
which will be refered to here in as individualistic terrorism. As a result they exclude
from discussion and analysis other situations in which terrorism occurs, such a state
terrorism which is a much more prevelant and pervasive form of terrorism". Boire
M.0 'Terrorism Reconsidered as Punishment: Toward an Evaluation of the Acceptability
of Terrorism as a Method of Societal Change and Maintenance'. Stanford Journal of
International Law. Vo1.20(1). 1984. pp43-143. p47.
9 Perdue concluded that caveats withstanding "[m]ost Western academic contributions
to the terrorism debate evade the question of institutional domination through fear".
Perdue W. Terrorism and The State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear. (Praeger.
New York. 1989.). p14.
10 Hocking wrote, "[a] second feature of the literature, is the frequent failure to
confront instances of terrorism when they are committed by a state or established
regime". Hocking J. Beyond Terrorism. (Allen and Unwin. St.Leonards. 1993.). p7. 8
'Would you say that more, less or just as much, academic work has been
done on 'terror/ist 'violence by those in power than on that by
insurgents?', 67%(78) indicated that they believed that less academic
work has been done on the topic of "terror/ist' violence by those in
power than on that by insurgents". In contrast only 10%(12) indicated
that they believed that more academic work has been done on the topic
of "terror/ist' violence by those in power than on that by insurgents",
with 7%(8) indicating that "just as" much had been done, and 16%(19)
ticking the box entitled "cannot say"11.
In contrast some authors can be seen to have made supporting
statements, the nature of which are absolute. For example Walter, one of
the few who actually study a particular regime in detail (that of the
nineteenth century Zulu chief Shaka), has argued that "Rule by terror a
familiar process in history has virtually escaped systematic analysis"12.
Similarly Schmid and Jongman claimed there is a conspicuous absence
of literature which addresses itself to the more serious problem of state
terrorism 13 . Whilst in an earlier book Schmid had concluded that most
authors and researchers on the subject avoid the issue of state
terrorism 14 . Van Der Kroef has claimed that whilst periodically
attention has been given to forms of extra-judicial violence and
intimidation by national governments against their own citizens, as a
distinct category "terrorism by public authority" has only begun to be
systematically analysed15.
In addition to these comments, some authors have used statistics to
substantiate their claims. These can be used in support of the initial
11 Seventy eight of the replies to question 6 indicated that they believed that less
academic work has been done on the topic of "terror/ist' violence by those in power
than on that by insurgents". In contrast only 12 indicated that they believed that more
academic work has been done on the topic, with 8 indicating that "just as" much had
been done, and 19 ticking the box entitled "cannot say". Three were left blank.
12 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p3.
13 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). pl 79.
14 Schmid wrote "most [researchers] also shy away from treating in depth regime
terrorism" and "state terrorism...has also been neglected by the majority of authors"
Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases
and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p272 and p422 respectively.
15 Van Der Kroef J.M. 'Terrorism by Public Authority: The Case of the Death Squads
of Indonesia and the Phillipines'. Current Research on Peace and Violence. Vol. 10 (4).
1987. pp143-158. p143. 9
hypothesis that there is very little work on the topic of state terrorism.
Schmid for example claimed that probably more than 90 percent of the
literature was on non-state terrorism 16 . Yet his 'guestimate' can be seen
as an underestimation of the ratio of works on insurgency terrorism
vis-a-vis that on terrorism by those in power, if one accepts the
content of Lakos' book Terrorism, 1980-1990: A Bibliography as a
representative sample of the works on terrorism. Despite the 5850
references to articles, databases and books on the topic the contents
page reveals the lack of a single chapter or sub-section within a
chapter on direct 'state terrorism' by whatever name. However of more
importance to this study is the fact that whilst the index contains
seventy references under the labels 'state terror', 'police terror' and
'state repression' only one of these is placed beside the additional
reference title "conceptual studies" l7
Even if one assumes that Schmid's 'guestimate' that "more than ninety
percent of the literature on terrorism is on non-state terrorism" 18 is a
more accurate reflection of reality than the larger figure produced
from a content analysis of Lakos' work, it is still possible to claim there
is a much smaller amount of work produced on state terrorism and the
vast amount on insurgency terrorism. There are three possible
explanations for this conclusion. The first is that the small amount of
work on terrorism by those in power reflects the fact that the State
cannot be termed terrorist. The second is that this small amount of
literature accurately reflects the 'importance' of this form of terrorism.
That is, either/and/or:
2a) terrorism by those in power is a rare event in itself;
2b) there is very little terrorism by those in power compared to that
committed by insurgent terrorism;
2c) state terrorism is politically less important than sub-state terrorism.
16 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). p104.
17 Lakos A. Terrorism, 1980-1990: A Bibliography. (Westview Press. Oxford. 1991).
Index p377-443. Fifty nine of these can be found under the title 'State terror', one
under the title 'State repression', and one under 'Police terror', subtitled 'Spain'. The
rest can be found as subtitles within different sections, eg. 'Brazil.... state terror'.
The one reference to conceptual study of state terrorism is placed under the overall
title 'State terror' .
18 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). p104. 10
The third explanation is that the amount of literature on terrorism by
those in power does not reflect its importance in absolute terms or in
relation to insurgency terrorism, and that state terrorism has been
either unconsciously neglected or deliberately marginalised for one
reason or another. This author believes that answer number three is
the correct one, but before going on to examine the suggested reasons
as to why relatively little work has been done on the topic of state
terrorism, this author must show why the other two possible answers
are incorrect, and in doing so will simultaneously suggest various
reasons why answer three appears to be the correct one. It is therefore
to the view that the State cannot be terrorist that the thesis now turns.
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Can the State be Terrorist?
Some authors, including J.D. Smith, Ludwikowski, Quester and Hacker
and Howard, have implied 19
 that the State cannot commit acts of
terrorism within its area of domestic jurisdiction (if not elsewhere).
Others such as Merkl, Provizer and Farrel actually claim that the State
should not, or cannot, be termed terrorist by definition 20 , thus helping
to create and sustain what one author terms the 'myth' that political
terrorism is exclusively the activity of non-governmental actors 21 . As
Segaller put it, "State terror is a separate subject" 22 . He like many of
those within the 'no school' prefer to apply the ambiguous term 'terror'
19 Smith for example implies it with his comment that "terrorism is primarily an
urban phenomenon carried out by small cells of individuals". Smith J.D.
'Misunderstanding Terrorism'. Foreign Policy. Vol. 67. 1987. pp104-120. p11 2. Whilst
Ludwikowski said of the terms 'state terror' and 'terrorism' ,"they have little spiritual
kinship. They are differently motivated forms of violence and we should emphasize the
difference between them rather than accidental linguistic similarity. If we are to
successfully fight against terrorism we cannot use this term to label all forms of
violence.., even if we agree that terrorism is a response to state terror". Ludwikowski
R.R. 'Aspects of Terrorism. Reflections'. Terrorism: An International Journal.
V0l.10.(3).1987 p182. Quester wrote "[discussions on the frequency and causes of
terrorism ...(discussions hopefully leading to possible antidotes and solutions) will
similarly be handicapped if we are forced to include state terror in the category of
terrorism". Quester G. 'Some Explanations for State -Supported Terrorism in the
Middle East' in Stahl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Connecticut.1988.). pp225-246. p229. According to Schmid and Jongman, F.
Hacker uses the term "terror" for a type of state violence, while he reserves
"terrorism" for the insurgent variety". Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political
Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC.
Amsterdam. 1988.). p43. R.E. Howard wrote in reply to question 12 of this author's
questionnaire "I think state and insurgent terror should be separated not thrown
together".
20 Merkl wrote, "[g]overnment violence even unjust violent policies are exempt from
a definition of terrorism as long as we accord a legitimate monopoly of violence to the
state and its duly authorised functionaries" Merkl P.-(ed). Political Violence and Terror.
(University of California Press. London. 1986.).p20. Farrel wrote, "Nerror practised
by a government in office appears as law enforcement and is directed against the
opposition. Terrorism on the other hand, implies open defiance of law and is the means
whereby an opposition aims to demoralize govern". Farrell W.M.. 'Terrorism is..?'.
Naval War College Review. 1980. Vol.33. (3). p67. Provizer wrote, "the shared
component of "terror" does not mean that it is profitable, in either intellectual or
policy terms to collapse two distinct phenomena into a single category. The boundary
maintenance problems involved in the concept of terrorism are severe enough without
this type of over extension". Provizer N.W. 'Defining Terrorism' in Slann M. and
Schechterman B. (eds). Multidimensional Terrorism. (Lynne Rienner. Boulder. 1987).
pp3-10. p7.
21 Stahl M. 'Demystifying Terrorism, The Myths and Realities of Contemporary
Political Terrorism' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of Terrorism. (3rd ed. Marcel
Dekker. New York. 1988). pp1-30. p7.
22 Segaller S. Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s. (Sphere Books. London.
1987.). p.16 12
to (a variety of acts of) state violence whilst reserving the label
'terrorism' solely for the activities of insurgents. A method also used by
Paul Wilkinson who in a review of a number of books on terrorism
entitled 'Can a state be terrorist?' wrote:
"In general all the authors of the works reviewed below [i.e. Trautman, Crenshaw,
Bowyer Bell, Lodge, Alon, E.Evans] accept that it is unreasonable to insist on
encompassing analysis of the complex processes and implications of both regimes
of terror and factional terrorism as a mode of struggle within the same covers.
There is a rich and growing literature on what most authors now term state terror,
but the term terrorism is now widely used to demote the systematic use of terror
by non-governmental actors"23.
Unfortunately the issue of terminology is not as clear cut as those
wishing to study the issue might hope. For many of those who argue
that the State can be 'terrorist' also use the term 'state terror' to describe
such actions24 . A factor which will be investigated in more depth later.
Of far more importance here is the fact that a few of the writers within
the 'rejectionist' school of thought, usefully attempt to justify their
rejection of the idea that the State itself can carry out direct acts of
terrorism. This view is at its strongest when it refers to acts carried out
within its area of domestic jurisdiction. For those who reject the notion
of the State committing acts of terrorism at home do not always claim
that the State cannot commit such acts abroad 25 . It is therefore
primarily upon the notion of direct domestic state terrorism that the
conceptual side of this thesis focuses. However before this examination
25 Wilkinson P. 'Can A State Be Terrorist 7'. International Affairs. Vol. 57.(3).
Summer 1981. pp 467-472. p467. Van Der Kroef similarly declared "terrorism by
public authority has only begun to be systematically analysed". Van Der Kroef J.M.
'Terrorism by Public Authority: The Case of the Death Squads of Indonesia and the
Philippines'. Current Research on Peace and Violence. Vol. 10 (4). 1987. pp143-
158.p143.
24 For example Corrado R.R. and Tompkins E. 'A Comparative Model of the
Psychological Effects of the Victims of State and Anti-State Terrorism'. International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry. Vol. 12(4). 1989. pp281-293. p281, 291; and Gurr
T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis' in
Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for
Research. (Greenwood Press. NY.1986.). pp45-72. p46, 48.
25 R.R. Ludwikowski wrote in reply to question 10 of this author's definition, "I would
reserve the term "terrorism" for acts committed outside the area of domestic
jurisdcition". The opposite also exists. In reply to question 13, T.Lewellen. wrote: "I
have always employed the concept of "state terrorism" or "state terror" to apply only
to political killings, political imprisonment, torture, and disappearances by the state
against people within its own boundaries". 13
is embarked upon it is worth noting that in reply to this author's
question: 'Can acts, carried out directly by the agents of those in power,
ever be labelled acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism'?', only 3% of those 118
respondents answered with an outright 'No'. An overwhelming 86%
replying: 'Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or Iterrorism"26.
Those who reject the notion of the State committing acts of terrorism at
home include Quinton, who replied to his own question "Why should the
word terrorism with all it's pejorative quality, be confined to unofficial
violence, to violence not carried out or threatened by the state?", with a
two part answer which he claimed went a fairly long way towards a
rejection of the idea that the State itself can carry out acts of terrorism
within its area of domestic jurisdiction. For him the State cannot be
termed 'terrorist' because the amount of actual violence exercised by
well-established states is small, most arrests are peaceful, and the State
becomes violent only "in reaction to" the occasions when the citizens
themselves become violent. Yet a close examination of his work reveals
that even when the State's violence is not reactive -that is when it
carries out violent acts against peaceful demonstrators, or when its
violent actions are random or arbitrary in order to ensure the
submission of the public A la Stalin- Quinton cannot bring himself to
call it 'terrorism', it is merely "terror".27
Another author within the 'no school' has argued that the shared
component of 'terror' does not mean that it is profitable, in either
intellectual or policy terms, to collapse these two distinct phenomena
into a single category that of terrorism. For Provizer the author of these
lines, the boundary maintenance problems involved in the concept are
severe enough without this type of over-extension28 . In contrast, but
within the same school of thought, Quester emphasised the more
practical 'policy' reasons for refusing to accept the existence of state
terrorism, with a point that links nicely with Goldman's unexplained
26 Eight ticked the box entitled "Yes, but only as acts of 'terror'. Three of the replies
to question 1 were 'no', 101 indicated "Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism', 6
indicated that it was acceptable to label 'acts carried out directly by the agents of
those in power' 'only as acts of 'terrorism". Two of the 120 were left blank.
27 Quinton A. 'Reflections on Terrorism and Violence ' in Warner M. and Crisp R.
(eds.) Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp35-43. p41.
28 Provizer N.W. 'Defining Terrorism' in Slann M. and Schechterman B. (eds).
Multidimensional Terrorism. (Lynne Rienner. Boulder. 1987). pp3-1 O. p7. 14
claim that one "naturally" concentrates on the violence of insurgent
groups 29 . For Quester, discussions on the frequency and causes of
terrorism, (discussions hopefully leading to possible antidotes and
solutions) will "be handicapped if we are forced to include state terror
in the category of terrorism" 30 . Such a view has been challenged by
other terrorologists. Wilkinson, known for his books on the general
topic of terrorism, claimed that some of the best historical case-studies
of the use of insurgency terrorism vividly demonstrate how state
violence often helped to provoke and fuel the violence of terrorist
movements31 . Whilst in the same vein Maxwell Taylor wrote:
"A consideration of state terrorism allows us to examine the problem [of
insurgency terrorism] from a different and rather less familiar perspective. In
doing so we will see more clearly some of the considerations inherent in the term.
We will also, and more importantly, develop a more sophisticated notion of the
nature of terrorism. By 'peeling' away the complications arising out of our
everyday view of terrorism as the activity of a secret or underground society, we
can better come to look at terrorism as a process, and attempt to identify the
particular kind of acts that characterise it"32.
Quester also attempted an intellectual justification of his "normal
conventional usage of language", by claiming that it was the defence of
a line, of territory that differentiates the actions of a state and
insurgent groups. For him terrorism is not what a regime perpetuates
in the territories it already controls, and over which it has a monopoly
of the tools of military power and police violence 33 . In a similar vein
29 Goldman J.R. 'Counter Terrorism' in Slann M. and Schechterman B. (eds).
Multidimensional Terrorism. (Lynne Rienner. Boulder. 1987.).pp33-37. p35. Der Derian
interestingly notes, "Migourous or broad, rigid or sloppy, definitions are in
themselves and important discursive practise of the terrorism industry. Often they
appear to be yet another weapon in the vast arsenal of counter-terrorism, aiming to
re-establish order and meaning in international relations practice and discourse at a
time when both are undergoing extensive and intensive assaults". Der Derian J. Anti-
Diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War. (Blackwell. Oxford. 1992). p81.
30 Quester G. 'Some Explanations for State-Supported Terrorism in the Middle East'
in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Connecticut.1988.). pp225-246. p229.
31 Wilkinson P. 'Can A State Be Terrorist?'. International Affairs. Vol. 57.(3).
Summer 1981. pp 467-472. p467.
32 Taylor M. The Terrorist. (Brassey's Defence Publishers. London. 1988.). p40.
33 Quester G. 'Some Explanations for State-Supported Terrorism in the Middle East'
in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Conneticut.1988.). pp225-246. p227. 15
Merkl's emphasises the latter of these reasons to claim that
"government violence" and even "unjust violent policies" are exempt
from a definition of terrorism as long as we accord a legitimate
monopoly of violence to the State and its duly authorised
functionaries34.
Yet just because we are prepared to ascribe legitimacy a priori to the
use of (at least some) violence by the State does not mean that all of the
State's actions should always be considered legitimate. A point implied
by Gurr when he suggested:
"State terror should be judged not in the absolute but against some standard.
Normatively, the standard might be that of international law (which at present
condemns genocide but not state terrorism), or the domestic laws of the state in
question, or the laws of culturally similar states, or some not-yet-codified
conception of global human rights"35.
Slann also suggested non-conceptual reasons why governments can get
away with more violence whilst avoiding the label terrorism, than
other institutions in society. Namely the unrivalled resources of the
State and the fact that there is usually either some popular support for
even the most brutal regime or legitimation of the government from
outside by international law36 . On this latter point, Skubiszewski
asserted that the notion of state terrorism as a crime committed by the
State, in contrast to official persons, does not exist in positive
international law. He went on to say that in "terms of law, in contrast to
the language of politics and diplomacy, the State cannot perpetrate the
crime of terrorism" 37 . However as Gurr just noted, one does not
necessarily have to involve international law within one's concept of
state terrorism, and this thesis is primarily a study of a political concept.
34 Merkl P. 'Approaches to the Study of Political Violence' in Merkl P. (ed). Political
Violence and Terror. (University of California Press. London. 1986.). pp19-61. p20.
35 Gurr T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical
Analysis' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An
Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. New York.1986.). pp45-72. p49.
36 Slann M. 'The State as Terrorist' in Slann M. and Schechterman B. (eds).
Multidimensional Terrorism. (Lynne Rotienner. Boulder. 1987.). pp39-44. p40.
37 Skubiszewski K. 'Definition of Terrorism'. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol. 19.
1987. pp39-54. p48. 16
The validity of each of these conceptual arguments will be implicitly
examined later when the thesis addresses criticisms of its own
definition. Their inclusion here is primarily to identify and describe
some of the major conceptual problems which might explain the
neglect of state terrorism. The idea that there is a conceptual problem
surrounding the notion of state terrorism was noted by Duvall and Stohl.
For them this conceptual problem results from the fact that the State is
typically conceived or understood in the terms of force and violence (to
which one can add 'territory' because of the nature of the State). In
• addition they also noted that those who address the violence practised by
legally constituted governments must confront at least one other
problem 38 . This second problem, which they call an emotional one,
derives from the commonly held assumption that the State is a neutral
arbiter in social conflict and is itself the victim of terrorism, the latter
of which is perceived a priori as an anti-state phenomenon. Yet as this
author noted within his 1991 article, this latter emotional problem will
automatically be overcome once one has solved the former conceptual
problem. That is, when one shows that the State can be terrorist,
terrorism will, of course, no longer be equated with the insurgent's
anti-state violence39 . Unfortunately despite their assertion that the
conceptual problem is certainly not unsolvable, Duvall and Stohl fail to
clearly "demarcate that which is terroristic in its essence from that
which is not" 40 . A point which will be shown later within a literature
review. Instead, they merely (although usefully) describe the various
forms that state terrorism can take.
The view that the State cannot be terrorist by definition is that of a
minority of the terrorist scholars who answered the question 'Do you
think that it helpful or a hindrance to study such acts alongside
terror/ist acts carried out by insurgent groups?' contained within this
author's questionnaire. Of the 119 responses to this particular question
(which includes three answers given by one respondent), only 10%
claimed that it was a hindrance to study such acts alongside terror/ist
acts carried out by insurgent groups, with 66% saying that it was
38 Duvall R.D. and Stohl M. 'Goverance by Terror' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of
Terrorism. (2nd ed. Marcel Dekker. New York. 1983.). pp179-219. p180.
39 Sproat P.A. 'Can The State Be Terrorist?' Terrorism: An International Journal. Vol.
14.(1). Jan-Mar 1991. pp19-29. p19.
40 Duvall R.D. and Stohl M. 'Goverance by Terror' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of
Terrorism. (2nd ed. Marcel Dekker. New York. 1983.)- po 79-219. p180. 17
helpful. The remaining 24% of the responses were split between those
who replied "neither" or "both". If this latter group is removed so that
the figures are solely those who expressed a preference one way or
another, the percentage of those who believe that it is helpful or a
hindrance to study the two phenomena together rise to 87% and 13%
respectively41.
After showing that the reasons put forward within the literature read
by this author as to why the State cannot be termed terrorist are far
from solid, the thesis will go on to examine the view that the small
amount of literature on the topic accurately reflects the 'importance' of
this form of terrorism. That is it will examine the view that state
terrorism is, either/and/or: a) a rare event in itself; b) a relatively rare
in comparison to insurgent terrorism; c) politically less important than
sub-state terrorism. The easiest way of showing that each of these
potential answers are flawed is by merely citing claims from the
existing literature about its importance both in historical and political
terms including the scope and intensity of such acts, especially vis-a-
vis terrorism carried out by insurgent groups.
41 To question 3, 78 replies indicated that it was helpful to study 'terror/ist' acts
carried out by agents of those in power alongside 'terror/ist' acts carried out by
insurgent groups,12 indicated that it was a hindrance, 9 indicated that it was neither a
help nor a hindrance and 20 replies indicated that it was in some respects both a help
and hindrance. Two of the 120 were left blank. 18
The Importance of State Terrorism. 
"...the most sobering source justifying the study of state terror is political
history."
M. Stohl and G.A. Lopez.42
The idea that state terrorism is either a rare or unimportant event is
challenged by Schmid's assertion that terrorism by regimes "has a
longer history than insurgent terrorism" 43 . Another supporting
'historically based' answer is given by Herman and G.O'Sullivan who
concluded that the really massive and significant growth of terrorism
since World War II has been carried out by states44 . Whilst Freeman
went a little further by claiming that the history of political terrorism
in the 20th Century consisted to a large extent of the acts of "terroristic
states" 45 . However none of these authors claim as much as Wilkinson.
He argued that throughout history the primary agent of terrorisation of
civilian populations have been armed military forces whether
composed of regular or irregular troops conscripts or mercenaries46.
Dimitrijevic's comments on the history of such terrorism not only
traces its origins to an far earlier era, but introduces both a spatial and
a legal (and/or moral) dimension to the concept. For Dimitrijevic "state
terror", placed alongside human rights violations, has "occurred in
almost all periods of history and in almost all countries of the world"47.
42 Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State
as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp3-10. p4
43 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors,
concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p72
44 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions
that Shape our View of Terrorism. (Pantheon. New York.1989). p83.
45 Freeman M. 'State Terrorism and Human Rights in the New Europe' Conference
Paper from Conference on 'Terrorism in the New Europe' at the University of Hull. 15-
17 May 1992. p52.
46 Wilkinson P. 'Three Questions on Terrorism' Government and Opposition Vol.8(3)
Summer 1973. pp290-312. p294.
47 Dimitrijevic as interpreted by P.B.Maggs review of his book 'Tyrannies: Studies in
Human Rights and State Terror'. Maggs P.B. 'Review of Tyrannies: Studies in Human
Rights and State Terror - A. Dimitrijevic'. American Journal of International Law. Vol.
81 (3).1987. p399. [This author's emphasis] 19
The extreme nature of his answer is however surpassed by the
(presumably anarchistic) Sanguinetti who went further in claiming
that "All states have always been terrorist" 48 . However whilst this
author's study does not attempt to answer such questions, its
methodology does not rule out such conclusions. In testing the various
definitions of state terrorism, it merely takes an open minded approach
a la Walter who claimed that "Terror is not confined to anomalous
circumstances or exotic systems. It is potential in ordinary institutions
as well as in unusual situations"49.
Stohl and Lopez wrote on one occasion that the vast resources of the
State suggest that governments may make greater use of terrorism than
many individuals and insurgent groups 50 . Whilst Narveson similarly
claimed that the greatest proportion of terrorist acts may be performed
by the agents of legitimate governments 51 . Some academics, however,
are more certain in their claims. Glover for example, suggests that even
a casual study of state terrorism shows that it "totally dwarfs unofficial
terrorism in its contribution to human misery" 52 . Similarly
Oppenheimer asserted that the amount of terror inflicted by insurgent
48 Sanguinetti G. Terrorism and the State. (Aldgate Press. London. 1982). p99. Also
cited by O'Sullivan N. 'Terrorism, Ideology and Democracy' in O'Sullivan N. (ed.).
Terrorism, ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Book. Brighton. 1986.). pp3-26. p22.
[This author's emphasis.]
49 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p3. Support for this can be seen in the words of Bell
who argued that, "[s]tate terror of course has long been with us , even if only a
relatively rare option for democratic governments". Bell J.B. A Time of Terror How
Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (Basic Books. New York.
1978).p.3.; and Bushell et al who claimed that, "[i]n this century alone, tens of milions
of people, living in most regions of the world, under communist, democratic, military
and theocratic governments have been and continue to be victim of state organized
repression and violence" Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam
J. 'State Organized Terror Tragedy of the Modern State' in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh
V., Vanderpool C.K and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State Organized Terror (Westview Press.
Oxford. 1992.). pp3-22. p3.
50 Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stahl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). Terrible
Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.1988.).pp1-12. p2. [My
emphasis].
51 Narveson J. 'Terrorism and Morality' in Frey R.G. and Morris C.W. (eds). Violence,
Terrorism and Justice. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1991.). pp116-169.
p117 [My emphasis]. Interestingly Quester who is cited earlier decrying the idea of
state terrrorism, wrote "state terror can be worse than state sponsored terror"
Quester G. 'Some Explanations for State-Supported Terrorism in the Middle East' in
Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Connecticut.1988) pp225-246. p229. [My emphasis]
52 Glover J. 'State Terrorism' in Frey R.G. and Morris C.W. (eds). Violence, Terrorism
and Justice. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1991.). pp256-275. p273 20
terrorists no matter how dreadful is "a thimbleful compared to official
'legally' sanctioned terror" 53 . Unfortunately for those who like
empirical data, both remain without figures, presumably because of the
methodological difficulty (if not impossibility) of quantifying 'human
misery'; or measuring 'terror' or the volume of thimbles. However such
logic cannot not excuse the lack of such empirical evidence or at least
an educated 'guestimate' by others such as Stohl, who in one article
claimed that states rather than insurgent groups have been the most
persistent and successful users of the strategy of terrorism 54 ; and
Chaliand who claimed that this form of terrorism generates many more
victims than the other forms of terrorism 55 . Although, speaking
abstractly, the sheer scope of carrying out such an historical task on a
world-wide scale, combined with the actual physical dangers of
studying regimes that resort to 'terrorism', would excuse the failure to
produce such empirical evidence.
In contrast various authors have attempted to quantify their claims. For
example on another occasion Stohl asserted that more than half (but
presumably not all) of the world's governments perpetrate state
terrorist acts on a daily basis56 . A view which can be seen as giving
support to Walter's earlier conclusion that the potential to commit acts
of state terrorism lies in every structure, rather than being inherent,
as Sanguinetti seemed to assert. Stohl however makes up for this lack of
quantifiable data in another work where he supports his claim that the
rates of death, destruction casualties of terrorism have been
substantially greater from the hands of state operatives than from
insurgent challengers, with some figures. Yet even then his claim that
53 Oppenheimer M. 'Terrorism is Sometimes Justified' in Szumski B. (ed.). Terrorism:
Opposing Viewpoints. (Greenhaven Press. St. Paul. Minnesota. 1986.).pp86-89. p87.
54 Stahl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p55.
55 Chaliand also wrote that in Guatamala, for example, Amnesty International believed
that in the four years between 1980 and 1984 there were some 15,000 deaths. In
contrast The Rand Corporation put at 3,000 the total number of deaths attributable to
acts of terrorism since 1968. Chaliand G. 'Terrorism: A Means of Liberation'.
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 1. (1). Jan 1989. pp21-27. p21.
56 Stohl M. 'Demystifying the Mystery of International Terrorism' in in C.W. Kegley
(ed.).International Terrorism: Characteristics; Causes; Controls. (St.Martin's. New
York. 1990). pp81-96. p82. Schmid and De Graaf wrote, "pit can be argued - and there
are good reasons for it - that state terrorism is the main terrorist problem in the
world where as many as 117 states violate human rights in one way or another"
Schmid A.P. and De Graaf J. Violence as Communication. (SAGE. London.1982.). p2. 21
"state terrorism in the domestic realm is responsible for millions of
deaths" is an (imprecise) absolute figure rather than as a ratio57.
Similarly Boire uses a figure in this useful, if rather imprecise way,
when he asserted that in striking contrast to the comparatively light
amount of carnage resulting from individualistic terrorism however,
state terrorism is responsible for "millions of deaths" as well as being
far more pervasive and destructive 58 . Likewise Stohl's assertion that
during the period that the Department of State has kept statistics on
international terrorism i.e. 1975-1985, "tens of thousands of people have
perished at the hands of government terrorism" leaves a lot to be
desired by empiricists. He goes on to claim that: 'Mills terror far
outstrips the insurgent terror that gains most western press notice"59.
In contrast Corrado and Topkins are more precise in their use of
statistics to support their claim that: "state terrorism surpasses anti-state
terrorism both in scope and intensity of violence". However their
comparison of the U.S. State Department's view that between 1975-85
there were approximately 5000 events including threats related to anti-
state terrorism, with their own estimation that hundreds of thousands of
people were killed or tortured because of state terrorism 60 , does not
empirically prove all aspects of their claim. Ahmed is far more precise
in his use of numbers. He estimated that the ratio of loss of life by
illegitimate state and state sanctioned terror (the latter being an
unfortunate addition) when compared with revolutionary terror or non
official terror is probably half a million to one 61 . Although such a large
57 Stohl M. 'National Interests and State Terrorism'. Political Science. Vol 36 (1)
July. 1984. pp37-52. p37 and 40.
58 Boire M.C. 'Terrorism Reconsidered as Punishment: Toward an Evaluation of the
Acceptability of Terrorism as a Method of Societal Change and Maintenance'. Stanford
Journal of International Law. Vol.20 (1). 1984. pp43-143. p.71.
59 Stohl M. 'Demystifying the Mystery of International Terrorism' in C.W. Kegley
(ed.). International Terrorism: Characteristics; Causes; Controls. (St.Martin's. New
York. 1990.). pp81-96. p.82. Interestingly enough in the previous paragraph he notes
the same figures, dates and source as Corrado and Tompkins, unfortunately all
references have been deliberately ommitted in Kegley's book).
60 Corrado R.R. and Tompkins E. 'A Comparative Model of the Psychological Effects of
the Victims of State and Anti-State Terrorism'. International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry. Vol. 12(4). 1989. pp281-293. p281.
61 Ahmed E. 'Comprehending Terror' MER1P Vol.16 (4). May/June 1986. pp3-5, cited
by Falk R. 'Revolutionaries and Functionaries. The Dual Face of Terrorism' in Kegley
C.W.(ed.). International Terrorism: Characteristics; Causes; Controls. (St.Martin's.
New York. 1990.). pp39-44. p33. 22
scale comparative analysis was carried out in a more detailed manner by
Herman and G.O'Sullivan and collated in the following table:
23
Killings by State and Non-State Terrorists: numbers and orders of
magnitude. 
Types of killing Numbers Fraction	 or
killed Multiple of
PLO
killings
Non-state
German: Red Army Faction, Revolutionary Cells,
and all other non state, January 1970-April
3 1 0.1
1979
Italian: Red Brigades and all other non-state, 334 1.2
1968-82
PLO: Israelis killed in all acts of terror, 1968- 282 1.0
81
World:	 all	 "international	 terrorists,"	 CIA
global aggregate, 1969-80
3,368 11.9
Single	 incidents	 of state	 terror
El Salvador: Rio Sumpul, May 14, 1980 600+ 2.1+
South Africa: Kassinga refugee camp	 May 4, 600+ 2.1+
1978
Guatemala: Panzos, May 29, 1978 114 0.4
Israel: Sabra Shatila, September 	 16-18, 1982 1,900-3,500 6.7-12.4
Larger dimensions of state terror
Argentina: 1976-82 "disappeared" 11,000 39.0
Chile: 1973-85 20,000+ 70.9+
Dominican Republic: 1965-72 2,000 7.1
El Salvador: Matanza I, 1932 30,000 106.4
El Salvador: Matanza II, 1980-5 50,000+ 177.3+
Guatamala: Rioss Montt pacification campaign, 2,186 7.8
March -June 1982
Guatemala: 1966-85 100,000+ 354.6+
Indonesia: 1965-6 500,000+ 1,773.0+
Indonesia: invasion and pacification of East 200,000+ 709.2+
Timor, 1980-5
Libya:	 external	 assassinations	 of Libyans, 10+ 0.04+
1980-3
Cambodia: Pol Pot era, 1975-8 300,000+ 1,063.8+
US-sponsored
	 Contras:	 civilians
	 in 3,000+ 10.6
Nicaragua, 1981-7
South Africa and proxies: in Angola and 1,000,000+ 3,546+
Mozambique, 1980-9
24
Unfortunately their data62
 and resulting comparisons can be criticised
for being based upon a variety of rather broad 'definitions' of the term
terrorism. Yet on another level this can be seen to be of little
importance in that many, if not most, authors on the topic fail to define
their terms, never mind prove that their statistics produce their
figures. The largest differentiation between the number of acts of
terrorism committed by insurgents and those committed by the state
found by this author was provided by Segaller who produced a ratio so
high that it gives him the excuse of not providing any figures. For
SegaIler the actual number of incidents and victims of 'state terror'
infinitely outweighs the toll of insurgency terrorism63.
In contrast to this quantitative approach, some authors have suggested
'qualitative' reasons as to why it is important to study state terrorism; or
even why it is a more important area of study. Pipes, for example, has
62 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. "Terrorism' as Ideology and Cultural Industry' in
George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75.
pp.41-42. They cite:
a. H.J.Horchem,'Political Terrorism:The German Perspective', in Ariel Merari (ed), On Terrorism and Combatting
Terrorism (University Publication of America, 1985). p63.
b. V.S. Pisano, Terrorism and Security:The Italian Experience, Report of the Subcommitte on Security and Terorism,
Senate Judiciary Committee, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., November 1984.. p63.
C. B.Michael, Ha'aretz (July 16,1982), citing official police statistics. Some of the 282 were killed by Israeli forces in
attempts to free hostages by force.
d. CIA, Patterns of International Terroism: 1980 (CIA,June 1981).p. vi.
e. M.McClintock, The American Connection, vol.1, State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador (Zed
Books,1985), p.306
f. R.Leonard, South African at War (Lawrence Hill, 1983), p67.
[for some unexplained reason g is omitted]
h. The Lebanese government claims that it recovered 762 bodies and 1,200 were privately buried by relatives.
N.Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle (South End ,1983),p.370. In a careful study, Amnon Kapeliouk estimates 3,000-
3,500 murdered: Sabra and Shatila Inquiry into a Massacre (Association of Arab- American University Graduates,
1984).pp62-3
i. J.Simpson and J. Bennett, The Disappeared and the Mothers of the Plaza (St. Martins,1985). p.7.
j. Amnesty International, Report on Torture (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), p252.
k. C.M.Gutierrez, The Dominican Republic: Rebellion and Repression (Monthly Review Press, 1972),p11.
I. R.Armstrong and J. Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of Revolution (South End, 1982).p30.
m. Central America Historical Institute.
n. Amnesty International, Special Briefing, "Guatamala: Massive Extrajudicial Executions in Rural Areas under the
Government of General Efrain Rioss Montt", (July 1982).px
o."Bitter and Cruel...," Report of a Mission to Guatamala by the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group (October
1984): C. Krueger and K.Enge, Without Security or Development; Guatamala Militarized, report submitted tothe
Washington Office on Latin America, (June 6, 1985).
p. Amnesty International, Political Killings by Governments (Amnesty International, 1983), p.34. This is a
conservative estimate.
q. N. Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War (Pantheon, 1982), pp.341 and 470 (citing Father Leoneto Vierra do Rego
and Father Francisco Maria Fernandez).
r. Amnesty International, Political Killings by Goverments, pp69-77.
S. Ibid., p.24.
t. H.Skiar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (South End ,1988)
u. P.Johnson and D. Martin, Frontline Southern Africa (Four Walls Eight Windows, 1988), p467 and sources used
there.
63 Segaller S. Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s. (Sphere Books. London.
1987.). p16. Similarly J. McCamant in response to question 13 of this author's
questionnaire wrote in regards to his study of Latin America, "states perpetrate more
acts of terror than opposition...governments out did opposition by at least a ratio of ten
to one and in most cases the ratio was infinite as there was no oppositional violence". 25
argued that the state element (although he implies 'support' only)
makes terrorism far more important politically than it would be if
confined to small organisations hiding from the law64 . Unfortunately
however Pipes does not explain his reasoning, unlike Segaller who
suggests that such direct internal "state terror is an offense more
intolerable even than the terrorism of small groups" because of the
legal expectations attached to the State by its own people 65 . Herman
claims that state (or "wholesale") terrorism is much more important
than non-state violence because it is rooted in relatively permanent
structures that allow terror to be institutionalised. His concern is that
the institutionalisation of terrorism by the State could develop a
reckless permanency of its own, which he contrasts with the
frequently transitory nature of what he terms the "retail terrorists"66.
The worry that terrorism might be institutionalised within the State is
supported by Bushell et al 67 , and Arendt in her work on totalitarian
regimes68 . Similarly both Stohl and Thackrah have argued that the
strategies and tactics of terrorism have become integral components of
the foreign policy instruments of the modern state69.
64 Pipes D. 'Why Assad's Terror Works and Qadhafi's Does Not'. Orbis . Vol. 34 (1).
Winter 1990. pp501-509. p501.
65 SegaIler S. Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 7990s. (Sphere Books. London.
1987). p16.
66 Herman E.S. The Real Terror Network. (South End Press. Boston. 1982). p83. Retail
terrorists can of course become wholesale terrorists as with Israeli leaders Begin and
Shamir formerly of the Stern and lrgun Gangs. See Chomsky N. 'International
Terrorism: Image and Reality' in George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity
Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp12-38. p28,35.
67 Bushnell et al claimed that "Mt has become evident that the increasingly
sophisticated and continuously expanding bureacratic and technical capabilities of states
everywhere for violence and repression". Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool
C.K. and Sundriam J. 'State Organized Terror Tragedy of the Modern State' in Bushnell
P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State Organized Terror
(Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp3-22.p.3. They rely heavily upon the work of
Giddens A. Violence and the State. Vol.11 of A Contemporary Critique of Historical
Materialism. (Polity Press. Cambridge.1985.).
68 Arendt wrote, "[t]error continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even when its
psychological aims are achieved" and "terror 	 is the very essence of its form of
government". Arendt H. The Origins of Totalitarianism (3rd edition. George Allen and
Unwin. London. 1966.) p.344.
69 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p55. and Thackrah J.R. The
Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge, Kegan and Paul. London.
1987.). p236. Again the sentences are almost exact, with Stohl saying: "strategies and
tactics of terrorism have become integral components of the foreign policy instruments
of the modern state" to Thackrah's, " The tactics and strategies of terrorism have 26
In addition to these comments made by various academic authors a
further reason to persuade the reader that state terrorism is neither, a
rare event, nor a relatively rare one compared to insurgent terrorism,
nor politically less important than sub-state terrorism, is the history of
the word itself.
become integral to the foreign policy instruments of the modern state". Neither is
referenced. 27
The Etymology of 'Terrorism'.
The history of the word 'terrorism' also seems to refute the idea that
state terrorism is either a rare or unimportant event. For Stohl, the
particular irony of what he terms the "myth" that political terrorism is
exclusively the activity of non-governmental actors is that the first use
of the term 'terrorism' referred to the direct activities of a State -that of
France- between 1793 and 1798 70 . Other authors in agreement with this
identification of the first use, and original meaning of the term include
Walter, Parry, B. Singh, Fields and Teichman 71 . Indeed The Oxford
English Dictionary still defines terrorism as "Government by
intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France
between 1789-1794"72.
According to Dallas the first dictionary to enter the word was the 1798
edition of Dictionnaire de l'Academie Francaise. Within it the word
'terrorism' was described, -in French-, as a "system, a regime of
terror" 73 . Interestingly Lacquer noted that two years earlier a French
dictionary stated that the Jacobins had on occasions used the term
'terror' in a positive sense when speaking and writing about
themselves. Schmid can be seen to have provided an explanation for
70 Stohl M. 'Demystifying Terrorism, The Myths and Realities of Contemporary
Political Terrorism' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of Terrorism. (3rd ed. Marcel
Dekker. New York. 1988). pp1-30. p8.
71 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford University
Press. Oxford. 1969.). p4: Parry A. Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat.
(Vanguard Press. New York. 1976.).p39: Singh B. 'An Overview' Alexander. Y and
Finger S. (eds). Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. (McGraw-Hill.
Maidenhead.1977.). pp5-17. p6; Fields L.G. 'Contemporary Terrorism and The Rule of
Law' Military Law Review. Vol.113. 1986. p1-15.p3. Teichman J. 'How to Define
Terrorism'. Philosophy. Vol. 64. 1989. pp505-517.p507. Also Chomsky who wrote,
"[title term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the eighteenth century, primarily
refering to violent acts of government designed to ensure popular submission. That
concept is plainly of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who in holding
power are in a position to control the system of thoughts and expression. The original
sense has therefore been abandoned and the term terrrorism has to be applied mainly to
retail terrorism by individuals or groups". Chomsky N. Pirates and Emperors:
International Terrorism in the Real World. (Black Rose Books. Montreal. 1987.). p9.
72 The O.E.D. also defines terrorism as "2. A policy intended to strike with terror
those whom against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the
fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized." Simpson J.A. and Weiner S.C. The
Oxford English Dictionary (2nd. ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1989.). Part XnIII p820-1.
73 Dallas G. 'An Exercise in Terror: The Paris Commune 1871' History Today Vol. 39.
February 1989. p38-44. p38. Lacquer asserts that it was given in the 1798
supplement of Dictionnaire de l'Academie Francaise. Lacquer W. Terrorism (Weidenfeld
and Nicolson. London.1972.). p6. 28
this change. He claimed that the Jacobin led National Convent had
declared 'terror' to be the order of the day on 30th August 1793, thereby
giving legal sanction to a number of emergency measures against the
monarchist traitors via the Terror of the Committee of Public Safety (of
which Robespierre was the most prominent member). Soon those who
had originally supported Robespierre's reign of terror began to fear for
their own lives as this instrument began to target revolutionary allies
to both the right and left of Robespierre, namely the Indulgents under
Danton, and the Hebertists. However because they could not accuse
Robespierre of the Terror, since they had also declared it to be the
legitimate form of government, they accused him of "terrorism". Thus
under the Thermidorian reaction, the agents of the revolutionary
tribunals were termed "terrorist". This term of abuse with criminal
implications spread fast in Europe 74 including Britain where Burke, in
a famous passage written in 1795 wrote about "thousands of those Hell
hounds called terrorists" 75 . The subsequent change in the use of the
term 'terrorism' from one which was originally applied to the actions of
rulers who molested their own subjects (and the world), to one whose
use is now restricted to 'thieves who molest the powerful' reveals
according to Chomsky, the power of the State in the free West in
controlling the system of thought and expression76 . However Chomsky's
explanation would have to conceive of various Western states
continually controlling the system of thought and expression at least
since the end of the 19th Century, when the word had become associated
with both the anti-Tsar violence of 1880s and the anti-state violence of
74 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). p66: Lacquer W. Terrorism
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London.1972.). p6.
75 Lacquer W. Terrorism (Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London.1972.). p6.
76 Chomsky also wrote, "[t]he term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the
eighteenth century, primarily refering to violent acts of government designed to ensure
popular submission. That concept is plainly of little benefit to the practioners of state
terrorism, who holding power are in a position to control the system of thoughts and
expression. The original sense has therefore been abandoned and the term terrrorism
has to be applied mainly to retail terrorism by individuals or groups". N.Chomsky.
Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World. (Black Rose Books.
Montreal. 1987.). p9.
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the anarchists in the 1890s 77 , if not before (be it 184878 or with the end
of Robespierre).
Any credible explanation of the contemporary use of the term would
have to explain the caveats, that is the fact that most exceptions to this
rule that terrorism is carried out by sub-state actors tend to focus on
totalitarian i.e. fascist or communist state terror or terrorism 79 . This
problem however is not the main one to be answered by the thesis.
Instead it attempts to address, if not resolve, the conceptual problem
which may explain the overall neglect of state terrorism. This
conceptual problem noted earlier by Duvall and Stohl surrounds the use
of the terms 'terrorism' and 'the State' which often results in the
conclusion that the nature of the two concepts are incompatible. Seen
from this perspective: "state terrorism is merely a pejorative label for
what states do by right"80.
To sum up then, at this stage of the thesis the view that the State cannot
be termed terrorist is rejected here for various reasons. Firstly, the
suggested reasons as to why the State cannot be termed terrorist has
been seriously challenged, if not refuted. Secondly, the etymology of
the word reveals that the word 'terrorism' (and its derivatives) were
originally used to describe the actions of the State. Thirdly, the vast
majority of 'terrorologists' who responded to this authors questionnaire
77 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). p66.
78 Teichman wrote, "Nile change can perhaps be traced to the middle of the nineteenth
century. After about 1848, terrorism, at least in Europe and Russia, was conceived by
its exponents as comprising a kind of action directed against tyrannical rulers."
Teichman J. 'How to Define Terrorism'. Philosophy. Vol. 64. 1989. pp505-517. p508.
79 Stohl declared, "[t]he singular exception to this myth proposed by most liberal
Western authors is the recognition that non-democratic, totalitarian, fascist or
communist states practise terrorism". Stohl M. 'Demystifying Terrorism, The Myths
and Realities of Contemporary Political Terrorism' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of
Terrorism. (3rd ed. Marcel Dekker. New York. 1988). pp1-30. p8. Also a quantitative
content analysis of Lakos' 134 references in his section on state sponsorship reveals
that of the references that can be attributed, to one country or another, 42 relate
solely to the Soviets and socialist allies (of which only Cuba (2) is mentioned), 13 on
Middle Eastern countries in contrast to 4 on the U.S. and it's Western allies (nil).
Producing a ratio of 10.5 to one or 13 references on Soviet terrorism for every 1 on
American terrorism if those on allies (2) and 'balanced' ones examining both (1) are
excluded.
80 Gurr T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical
Analysis' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An
Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press, New York. 1986.). pp45-72. p45. 30
appear to take this view, for in response to the question, 'Can acts,
carried out directly by the agents of those in power, ever be labelled
acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism'?' only 3% of those 118 respondents
answered with an outright 'No', with an overwhelming 86% replying
'Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism"81.
As to the belief that the small amount of literature accurately reflects
the 'importance' of this form of terrorism -that is state terrorism is,
either/and/or; a) a rare event in itself; b) a relatively rare event in
that there is far more insurgent terrorism; c) politically less important
than sub-state terrorism- such a view seems to have been severely
questioned, if not refuted, by the claims made within the existing
literature which suggest that state terrorism is widespread. This view is
also supported by the replies to this author's questionnaire. For example
only three percent of respondents claimed that state terrorism is a more
recent phenomenon than insurgent terrorism, compared to 37% who
indicated that it had a longer history 82 . Likewise only 4% of the
respondents indicated that terrorism by those in power has occurred
less often throughout history than insurgent violence, in comparison
with 55% who said it had occurred more often83 . Finally only 3% of the
81 Eight ticked the box entitled "Yes, but only as acts of 'terror'. Three of the replies
to question 1 were 'No', 101 indicated "Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism', 6
indicated that it was acceptable to label 'acts carried out directly by the agents of
those in power' 'only as acts of 'terrorism". Two of the 120 were left blank.
82 Forty three respondents to question 5(a) indicated that they believed such
'terror/ist' violence by those in power is historically "earlier than" such violence by
insurgents, 4 indicated that they believed such 'terror/ist' violence by those in power
is historically "more recent" and 27 indicated that is "just as recent" as such insurgent
violence. Forty one indicated that they could not say one way or another, and 5 failed to
answer the question. Question 5a asked "Do you think that such 'terror/ist' violence by
those in power is historically earlier, more recent, just as recent than such violence
by insurgents?", to which 115 authors replied. Thirty-seven percent ticked the box
marked 'earlier'. Three percent indicated that it was "more recent" than such violence
by insurgent groups, and 23% percent indicated than it was 'just as recent' a
phenomenon. The remaining 36% ticked the box labelled "cannot say".
83 Question 5c asked "Do you think that such 'terror/ist' violence by those in power
has occurred more, less, just as often throughout history?". To which sixty-seven
replied "more often", compared to only 5 "less often", 16 answered 'just as' often
and 30 answered 'cannot say'.Three left the boxes blank. Also In answering the
question 5b which asked "Do you think that such 'terror/ist' violence by those in power
occurs more, less, or just as frequently in today's world than by insurgents?", 48% of
the 118 respondents answered "more frequently" with only 12% answered "less
frequently", 17% indicated "just as" frequently and 23% "cannot say".Fifty-seven
respondents to question 5(b) answered "more frequently" with only 14 answering "less
frequently", 20 answered "just as" frequently and 27 answered 'cannot say'. Two
were left blank. 31
119 respondents to this author's questionnaire claimed that state
terrorism was "less important" than insurgent terrorism with 27.5%
claiming it was more important 84. It is therefore to the explanations for
the neglect of state terrorism by academics that this thesis now turns.
84 Seventy four of the 119 respondents to question 5(d), which asked "Do you think
that such 'terror/ist' by those in power is more, less, or just as important an area of
study than such violence by insurgents?" indicated that state terror/ism is "just as"
important an area of study than such violence by insurgents. Only 3 claimed that it was
"less important", compared to 33 who indicated that it was "more important" . The
remaining 9 ticked the box labelled 'cannot say' and one questionnaire was left blank. 32
Explanations for the Neglect of State Terrorism.
"By and large when the public hears the word terrorist they think
revolutionaries... [the government's functionaries] have won temporarily the
contested semantic battleground"
R. Falk85.
As already noted within the first few pages of the thesis there is strong
evidence to suggest that most writers and researchers on the subject of
political terrorism avoid the issue of state terrorism 86 . Schmid for
example concluded that "those who exclude state violence from the field
of terrorism are in a minority, though a substantial minority" 87 . He
went on to say that given the ubiquity of the rule of terror, the uneven
attention given to regime terrorism in contrast to insurgency terrorism
by social scientists is "depressing" 88 . The view that state terrorism has
been neglected can be seen to be supported by the answers received in
reply to this author's questionnaire. For example only 10% of the 117
respondents to the question, "Would you say that more, less or just as
much, academic work has been done on 'terror/ist 'violence by those in
power than on that by insurgents?", indicated that they believed that
more academic work has been done on the topic of "terror/ist' violence
by those in power than on that by insurgents". Two-thirds indicated
that they believed that less academic work has been done on the topic of
"terror/ist' violence by those in power than on that by insurgents89.
Interestingly a surprisingly high 63% of the 115 respondents to the
85 Falk R. Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism. (E.P.Dutton.
New York.1988.). p141.
86 Schmid wrote, "most [researchers] also shy away from treating in depth regime
terrorism " and "state terrorism...has also been neglected by the majority of authors'
Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases
and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p272 and p422 respectively.
87 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p 1 04.
88 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p174.
89 Seventy eight of the replies to question 6 indicated that they believed that less
academic work has been done on the topic of "terror/ist' violence by those in power
than on that by insurgents". In contrast only 12 indicated that they believed that more
academic work has been done on the topic, with 8 indicating that "just as" much had
been done, and 19 ticking the box entitled "cannot say". Three were left blank. 33
question "Have you ever written on the topic of direct 'terror/ism' by
those in power?" answered "Yes" 90 . However a detailed examination of
the replies revealed only 30 or so of these backed up their claim by
provided a definition and many of these barely deserve this description
(see Appendix A). This overall conclusion raises the question of why
such a situation has arisen and it is to this part of the thesis addresses
itself.
One explanation for both the small amount of academic work on state
terrorism, and Schmid's surprise at finding that 26% of his 109
definitions allow for terrorism by the State 91 is Hocking's claim that
authors such as Lacquer, Wilkinson and Jenkins acknowledged that
state terrorism exists but nevertheless confine their analysis to
incidents of revolutionary terrorism. 92 A fine example of this
technique was provided by Tupman in his grandly-titled paper 'Towards
a typology of terrorism: Criticisms and Definitions in the Field of
Political Violence'. After noting The Oxford English Dictionary's state-
centric use of the term terrorism, Tupman said "Let us leave the issue of
state terror for the moment" 93 never to return to it. Unfortunately
however whilst welcome for the fact that it highlights a tendency of
authors, Hocking's comment does not explain why academics should do
such a thing.
In contrast the three-fold explanation by Bushnell et al for the neglect
of state terrorism can be see as such an attempt at an explanation for
the neglect of state terrorism. The first of the factors identified by
Bushnell et al was the scarcity of information on the topic. A situation
which they say was aided by the secrecy of the perpetrator's decision
making (if not actions), and the fact that the states in question may
90 A corresponding 37% replied "No". Seventy three of the responses to question 4
answered 'Yes" and a corresponding 42 replied "No". Five respondents failed to answer
the question.
91 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. ( North Holland. Amsterdam.1984.). p103.
92 Hocking commenting on Lacquer W. Terrorism. (Weidenfeld and Nicholson. London.
1977.). p7: Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (Macmillan. London. 1977.).
pp97-102 and Jenkins B. International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict in Carlton D.
and Schaerf C. (eds) International Terrorism and World Security (Croom Helm. London.
1975).p14,19. Hocking J. 'Orthodox Theories of Terrorism': the Power of Politicised
Terminology'. Politics (Sidney). Nov.1984. pp 103-110. p105.
93 Tupman B. Towards a Typology of Terrorism: Criticisms and Definitions in The
Field of Political Violence. (Broomfield Papers. University of Exeter. 1989.). p2. 34
have destroyed any incriminating documents and may have helped
witnesses to 'disappeared' themselves. These processes can be facilitated
by the notion of state sovereignty which hinders any outside
investigation. Thirdly he suggest that the existing 'theoretical
frameworks' of social science find it difficult to identify such state
violence as terror94 . This last point is supported by other academics who
see the neglect of state terrorism as a microcosm of a larger problem
within academia. McCamant, for example, noted that one can search in
vain through the thousands of articles and books written by political
scientists, political sociologists, economists and anthropologists for
references to the awful deeds done by the state, leading him to conclude
that the social sciences have an "antiseptic" view of state violence95.
Likewise Mason and Krane have claimed that inattention to state
sanctioned terror is symptomatic of the tendency among students of
revolutions to treat repressive violence as largely reactive in character,
with the form and levels of such violence being determined by the
scope and intensity of the insurgent violence and not vice-versa. The
result is that: "proactive or pre-emptive violence by the state" has
seldom been accorded what they term "independent analytical
attention"96.
Social scientists however are not the only group of academics who have
a problem in addressing the violence of the state per se , never mind
that of terrorism. Groom has claimed that historians find it difficult to
think themselves into the mores of a Robespierre or a Stalin's reign of
terror. A fact that may be at least partially explained by his comment
that it is far easier to conceptualise the use of terror as a weapon to
achieve a specific goal rather than to conceptualise it as a form of
94 Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. 'State Organized
Terror Tragedy of the Modern State' in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K
and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State Organized Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992) pp3-
22. p3-4.
95 McCamant J.F. 'Governance without Blood: Social Sciences Antiseptic View of Rule:
or the Neglect of Political Repression in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as
Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp1-42. p11.
96 Mason T.D. and Krane D.A. 'The Political Economy of Death Squads: Towards a
Theory of the Impact of State Sanctioned Terror'. International Studies Quarterly.
1989. Vol. 33 (2) pp175-178. 35
regular and normal government97 . This brings us back to Duvall and
Stohl's view that there is a conceptual (and a resulting emotional)
problem surrounding the notion of state terrorism. This is more than
just the idea that people generally 'reify' the actions of the State a
process which has been noted by Greisman, Wardlaw, and Perdue 98 . It is
one which results from the fact that the State is typically conceived or
understood in the terms of force and violence (to which one can add
'territory' because of the nature of the State) 99 . A view also held by
Skubiszewski who said that in "terms of law, in contrast to the language
of politics and diplomacy, the State cannot perpetrate the crime of
terrorism"100.
As for the notion of reification, Wardlaw was impressed by it as a means
to (at least partially) explain the neglect of state terrorism, whilst
Perdue uses it extensively 101 . Wardlaw relied heavily on an article by
Greisman entitled 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence
and Social Control' 102 , while Greisman himself attempted to apply the
theoretical contributions of other authors who see social order as a
totally human product and the construction of social reality as a
process. For such authors people are continually making society and
this society produces social human beings. As a result, the 'moral'
meanings ascribed to people, events (and presumably words) are
97 Groom A.J.R.. 'Coming to terms with terrorism'. British Journal of International
Studies. Vol.4. 1978. p62 cited in Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics
and Countermeasures. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1982.). p11.
98 Greisman H.C.. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reificaton, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. Wardlaw G. Political
Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd edition. Cambridge
University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p5-8. Perdue W. Terrorism and The State: A
Critique of Domination Through Fear. (Praeger. New York. 1989.). p17-19.
99 Duvall R.D.and Stohl M. IGoverance by Terror' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of
Terrorism. (2nd ed. Marcel Dekker. New York. 1983.). pp179-219. pl 80.
100 Skubiszewski K. 'Definition of Terrorism'. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol.
19. 1987. pp39-54. p48.
101 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p5-8. Perdue W. Terrorism
and The State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear. (Praeger. New York. 1989.).
p17-19.
102 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p5. Greisman H.C.. 'Social
Meaning of Terrorism: Reificaton, Violence and Social Control. Contemporary Crisis.
Vol. 1. 1977. pp303-318. 36
situationally dependent 103 . Generally speaking reification is said to
occur when members of society lend a concreteness and objectivity to
social relations and institutions which, though purely conjectural in
origin, becomes real in its consequences104.
In practice, successful rhetorical persuasion is the result of
Identification' 105 . A process that involves the creation within the
casual observer of an image of themselves, to which the observer can
overlay with hope of gain, be this monetary, emotional or cosmic106.
The key factor in influencing the average observer of an act of
'terrorism', is the issue of 'legitimacy'. Legitimacy is a social product and
when it extends in a highly abstracted way to governments, these
governments and these agents are reified 107 . It is not that the
individual member of the public identifies with the individual state
agents who have committed acts of violence but that they are drawn to
identify with the legitimacy they represent108 . It is this that enables
103 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p5
104 Greisman H.C.. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p304. In Berger and Luckman's
words reification is :"...the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they
were something else than human products - such as facts of nature, results of cosmic
laws, or manifestations of divine will....as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or
manifestations of divine will...through reification, the world of institution appears to
merge with the world of nature". Berger P.L. and Luckman T. The Social Construction
of Reality. (New York. Doubleday and Company). p82, 84 cited by Greisman H.C.. 'Social
Meaning of Terrorism: Reificaton, Violence and Social Control. Contemporary Crisis.
Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p304. Whilst for Lukas reification occurs when"...a relation
between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom
objectivity,' an autonomy that seems so strictly rational arid all-embracing as to
conceal every trace of its fundamental nature; the relation between people". Lukas G.
History and Class Consciousness (MIT Press. Cambridge Mass. 1971) p83-84 Cited by
Greisman H.C.. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social Control.
Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p314.
105 Burke K. Rhetoric of Motives (University of California Press. 1966.). p19-23.
Cited by Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge Univ.Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p6. Also cited generally by
Greisman H.C.. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social Control.
Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318.
106 Greisman H.C. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p306-7.
107 Greisman H.C. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p306-307. Also cited by
Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd edition.
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p6.
108 Greisman H.C. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-31 8. p306. 37
official terrorism either not to be recognised at all or accepted as severe
but necessary whilst individual terrorism are condemned as morally
repugnant109.
Other authors however suggest that such conceptual problems are not
enough to explain academia's neglect of the topic. Herman and G.
O'Sullivan for example, claim that academia's focus on (particular)
insurgent groups can be seen as a product of the underwriting of such
intellectual efforts by Western governments and interested business
firms. For them both the supply of terrorist activity and the demand for
publicity regarding terrorism can be explained mainly in terms of
Western interests and policy not by the action and plans of the
terrorists 110 . Herman and G. O'Sullivan suggest that Western interests,
have pushed terrorism to the forefront because they wanted to use the
issue of terrorism as an ideological instrument of propaganda and
control. These "Western interests" range from simply diverting
attention from its own activities and crimes, to justifying arms build-
ups, and increasing domestic surveillance to individual parts,
specifically discrediting rival politicians and sabotaging peace
plans 111 . The result of this is the production of what one could describe
as state-sponsored 'intellectuals' who belong to what Herman and G.
O'Sullivan term the "terrorism industry". At its largest this terrorism
industry consists of "government officials and bodies, governmental
and quasi private think tanks and analysts and private security firms".
The 'private' section of the industry is heavily interlocked with
government intelligence, military and foreign policy agencies and is
funded by, and serves, both governments and corporate
establishments 112 . This cultural industry manufactures, refines and
packages for distribution, information, analysis and opinions in a topic
109 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p8.
110 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. 'Terrorism' as Ideology and Cultural Industry' in
George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75. p39.
111 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. "Terrorism' as Ideology and Cultural Industry" in
George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75. p40.
112 This 'terrorism industry' is also a multinational industry with close ties between
governments and private persons, institutions and experts in and among the United
States, Israel, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and
other members of the Free World. Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. The Terrorism
Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terrorism. (Pantheon.
New York.1989.). p7-8. 38
called 'terrorism'. The industry comprises of a public sector of
government agencies and officials who establish 'policy' and provide
selective facts and official opinions on these 'terrorist' activities to the
media in press releases and conferences, interviews and in speeches,
hearings and reports 113 . The analysts supplied by the 'terrorism
industry' in turn constitute the media's "experts", and once installed
within the mainstream media, they establish and expand the terms and
agenda demanded by the State. In accordance with the agenda of the
Western states, these experts, invariably see the west as the "victim" of
terrorism114. In contrast:
"Neither the African National Congress (ANC) nor the Mutual Support group of
Guatemala can fund data banks or theoretical analysis of the state's terrorism that
has killed scores of thousands in their countries and has posed an ongoing threat
to the survivor populations".115
In light of this type of analysis of the field of terrorism studies,
Alexander George declared that the field of "terrorology" is
"intellectually sterile, if not bankrupt", because the construct of
'terrorism' employed by it was not developed in response to honest
puzzlement about the real world, but rather in response to ideological
pressures 116.
Yet one does not have to accept either Alexander George's conclusion, or
all of the detail of Herman and G. O'Sullivan's analysis, to see how the
broad economic processes that they describe may be at work, and why a
political economy approach can contribute to an explanation for
academia's neglect of state terrorism. For example even the process of
'reification' seems to be inseparable from economics. One of the reasons
suggested as to why identification with the victims of state violence is
problematic is because large numbers of the population participate to
113 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. ' 'Terrorism' as Ideology and .Cultural Industry' in
George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75. p40.
114 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. "Terrorism' as Ideology and .Cultural Industry' in
George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75. p46.
115 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions
that Shape our View of Terrorism. (Pantheon. New York.1989.). p8.
116 George A. 'The Discipline of Terrology' in George A.(ed.) Western State
Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). p76-101. p92. 39
some degree in government-approved acts of violence. In Greisman's
words:
"When people identify with the victim of a terrorist act, the act becomes terrorist.
If they identify with the perpetrator, it becomes something more justified,
plausible or praiseworthy. In this sense western populations are unique insofar as
industries, and by extension their employees, are active participants in official
terrorism. As a result, identification with the victim who may be a simple peasant,
is rendered difficult"117.
Although it is not simply for this reason that such identification and
reification occurs, otherwise identification and reification would be
confined solely to those working within this 'military-industrial
complex'. Greisman claimed that the style of behaviour, its setting, and
other cultural variables also help to account for the different social
meanings assigned to similar acts of terrorism. For him:
"The official terrorist has an existence whose appeal has been forwarded by the
media and the agents of socialisation on a large scale. His private life is admirable
to most members of an industrial middle-class, while the individual terrorist
leads an unsavoury and precarious underground life devoid of domestic peace and
respectability. Official terrorism is premised on rationality [of the state] and a
businesslike system of costs and benefits. Individual terrorism issues from the
passions, and is suspect. The destructive devices of official terrorism are
standardised, "quality-controlled," and generally dependable
	 The [individual
terrorists] devices are covert and resemble the terrorist themselves who operate
out of uniform, and hence, out of control" 118 .
The difference is, as already noted, further reinforced by one's choice
of weapons, targets 119 , and stylistic variables between the acts
committed by insurgent terrorists and state terrorism also contribute to
the perceived differences120. For Wardlaw it is:
117 Greisman H.C. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p312.
118 Greisman H.C. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p312.
119 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p6-7.
120 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p7 and p6. 40
"the element of uncertainty that plays a large part here. State terrorism may be
brutal and unjust but, in general one knows what activities not to indulge in order
to escape its immediate and personal intrusion. Individual terrorism by contrast
bears no necessary relation to one's own behaviour. It appears random and
therefore more dangerous"121.
However Greisman's explanation also notes that other factors which one
could described as either political or economic may be at work in
explaining how this particular aspect of social reality is constructed.
For Greisman notes that:
"The variable modalities of meaning that attended terrorism are the products of
socially constructed realities. Some groups have greater ability to construct
reality for less influential groups, and the former tend to control the process by
which social meanings are assigned. As this reality is constructed, the
"spectators" of terrorist acts are encouraged to identify with the perpetrators or
victims as the situation warrants"
It can be suggested that this phantom objectivity is encouraged by
persons who will gain profit or power from such a perception.
Unfortunately Greisman does not satisfactorily explain why the media
acts in the way it does. Nor is there space here.
The idea that economic pressures of supply and demand can influence
the output of academia has also been noted by other authors in relation
to other areas of the social sciences. For example, from their
examination of the work on the definition of the State, Ferguson and
Mansbach claimed that: "governmental support, offices in academic
associations, promotion and merit awards and in general disciplinary
prestige" are at stake in these battles amongst intellectual protagonists.
Whilst for the "policy makers", on the other hand, "control of concepts
is a source of unique authority and legitimacy". The result is what
Ferguson and Mansbach call as the "1984" function of definitions, that
122.
121 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989.). p11. This author is of course
not in agreement with his description of state terrroism.
122 Greisman H.C. 'Social Meaning of Terrorism: Reification, Violence and Social
Control. Contemporary Crisis. Vol. 1.1977. pp303-318. p303. 41
is: "[d] ecisions regarding definitions, then, may actually follow
analysis rather than preceding it as we commonly assume" 123 .
So whilst it is true that Western universities may have a great deal of
control if not autonomy over the state funding that they receive from
the State, nevertheless academia exists in a market system, and it is
increasingly reliant upon external funding from private sources and
government contracts. As a result of this structure, intellectual service
can be seen to largely reflect market forces, rather than being
determined by it. As Herman and O'Sullivan put it, ideas, and those who
produce them, can be bought and subsidised by those with the need and
resources to provide the effective demand 124 . Therefore one major
reason for academia's overwhelmingly concern with insurgency
terrorism is the (unsurprising) fact that states' themselves are more
interested in giving out research money to 'academics' who study
threats to the State rather than the threat that their particular state
poses to others 125 . In addition to this direct influence of the State itself,
are indirect spin-offs. For example, the fact that in 1985 the U.S.
government alone had 18,000 people dealing with the issue of terrorism
as they saw it126 means that a large amount of data bases are created
many of which provide valuable resources for like-minded academics.
Other support for this broad political economy approach comes from
Reid, a Professor of Information Science at Rutgers University. After
studying the growth of the literature on terrorism she concluded that as
the newspapers and television media covered terrorism, there was a
corresponding increase in magazine and journal citations, followed by
the creation of specialised periodicals and databases in response to the
125 Ferguson Y.H. and Mawbach R.W. The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Future of
International Relations Theory. (Lynne Reinner. London. 1989.). p84.
124 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions
that Shape our View of Terrorism. (Pantheon. New York. 1989.). p8
125 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.) .pl 04 or Stohl M. 'National
Interests and State Terrorism'. Political Science. Vol 36 (1) July. 1984. pp37-52.
p38. Alternatively, Crelinsten R.D. 'Terrorism as Political Communication: The
Relationship between Controller and Controlled' in Wilkinson P. and Stewart A.M.
Contemporary Research on Terrorism. (Aberdeen University Press. Aberdeen. 1987.).
pp3-21. p4.
126 Herman and O'Sullivan appear to be citing The Report of the Vice President's Task
Force on Combatting Terrorism (U.S.. Superintendent of Documents. 1986) p10. Herman
E.S. and O'Sullivan G. "Terrorism' as Ideology and Cultural Industry' in George A.(ed.)
Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75. p53. 42
new subject area l 27 . However whilst all of the explanations for the
media's concentration on insurgency terrorism are beyond the scope of
this thesis, there is little doubt that a major one of them is the fact that
the mainstream media relies upon the State for much of its 'hard', or
serious news stories, and in this way follows its agenda and that of other
political and economically powerful institutions in society128.
Despite Schmid's claim that many academics in the field of terrorism
studies are in all likelihood ideologically closer to the establishment
than to the forces opposing state power 129 , it would be incredible to
accuse those Western academics who work in publicly funded
universities of being 'state functionaries' purely because they are
ultimately paid by the State, or because they work within a market
system. This said, it would be equally implausible to say that economic
factors do not play a role in the production of an 'antiseptic' view of
state violence by academia. Western academics live in a free market
system and themselves are part of society, and even those who are
aware of social science methodology may find it difficult to step back
from the values of their own individual socialisation to become
completely 'objective' social scientists. However despite the relative
neglect of the topic, some academics have attempted to address the
notion of state terrorism, and it is for this reason -and to provide context
for the following explanation of the aims of the thesis- that the next
section of this introductory chapter constitutes a review of particular
pieces of academic work on the topic of state terrorism.
127 Dr. E. Reid as reviewed and interviewed by Arnold. Arnold S.E. 'Researching
Terrorism'. Information Today. Vol. 9(7). July-Aug. 1992. pp13-14. p13.
129 Gans H. Deciding What's News. (Vintage. New York. 1979.). cited without page
reference by Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through
Fear (Praeger. New York. 1989.). p65. See also Table 8.1 entitled 'Mass Media Sources
Used in Covering Terrorism' in Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. The Terrorism Industry:
The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terrorism. (Pantheon. New
York.1989.). pl 94.
129 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). pl 04. 43
A Selective Literature Review. 
The following selective literature review does not examine all, or even a
majority of the works read by this author, for such a piece would be
extremely long and tedious as it would involve many hundreds of books
or articles. Instead this section comprises an examination of a number
of noteworthy works on the topic of terrorism which devote some if not
all of their space to the notion of state terrorism. The aim, is not to give
a critique of each work, rather it is to identify their attempts to define
state terrorism and to show the need for an fresh attempt to define the
concept of state terrorism, as well as to provide context for an
understanding of many of the secondary aims of the thesis.
As already noted at the start of this chapter, prior to embarking upon
the Ph.D. it appeared that little thought was given to the use of the term
'terrorism' by authors within the field of terrorism studies. More
specifically a definition was by no means always stated within each
piece of literature on the topic. Furthermore when a definition was
actually produced its application was invariably far from methodical or
thorough.
The first of these two hypotheses is sustained both by various authors
and the author's subsequent reading. The legal specialist Friedlander,
for example, claimed that both the literature generally, as well as the
legal literature on the topic, was not very strong on definitions 130 . The
same tendency appeared to apply to the work on state terrorism. Gibbs
for example claimed that writers on Nazi terror are prone to avoid an
explicit definition of terrorism 131 . This is a view which seems to be
130 R. Friedlander in interview with Hoffman in Hoffman R.P. Terrorism A Universal
Definition (Claremont Graduate School. Ph.D. 1984). p89. A fuller citation of
Friedlander reads: "[s]urprisingly the literature is not very strong on definition even
the legal literature. I think that there are only a couple of us and there's Brian Jenkins
at Rand (who's not a lawyer), Jordan Paust, maybe one or two others - and myself -
who have even an article or chapter on definition, that's all".
131 Gibbs J.P. 'Conceptualization of Terrorism'. American Sociological Review. Vol.
54. 1989. pp329-340. Footnote 6, p333. Various authors do not define the term despite
the titles of their books or the importance of terror to their topic. Even DaIlin and
Breslauer who did define the term in the second paragraph of their book Political Terror
in Communist Systems fail to expressly show how each action undertaken by the
Communist system fits their definition; instead they describe the workings of the 44
equally valid for those writing on the Soviet Union or
totalitarianism 132 . Whilst in regards to historians' use of such terms in
reference to an even earlier era, the historian Emsley wrote: 'What is
meant precisely by the terms such as 'repression' and 'Pitt's reign of
terror' during this decade are questions rarely asked" 133 . Generally
speaking, the historians tended to used ill-defined terminology, whilst
occasionally social scientists studying contemporary regimes might
'improve' upon this with an equally vague definition134.
The fact that many authors do not define what they mean when they use
the term terrorism (or whatever variant), despite the importance of the
term to their topic, is perhaps most apparent within the general
literature on terrorism. Alternatively authors on the topic of terrorism
acknowledge that state terrorism exists but nevertheless confine their
analysis to incidents of revolutionary terrorism 135 . A fine example of
this technique of acknowledging the possibility of state terrorism, only
to ignore it was provided by Tupman noted earlier 136 . This latter
system as a whole. See DaIlin A. and Breslauer G.W. Political Terror in Communist
Systems. (Stanford University Press. Stanford, California. 1970). p1.
132 Friedrich C.J. and Brzezinski S.K. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.
(Praeger. New York. 1965.). Their work does not contain a definition despite the
inclusion of a terroristic police within their six-point syndrome. The same can be said
of Arendt H. The Origins of Totalitarianism. (3rd.ed. George Allen and Unwin.
London.1966.) for despite referring to "terror" twenty times in her index, the term
is not defined on any of these pages. .Similarly Conquest R. The Great Terror: A
Reassessment. (Pimlico. London.1992.). does not define the term despite the title of his
book.
133 Emsley C. 'Repression, 'terror' and rule of law in England during the decade of the
French Revolution'. English Historical Review. Vol.C. No397. Oct. 1985. pp801-825.
p801. Emsley notes that "Repression' and 'terror', of course are not synonymous. It
may help to consider repression as the overt and legal acts of government and its
agents, while terror went on under the repressive aegis of official advice, exhortation,
and legislation, but involved many private and sometimes illegal activities by
loyalists". He also noted the problem of the 'terror' of punishment.
134 For example Thurston wrote, "[t]error (is] defined here simply as mass arrests
of innocent people and for the moment without reference to the State's motives,
certainly existed in the Soviet Union from 1935 to 1939". Thurston R.W. 'Social
Dimensions of Stalinist Rule: Humour and Terror in the USSR'. Journal of Social
History. Vol. 24 (3). 1991. pp541-562. p542.
135 Hocking commenting on Lacquer W. Terrorism. (Weidenfeld and Nicholson. London.
1977.) p7: Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (Macmillan. London. 1977.).
pp97-102 and Jenkins B. 'International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict' in D.
Carlton and C.Schaerf (eds) International Terrorism and World Security (Croom Helm.
London. 1975). pl 4,19. Hocking J. 'Orthodox Theories of Terrorism': the Power of
Politicised Terminology'. Politics (Sidney). Nov. 1984. pp 103-110. p105.
136 In his grandly titled paper 'Towards a typology of terrorism: Criticisms and
Definitions in the Field of Political Violence'. Tupman noted only The Oxford English
Dictionary's state-centric use of the term terrorism, before saying: "Let us leave the 45
tendency could explain why Schmid was surprised to find that as many
as 26% of the 109 definitions of terrorism which he had identified
explicitly allowed for the state to commit acts of terrorism' 37. However,
rather than review the many general books on the topic that ignore the
idea or fail to define what they mean by terrorism by those in power,
this selective literature review will identify and criticise the definitions
contained within a number of notable books that deal with the issue,
starting with widely respected general books on the topic of terrorism.
These are Wardlaw's Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and
Countermeasures; Wilkinson's Terrorism and the Liberal State; and
Schmid's Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories,
Data Bases and Literature.
Wardlaw defines "political terrorism" as:
"the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting
for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to
create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than
the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the
political demands of the perpetrators"138.
The most obvious problem with his choice of words is that his sentence
"the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group" does
not seem to allow the State to commit direct acts of terrorism. However it
is possible to deduce a state centric interpretation from other sections of
the book which make references 139 . Even then if one accepts a very
wide interpretation of the term 'group' to include the State, the rest of
the definition fails to distinguish the State's use of violence to enforce
its laws within its area of domestic jurisdiction from an act of state
terrorism, for the laws of contemporary states aim to deter others as
issue of state terror for the moment". Tupman B. Towards a Typology of Terrorism:
Criticisms and Definitions in The Field of Political Violence. (Broomfield Papers.
University of Exeter. 1989.). p2.
137 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam.1984.). p103.
138 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures.
(Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1982.). pl 6. He uses italics.
139 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures.
(Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1982.). p10-13. 46
well as to punish the victim and protect the innocent 140 . Likewise his
definition fails to distinguish the State's use of violence in war from acts
of state terrorism committed outside its area of domestic jurisdiction.
These two problems (amongst others) also hit most of the other
definitions reviewed here, including those of Wilkinson and Schmid in
the said books. Wilkinson for example defined "political terrorism" as:
"the systematic use of murder and destruction, and the threat of murder and
destruction, to terrorize individuals, groups, communities or governments into
conceding to the terrorist's political aims"141.
Wilkinson's use of the phrase "systematic use of murder and
destruction" within his definition allows only a limited number of
events to be included, for it incorporates such a high threshold of
violence. Yet in another sense the definition is too wide in that it would
fail to distinguish state terrorism from those similar actions which are
generally referred to as genocide, war or war crimes. One can add
further precision to his definition by making use of his basic typology
of terrorism 142 . He uses the term "epiphenomenal terror", to denote:
"those random but often extremely deadly acts of large-scale terror
which occur in the course of major outbreaks of intra-specific
violence" such as mass insurrection, and both civil and international
wars. He also notes that: "such acts of terror essentially occur as an
unintended consequence of the depredations and devastation of war and
mass violence". However he prefers to label perpetrators of such
violence when it occurs in war, war criminals 143 . As for systematic
politically motivated terrorism, he identifies three types:
"(i) repressive terrorism, which is used most commonly but not exclusively by
states to suppress, put down or constrain certain groups or individuals; (ii) sub-
revolutionary terrorism, which is employed for a variety of purposes short of
140 According to Morris every criminal law system in the world, except Greenland has
deterrence as its primary and essential postulate. Morris N. 'Impediments to Penal
Reform' . The University of Chicago Law Review. 1966. Summer. 33 (4). pp 627-656.
p631-
141 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.).
p56-
142 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.).
p57-
143 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.).
p57.
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revolutionary seizure of power such as coercion or intimidation, vengeance or
'punishment'; and (iii) revolutionary terrorism, which has the long-term objective
of bringing about political revolution, i.e. a fundamental change in the power
structure, and often, in addition, fundamental changes in the socio-economic
order"144.
However this 'definition' is still too wide in that it would label a legal
policy of genocide like that undertaken by the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia after it had won a civil war as state terrorism. Here it is also
worth noting that Wilkinson acknowledges that he is: "concerned
almost exclusively with the use of revolutionary and sub-revolutionary
terrorism by non-governmental groups" 145, for whilst this process is
commonplace, the awareness of it occurring is not.
Schmid came to the following definition, which is not only rather
lengthy, but fails to distinguish the State's use of violence to enforce its
laws within its area of domestic jurisdiction from an act of state
terrorism. This is because the laws of contemporary states aim to deter
others, unless one interprets his reference to "extranormal" as meaning
the legislation. For him:
"Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as
instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class
characteristics which form the basis of their selection for victimization. Through
previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that
group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose
members' sense of security is purposively undermined, is the target of terror. The
victimization of the target of violence is considered extranormal by most observers
from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity; the time (e.g. peacetime)
or place (not a battlefield) of victimization or the disregard for rules of combat
accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience
beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main
object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to
immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or
compliance, or to mobilise secondary targets of demands (e.g. a government) or
144 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.).
p57.
145 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.). 	 48
p57.
targets of attention  (e.g. public opinion) to changes of attitude or behaviour
favouring the short or long-term interests of the users of this method of
combat" 146.
As already noted the tendency not to define their terms despite the titles
of their books or the importance of terror to their topic is also apparent
within the classic or historical literature on the topic. For example
despite referring to "terror" twenty times in her index to her book The
Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt did not define the term on any of
these pages 147 . Likewise Friedrich and Brzezinski did not define the
meaning of the term despite the inclusion of a the notion of "terroristic
police" within their six-point syndrome for what constitutes the
concept of totalitarianism contained within their classic Totalitarian
Dictatorship and Autocracy 148. Similarly despite entitling his book The
Great Terror: A Reassessment, Conquest did not define the term, which
makes any assessment difficult 149 . DaIlin and Breslauer did far better.
In the second paragraph of their book Political Terror in Communist
Systems they wrote:
"By 'political terror' we mean the arbitrary use by organs of political authority, of
severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat or use, or the
arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups" 150
Unfortunately they failed to define what they meant by "severe
coercion" and the issue of whether arbitrary meant illegal was not
answered. In addition they failed to show how each action undertaken
by the Communist system fits their definition, instead they described
the workings of the system as a whole.
These views on the literature on what can be termed the classical
'reigns of terror' or 'terrorist regimes', such as Robespierre's France,
146 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p111.
147 Arendt H. The Origins of Totalitarianism. (3rd.ed. George Allen and Unwin. London.
1966).
148 Friedrich C.J. and Brzezinski S.K. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.
(Praeger. New York. 1965.).
149 Conquest R. The Great Terror: A Reassessment. (Pimlico. London.1992).
1 50 DaIlin A. and Breslauer G.W. Political Terror in Communist Systems. (Stanford
University Press. Stanford, California. 1970). p1. 49
the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany (the latter two might be termed
'totalitarian') can be seen to be of great importance in that much, if not
most, of the relatively small amount of work produced on state terrorism
appears to be the work of historians on these. This latter point is
supported by the comments of various authors as well as statistical
evidence. Perdue for example claimed that, there is "a recurring
tendency" within that literature "to specify notorious regimes" such as
the Jacobins, the Nazis, the Stalinists 151 . This goes beyond the tacit
admission of the existence of state terrorism. Incidentally it was the
latter two of these regimes which Thorton was contemplating when he
wrote in 1964 that "[t]here is already an extensive literature on
enforcement terror" 152 . Along with Thorton and Perdue, Anderson too
appears to support this authors preliminary observation when he
wrote:
"During the post-war period state terrorism has been analysed as a function of the
totalitarian state; the models have been, despite their own vast differences,
Stalinism and Nazism. The images and theories of such state terror are owed
principally, to Orwell and Arendt. And the central image of state terrorism
indelibly linked with Stalinism and Nazism is the police state, implacable and all-
knowing, total, as in the totalitarian state"153.
Anderson's view appears to be a slight exaggeration even in relation to
the area of direct domestic state terrorism, for much of the work done
by political scientists has examined 'authoritarian' rather than
'totalitarian' regimes, especially those in Central and Latin America.
Support for this claim can be seen in the results of a content analysis of
the relevant references within the bibliographical section of Schmid
and Jongman's book Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors,
151 Perdue also notes that they "avoid placing such regimes in historical and global
contexts". Perdue W. Terrorism and The State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear.
(Praeger. New York. 1989.). p15. Perdue also usefully points to a more specific area
of the terrorism literature in which this trend exists. He noted that conventional
conceptions on nuclear terrorism also reduce the level of debate ignoring the arsenals
of the State and actively dealing with the renegade scenario. Perdue W. Terrorism and
The State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear. (Praeger. New York. 1989.). p.71.
152 More precisely the Soviet Union rather than just Stalin's regime. Thorton T.P.
'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation' in Eckstein H.(ed.). Internal War Problems
and Approaches (The Free Press of Glencoe. Collier Macmillan. London. 1969.). pp71-
100. P73.
153 Anderson K. 'Beginning to Theorise about Internal State Terrorism in the Third
World'. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 2 (1). 1990. pp106-111. p107. 50
concepts and databases. A content analysis of the English language
references within the sub-section entitled 'Regime Terrorism and
Repression' reveals that 43% of the works could be assigned to the
particular (geographical and to a lesser extent historical) category
which this author refers to as the 'classics', that is Totalitarianism,
Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Fascism or revolutionary France. This
figure rises to at least 63% if Central and Latin American regimes were
included154.
Walter, the author of a famous book on the use of terror by Shaka, an
19th century king of the Zulu tribe, is however one author who does
attempt to define his terms, and although those produced are not
particularly practical, they do contribute to the overall process of
identifying state terrorism. In his book Terror and Resistance: A Study
in Political Violence he noted that "terror", may mean either the:
"psychic state - extreme fear", or "the thing that terrifies - the violent
event that produces the psychic state" 155 . He then went on to describe
the "process of terror" as a: "a compound with three elements; the act or
threat of violence, the emotional reaction, and the social effects"156.
Stripped of the essentials, "a dramaturgic model of the terror process",
would according to Walter, include three actors: a source of violence, a
victim and a target. In this process, the victim perishes but the target
reacts to the spectacle or the news of that destruction with some manner
or submission or accommodation, such as withdrawing his resistance or
by inhibiting his potential resistance 157 . He distinguishes between
military terror "the aim of which is to paralyze the enemy, diminish his
resistance, and reduce his ability to fight, with the ultimate purpose of
154 Rounded up figures. Of the references in English, 49 could not be placed in one
'geographical' category. 63 were on the Soviet Union (32), Totalitarianism(11), Nazi
Germany(13), Fascism(2) and Revolutionary France(3) and 4 with Communism in the
title for this grouping included two on Nazi Germany and the USSR. The remaining 85
were on Africa (10), Middle East (7), Europe (5), Asia (15), Latin and Central America
(35), U.S.A. (19), for this includes one one U.S. and Middle East and 5 on U.S. support
for regimes in Latin America. Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A
new guide to actions, authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.).
pp259-269.
155 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p5.
156 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p5.
157 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p9. 51
destroying him"; 158 and civil terror which "is frequently practised
against the unarmed non-combatant population by its own leaders"159•
Walter notes that this raises the question of when violence inflicted by
men in authority is legal punishment and when it is not 160 . He answers
this by saying that:
"The conditions of legality imply that there must be a way of being innocent. If
there is no path left open to avoid transgression, or if people are bound to be
charged falsely with offenses they do not commit, then it is not possible to be
innocent. In the terror process, no one can be secure, for the category of
transgression is, in reality, abolished. Anyone may be a victim, no matter what
action he chooses. Innocence is irrelevant"
Like Walter, Thorton also produced a general piece of work on terrorism
in the 1960's prior to the deluge of books on contemporary terrorism,
and he too wrote about "enforcement terror" as well as insurgency
terror. More specifically he wrote that: "in an internal war situation,
terror is a symbolic act designed to influence political behaviour by
extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence" 162 . In this
way, he too, distinguishes between normal legal punishment and
extraordinary acts, but unfortunately he did not define what he meant
by "extranormal means".
Perhaps the most influential contemporary writers on the topic of state
terrorism by more recent regimes are Stohl and Lopez, who in addition
to writing earlier articles on the topic edited three books on the subject
in the 1980s. In their first book: The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of
Global Violence and Repression, Stohl wrote a chapter specifically
dealing with the 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism'. There he
clearly notes that by such terrorism he meant: "The purposeful act or
161.
158 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p14.
159 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p22.
160 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p22.
161 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p26.
162 Thornton T.P. 'Terror as a Weapon of
Internal War Problems and Approaches. (The
London. 1964.). pp71-100. p73.
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Political Agitation' in Eckstein H. (ed).
Free Press of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan.
threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim
and/or audience of the act or threat" 163 • He also notes that whilst by
convention the threat of nuclear deterrence is not normally labelled
'terrorism' by scholars of international relations, it meets the two
denotative criteria that the commonly used dictionary definition of the
term sets forth 164 . Also, of direct interest to this thesis, is the fact that
Stohl described Mossad 's assassinations of Palestinian agents in Cyprus,
Algeria, Norway, Athens, Beirut and Paris as "a highly effective
technique of political terrorism" 165 . He also labelled Israel's destruction
of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 as an example of an act of state
terrorism, on the basis that "[t] he bombing raid had.... a wider audience
than the immediate victim of the raid" it sent a message to both the
Iraqis and other Arab neighbours about Israel's position on the
development of nuclear capability
Moreover within the 'Introduction' to this book, Stohl (along with
Lopez) used the same definition in reference to internal state terror167.
Their reference to internal state terrorism can be deduced from both
the statement that they did "not consider all coercive acts of the state to
be terrorist" 168
 and from the fact that they distinguished it from other
phenomena with which it may be concurrent and co-ordinated namely
183 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p43.
184 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p48.
185 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43 -58. p53.
188 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p45.
187 They wrote, "terrorism is the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear
and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat" Stohl M.
and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist:
The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport.
Conneticut. 1984.). pp3-10. p7. Likewise in his other chapter Lopez wrote that when he
considered the government as terrorist his views are in keeping with those expressed
within the introduction. Lopez G.A. 'A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as
Terrorist' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of
Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp59-
82. p59.
188 Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State
as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport. Conneticut. 1984.). pp3-10. p8.
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"oppression" and "repression" 169 . Unfortunately this definition does
not distinguish state terrorism from ordinary law enforcement.
In their chapter entitled 'South African State Terror: The Costs of
Continuing Repression' Denemark and Lehman use a definition which
can be described as 'Stohl-like'. For them state terror is the relatively
amorphous extreme on the continuum of repression 170 and may be
viewed as:
"the more precise and deliberate act of inflicting harm on an individual or group
in order to change the nature of their behaviour and/or instil fear in other
individuals or groups" 171.
Although this is no more precise than Stohl and Lopez's definition. In
his chapter entitled 'Government Terror in the United States: An
Explanation of Containment Policy', Homer notes that most of the
literature on terrorism concentrates on 'insurgency' terrorism or
'terrorism from below.' 172 . He also notes that the concepts 'reign of
terror', 'establishment terrorism', 'terror from above' and 'government
terror' define acts of violence by those in power against those out of
power. For Homer what differentiates such acts of terror from acts of
force or violence is that the message of the former is conveyed to those
who are not harmed directly 173 . Yet, he then notes that difficulties
arise immediately with these preliminary (attempts at) definitions. For
example one has difficulty in deciding whether an act must be illegal to
169 Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State
as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport. Conneticut. 1984.). pp3-10. p8.
170 Denemark R. A. and Lehman H.P. 'South African State Terror: The Costs of
Continuing Repression' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). pp143-166. p147.
171 Denemark R. A. and Lehman H.P. 'South African State Terror: The Costs of
Continuing Repression' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). pp143-166. p147.
172 Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation of
Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). pp167-182. p165.
173 Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation of
Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). ppl 67-182. p168. 54
constitute a terrorist act 174
. He fails to answer his own question and
then asserts that because there is no agreed-upon definition he is free
to codify terror in which ever way he pleases 175 . Indeed, he goes as far
as claiming that definitions of government terror are "arbitrary
stipulations". He then states that even if a set of definitions could be
agreed upon, significant disagreements about the subjective intentions
of the actors would mean that final agreement on what constitutes
government terror would not be reached176 . Finally Sloan in his
chapter entitled 'State Repression and Enforcement Terrorism in Latin
America', fails to define "enforcement terrorism". The nearest he gets to
this is to claim that it is "the most extreme form of governmental
repression", before noting that "assassinations and secret arrests
followed by torture, mutilation; and perhaps death can be interpreted as
enforcement terrorism" 177 . This is, of course, far from being a
definition and even as a list, the last part of this is of course too vague,
whilst the rest with its high threshold is too precise and too narrow.
In their 1986 book Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for
Research , Stohl and Lopez are again involved in the production of a
definition this time along with Mitchell and Carleton in an article
entitled: 'State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement'. Here
they note that: "Nile literature on the nature of state terrorism is
growing, even if no generally accepted definition has emerged" 178 . To
prove this latter point they suggest a definition in answer to their own
question "What is state terrorism and how do we recognize its
174 Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation of
Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). pp167-182. p168
175 Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation of
Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). pp167- 182. p169.
176 Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation of
Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). pp167-182. p171.
177 Sloan J.W. 'State Repression and Enforcement Terrorism in Latin America' in Stohl
M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and
Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp83-98. p83.
178 Mitchell C., Stohl M., Carleton D. and Lopez G.A. 'State Terrorism: Issues of
Concept and Measurement'. in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and
Repression: An Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. NY.1986.). pp 1-26. p2. 55
presence?" which is different to that previously supplied by Stohl and
Lopez, but no better in distinguishing terrorism from law enforcement.
For Mitchell, Stohl, Carleton and Lopez:
"state terrorism is present when:
1) An actor intends to influence the behaviour of a target population.
2) The means of influence involve the actor or threat of violence or some victims
with whom the target will identify.
3) The deliberate effects of such actions are to induce a condition of extreme fear
or terror in the target population.
4) The actor is the state, its agents, or some approved surrogate group"179.
Nicolson within a chapter entitled 'Conceptual Problems of Studying
State Terrorism' rightly notes that: "we have to be extremely careful
with [a] definition" 18O . Unfortunately his 'definition' of state terrorism
as "the use of acts that induce fear amongst some social group or a whole
population, so as to induce them to act in a way they would otherwise not
have" 181 , is not as careful as one would like for it fails to distinguish
terrorism from most other uses of violence by the State. A fact which
Nicolson himself seems to be aware when he wrote: "1 do not want to get
embroiled in the question of whether all social control is violence"182.
However his production of a four-fold categorisation of the
phenomena l 83 and comments on the issue such as terrorism can take
the form of reprisals against admittedly innocent people when used to
dissuade people from hostile acts towards an occupying force are (more)
179 Mitchell C., Stohl M., Carleton D. and Lopez G.A. 'State Terrorism: Issues of
Concept and Measurement'. in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and
Repression: An Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. NY.1986.). pp1-26. p14.
180 Nicholson M. 'Conceptual Problems of Studying State Terrorism', in Stohl M. and
Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research.
(Greenwood Press. New York. 1986). pp27-44. p31.
181 Nicholson M. 'Conceptual Problems of Studying State Terrorism'. in Stohl M. and
Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research.
(Greenwood Press. New York. 1986). pp27-44. p31.
182 Nicholson M. 'Conceptual Problems of Studying State Terrorism'. in Stohl M. and
Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research.
(Greenwood Press. New York. 1986). pp27-44. p32.
183 "First is the control by a state of its own citizens by methods of terror. Second is
its use of colonial situations. Third is the use of terror as a means of prosecuting war,
and fourth is the use and support of terror as a form of surrogate war". Nicholson M.
'Conceptual Problems of Studying State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.)
Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. New
York. 1986). pp27-44. p31-2. 56
helpful in our quest to identify acts of state terrorism l 84 , as is his
identification of other terrorist methods in war: "are such things as
bombing to break the morale (an antiseptic phrase for "frighten") of
civilian populations, so as to destroy the support for a war" 185
The object of Gurr's chapter entitled: 'The Political Origins of State
Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis' "is the terroristic use of
coercion by the state" 186 . Within it Gun wrote:
"For our purposes we modify Raymond D. Duvall and M. Stohl's definition that
terrorism ...is [coercive, life threatening] action intended to induce sharp fear and
through that agency to effect a desired outcome in a conflict situation". The
specification of coercive, life-threatening action is ours. Regimes do many
coercive things to induce compliance: They threaten, arrest and jail, fine and
confiscate as well as murder. It is plausible both analytically and psychologically
to limit the concept of state terrorism to coercion that takes or grossly endangers
the lives of its targets"187.
Unfortunately this author would suggest that this narrows the concept
to an unacceptable extent especially if one considers that the State is
prepared to escalate its violence to the point of "life threatening"
behaviour if attempts to arrest are resisted with sufficient force. Gurr
also makes the interesting claim that "state terror" implied a patterned
activity in which instrumental violence recurs often enough so that
threats of similar violence, made then or later, have their intended
effects on conflict outcomes188.
184 Nicholson M. 'Conceptual Problems of Studing State Terrorism'. in Stohl M. and
Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research.
(Greenwood Press. New York.1986). pp27-44. p33.
188 Nicholson M. 'Conceptual Problems of Studying State Terrorism'. in Stahl M. and
Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research.
(Greenwood Press. New York.1986). pp27-44. p33.
186 Gurr T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical
Analysis' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An
Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. New York. 1986.). pp45-72. p45.
187 Gurr T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical
Analysis' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An
Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. New York. 1986.). pp45-72. p46.
188 Gurr T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical
Analysis' in Stahl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An
Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. New York. 1986.). pp45-72. p46. 57
Harff in her chapter 'Genocide as State Terrorism' examines genocide as
a particular form of state terror 189 . She goes on to define genocide as:
"mass murder, pre-meditated by some power wielding group linked with
State power, directed against any target group within the state however
defined". 190 But she fails to define state terror further, a fact which
excludes its use within the international sphere. Whilst Friedlander in
his article 'The Implausible Dream: International Law, State Violence
and State Terrorism', concentrates on describing the development of
international law, and describes what he terms "state or governmental
terrorism" as "any organized form of violent repression directed by
governments against their citizens or subjects" but fails to define the
meaning of the term "repression" 191
Within Stohl and Lopez's 1988 book: Terrible Beyond Endurance: The
Foreign Policy of State Terrorism, Asimow and Homer do not produce a
definition of terrorism despite the chapter being entitled: 'Democracies
and the Role of Acquiescence in International Terrorism'.1 92
Interestingly, however, they do mention a Soviet author who claimed
that:
"The socio-political terrorism of imperialism has become state terrorism, with
both the government and the various social institutions under its control pursuing
its class objectives... .Without any exaggeration one can say that the C.I.A. is the
centre of international terrorism. The range of its terrorist activity is exceedingly
wide - from the assassination of undesirable individuals, including heads of
sovereign state[s] to the forcible overthrow of legitimate governments" 193.
189 Harff B. 'Genocide as State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.)
Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. New
York. 1986.). pp165-188. p165.
190 Harff B. 'Genocide as State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.)
Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press.
NY.1986).ppl 65-188. p165.
191 Friedlander R.A. 'The Implausible Dream: International Law, State Violence and
State Terrorism'. in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and
Repression: An Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. New York. 1986.). pp235-
268. P247.
1 32 Asimow L. and Homer F. 'Democracies and the Role of Acquiescence in International
Terrorism' in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. (eds.). Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood
Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1988.). pp35-58.
193 Pankov Y. Political Terrorism: An inditement of Imperialism. (Progress Publishers.
Moscow. 1983.). (no page reference). cited by Asimow L. and Homer F. 'Democracies
and the Role of Acquiescence in International Terrorism' in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. 58
Neither Vayrynen 194 , Weisfelder 195 , nor Lewellen produce a definition
of terrorism despite including a variant of the term state terrorism
within the title of their chapters. Although Lewellen does mention tens
of thousands of murders by security forces and paramilitary groups as
well as "Norture and mutilation routine in killings", and thousands of
"disappearances" after arrest by security forces, under the title "State
Terror". 196 In his chapter entitled 'U.S. Approaches to Guatemalan State
Terrorism. 1977-1986' Bowen claimed that state terrorism is:
"a method of political rule in which a government routinely detains its citizens
and without stated charges or promise of trial, tortures rapes, mutilates and
murders those it has defined as "undesirable"197.
This is useful in listing common methods of the state, but unfortunately
it fails to explain why this should be considered terrorism. A failure
which limits any application of the concept to the actions of the state
outside its area of domestic jurisdiction.
Although he does not use the term with the title of his chapter, Peleg is
worth noting because he claims that: "Nile examination of Israel's
policy in Lebanon during the Likud era (1977-1984) provides a useful
and instructive case study of the exercise of state terrorism" 198 . In this
sense he is one of the few to assess an element of Israel's counter-
terrorist policy. Unfortunately he does not explain why this provides a
(eds.).Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1988.).
pp35-58. p36.
194 Vayrynen R. 'Domestic Stability, State Terrorism and Regional lntergration in the
ASEAN and the GCC' in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. (eds.).Terrible Beyond Endurance
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1988.). ppl 67-202.
198 Weisfelder R. ' "Peace" from the Barrel of a Gun: Nonaggression Pacts and State
Terror in Southern Africa' in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1988.). pp281-312.
196 Lewellen T.0 'The U.S. and State Terrorism in the Third World' in Stohl. M and
Lopez G.A. (eds.). Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Connecticut.1988.). p85-118. p103. Under heading of 'State Terror' in Table 4.2
'Comparison of El Salvador and Nicaraguan Elections'.
197 Bowen G.L. 'U.S. Approaches to Guatemalan State Terrorism. 1977-1986' in
Stohl. M and Lopez G.A.(eds.). Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Connecticut.1988). pp119-166. p119.
198 Peleg I. 'A Different Type of War: Begin and Sharon's Invasion of Lebanon' in Stohl.
M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.
1988.). pp203-225. p203. 59
useful and instructive case study of the exercise of state terrorism, as he
fails to define his term. The only reason this author can deduce from the
rest of his chapter is the fact that he describes it as a form of "coercive
diplomacy" elsewhere in his chapter199.
Although the term or any derivative is not mentioned within his title,
Hart in his article 'U.S. Interventions in Latin America since World War
II' appears to generally accept Stohl's definition noted earlier, but
suggests that: "one might quarrel with Stohl's definition of terrorism
for being overly broad" 200 . Here it is also worth mentioning the
inclusion within the book of Quester's piece entitled 'Some Explanations
for State-Supported Terrorism in the Middle East'201 . As noted earlier
Quester is against the idea of labelling the acts of the State as terror or
terrorism on the grounds that terrorism: "is not what a regime
perpetuates in the territories it already controls, the territories over
which it has a monopoly of the tools of military power and police
violence"202.
Another collection of chapters on the topic of state terrorism arose from
a conference on the issue held at Michigan State University in
November 1988. It was edited by Bushnell, Shlapentolch, Vanderpool and
Sundriam and entitled State Organized Terror 203 . However it suffered
from the same problems that faced Stohl and Lopez's books in that many
of those who used the term state terrorism (or some derivative) in their
title failed to define it. The editors themselves, within their introductory
chapter entitled 'State Organized Terror: Tragedy of the Modern State',
199 Peleg I. 'A Different Type of War: Begin and Sharon's Invasion of Lebanon' in Stohl.
M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.
1988.). pp203-225. p222.
200 Hart
 J.A. 'U.S. Interventions in Latin America since World War II' in Stohl. M and
Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.1988)
pp59-84. p60. Stohl's definition is that found within Stohl M. 'National Interests and
State Terrorism in International affairs'. Political Science. Vol. 36(1). July 1984.
201 [My emphasis] Quester G. (eds.). 'Some Explanations for State-Supported
Terrorism in the Middle East' in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1988.). pp225-246.
202 Quester G. 'Some Explanations for State -Supported Terrorism in the Middle East'
in Stahl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance. (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Connecticut.1988.). pp225-246. p227.
203 Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State
Organized Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). p20. 60
failed to define the terni204 ,
 as did Brockett205 , Pion-Berlin206,
Ma1ey 207 and Shernock208
 within their respective chapters that
contained a variant of the term within their title. In contrast Howard
did define what he meant by state terror his chapter: 'Repression and
State Terror in Kenya 1982-1988', although interestingly he uses Stohl
and Lopez's definition: "terrorism is the purposeful act or threat of
violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or
audience of the act or threat" 209 . In this work Schmid has a chapter
specifically addressing the issue entitled 'Repression, State Terrorism
and Genocide. Conceptual Clarification'. There he uses the definition
which he produced within his revamped version of his major work, this
time in conjunction with Jongman in 1988. In that joint work, Schmid
(and Jongman) had written that:
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal,
or political reasons, whereby -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative
or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.
Threat -and violence- based communication processes between terrorist
(organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the
204 Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. 'State Organized
Terror Tragedy of the Modern State' in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K
and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State Organized Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp3-
22.
205 Brockett C.D. 'Sources of State Terrorism in Rural Central America' in Bushnell
P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. (eds.) State Organized Terror
(Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp59-76.
2 0 8 Pion-Berlin 'The Ideological Governance of Perception in the Use of State Terror in
Latin America: The Case of Argentina' in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool
C.K and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State Organized Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.).
pp135-152.
207 Maley W. 'Social Dynamics and the Disutility of Terror: Afghanistan, 1978-1989'
in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State Organized
Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp113-134.
208 Shernock S.K. 'The Refractory Aspect of Terror in Movement-Regime' in Bushnell
P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State Organized Terror
(Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp169-206.
209 Howard refers to Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport. Conneticut. 1984.). pp3-10. p7-8. Howard R.E.
'Repression and State Terror in Kenya 1982-1988' in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V.,
Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. (eds.) State Organized Terror (Westview Press.
Oxford. 1992.). pp77-98. p78. 61
main target audience(s), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is
primarily sought"210.
Unfortunately this new definition is greatly restricted by his insistence
that terrorist actors must be clandestine or at least semi-clandestine,
thus excluding the open actions taken by security forces against its own
citizens, or those living in other nations.
Many chapters in Barry Rubin's edited book Terror as a State and a
Revolutionary Strategy were potentially promising not only in terms of
providing a definition of state terrorism but also in addressing the
State's counter-terrorism as such. Falcoff's 'Between Two Fires:
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Argentina, 1970-1983' 211 seems
especially promising following his apparent link of "counter-terrorism
or state repression" on the second page, but he provides neither a
definition of state terrorism, nor does he link the two. Indeed he
concentrates on the insurgents. Rubin, in his chapter entitled 'The
Political Uses of Terrorism in the Middle East' 212 went no further in
producing a definition that allowed for state terrorism than linking
what he termed "Systematic terrorism" with actions against "innocent
by-standers' 213 . Despite the title 'War, Terror, Revolution: The Iran-Iraq
Conflict', Kostiner also failed to produce such a definition in his chapter
which mentioned only state-sponsored terrorism 214 . A process which
was repeated by Albin in her chapter entitled 'The Politics of Terrorism:
210 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p28 cited in Schmid
A.P. 'Repression, State Terrorism and Genocide: Conceptual Clarifications' in Bushnell
P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. (eds.) State Organized Terror
(Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp23 -40. p30.
211 Falcoff M. 'Between Two Fires: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Argentina,
1970-1983' in Rubin B. (ed.). The Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and
Revolutionary Strategy. (University Press of America. London. 1988.). pp1-26.
212 Rubin B. 'The Political Uses of Terrorism in the Middle East' in Rubin B. (ed.). The
Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy. (University
Press of America. London. 1988.). pp27-67.
213 Rubin B. 'The Political Uses of Terrorism in the Middle East' in Rubin B. (ed.). The
Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy. (University
Press of America. London. 1988.). pp27-67. p29.
214 Kostiner J. 'War, Terror, Revolution: The Iran-Iraq Conflict' in Rubin B. (ed.). The
Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy. (University
Press of America. London. 1988.). pp95 -128. 62
A Contemporary Survey' 215 . However in his chapter Howe defined
terrorism as "the deliberate use of physical violence against non-
combatants for political end" and stated that both states and sub-
national groups can practice terrorism216.
Another book worth noting is 0' Kane's The Revolutionary Reign of
Terror 217 . Unfortunately she concentrates on what she describes as
"revolutionary reigns of terror" 218 which "occur within the
revolutionary upheaval" 219 . Yet as O'Kane herself acknowledges, "the
revolutionary crisis itself prevents total state control and invites
lawlessness", allowing one to suggest that those embarking upon what
she describes as a "reign of terror" do not constitute the State at that
time. Whilst she notes the definitions produced by various authors on
the topic including Wardlaw, Walter, Thorton and Wilkinson 220 , she
does not really define state terrorism, although she does note that
terrors are identified by the introduction of the laws on counter-
revolution221
 (however she does not say what makes them terroristic in
nature). She also noted earlier that in all "terroristic states" some
arbitrariness must remain222 , and that the chances of the innocent
falling victim to the terror were multiplied yet higher in the
revolutionary regime than a terroristic or repressive regime 223 .
The book Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America
edited by Corradi, Weiss-Fagen and Garreton 224
 provided a promising
title, but its content in terms of the concept of state terrorism was very
216 Albin C. 'The Politics of Terrorism: A Contemporary Survey' in Rubin B. (ed.). The
Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy. (University
Press of America. London. 1988.). ppl 83-234.
216 Howe H.M. 'Government and Opposition Terrorism in South Africa' in Rubin B.
(ed.). The Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy.
(University Press of America. London. 1988.). pp153-182. p153.
217 0' Kane R.T.H. The Revolutionary Reign of Terror. (Elgar. Aldershot. 1991.).
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224 corradi J.E., Weiss-Fagen P. and Garreton M.A. (eds.). Fear at the Edge: State
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disappointing and instead it concentrated on how people deal with fear.
In fact of the 14 chapters (excluding the introduction) by different
authors, only one mentioned any variation on the term state terrorism
and that was Rial's 'Makers and Guardians of fear: Controlled Terror in
Uruguay'. Unfortunately he does not produce a definition of the term,
although he does note torture in prison225 . Likewise while the index of
the book gives 18 references under the title: "Terror, state", not one
contains a definition. Instead the book concentrates on the way people
resisted 'repressive' acts of the state in Latin America.
Whilst Western State Terrorism edited by Alexander George is a
welcome change to the vast majority of general books on terrorism,
which focus almost exclusively on sub-state terrorism supported by
non-Western regimes, the various chapters are rather disappointing in
regards to the concept of state terrorism. Unlike the books edited by
Stohl and Lopez's, there are no chapters specifically dealing with the
concept of state terrorism, and although there is opportunity for the
authors to produce a definition within their chapter, few do. Herman
and O'Sullivan for example in their chapter: 'Terrorism as Ideology and
Cultural Industry' provide a table which suggests that the number of
terrorist acts carried out by non-state actors are dwarfed by those
carried out by states. Unfortunately however the table is not based on
any single precise definition, instead it is merely a collation of data
based on similar incidents226 . Similarly Chomsky's chapter entitled
'International Terrorism: Image and Reality' does touch on the issue of
defining terrorism but he merely (although usefully) takes the
definitions given by Western governments and scholars on the issue
and applies them to the actions of Western governments227.
Interestingly, he does however suggest that acts of terrorism would
include Israel's Iron Fist operations in Lebanon, and Israel's counter-
225 Rial J. 'Makers and Guardians of fear: Controlled Terror in Uruguay' in Corradi
J.E. , Weiss-Fagen P. and Garreton M.A. (eds.). Fear at the Edge: State Terror and
Resistance in Latin America. (University of California Press. Berkeley. 1992.). pp90-
103.
226 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. "Terrorism' as Ideology and .Cultural Industry' in
George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75.
p.41-42. Table A.
227 Chomsky N. International Terrorism: Image and Reality' in George A.(ed.) Western
State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp12-38. 64
terrorist bombing of Tunis228, as well as genocide against a defenceless
civilian population229.
McClintock does a similar thing within his chapter 'American Doctrine
and Counterinsurgent State Terror'. Instead of producing his own
definition of 'state terror' he relies upon the U.S. armed forces' use of
the term 'terror' within their own documents on unconventional and
low intensity warfare. He then describes the development and use of
such self-styled terror tactics by the U.S. armed forces within Indochina
and Central America230 . It is not surprising that Rolston does not define
the term for there is no use of the term or any derivative within the
title of his chapter 'Containment and its Failure: The British State and
the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland'. However, within his
description of the development of the terrorist conflict in Northern
Ireland, he does usefully note that:
"When the question of 'state terrorism' is broached at all it is usually in relation
to the state's proxy instrument in "terror". Rarely is the role of the state in
creating, perpetuating "terrorism" examined thoroughly, especially in the case of
Ireland. This is a grave oversight"231
Likewise whilst Budiardjo does not make reference to the term
'terrorism' within the title of her article 'Indonesia: Mass Extermination
and the Consolidation of Authoritarian Power', she does note that
Indonesia committed numerous acts of terrorism against its own people
and against the people of W. Papau and E. Timor. These include the
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people, the massacres of villages,
clubbing to death of 800 suspected communist suspects232 . Falk also fails
to define the term despite including a variant of it within the title of his
228 Chomsky N. International Terrorism: Image and Reality' in George A.(ed.) Western
State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp12-38. p26-27.
229 Chomsky N. International Terrorism: Image and Reality' in George A.(ed.) Western
State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). ppl 2-38. p20.
230 McClintock M. 'American Doctrine and Counterinsurgent State Terror' in George
A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp121-154.
231 Rolston B. 'Containment and its Failure: The British State and the Control of
Conflict in Northern Ireland' in George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press.
Oxford. 1991.). pp155 -179. p167.
232 Budiardjo C. in her 'Indonesia: Mass Extermination and the Consolidation of
Authoritarian Power' in George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press.
Oxford. 1991). pp 180-211. p180. 65
chapter: 'The Terrorist Foundations of Recent US Foreign Policy'. He
does however suggest that "unless terrorism is conceptualized in a
manner broad enough to emphasise the role of the State and the nature
of total war in the nuclear age", the issue of responsibility and response
will be misrepresented by being restricted to the tactics of the
dispossessed 233 . Therefore, in addition to suggesting that deploying
nuclear weapons, drafting war plans to destroy on a massive scale the
civilian society of the Eastern bloc "was terroristic is essence", he also
suggests that "the dispossession of people from their land almost always
is a product of terrorist forms of belligerency"234.
Another interesting book on the topic, which is disappointing on the
definition of state terrorism is Perdue's Terrorism and the State: A
Critique of Domination Through Fear. The book is interesting in terms
of its political economy approach 235 which proports to take the analysis
of state terrorism to a level even higher than other critical authors
such as Chomsky and Herman. According to Perdue a political economy
approach must place the behaviour of the state "in a world system
context" 236 . As such, it involves "a critique of the rational-legal
authority" and "transcends questions of law and legalism to consider the
domination of weaker states by the stronger" 237 . For Perdue terms like
'unlawful', 'rational', and 'official' offer legitimation for a system of
rule and: "[s]uch symbolism has the clear potential to disguise patterns
of intimidation and intervention, designed to keep the world safe from
change". For Perdue this: "may distort ongoing struggle between
conflicting strata, positioned in a hierarchical international order of
production, transfer, and concentration" 238 . The result of all this is
that:
233 Falk R. 'The Terrorist Foundations of Recent U.S. Foreign Policy' in George A.(ed.)
Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). ppl 02-120. p109.
234 Falk R. 'The Terrorist Foundations of Recent U.S. Foreign Policy' in George A.(ed.)
Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp102-120. p110-1. He gave
the example of native Indians of America.
235 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). p16.
238 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). pl 6.
237 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). p16.
238 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). p18. 66
"An analysis of state terrorism must be carried out at different levels. At the
national level, the state may become an instrument designed to control through
fear its subject population. Regime terror involves the systematic use of torture
and the rise of military and police forces engaged in an internal war against a
subject population. This form of state terrorism may also be waged through
shadowy organisations, death squads, and the like that have no official power but
that are clearly linked with the national elite. However, to focus on regime terror
is often deceptive. To cast the issue of terrorism as the abuse of state power by
political deviants may be to ignore the more endemic, taken-for-granted, higher
forms of sanctioned violence that avoid the terrorist label. It may also ignore state
structural imperatives (expressed in policy and action, including the threat or use
of force) designed to preserve a transnational market system"239.
Therefore at the international level the higher terrorism takes
different forms and may include war between states. Thus Perdue
suggests that: "[p]erhaps the conduct of warfare can represent only
shades of dishonour. Perhaps the issue of war crimes is superseded by
that of the crime of war" 240 . As a result of such a structural perspective
the nearest Perdue comes to producing a definition is to produce a long
list of acts which he does not like. For him state terrorism is evidenced:
"1. in police state practices against its own people to dominate through fear by
surveillance disruption of group meetings, control of the news media beatings,
torture, false and mass arrests, false charges and rumours, show trials, killings,
summary executions and capital punishment;
2. in the armed attack by the military forces of a state on targets that put at risk
the civilian population residing in another state;
3. in assassination attempts and plots directed by a state toward the officials of
other states, whether carried out by military strike, special forces units or covert
operations by "intelligence forces" or their third party agents;
4. in the military occupation of a state, whether in the form of direct martial
control or in the establishment of a base of operations;
239 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). p18.
240 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). p19. 67
5. in covert operations by the "intelligence" or other forces of a state that are
intended to destabilize or subvert another state;
6. in disinformation campaigns by a state, whether intended to destabilize another
state, or to build public support for economic, political, or military force or
intimidation directed at another state;
7. in military exercises, manoeuvres, or "games" conducted by a state outside the
territory or territorial waters of that state;
8. in the creation and support of armed mercenary forces by a state for the purpose
of subverting the government of another state;
9. in the support, by whatever means, of other states that deny the right of self-
determination to nationally conscious populations expressed through popularly
supported liberation movements;
10. in arms sales that support the continuation of regional wars and retard the
search for political solutions;
11. in the introduction or transportation of nuclear weapons by a state into or
through the territory, territorial waters, or air space of other states, or into
international waters or airspace;
12. and in the development, testing, and deployment of nuclear and space weapons
systems, and all other weapons of mass destruction, by the state that in all
circumstances increase the probability of genocide and ecocide, while condemning
the poor to continued misery and all humanity to a state of perennial fear"241.
241 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). p42-3. Perdue writes that, "[p]oints 2,3,5-8, and 10-12
were prepared by the author, and adopted with modifications as part of a conference
declaratons on the question of terrorism. Others were developed expressly for this
volume. (The first point is the work of Ramsey Clark.) The conference was organized
by the International Progress Organization of Vienna, a U.N.E.S.C.O. non-governmental
organization." Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through
Fear (Praeger New York. 1989.). p43. 68
Finally it is worth noting Gilbert's Terrorism, Security and Nationality:
An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy 242, for this
philosopher devotes a whole chapter entitled 'Terrorism and The State'
to the notion. However whilst he makes many interesting points, many
of which are cited or even used by this author later on, Gilbert does not
define exactly what he means by state terrorism. Instead he answers his
own question "What is state terrorism" by saying that:
"On the one hand it has many of the features of war; what is particularly
distinctive of state terrorism is its use of political assassination, of torture and of
other cruelties against opponents. Such acts are indisputably contrary to the rules
of war"243.
Yet he goes on to note that what makes the 'taking out' of terrorists
without due process of law 'state terrorism' is that it violates the rules of
civil life: "State terrorism too is characteristically criminal. ...it is
contrary to the laws enforced by the state" 244 . Interestingly he also
notes that states may legislate their violent acts of acts of oppression
against opponents "by passing laws that permit summary executions,
torture or detention without trial" 245 . The qualification according to
Gilbert is not a radical one:
"Terrorism which is legalised by the State involves making exceptions to laws
which protect citizens in times of peace from being killed, wounded or imprisoned
without the application of recognised legal processes. Acts of legalised terrorism
thus constitute a grave infringement of human rights. In such cases it may be
argued that, although legislation has been carried through which is technically in
order, the fact that it breaches human rights invalidates it under international law
- lex in vista non est lex' .1246.
242 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality:
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.).
243 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality:
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p128
244 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality:
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p131
245 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality:
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p133
246 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality:
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p133
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Moreover it is difficult to accept that all of the breaches of international
legislation or even all human rights legislation constitutes state
terrorism. Indeed in response to this author's questionnaire only 9% (or
11) of the 120 respondents indicated that "Violations of international
law" constituted state terrorism247.
This selective literature has shown why many of the existing
definitions of state terrorism are inadequate in that they fail to label all
the areas of a state's activities that need to be covered. It also raises
many points in relation to the issue of state terrorism, many of which
provide context to understanding the aims of the thesis and its
development. It is therefore to the research design and aims that the
thesis now turns, before examining a section on its content.
247 In reply to part of question 7. In contrast 34% (40) of the 120 respondents
indicated that "human Rights violatons" constituted state terrorism, although here the
terms human rights legislation was not used. 70
Research Design: The Aims
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the concept of state terrorism.
First it proposes to examine the notion of state terrorism from which a
working definition of the concept will be produced. Then it aims to
apply this, along with any other notable definitions of the term, to
particular activities of a specific state in order to identify any problems
pertaining to each definition. The 'results' of such an analysis will be
reviewed in a concluding chapter, in which any necessary revisions to
the original working definitions will be made.
Such a plan asks various questions above and beyond those of 'Why
study state terrorism?' and 'Why is the primary aim of this study to
define the concept of state terrorism?', both of which can be seen to
have been both asked and answered within the previous part of this
introductory chapter. The first and most obvious of these questions is
'What are the "particular activities of a specific state" to which the
definitions of state terrorism will be applied?'. The answer to which is
the 'counter-terrorist' activities of Israel. This in turn leads to various
questions, including 'What are these counter terrorist activities?', and
'Why apply the definitions to these counter-terrorist activities of
Israel?'.
A detailed answer to the first of these two questions can be found within
the later section on Israeli counter-terrorism. Whilst the decision to
apply the various definition of state terrorism to the actions of a
contemporary Western democracy which pride themselves on the 'rule
of law' can be seen to have been primarily designed to fill another
apparent 'gap' in the literature on terrorism. As already noted, the
reading undertaken prior to the commencement of the Ph.D. had given
the distinct impression that great number, if not the vast majority, of
'terrorologists' could not conceive of terrorism being undertaken by
Western democratic states, especially any carried out within their areas
of jurisdiction, in that few authors used examples from contemporary
'Western' states. Bell for example wrote that although state terror has
long been with us, it has been only a relatively rare option for
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democratic governments 248
. Whilst other authors went as far as
claiming that 'terrorism' was the antithesis of the 'rule of law'249 , if not
'Western' values250 . Indeed many appeared to write merely to prove
that insurgent terrorists were inspired or trained by the ideologues of
either the Soviet Union and its allies, or Muslim (or 'Mad') Middle
Eastern states251.
Stohl can be seen to support this initial 'hypothesis' when he wrote that
the singular exception proposed by most liberal Western authors to the
myth that terrorism is perpetrated solely by non-state actors is the
recognition that non-democratic, totalitarian, fascist or communist
states practise terrorism 252 . A view which seems to be supported by a
content analysis of the relevant references within the sub-section of
Schmid and Jongman's bibliography found in their book Political
Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and databases. It
reveals that not one of the 196 English language references within the
section entitled 'Regime Terrorism and Repression' specifically
mentioned Israe1 253 .
248 Bell J.B. A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary
Violence (Basic Books. New York. 1978). p3.
243 In full the sentence reads, "It [terrorism] is also a moral crime, a crime against
humanity, an attack not only on our security, our rule of law, and the safety of the
state, but on civilised society as well". Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State.
(2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.). p66
250 Netanyhu wrote, "spiritually [the West's] values are the direct antithesis of those
of terrorism" Netanyhu B. (ed.). Terrorism: How The West Can Win. (Farrar Strauss
and Giroux. New York. 1986.). p5.
251 For example Netanyhu B. (ed.). Terrorism: How The West Can Win. (Farrar
Strauss and Giroux. New York. 1986.)., Cline C.S. and Alexander Y.(eds.). Terrorism
and the Soviet Connection. (Crane Russak. New York.1984), Sterling C. The Terror
Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
1981.). Possony S.T. and Bouchey L.F. International Terrorism: The Communist
Connection. (Washington, D.C. American Council for World Freedom. 1978) The latter
two were cited by Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality.
(University of Southern California. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 1989.).
252 Stohl M. 'Demystifying Terrorism , The Myths and Realities of Contemporary
Political Terrorism' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of Terrorism. (3rd ed. Marcel
Dekker. New York. 1988). pp1-30. p8.
253 See Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). pp259-269. Only one
mentioned the United Kingdom (or part of it) and it was entitled A society on the run: A
psychology of Northern Ireland. Interestingly Schmid and Jongman note that "This book
[Field R.M. A society on the run: A psychology of Northern Ireland.] was censored, then
withdrawn from the British market and 10,000 copies were shredded". Schmid A.P.
and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and
databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p262. 72
However the decision to concentrate on a contemporary western state
does not mean that the classical 'reigns of terror' such as revolutionary
France, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany have been totally ignored,
for aspects of them are used to aid the conceptual thinking, or to
illustrate, particular points.
Secondly the decision to concentrate solely upon counter-terrorist
actions to provide possible examples of state terrorism is also in the
hope of addressing a gap in the literature. A content analysis of
Schmid's bibliographical chapter on the topic of 'Regime terrorism and
Repression' reveals that the term 'counter-terrorism' or 'counter-
terror' was mentioned only once within either the title of the reference
or the brief resume by the editors of the bibliography, and that was a
conference paper entitled 'Terror and counter-terror in Nazi Occupied
Poland' 254 . The choice of Western counter-terrorism meant that this
area provided a novel subject for an examination of state terrorism, one
that potentially contained a number of problems. Perhaps the most
obvious problem being the emotional one noted earlier by Duvall and
Stohl of getting people to accept that the State can be terrorist,
especially a Western state, a problem which can be see to be made even
stronger by the claim that people will accept the 'draconian laws',
abuses of 'civil' or 'human' rights, if they believe it will solve a
problem 255 , especially when the problem is as well publicised and
254 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p264. Interestingly
many of the alleged examples of state terrorism were justified in order to counter
terrorism including some of Stalin's show trials, Hitler's reprisals and the repression
of various Latin American governments in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
255 According to Green, "the world, especially the public at large, is not excessively
interested in governmental terrorism, which tends to be accepted as unavoidable and is
often viewed as inevitable if a government is to retain its authority against threats
emanating from woolly-headed or vicious revolutionaries". Green L.C. 'The Legalization
of Terrorism' in Alexander Y., Carlton D., and Wilkinson P. (eds.). Terrorism: Theory
and Practice (Westview Press. Boulder, Colorado. 1979.). p176 cited by Sederberg P.
Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. (University of Southern California.
Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 1989.). p47. Similarly Bushell et al asserted that within
internal conflict situations, "[t]he general population remains unable to distinguish the
war against society from the war against society's enemies and is ready to accede to
violent political upheavals and terror as legitimate attempts by the leaders of the state
to return state and society 'to the right path". Bushnell PT., Shlapentokh V.,
Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. 'State Organized Terror Tragedy of the Modern State'
in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K and Sundriam.J. (eds.) State
Organized Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992) pp3-22. pl 2. For an explanation for 73
potentially dangerous as, the terrorism of those who challenge the
Western state.
Here it should be noted that when the author initially started the Ph.D.
on a part-time, self-financed basis at The University of Reading, the aim
was merely to illustrate each of the various possible types of state
terrorism that this author's 1991 definition had conceptualised, using
examples which included some taken from the foreign and domestic
policies of the USA and her allies as well as from the 'classic' 'terrorist
regimes'. Following discussions with an external examiner from the
University of Surrey and with my supervisor at Reading, it was decided
to change the title of the Ph.D. to include the term counter-
terrorism256 . The intent then became one of examining both the state
terrorism and counter-terrorism of the UK and USA only. These original
aims changed somewhat following the transfer of the doctorate to the
University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.
First, it was decided to examine a single part of particular states' foreign
and domestic policies, that is their 'counter-terrorist' policies. Second, it
was decided to rigorously 'apply' this author's definition to this
generally unknown quantity, rather than to merely 'illustrate' it along
with various other credible definitions in order to highlight the
advantages and disadvantages of each, and the parts thereof. The
application of the various definitions to 'ring-fenced' phenomena of
which the author was fairly ignorant was considered a valid means of
'testing' the definitions, and a far more intellectually rigorous one than
the previous method. Therefore, instead of merely allowing the author
merely to pick and chose examples that lay cosily with his definition, it
and the other definitions were exposed to potentially challenging
examples.
The third change was the decision to examine the counter-terrorist
actions of just Israel rather than the U.K. and U.S.A.. This decision came
about in stages. Initially, Israel replaced the U.S.A. for like the latter,
Israel constituted a Western power which suffered from large scale
this, see the sociological explanation (reification) for the neglect of State terrorism
later.
256 Primarily in order to increase the chance of gaining funding from the state itself
(via the E.S.R.C.).
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'terrorism', and carried out 'counter-terrorist' policies. More
importantly however Israel appeared to provide a far better comparison
with Britain now that the definitions were to be applied solely to
'counter-terrorist' activities. Israel's well documented use of force
abroad in order to counter what it termed 'terrorism' appeared to
surpass in variety, if not in intensity, anything that the U.S.A. had
undertaken in the name of counter-terrorism. In terms of the
particularly controversial area of 'direct domestic state terrorism' there
were a number of factors that made Israel far more worthy of a
comparison with the UK than the U.S.A. The most obvious was the fact
that the domestic 'terrorist' threat faced by the U.S.A. was not only far
smaller in absolute and relative terms but was of an entirely different
ilk to that relatively large-scale 'terrorism' which both the UK and
Israel faced from nationalist groups. In addition, the constitutional and
legal systems of the two countries were similar, both possessed a partly
written constitution and Israel had 'inherited' various legal customs and
laws from the UK which had previously ruled the land, then called
Palestine. Finally the fact that at the time of the decision both Israel and
the U.K. were involved in on-going conflicts also encouraged the use of
these two nation states, for this meant that the accusations of terrorism,
'counter-terrorism and state terrorism were politically important and
therefore even more controversial. Many of their counter-terrorist
policies were (and still are) considered to constitute state terrorism by
the victims and/or the enemies of the perpetrating states 257 , even if
257 See for example Berry's assertion that, "[f]or more than three million Irish men
and women living in Britain the introduction of the PTA was the introduction of legalised
terror." by Berry S. The Prevention of Terrorism Act: Legalised Terror. (Socialist
Workers Party Pamphlet.). p3. According to Bonner other accusations of State
terrorism are to be found in Kelley K.J. The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA
(London. Zed. 1988.). pp189-92, 248-9, 275. and McLee A. Terrorism in Northern
Ireland (N.Y. General Hal1,1983) Bonner D. 'United Kingdom: The United Kingdom
Response to Terrorism.' in Schmid A.P. and Crelinsten R.C. (ed.). Western Responses to
Terrorism. (Frank Cass. London. 1993.).pp171-205. p172. As for Israel, the PLO have
claimed that "The illegal acts of terror that have been perpetrated by Israel and
condemned by the world community for over 25 years include the following: arbitrary
arrest and detention; ill-treatment and torture of prisoners; destruction and demolition
of villages, town quarters, and houses; confiscation and expropriation of property;
arbitrary evacuation and transfer of sections of population; mass and indiscriminate
killings; and unwarranted terroristic attacks on refugee camps". Palestine Liberation
Organisation. (Department of Information and National Guidance). Crime and No
Punishment. (PLO. Beirut. 1974.). p5. See also Hadaw S. The Palestinian: Victim of
Conspiracy. (Arab Palestine Association. Toronto. 1981.).p46-47. Free Palestine. 'Who
are the Terrorists?. The Zionists Record'. Part 7 in Free Palestine. Palestine
Information Kit. London. August 28. 1975. 75
few, if any, of the many 'terrorologists' of these countries perceive
them in this way. However since the production of the detail on both the
counter-terrorist activities of U.K. and Israel at home abroad, (the latter
of which were almost exclusively Israeli), it was decided to omit the
section on the U.K. because it added little in return for the inclusion of
tens of thousands of extra words, whilst pushing the thesis well beyond
the original target in terms of the number of words.
By examining the issue of state terrorism the thesis aims to raise, if not
answer several important questions and issues surrounding the concept
of state terrorism. In addition to illustrating the problems facing the
production of any definition of the word 'terrorism', such an
examination will hopefully illustrate the problems of applying any
definition of terrorism. Finally the thesis aims to further the cause of
knowledge by accurately describing the legalities of various aspects of
each countries counter-terrorist policies since the day troops were sent
into the West Bank in the late 1960s.
Research Design: The Content. 
I will now note three points in relation to the content and methodology.
The first is the inclusion of the results of a questionnaire on the topic
designed and sent to various academics because the author's reading of
the literature on the topic of 'terrorism' continued to be producing so
little of value to the debate on definitions even after the transfer of his
Ph.D. at Newcastle. Many of the results of this are scattered throughout
the conceptual parts of the thesis including this introductory chapter,
and all the quantifiable results and the sampling technique are
described in Appendix A.
The second and perhaps most important of these final three points is
that the methodology of the thesis relied heavily upon computer
databases, not only to find literature on the topic, but also to produce the
sample group of academics to who the questionnaire was sent258. It was
to temper any criticisms of 'ethnocentrism' which could result from the
258 The overall sample can be seen to be made up of four unequal sources, three of
which involved the use of the databases supplied by the Bath Information and Data
Services (BIDS). See Apppendix A for details. 76
view that such databases reflect the economic strength of the larger
mainstream Western publishers vis-a-vis those of the 'third world' and
'alternative' press 259 , that this author therefore made a conscious
effort to search the latter and to follow any potentially-relevant
material cited by individual authors.
The third, relatively minor problem (which is also related to this latter
point) is the lack of consensus in the use of terminology.
The Issue of Terminology. 
Unfortunately as already noted within the opening chapter the
question of terminology is not as clear cut as those wishing to study the
issue might hope, for many of those who argue that the State can
indeed be 'terrorist' also use the term 'state terror' to describe such
actions 260 . Even within the confines of this introductory chapter the
many authors cited have used a wide variety of labels to describe the
phenomenon. Many of which revolve around the use of the word
'terror' or 'terrorism'. This is of no real surprise in that these were the
main terms used in the computer driven literature search which formed
the basis of the literature used within the conceptual part of the thesis.
259 After comparing the results of a database on terrorism with a hand compiled list
Dr. E. Reid Professor of Information Science at Rutgers University concluded that
"[online databases can give the researcher a distorted view of a subject like
terrorism". The databases she examined contained only 46% of the 1,165 works on her
handcompiled list. She goes on to say "[m]any times, it is almost impossible to find
comprehensive coverage of non-U.S. materials in either on-line or print reference
sources". Her explanation for this was that "[e]ach electronic database has an
unintentional bias because of its editorial policy. What one database defines as
terrorism might not be a patriotic act in another country" and "[i]f the U.S. media says
an event is important, that event becomes raw material for terrorism incident
databases" See a summary of her work and interview by Arnold S.E. 'Researching
Terrorism'. Information Today. Vol. 9(7). July-Aug. 1992. ppl 3-14.pl 3-14. Even for
those who are skeptical of such economic interpretation of databases, one merely has
to note the words of Schmid who when writing about the literature on terrorism wrote,
"the Anglo-American output dwarfs all others" Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature. (Amsterdam, North
Holland. 1984.). p 1 .
260 For example Corrado R.R. and Tompkins E. 'A Comparative Model of the
Psychological Effects of the Victims of State and Anti-State Terrorism'. International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry. Vol. 12(4). 1989. pp281-293. p281, 291; and Gurr
T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis' in
Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for
Research. (Greenwood Press. NY.1986.). pp45-72. p46, 48. 77
However it may mean that various works on state terrorism that go by
the name of repression, oppression or human rights abuses (all of
which have been used interchangeably with the 'terror-centric' terms
by some authors261 ) may have been excluded from this authors search.
This variety of labels creates a number of other problems. The first of
these is the fact that some authors also use terms such as state terrorism
interchangeably with these other concepts means that the situation can
often appear very confusing. The second, and far more important
problem relating to terminology is that some authors believe that 'state
terror' and 'terrorism' are separate subjects and should not be studied
together, whilst many of those who assert that 'the State' can be
'terrorist' also use the term 'state terror' 262 to describe such actions263.
Indeed this author's questionnaire attempted to address the
questionnaire. In response to the question 'Can acts, carried out directly
by the agents of those in power, ever be labelled acts of 'terror' or
261 See for example Dimitrijevic A. as interpreted by P.B. Maggs review of his book
'Tyrannies: Studies in Human Rights and State Terror'. American Journal of
International Law. Vol. 81 (3). 1987p399.; Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool
C.K. and Sundriam J. 'State Organized Terror Tragedy of the Modern State' in Bushnell
P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K and Sundriam J. (eds.) State Organized Terror
(Westview Press. Oxford. 1992) pp3-22; Gerner D.J. 'Weapons for Repression ?. U.S.
Arms Transfers to the Third World' in in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond
Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1988.). pp247-280. Various
authors appear to accept Stohl and Lopez's that, "[o]ppression , repression and
terrorism may be concurrent and coordinated policies and actions" but forget their
assertion that "they are nonetheless different phenomena and should be
distinguished".Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.).
The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood
Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp3-10. p8. Perhaps it is Stohl and Lopez's own
use of book titles such as "The State As Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and
Repression and Testing Theories of State Violence, State Terror and Repression" and a
diagram of three concentric circles that gives the impression that terrorism is merely
a subset of repression which is in turn a subset of oppression.
262 Schmid notes that, "[i]n the literature on terrorism there is no consensus as to
what the relatioship between terror and terrorism is", he also notes that "one author
held that the terms could be used as synonomous and therefore interchangeably (Blok)"
and that "[a] number of authors (Hess, Merari, Ochberg, Wilber) stress that terror is a
state of mind while terrorism would refer to organized social activity" whilst "[a]
number of authors reserve the word terror for state -induced violence and use
terrorism for insurgent violence (e.g. Francis, Wilkinson, Zofka)". Schmid A.P. Political
Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North
Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p64.
263 For example Corrado R.R. and Tompkins E. 'A Comparative Model of the
Psychological Effects of the Victims of State and Anti-State Terrorism'. International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry. Vol. 12(4). 1989. pp281-293. p281, 291. And Gurr
T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis' in
Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for
Research. (Greenwood Press. NY.1986.). pp45-72. p46, 48. 78
'terrorism'?, only 3% of those 118 respondents answered with an
outright 'No', with an overwhelming 86% replying 'Yes, either as acts
of 'terror' or 'terrorism'264 . In contrast to the tendency within the
literature observed by Wilkinson, only 7% replied 'Yes' but only as acts
of 'terror'. Interestingly this latter figure was only one percent more
than the percentage of respondents who answered 'Yes but only as acts
of terrorism'265 . Yet in answer to the question 'What words would you
use to label acts of direct 'terror/ism'? (excluding support/sponsorship
of insurgents) e.g. 'state terror', 'regime terrorism', 'terror from above',
'governmental terrorism', 'repression' etc.?' more than 60 answers were
received, of which this author would describe 26 as credible 'labels'266.
The most popular was that of 'state terror' 267
 chosen by 49 authors, a
fact that could at first glance be seen to give weight to those that believe
it is not profitable to collapse these two distinct phenomena into a single
category. Yet this finding must be tempered by the fact that the
question was 'biased' in favour of use of the term, in that 'state terror'
was cited as an example of a label that one might use along with four
others. The reasoning being that some respondents to the pilot
questionnaire had not understood the meaning of the word 'label' when
the question had not included examples of such labels. Support for the
claim that the inclusion of the examples may have influenced the
outcome is that a number of authors answered the question by either
referring to "all of the above" or simply underlining some or all of the
264 Eight ticked the box entitled "Yes, but only as acts of 'terror'. Three of the replies
to question 1 were 'no', 101 indicated "Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism', 6
indicated that it was acceptable to label 'acts carried out directly by the agents of
those in power' 'only as acts of 'terrorism". Two of the 120 were left blank.
265 Eight ticked the box entitled "Yes, but only as acts of 'terror'. Three of the replies
to question 1 were 'No', 101 indicated "Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism', 6
indicated that it was acceptable to label 'acts carried out directly by the agents of
those in power' 'only as acts of 'terrorism". Two of the 120 were left blank.
266 Question 2. Examples of the less credible definitions also cited by one author unless
otherwise stated include: 'reprisals', 'counter-terrorism reprisals' 'state sanctioned
terrorism'(2), 'state directed international terrorism', 'military despotism',
'totalitarianism', 'death squads', 'human rights violations', 'war crimes'. This is not all
the answers given, there are other answers including sentences which are even less
credible as labels.
267 Also used by Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1984.). pp3-10. p4 Indeed only 4 (or 8%) of
the 49 authors who accepted the label 'state terror' had answered 'Yes, terror only' in
response to question 1, with 44 (90%) of those who had accepted answered 'Yes,
either as acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism'. The remaining respondent who constituted the
other 2% indicated that he would only accept the use of the term 'state terror' in
reference to the external actions of the state. 79
given examples. It is not surprising that two of these other four labels
were joint second in these rankings. The labels 'governmental
terrorism' and 'repression' were cited by 27 authors along with the label
'state terrorism' 268
 which had not been given as an example. The other
two of the five examples 'regime terrorism 1269 and 'terror from above'
came in fourth and fifth with 26 and 18 citings respectively. As for the
rest of the 26 credible labels identified by this authors questionnaire,
these were 'terrorism'(4 citations270 ), 'political terrorism'(2), and the
rest 'terror'271 , 'governmental strategies of terrorism', 'elite strategies
of terrorism', 'state based terrorism', 'regime of terror' 272 , 'government
terrorism', "governmental terror' 273 , 'government terror'274,
'oppression', 'state repression', 'government repression', 'elite
repression', 'political governmental terrorism', 'legal terrorism',
'legitimised terrorism', legitimised terror', 'institutionalised terror'275,
'official terrorism1276 were each cited by one author.277
In addition, as a result of his reading this author has identified the use
of 20 other different ' terror-centric' labels to describe acts of violence
268 Also used by Schmid A.P. and De Graaf J. Violence as Communication (SAGE.
London.1982). p2.
269 Also used by Weinberg L.B. and Davis P.B. An Introduction to Political Terrorism.
(McGraw-Hill. London. 1989.). p8.
270 Also used by O'Sullivan N. (ed.). Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf
Book. Brighton. 1986.). pX.
271 Also used by Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence.
(Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1969). p3.
272 Also used by Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through
Fear (Praeger New York. 1989). p19.
273 Also used by Taylor R.W. and Vanden H.E. 'Defining Terrorism in El Salvador' in
Wolfgang M.C. (ed.). International Terrorism: (The Annals of the American Academy of
Poltical and Social Science. No. 463 Sept. 1982.). pp 106-118. p113.
274 Also used in title by Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An
Explanation of Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as
Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp167-182.
275 Also used in title by Premo D.L. 'Political Assasination in Guatamala: a case of
Institutionalised terror'. Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 23
(4). Nov.1981. pp429-456.
276 Taylor R.W. and Vanden H.E. 'Defining Terrorism in El Salvador' in Wolfgang M.C.
(ed.). International Terrorism: (The Annals of the American Academy of Poltical and
Social Science. No. 463 Sept. 1982). pp 106-118. p116.
277 Less credible definitions also cited by one author unless otherwise stated include:
'reprisals', 'counter-terrorism reprisals' 'state sanctioned terrorism'(2), 'state
directed international terrorism', 'military despotism', 'totalitarianism', 'death
squads', 'human rights violations', 'war crimes'. This is not all the answers given,
there are other answers including sentences which are even less credible as labels. 80
by those in pOWer278, these are: 'governance by terror'279 ,
 'terror as a
government service'280  'terror by governments , 2 8 1, 'regime
terror' 2 82 , 'reign of terror'283 , 'legalised terrorism' 2 a 4, 'institutional
terror' 2 8 5 , 'terrorism by public authority' 2
 8 6 , 'terrorism from
above' 287 , 'establishment terrorism1288 , 'wholesale terror' 289 , 'primary
te rrorism' 2 90 , 'counterterror' 291 , 'police terrorism' 292 , 'police state
278 Plus less credible variations on the theme. Der Derian used the term [state] endo
terrorism to describe internal state violence, as opposed to 'state exo-terrorism'
which is defined as "state supported kidnapping, hostage taking, or murder by proxy
terrorists, state exo-terrorism is for the most part seen as a Middle Eastern
continuation of war by condemnatory means"Der Derian J. Anti Diplomacy: Spies,
Terror, Speed and War. (Blackwell, Oxford. 1992). p111. For 'terrorism by regimes'
see Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p171. For 'internal state
terrorism' see title of Anderson K. 'Beginning to Theorise about Internal State
Terrorism in the Third World'. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 2 (1). 1990.
ppl 06-111. For 'repressive state terror' see Crelinsten R.D. 'Power and Meaning:
Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure' in Wilkinson P.
and Stewart A.M. Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen University Press.
Aberdeen. 1987.). pp419-452. p415
279 Schlagheck D.M. International Terrorism: An Introduction to the Concepts and
Actors. (Lexington Books. Lexington.1988.). p45.
280 De Swann A 'Terror As Government Service' in Hoefnagels M. (ed.). Repression
and Repressive Violence. (Swets and Zeitlinger. Amsterdam. 1977.). pp40-50. p40
281 Schlagheck D.M. International Terrorism: An Introduction to the Concepts and
Actors. (Lexington Books. Lexington.1988.). p45
282 Also used by Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination
Through Fear (Praeger New York. 1989.). p19
283 Also used in title by O'Kane R.T.H. The Revolutionary Reign of Terror. (Aldershot.
Elgar. 1991.).
284 Almond H.H.(Jnr).'The Use of Organized Groups by States as Vehicles To Promote
their Foreign Policy' in Han H.H. Terrorism, Political Violence and World Order.
(University Press of America. London. 1984.). pp229-266. p233.
285 Perdue W. 'Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.). p4.
286 Van Der Kroef M. 'Terrorism by Public Authority: the case of the death squads of
Indonesia and the Philippines'. Current Research on Peace and Violence. Vol.10
(4).1987. pp143-158. p143.
287 Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation of
Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). ppl 67-182. p167.
288 Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation of
Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.).ppl 67-182. p167.
289 Herman E.S. The Real Terror Network. (South End Press. Boston. 1982.). p83.
290 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions
that Shape our View of Terrorism. (Pantheon. New York.1989.). p9.
291 Thornton T.P. 'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation' in Eckstein H. (ed).
Internal War Problems and Approaches .(The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan. 81
terrorism' 293 , 'rule by terror'294 ,
 'state rule by terrorism , 2 95,
'enforcement terror' 296 , 'institutional domination through fear' 297 ,
 and
'official 'legally' sanctioned terrorism' 298
As one can see this list is not exhausted for one could merely add the
term terror or terrorism to whichever suffix or prefix has not had both
variations applied to it. In addition to this many of the authors use the
terms interchangeably 299 . The preference here then is for the term
'state terrorism'. A choice which can only be successfully explained in
relation to these alternatives. However rather than go through the list
and explain the reasons for rejecting each variation on the theme one
by one, a number of comments will be made that explain the rejection of
all of the other mentioned terms.
The first comment explains the rejection of individual terms such as
'terror', 'terrorism' or 'political terrorism'. Whilst this author sees the
phenomenon as a part of the topic of 'terrorism' or more precisely
'political terrorism', these terms are rejected here for they are
considered too broad in that they fail to distinguish between the actors'
London. 1964.). pp71-100. He seems to prefer the label 'enforcement terror' which he
used in front of the bracketed label 'counterterror i p72. Also Herman "what in western
terrorism semantics is called "counterterror" is in reality a dressed up form of state
(wholesale) terror" Herman E.S. 'U.S. Sponsorship of international Terrorism: An
Overview'. Crime and Social Justice. No.27-28. 1986. pp1-31. p6.
292 See title of Engineer A.A. 'Communal Violence and Police Terror'. Economic and
Political Weekly. Vol.21(9). Mar1.1986. pp382-3.
293 Clark R. 'The Dimensions of Terrorism' in Kochler H. (ed.). Terrorism and National
Liberation. (International Progress Organisation. Peter Lang. Frankfurt. 1988.). pp41-
46. p44.
234 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance:A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p3.
295 Der Derian J. Anti Diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War. (Blackwell, Oxford.
1992.). p111.
296 Thornton T.P. 'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation' in H. Eckstein (ed)
Internal War Problems and Approaches (The Free Press of Glencoe Collier Macmillan
London 1969.). pp71 -100. p73.
297 Perdue W. Terrorism and The State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear.
(Praeger. New York. 1989.). p14.
298 Oppenheimer M. 'Terrorism is Sometimes Justified' in Szumski B. (ed.). Terrorism
• Opposing Viewpoints. (Greenhaven Press. St. Paul. Minnesota. 1986.). pp86-89. p87.
299 For example, Homer F.D. 'Government Terror in the United States: An Explanation
of Containment Policy' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The
Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut.
1984.). pp167-182.uses the terms 'Reign of Terror', "Establishment terrorism'
'Terror from Above' and "Government Terror(which is his preference) , as well as
the term 'Terror' within the title, without distinguishing between them. 82
perpetrating the deeds. However before going on to explain the
rejection of other prefixes or suffixes it is helpful to explain the choice
of the suffix 'terrorism' over 'terror'. In doing so one will have
explained the rejection of approximately half of potential labels. The
decision to choose to use a label with the word 'terrorism' rather than
'terror' within it, was made for two reasons. The primary one being that
it equates the use of such terrorist violence with that by insurgent or
non-state groups. This then allows one to envisage a two part typology
of political terrorism based on the characteristic, by whom?, that is
those in power and those without. The second is that the word terror
already means something else, that is the actual emotion produced300.
So to introduce the same word to describe the process merely confuses
things and is probably the reason that most authors talk of sub state or
insurgency 'terrorism'.
As for the choice of prefix/suffix being the 'state' this too can best be
explained in relation to the alternatives. As noted in the previous
paragraph this author believes that state terrorism can be viewed
alongside insurgency terrorism as the two parts of the concept of
(political) 'terrorism', but that an additional word or number of words
would have to be used in order to distinguish between the two types of
actors in any typology. Schmid for example suggests that a neutral term
such as 'regime terrorism' might be preferable, because the term 'state'
300 Thornton wrote, "[t]he word "terror" has two meanings. The basic one is an
induced state of fear or anxiety within an individual or group of individuals. It is
sometimes called "subjective terror". Derived from this meaning is the use of "terror'
to describe the tool that induces the state of being terrified. This tool is variously
called "terror", "objective terror" and terrorism. Although it would be convenient to
distinguish simply betweeen terror (the psychic state) and terrorism (the tool) this
distinction is not advisible, for frequently "terrorism" and "terror" are used
interchangeably to denote objective terror...Whenever we use the word "terror", it
will be understood to refer to the tool". Thornton T.P. 'Terror as a Weapon of Political
Agitation' in Eckstein H. (ed). Internal War Problems and Approaches (The Free Press
of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan. London. 1964.). pp71-100. p71. Calvert argues that "we
must always distinguish between 'terror' as a technique and 'terrorism' as a belief in
the value of terror". Calvert P. 'Terror in the Theory of Revolution' in O'Sullivan N.
(ed.) Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Books. Brighton. 1986).pp27-
45. p38. N. O'Sullivan himself noted that "[t]error refers to a psychological state -
the state that is , of extreme fear and anxiety. The addition of an "ism', however lifts
the concept out of a realm of psychology and relocates it in the sphere of beliefs and
ideas". O'Sullivan N. 'Terrorism, Ideology and Democracy' in O'Sullivan N. (ed.).
Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Book. Brighton. 1986.). pp3-26. p5.
Sederberg wrote that "we easily confuse the actor (terrorist), the action (terrorism)
and the effect (terror)" Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality.
(University of Southern California. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 1989). p29. 83
refers to a territory, a people, a government; while 'regime' is less broad
excluding territory and most of the population and at the same time does
not cover the whole of government301 . However this author prefers to
use the term the term 'state' precisely because, unlike the alternatives,
it reminds the analyst of the special conceptual problem that this
permanently entails. That is, it highlights the phenomenon which is at
the heart of the conceptual question as to whether or not terrorism by
those in power can exist; and (if so) what distinguishes it from the rest
of the State's use of violence. More specifically, the reason for rejecting
the term 'regime', is that the works on insurgent groups themselves do
not usually distinguish between the different leaderships that the
insurgent groups have over time. The issue of treating like with like is
an important part of this methodology.
As for the other alternatives, the prefix 'government' (and variations of
it) can means various things, as do words such as 'establishment' or
'elite'. Indeed if these latter two were applied one could still see them as
a reference to terrorism carried out by groups representing the
wealthiest section of society. Variations which include the term
'strategies of' suffer from this and are also unnecessarily extrapolated.
The suffix 'from above' is not much better than the former and can also
be read as a spatial dimension (i.e. from aircraft), or moreover
referring to purely internal violence. This latter fault of course also
affects the use of the term 'reign of' and any variations on the theme
which include the term 'internal'.
Those labels which use the with the prefix 'official', 'legalised',
'enforcement', 'legitimised', 'institutionalised' are too narrow in that
they can be read to exclude illegal acts of violence by the state. This
criticism also applies to 'terrorism by public authority' which is also
longwinded vis-a-vis this authors choice. Terms possessing only the
prefix 'police' (or 'military' for that matter) are too specific in regard to
their identification of actors. They also appear to ignore the possibility
that the other may exist, and seem to imply that such actions would be
solely an internal (or perhaps even external) phenomenon.
301 Schmid notes that he is endebted to H.Lobert the Belgian chargé d'affairs in Athens.
Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases
and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p105. 84
The prefix 'state' is also relatively neutral in comparison to the apriori
biased (though perhaps accurate) labels with the words 'primary',
'wholesale', and 'counter' within them. When attached to the term
terrorism the latter prefix is particularly confusing for as already
noted this term is used to describe those various passive and potentially
violent measures implemented to limit the effects of insurgency
terrorism. Whilst as already noted labels such as 'repression' or
'oppression' (or variations of them i.e. 'repressive') could also be
unnecessarily confusing302.
Yet the terms used in the opening chapter have not only identified
these problems but have raised other issues such as, is there a
difference between the states activities within the domestic and
international arena?; and what distinguishes 'state terrorism' from
other concepts such as 'war' and 'law' and human rights?. However the
main lack of consensus within the literature which this thesis is
concerned with is the definition of the phenomena of terrorism by
those in power by whatever label.
302 Also 'War terrorism' has the problem that it could be seen as excluding both
internal state terrorism, as well as such activities in 'peacetime' or without a
declaration of war. Likewise 'endo terrorism' is relatively unknown and requires a
prefix of some kind in order to distinguish it from insurgency terrorism. 85
The Structure of the Thesis. 
In light of these aims the thesis can be seen to be split into two main
parts in addition to this introductory chapter, the concluding chapter
and the appendix. The first consist of a conceptual part, which addresses
the issue of defining state terrorism; the second consists of an
application of various definitions of state terrorism to various Israeli
counter-terrorist actions carried out at home and abroad. It is the
results of these applications along with earlier comments concerning
the strengths and weaknesses of each various definitions which will be
reviewed in the concluding chapter which will (re)assess the idea of
defining the concept of State terrorism as a whole.
The conceptual part which immediately follows this introductory
chapter can be seen to be made up of four chapters. The first of these
entitled "The Problem of Defining", examines the debates surrounding
the possibility of producing such a conceptual definition and the means
to achieve it. The second entitled: "A Legalistic Approach" involves an
examination of the legalistic approaches to defining terrorism and state
terrorism. The third chapter entitled: 'An Analytical Attempt' produces
a definition of sub-state terrorism, whilst simultaneously explaining the
relationship of terrorism to other concepts used to describe this type of
political violence. This is followed by a fourth of these chapters (the
fifth altogether) in which the concept of the State is examined and
fused with the findings of the previous chapter to produce a
comprehensive definition which enables the State to be labelled
terrorist.
The application part can be seen to consist of two chapters. In the first
the various definitions of terrorism are applied to various counter-
terrorist actions of Israel within Israel and the West Bank. In the second
the various definitions of terrorism are applied to various Israeli
counter-terrorist actions committed abroad.
It is line with this overall structure that this thesis will now go on to
look at the problem of defining.
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Chapter 2.
The Problem of Defining
"What words mean few can say, but with words we govern men".
Benjamin Disraeli303
The Need for a Definition
Within the literature on 'terrorism' there is a debate over the actual
need for a definition. Lambert for example has asserted that the "term
"terrorism" is unsatisfactory", presumably because, "[it is emotive,
highly loaded politically and lacking a universally, or even generally-
accep ted definition" 304 Support for the view that there is no generally
accepted definition can be found in the works of Gibbs, Hoffman,
Crenshaw, Thackrah and Farre1 305 as well as Schmid and Jongman who
claimed that: "Nile search for an adequate definition is still on"306.
Schmid and Jongman's conclusion was based on two factors. The first
was their identification of 109 definitions of the term 'terrorism'
produced between 1936 and 1981. The second was the fact the most cited
answer to their question: "Whose Definition of Terrorism Do you find
Adequate for Your Purposes"? was: "There is no adequate definition"307.
303 Harris P. Foundations of Political Science. (Hutchinson. London. 1976.). p53. No
other reference.
304 Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius Publications
Cambridge.1990.). p13.
305 See abstract of Gibbs J.P. 'Conceptualization of Terrorism'. American Sociological
Review. Vol. 54. 1989. pp329-340. o329. It is the rationale behind Hoffman's thesis,
Hoffman R.P. Terrorism A Universal Definition (Claremont Graduate School. Ph.D.
1984). According to Farrell, "Mlle term has no precise and completely accepted
definition". Farrell. W.R. 'Terrorism Is...?'. Naval War College Review. Vol. 33 (3)
1980. pp68-72). p64. Similarly Crenshaw wrote, "there is scarcely any agreement on
the definition of terrorism." Crenshaw M. Revolutionary Terrorism. An Introduction
(Hoover Institute Press. Stanford California. 1978).p6. Thackrah wrote, "[i]n the field
of terrorism there is no agreement about any single definition" Thackrah J.R. The
Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge, Kegan and Paul. London.
1987.).p57. The wording is identical to Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research
Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam.
1984.). p110.
306 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988). p1.
307 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988). p73. Table IV. 87
Although here it should be noted that many, if not most, writers on the
subject appear to avoid this debate, with slightly less avoiding a
definition altogether. An example of an author who avoids the use of a
definition is Heradstrait. After noting that the term 'terrorism' is both
vague and has a variety of meanings, Heradstrait wrote: "I shall not be
trying to define terrorism because I believe that discussions on
definitions do not take us further with the problem with which we are
dealing" 3 ° 8 . Heradstrait is unusual in that he actually justifies his
omission, as is Cooper who claimed that for the most part, the exercise of
defining: "has only an aesthetic appeal at best, while at worst it can be
so inhibiting as to cause a functional seizure"309.
Sederberg has suggested at least one reason for this aversion to define
the term. He noted that when scholars threaten to define their terms,
readers eyes often begin to glaze over for the results of these well-
intentioned efforts are often dry, dead things, or "concept mummies" as
Nietzsche termed them. The result of this is that many academics are
tempted to treat the meanings of commonly-used terms, such as
'politics', 'violence' or 'terrorism' as self-evident and commonly
understood.310
In 1985, Lacquer claimed that ten years of debates on definitions have
not enhanced our knowledge of the subject to a significant degree311,
and elsewhere he claimed that a comprehensive definition of terrorism
308 Heradstrait D. cited without reference by Ezeldin A.G. Terrorism and Political
Violence: An Egyptian Perspective. (University of Illinois. Chicago.1987). p20.
Similarly an anonymous quote cited by Schmid describes Lacquer's work as "a book on
an unidentified subject, so that the author can include whatever he sees fit", Schmid
A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and
Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p420 and Schmid A.P. and Jongman
A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and databases.
(SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988). p3. Similarly Hoffman wrote that Clutterbuck's work
entitled Kidnap and Ransom: The Response completely avoids the problem of formulating
a definition of terrorism. Hoffman R.P. Terrorism A Universal Definition (Claremont
Graduate School. Ph.D. 1984.). p53.
309 Cooper H.H.A. 'Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition'. Chitty's Law
Journal. Vol. 26. (3).1978. pp105-108. p.105.
310 Nietzsche F. The Twilight of the Idols, in Kaufmann W. (ed). The Portable Nietzsche
(Penguin/Viking. Balitimore. 1970.) in Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric
and Reality. (University of Southern California. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 1989.). p3.
However to succumb to such a temptation, argued Sederberg, would be an error.
311 Lacquer in response to Schmid and Jongman's questionnaire Schmid A.P. and
Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and
databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988). p3. 88
which covered all of the varieties that have appeared throughout
history does not exist312 , nor would it be found in the foreseeable
future313 . Yet his answer was not quite as dismissive as that produced
by the 1984 Committee of the French Senate which pronounced that:
"any definition is practically guaranteed to fail" 314. Such a conclusion
was echoed by C.C.O'Brien who said that the labels 'terrorism' and
'terrorist' are not purely analytical terms and cannot be made to work
as such315 . It was his first point that Hocking had in mind when she
argued that:
"academic analyses have generally been built around the question 'what is
terrorism?'. By posing this question and by assuming that it can be answered in
terms of specific attributes, terrorism has been treated as an essentially
analytical term, one for which particular objective features can be pointed as a
defining characteristic 	 'Terrorism' however is not a neutral or purely
descriptive term. In the sense that its understanding is based on perceptions of
legitimacy structured according to a bench-mark of political and social
'normality': 'terrorism' is an ideological construct. As such, the question to be
asked is not the simple one, 'what is terrorism'? but the more complex one of 'how
does the ideological construct of terrorism function?'"316
There can be little doubt that within the everyday exercise of real
political power across the globe, Hocking's conclusion, and that of
Horowitz who claimed that: "the definition of someone who is a terrorist
is purely a labelling device" 317 , is correct. Viewed from this
perspective, it is not difficult to understand both why the public could
312 Lacquer W. Terrorism (Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London.1972.).p7. Similarly
Paust J.J. 'A Definitional Focus' in Alexander. Y and Finger S. (eds). Terrorism:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives. (McGraw-Hill. Maidenhead.1977.). pp18-29. p.20.
313 Lacquer W. Terrorism (Widenfeld and Nicolson. London. 1977). p5.
314 Committee of the French Senate cited without further reference by Kegley C.W.
'The Characteristics of Contemporary International Terrorism' in Kegley C.W.(ed.).
International Terrorism: Characteristics; Causes; Controls. (St.Martin's .New York.
1990). pp11-26. p12.
315 O'Brien C.C. Herod: Reflections on Political Violence p72 cited by Hocking J.
'Orthodox Theories of Terrorism': the Power of Politicised Terminology'. Politics
(Sidney). Nov.1984. pp 103-110. p103.
316 Hocking J. 'Orthodox Theories of Terrorism': the Power of Politicised
Terminology'. Politics (Sidney). Nov.1984. pp 103-110. p103.
317 Horowitz I.L. 'Political Terrorism and State Power'. Journal of Political and
Milititary Sociology. Vol. 1.1973. (no further reference) cited by Thackrah J.R. The
Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge, Kegan and Paul. London.
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become the target of political disinformation by those who crave the
power that such public support (through fear) would allow them; and
how the word terrorism has become what Jenkins terms a "fad word"
used promiscuously and often applied to a variety of acts of violence
which are not strictly terrorism 318 . Hitchens similarly complained that
the term terrorism:
"disguises reality and impoverishes language and makes a banality out of the
discussion of war and revolution and politics. It is the perfect instrument for the
cheapening of public opinion and the intimidation of dissent....Stalin was a
terrorist, Mao was a terrorist, Arabs are terrorist, Europeans are soft on
terrorism, Latins are riddled with it. Whish, Whish, Whish and there goes history,
there goes inquiry, there goes proportion. All is terror. The best that can be said
for this method is that it economises on thought. You simply, unveil it like a
Medusa's head and turn all discussion into stone"319.
This assertion that 'terrorism' is a term of political discourse and as such
is often employed for political effect in the same way as the terms such
as 'democracy' and 'freedom' are employed in the political arena,
constitutes one of the three dimensions to the definition problem noted
by Thomas and Stanley 320 . The second point noted by Thomas and
Stanley was the claim that whilst commentators often eschew overtly
political usage, and recognise a question of value and neutrality, they
may nevertheless find it impossible to escape from positions profoundly
influenced by their political and cultural environments 321 . According
to Thomas and Stanley this factor produces the third and more general
318 Jenkins B.M. 'The Study of Terrorism: The Definitional Problem'. in Alexander Y.
and Gleason J.M. (eds.) Behavioural and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism.
(Pergamon Press. Oxford. 1981.). pp3-10. p3.
319 Hitchens C. 'Wanton Acts of Usage' Harper's, September. 1986. p68-69 cited in
Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. (University of Southern
California. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 1989). p26.
320 Thomas P.A. and Standley T. 'Classifying Terrorism' in Kochler H. (ed.). Terrorism
and National Liberation. (International Progress Organisation. Peter Lang. Frankfurt.
1988.). Pp67-78. p67.
321 Thomas P.A. and Standley T. 'Classifying Terrorism' in Kochler H. (ed.). Terrorism
and National Liberation. (International Progress Organisation. Peter Lang. Frankfurt.
1988.). pp67-78. p67.
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dimension; whether it is possible to attain objectivity in the sense of
aiming at an absolute, universal truth or criterion322.
Other authors can be seen to be in agreement with this third point
albeit for other reasons. For example in discussing the concept of state
terrorism with regard to India, Singh claimed:
"In a class divided, exploitative society like ours, on all important issues in
philosophy as in real life, neutrality is an illusion ... An explanation thus always
has a 'value slope', it determines the prescription as we/1"323.
Likewise Cooper claimed that a "colourless" definition is a contradiction
in terms; the representation derives meaning and significance only
through, and only from, the thought processes of the definer324 . For
Cooper, the task of defining is undertaken in order to give meaning or
significance to an idea or some aspect of reality: "the problem of
definition begins with the definition of the problem" 325 . He goes on to
say that the business of definition takes on importance when we find it
necessary to relate ourselves and others to some abstraction, or reality;
it is thus a necessary part of meaningful communication. Like any
other, the word 'terrorism' is invested in meaning and significance as a
result of the process of human reasoning. Reality is, as it were, filtered
through the human mind and it is inevitably changed in the process.
For Cooper definitions are therefore always coloured by the subjectivity
of the definer. For, however artificially neutral they seek to make their
picture, what is presented will always bear traces of their fundamental
premises or technique in trying to eradicate them326.
322 Thomas P.A. and Standley T. 'Classifying Terrorism' in Kochler H. (ed.). Terrorism
and National Liberation. (International Progress Organisation. Peter Lang. Frankfurt.
1988.). pp67-78. p67.
323 Singh R. 'Terrorism, State Terrorism and Democratic Rights'. Economic and
Political Weekly. Vol. 27 (6). Feb. 8. 1992. pp 279-289. p279.
324 Cooper H.H.A. 'Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition'. Chitty's Law
Journal. Vol. 26. No3.1978. pp105-108. p106
325 Cooper H.H.A. 'Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition'. Chitty's Law
Journal. Vol. 26. No3.1978. pp105-108. p105.
326 Cooper H.H.A. 'Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition'. Chitty's Law
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Jenkins unknowingly supports Thomas and Standly's first two points,
indeed he can be seen to illustrate the overlap between the first and
second parts of the problem of defining when he wrote:
"If one group can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it
has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral and political point of view or at
least reject the terrorist's view. Terrorism is what the bad guys do. This drawing of
boundaries between what is legitimate and what is illegitimate, between the right
way to fight and the wrong way to fight brings high political stakes to the task of
definition"327.
The term 'terrorism' then signifies an element of political and moral
evaluation in its every use - it both describes and proscribes328.
Likewise, Bonante claimed that deciding whether an action is terrorist:
"is more the result of a verdict than the establishing of a fact; the
formulating of a social judgement rather than the description of a set of
phenomena" 329.
These last three comments, highlight what this author considers to be
the crux of the problem of defining the word 'terrorism' . At the heart
of any analysis of the use of the term is the fact that the concept of
terrorism undoubtedly carries with it (the clearly pejorative)
implications of illegitimacy 330 . The conventional view of terrorism is to
treat it as a special type of deviant behaviour and as a result the term
'terrorism' is viewed alongside that 'crime' and 'international
aggression' as abnormal, unacceptable and illegal forms of
behaviour 331 . It is because most definitions are predicated on the
327 Jenkins B. International Terrorism: The Other World War. (Rand. Santa Monica.
California. 1985.) in Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality.
(University of Southern California. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 1989.). p23.
328 Hocking J.	 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Institutionalising Political Order'.
Australian Quarterly. Vol. 58 (3). 1987. pp297-307. p297.
3 28 Bonante L. 'Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism' Journal of Peace
Research. 16 (3). 1979. p198 cited by Hocking J. 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism:
Institutionalising Political Order'. Australian Quarterly. Vol. 58 (3). 1987. pp297-307.
p297.
330 Wilkinson P. 'Some Observations on the Relationships between Terrorism and
Freedom' in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.) Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward
Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.).pp44-53. p46.
331 Purkett H. 'Dealing with Terrorism: Deterrence and the Search for an Alternative
Model' in Banks M.(ed) Conflict in World Society. (St. Martin's Press. 1984.). p162.
cited by Kegley C.W. Jnr., Sturgeon T.V. and Wittkopf E.R. 'Structural Terrorism: The
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assumption that some classes of political violence are justifiable
(legitimate), while others, including terrorism, are not that 'terrorism'
is seen primarily as a moral problem332 . This results in authors such as
Calvert writing that, "[n]othing justifies the use of terror in any
circumstances it is always morally unacceptable" 3 33.
The overall result is that a number of analysts appear to have begun at
the end with prescription, rather than at the beginning with
description and definition. Wilkins claimed that: "some of the
definitions we have are simply condemnations of terrorism" 334 . He sees
this question of morality as one of the main problems that plagues
discussions on terrorism. A point also noted by Provizer who suggested
that if one took away the emotive connections of the term, the
definitional disagreements would fade in significance 335 . Whilst Bell
goes further in suggesting that the very word terror may also be a
hindrance in the investigation of violence 336 . Unsurprisingly Wilkins
overcomes this potential problem by becoming one of the few analysts
to state that "terrorism can under certain circumstances be morally
Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.1988) pp 1 3-34. p13.
Support can be seen to be gained from the words of Falk, "regardless of historical rule
or normative vision recourse to political violence of a terrorist character can never be
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simply its severity but its amorality...Indiscriminate terror can never in principle, be
morally justified. "Wilkinson P. 'Three Questions on Terrorism' Government and
Opposition Vol.8 (3) Summer 1973. pp290-312. p292.
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(Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1982.). p4.
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Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Books. Brighton. 1986.).pp27-45. p41.
334 Wilkins B T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992).
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33 5 Provizer N.W. 'Defining Terrorism' in Slann M. and Schechterman B. (eds).
Multidimensional Terrorism. (Lynne Rotienner. Boulder. 1987). pp3 -10. p9.
336 Bell J.B. 'Terror: An Overview' in Livingstone M.H. (ed.). International Terrorism
in the Contemporary World. (Greenwood Press. Westport. Connecticut.). p26 cited by
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justifiable" 337 . Whilst Provizer states that no definition can solve the
moral dilemma connected to terrorism when terrorism is seen as a
moral problem 338 . Such an overall reading is echoed by Duvall and
Stohl who claimed that:
"Terrorism is an emotive word. Few of us hear it or speak it neutrally. Rather, we
use it generally to provide emotive meaning for the interpretation of actions. As a
consequence, emotive and denotative (or analytical) features are intermixed in
usage. We tend, on the one hand, to over extend the reasonable bounds of the
concept by labelling as terrorism any and all repugnant and/or violent actions by
"bad actors" and on the other hand, artificially to collapse conceptual bounds by
failing to use the term to refer to actions when denotative criteria are satisfied but
when actors or the context of action do not engender the appropriate emotional
response" 339
Following this examination of the problem of defining, the issue then
becomes: 'Should we continue to search for a definition of terrorism?",
or 'Should we just accept as reality the clichés, "I am a freedom fighter,
he is a terrorist", and "one man's terrorist is another man's patriot?"340.
337 Wilkins B T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.).
p6. Others who claim that terrorism can under certain circumstances be morally
justified include Hughes who wrote: "Dr. Walzer in a brilliant passage condemns
terrorism. I wish I could unequivocably agree with him". Hughes M. 'Terrorism and
National Security'. Philosophy. Vol. 57. 1982. pp5-25. p47. Similarly V. Held wrote
"we can rule out the view that terrorism is by definition always morally wrong" Held
V. 'Terrorism, Rights and Political Goals' in Frey R.G. and Morris C.W. (eds). Violence,
Terrorism and Justice. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1991.). pp59-85.
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by reference to ends (freedom); further, there is no necessary connection between the
two, for terror may be used for ends other than freedom, and freedom may be fought
for by nonterroristic means". Warner M. and Crisp.R. 'Introduction' in Warner M. and
Crisp R. (eds.) Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward Elgar. Aldershot.1990.).ppl -
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This author believes there is reason to continue in search for a
definition of terrorism. A view which is supported by the majority of
respondents to Schmid's question:
"Do you find that endeavours to come to commonly-agreed-upon definitions in the
field of Political violence in general and Terrorism in particular are: a) a waste of
time; b) necessary precondition for cumulative research; c) other".
Only six of the 50 respondents chose "a waste of time", 28 chose a
"necessary precondition for cumulative research" and 13 chose
"other" 341 . Like the majority who replied to Schmid's question, this
author is not convinced that the potential problems already identified
outweigh the benefit of producing and using a definition. Other authors
also appear to support this view. Wilkinson for example has argued
that: " [m]ost political-strategic concepts are slippery and elude easy
definition. But that does not mean that we cannot or should not use
them". 342 Although an 'honest' attempt at producing and applying a
'slippery' definition should not be confused with the deliberate and
cynical use of flexibility in labelling 'terrorism'. An example of the
cynical use of flexibility is that quantitative study of terrorist victims
carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1981. It was then that
the Reagan administration ordered the C.I.A. to study the frequency of
terrorist incidents against U.S. citizens, apparently in the hope of
showing an increase in order to justify more aggressive measures than
those taken by the previous Carter administration. However after the
agency concluded that such attacks were declining the Government
ordered the C.I.A. to do a new study using a broader definition of
terrorism. This second study showed terrorism on the rise!343
Wilkinson is also useful to quote in opposition to another of the
potential problems raised by Thomas and Stanley. For Wilkinson:
341 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p8.
342 Wilkinson P. 'Some Observations on the Relationships between Terrorism and
Freedom' in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.) Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward
Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp44-53. p44.
343 Quigley J. 'Government Vigilantes at Large: The Dangers to Human Rights From
Kidnapping Suspected Terrorists'. Human Rights Quarterly. Vol.10 (2).1988. pp193-
213. p210. Not to mention its application to our enemies' actions only. 95
"The notion that we should be aiming to restrict ourselves to using a strictly 'value
free' language of politics is based on a fundamental mistake. We cannot escape the
context of our humanity, values, beliefs and experience. Nor can we use our
concepts meaningfully unless we relate them to a specific context"344.
Finally in reply to Thomas and Standby's remaining point, it is credible
to claim that if one subtracts the moral point from this concept (or
other contested political concepts) then we would simultaneously
subtract the rationale for grouping its various components within the
rubric of the concept! 345
 Indeed for Connelly, the author of these
words, it is precisely the dialectical relation between the criteria of a
concept and its (moral) point or purpose in our language which makes
such contested concepts the subject of intense dispute.346
This thesis then goes along with Sederberg and like minded authors
such as Sloan who have asserted that: "one can and must devise
objective criteria to study, incidents of terrorism" 347 . For as Schmid and
Jongman recognised, the lack of one: "plays into the hands of those
experts from the operational anti-terrorist camp who have a 'we-know-
it-when-we-see-it' attitude, that easily leads to double standards" 348 . It is
also in agreement with Gibbs who argued that it is: "manifestly absurd
to pretend to study terrorism without at least some kind of definition of
it" 349 . The reasons being that rigorous standards of definition are
required for such tasks as scholarly investigation or legal codification,
344 Wilkinson P. 'Some Observations on the Relationships between Terrorism and
Freedom' in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.) Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward
Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp44-53. p44. He adds: "This point has long been conceded by
the mainstream thinkers in contemporary social science. See for example Berger 1963
and Runciman 1963)".
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government . Connolly W.E. The Terms of Political Discourse. (D.C.Heath. Toronto.
1974.). p27-29
346 Connolly W.E. The Terms of Political Discourse. (D.C.Heath. Toronto. 1974.). p29.
347 Sloan. S. 'International Terrorism: Academic Quest, Operational Art and Policy
Implications' Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 32(1). 1978. p2. cited by Hocking J.
'Orthodox Theories of Terrorism': the Power of Politicised Terminology'. Politics
(Sidney). Nov.1984. pp 103-110. pl 03.
348 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p1.
348 Gibbs J.P. 'Conceptualization of Terrorism'. American Sociological Review. Vol.
54. June. 1989. pp329-340. p329. 96
and policy preparation350 . Without isolating terrorism from other
forms of political violence, there can be no systematic observation351,
uniform data collection, effective analysis or responsible theory
building on terrorism352 . Policy makers would therefore have
difficulty in targeting resources effectively against the problem,
especially in co-operation with other nations with whom discussions
could be made at cross-purposes. Whilst the legal profession would be in
danger of doing nothing, or doing too much, and by antagonising more
people than they had hoped could create another problem for
themselves.
Thus, this author has found reason enough to attempt to produce a
definition of terrorism. It also seems necessary to construct the most
'apolitical' definition that is possible. It is in this light that this paper
attempts to produce a definition of terrorism that allows the State (of
whatever political hue) to be labelled terrorist, if it performs such
actions in accordance with the requirements of the definition. That is, it
aims to identify a definition that does not advance any particular
political preference; that can identify an act of (State) terrorism
occurring in any setting, regardless of the nature of the (political)
motive, and against any target.
350 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (New York Press. New York. 1979.).
p173. cited by Hoffman R.P. Terrorism A Universal Definition (Claremont Graduate
School. Ph.D. 1984). p5
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Producine A Definintion Of 'Terrorism' 
"Everyone knows what terrorism is - until they attempt to define it".
S. Segaller353.
Whilst this thesis takes the view that one can define the political
concept 'terrorism', it must be noted that there are debates about the
nature of any definition, and how one is produced. For example,
Robinson in his book Definition, not only listed 12 of, what he described
as, the most famous answers to the question: "What is the Definition of
'Definition'" 354, but he also listed 18 "names for sorts of definitions"355.
Whilst in an article entitled 'How to Define Terrorism', Teichman wrote
there are three different ways in which we might try to reach an
agreed and useful description or definition. The first was what she
termed an "ordinary language definition"; the second being a "wide
stipulative definition" and the third a "narrow stipulative
definition" 356 . The type of definition which is to be produced here is
what Robinson termed a "stipulative" definition. The main alternative to
which is the straightforward dictionary or "lexical" definition. In
explaining a preference for a stipulative, rather than a lexical,
definition it is helpful to note Teichman who wrote:
"we ought to reject attempts to arrive at a definition based on (current) ordinary
language ....The ordinary current use of the word terrorism is much too
wide....What is more, the speakers and writers of ordinary language disagree among
themselves about which phenomena should go on to the list"357.
Robinson went on to say by the term "stipulative definition" he meant
"establishing or announcing or choosing one's own meaning for a
word" 358 . Whilst Teichman fails to explain how one distinguishes
Books. London.353 SegaIler S.	 Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s. (Sphere
1987) . p11.
354 Robinson. R. Definition (Clarendon. Oxford. 1950.). p2-3.
355 Robinson. R. Definition (Clarendon. Oxford. 1950.). p7.
356 Teichman J. "How To Define Terrorism'. Philosophy. Vol. 64. 1989 p505-517.
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357 Teichman J. "How To Define Terrorism'. Philosophy. Vol. 64. 1989 p505-517.
p505.
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between a narrow and wide stipulative definition, except to say that:
"considerations of clarity, and the 'flavour' of the word, support a
narrow definition" 359 . This author believes that his constitutes a
narrow stipulative definition, but will leave this up to the reader to
decide, because the main question is "Why do we stipulate?". Robinson
replied to this question by saying that one stipulates when the primary
purpose:
"is to establish the rule that a certain word signifies a certain thing....The most
obvious advantage we may hope to gain by stipulation is the removal of an
ambiguity and the avoidance of an inconvenience caused by the ambiguity....The
greatest good to be obtained by stipulative definitions....is the improvement of
concepts or the creation of new concepts"360.
The question then becomes: 'How does one go about producing a
definition?', and as Berstein and Dyer noted in their introduction to
political science methods, there are no firm rules to follow that will
ensure clear definitions, nor are there tests that allow us to evaluate the
clarity of definitions. Instead researchers must simply strive to
maximise the communication which means they must use extreme care
in defining the properties 361 . Ponton and Gill, the authors of another
general politics book are a little more useful. They claim that first we
search for, and then try to understand, the meanings recognised
authorities have given to the idea. Then we attempt to discover any
'core' meaning which has been ascribed to it by all, or most,
authorities 362 . In this way they are proposing to investigate lexical
definitions before stipulating, and one can see this method in action
when terrorologists investigated the etymology of the term 363 . Another
useful set of suggestions is that made by Skubiszewski within an article
specifically on the definition of terrorism. He noted that:
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"The very notion of "definition" has more than one meaning. First,
there is the classical definition in the sense which that term has in
logic: definitio per genus et differentiam. Here one would show the
features that terrorism shares with a broader category of occurrences
and those which form that category.. ..However, even if one is successful
in that task, the classical definition should be supplemented by the
enumeration of various acts that constitute terrorism"364.
This study aims to satisfy both of Skubiszewski's demands. First it
attempts to identify the features that terrorism shares with a broader
category of occurrences and those which form that category. Secondly
it then applies it, and other suggested definitions of state terrorism to
various counter-terrorist activities of Israel. However this author is of
the opinion that the identification of properties inherent within a
'stand-alone' concept is not enough, at least for the purpose of this
thesis if not per se. For a definition of (state) terrorism to be useful it is
necessary to explain the concept vis-a-vis other political concepts with
which it is often confused. Or as Wilkinson put it:
"One must begin by attempting some conceptual clarification. How is terrorism to
be defined?. What differentiates terrorism from other forms of organised
violence?"365.
This method also seems to be accord with the requirements of Raymond
Williams the author of the book Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and
Society when he wrote, to: "apply any word to the world, we need to
have a clear grasp of both its sense and its reference."366
Schmid also dwelt heavily on the question of definition within both of
his research guides on the topic of political terrorism, and it is his
methodology as described within his second research guide which was
364 Skubiszewski K. 'Definition of Terrorism'. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol.
19. 1987. pp39-54. p39.
365 Wilkinson P. 'Three Questions on Terrorism' Government and Opposition Vol.8 (3)
Summer 1973. pp290-312. p291.
366 Williams R. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London Fontana
1976) cited without page reference by Skinner Q. 'Language and Political Change' in
T.Ball (ed) Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge. 1989.). Pp6-23. p10. 100
written with Jongman. This author feels this is particularly useful. Here
they wrote:
"A definition is basically an equation: an new, unknown or ill understood term
(the definiendum) is described (defined) by a combination of at least two old,
known, understandable terms (the definiens). The most primitive non-scientific
definitions use only one element. They are not real definitions but synonyms,
translations, tautologies or mere labels. Examples would be "terrorism = crime" or
"terrorism = communism". Definitions with two or three elements are for instance
"terrorism = political murder", "terrorism + violence for political purposes". As
one adds more elements the definition becomes less ambiguous" 367 .
Such noting of components, phenomena or essential elements within a
definition of terrorism, is a very popular methodology within the
academic literature. For example in answer to his own question: "How
can the concept of terrorism be delineated?", Townsend wrote:
"In the first place by emphasising (as Thornton and Walter did) the centrality of
fear itself. Second by stressing the systematic nature of the fear-inducing violence
used. Third, by insisting that the mark of terrorism as a method is its reliance on
the sufficiency of the non-physical effects" 368 .
Unfortunately this does not explain which elements should be included,
nor how many should be included. Schmid himself concluded that
there is no agreement in the field of terrorism about any single
definition and he noted that authors within the 109 definitions he
identified used on average eight elements 369 . However Schmid also
noted there is: "considerable agreement about the main element which
definitions should contain" 370. According to Schmid these were the ten
most frequently cited elements in the 109 definitions which were also
and the ten most frequently mentioned elements in the definitions
367 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p6.
368 Townsend C. 'The Process of Terror in Irish Politics' in O'Sullivan N. (ed.)
Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Books. Brighton. 1986). p88-111.
p91
369 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p6.
370 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p110. 101
supplied in reply to his questionnaire in his list371
. The relevance of all
of this is that even if one accepts these ten elements as the limit to the
possible number of words that could conceivably be placed on the right
hand side of the equation 'terrorism =" -and there is no definitive
reason to do so372 as many definitions do not fall within these
parameters- a simple mathematical formula 373 reveals why it is
impossible for the author to produce a definition of terrorism by simply
examining all of the potential options. Using just ten elements in this
way, the number of potential answers to the question "terrorism="
would be 1023. Whilst if one were to examine all of the possibilities,
when the number of elements was the full 22 found in Schmid's table,
then the figure is extremely large at 4,194,303. After producing such an
answer it is easy to agree with Hoffman, Ludwikowski and Thackrah's
view that it is easier to identify what is not terrorism than to attempt to
label exactly what is374 (although this author is not claiming that they
were contemplating this problem, when they said this).
The problem then is that if there are so many potential definitions of
terrorism that an examination of each is beyond the scope of this work,
by what method is this thesis to try to produce its answer? The answer
371 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p110.
372 Schmid and Jongman wrote 'The question is whether the above list contains all the
elements necessary for a good definition. The answer is probably: "No". Some elements
overlap, while others might be missing. The more popular elements might not be the
most important ones. How can we know?". Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political
Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC.
Amsterdam. 1988.).p4.
373 The figure is that which is gained after working out all of the various permutations
using 10 different variables. It is easy to see how this large final result came about
using only three elements (a,b,c) rather than 10 or 22 variables. If there were only
three potential variables the number of potential answers to the question "terrorism ="
would be 7, that is a, ab, ac, abc, b, bc, c. Here the author uses the formula and
results kindly provided by Ms. Lorraine Howe, teacher of Mathematics. That is one can
form groups of r objects from n in nCr = 111/ (n-r)!r! ways (! means factorial).
374 Thackrah wrote, "[i]t is easier to identify that which is not terror than attempt to
label exactly that which is". Thackrah J.R. The Encyclopedia of Terrorism and
Political Violence. (Routledge, Kegan and Paul. London. 1987.). p58. Hoffman in the
last sentence to his thesis on the topic of defining the term terrorism wrote, "[i]n
conclusion the observation may be offered that it is often easier to identify that which
is not terrorism than to attempt to label exactly that which is". Hoffman R.P.
Terrorism A Universal Definition (Claremont Graduate School. Ph.D. 1984). p197.
Ludwikowski wrote, "instead of looking for a trivial, one sentence-long description of
this complicated phenomenon we should consider "what is not" terrorism".
Ludwikowski R.R. 'Aspects of Terrorism: Personal Reflections'. Terrorism: An
International Journal. Vol.10(3). 1987. pp175-184. p182 102
is to try to identify a core meaning to the notion of sub-state terrorism
(and other concepts which are not terrorism but which it is often
confused or associated) by examining each of the 22 elements (or
definiens ) contained within the 109 definitions collated by Schmid, and
to ask questions of them, before attempting to incorporated any core
meaning into a definition of state terrorism. So whilst this method does
not guarantee the correct answer, it provides a solid foundation from
which to start an investigation. The 22 'elements' used by academics375
are:
375 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p76-77. Table V entitled
"Frequencies of Definitional Elements". 103
Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions
1. Violence, force 83.5 %
2. Political 65 %
3. Fear, terror emphasised 51 %
4. Threat 47 %
5. (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions 41.5 %
6. Victim-target differentiation 37.5 %
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organised action 32 %
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic 30.5 %
9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules
without humanitarian constraints
30 %
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28 %
11. Publicity aspect 21.5 %
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character;
indiscrimination
21 %
13. Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders
as victims
17.5 %
14. Intimidation 17 %
15. Innocence of victims emphasised 15.5 %
16. Group, movement, organisation as perpetrator 14 %
17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others 13.5 %
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness
of occurrence of violence
9 %
19. Clandestine, covert nature 9 %
20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of
violence
7 %
21. Criminal 6 %
22. Demands made on third parties 4 %
In addition to defining an act of terrorism, before incorporating it with
the notion of the State, it is hoped that this sieve-like process of
elimination will simultaneously distinguish terrorism (including state
terrorism) from the other political concepts with which it is often
associated such as war, guerrilla warfare, war crimes, riots,
assassination and genocide, and the violence that is used to enforce the
(non-terrorist) law.
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Finally it is worth noting that is necessary to avoid qualifying terms,
'often', 'mainly', 'generally', and 'usually' which are often attached to
the term for such qualifiers allow for the injection of personal views in
deciding whether a particular act is or is not 'terrorist'376.
The first ingredient into the sieving process is that factor of 'crime',
which was one of the 22 elements noted by authors in Schmid's analysis
of 109 definitions. Although it was mentioned in only 6% of the
definitions recorded by Schmid, it is examined here at the start because
it constitutes the foundation of many works on the topic, even if many
of the terrorologists are not aware of this. Therefore rather than solely
and immediately asking "Does terrorism= crime", and examining
terrorism's relationship to this element (as will occur with many of the
elements), this thesis will first of all examine existing legal attempts to
define terrorism, in order to show why this author prefers the
analytical approach to the 'legalistic' approach, which according to
Ezeldin, constitutes its main alternative3 77
 .
376 Thackrah J.R. The Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge,
Kegan and Paul. London. 1987.). p54-55. An example of such a definition is that of the
U.S. State Department, which reads; "The term "terrorism" means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience". U.S. State
Department. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993. (Department of State Publication
10136, Office of the Secretary Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.)
377 Ezeldin A.G. Terrorism and Political Violence: An Egyptian Perspective.
(University of Illinois. Chicago.1987.). p19, 21. 105
Chapter 3.
A Legalistic Approach. 
This section attempts to constitute the 'legalistic' approach to
identifying the concept of terrorism (including that committed by the
State) noted in the previous chapter by Ezeldin, and to provide a basis
for examining the question "Does terrorism =crime?". This section
therefore examines national, bilateral and international attempts to
produce legislation to 'counter-terrorism', before examining the
definitions of those author's who suggest that a definition of state
terrorism which incorporates a particular piece of international law.
National Legal Attempts to Counter - Terrorism.
Although numerous nation-states have produced legislation to counter
acts of terrorism, it is almost impossible for this author to acquire all
the criminal statutes of the existing 180 or so nation-states in order to
examine all references to the term 'terrorism'. Instead this chapter has
to rely upon secondary sources in order to identify national legal
references to the term. Given the nature of municipal law and the way
in which it is produced it is not surprising that the secondary literature
read by this author does not contain a reference to any nation
producing a crime of 'state terrorism'. However a few states have
adopted specific legislation to counter what they term 'terrorism',
although most states prosecute those who could be described as
'terrorists' under existing statutes which cover the offences of murder,
kidnapping or explosives etc. 378 . Even those "exceptions to the norm" as
Murphy calls those States which have adopted specific 'anti-terrorist'
statues, do not always define the term 'terrorism' within their
legislation379 . For example in 1975, Pakistan adopted legislation directed
towards the "suppression of terrorist activities" which did not define the
378 Murphy J.F. 'Defining international terrorism: A Way Out Of The Quagmire'. Israel
Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19. 1989. pp13-37. p23.
379 Murphy J.F. 'Defining international terrorism: A Way Out Of The Quagmire'. Israel
Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19. 1989. pp13-37. p23. 106
term 3 80 . Instead many countries which have introduced special
counter-terrorist legislation have merely outlawed specific groups or
particular acts which reflect the form of their terrorist problem.
Israel's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance for example, fails to define
the term -although it is possible to derive one from its definition of a
terrorist organisation 3 81 . The ordinance automatically proscribes as
terrorists any group whose members commit acts of violence, in
addition to allowing the government to proscribe any organisation382.
Finally, even in the few cases where the national legislation does
produce a definition of the term 'terrorism' within the counter-terrorist
legislation they are often very questionable because they merely
reflect the nature and form of that particular political problem which
their legislators faced. An obvious example of this is apartheid South
Africa's Internal Security act of 1982, which stated that:
"(1) Any person who with intent to-
(a) overthrow or endanger the State authority in the Republic;
(b) achieve, bring about or promote any constitutional , political
industrial, social aim or change in the Republic;
(c) induce the Government of the Republic to do or to abstain from doing
any act or to adopt or to abandon a particular standpoint; or
(d) put in fear or demoralise the general public, a particular population
group or the inhabitants of a particular area in the Republic, or induce the said
public or such population group or inhabitants to do or to abstain from doing any
act, in the Republic or elsewhere-
(i) commits an act of violence or threatens or attempts to do so;
(ii) performs any act which is aimed at causing, bringing about, promoting
or contributing towards such act or threat of violence, or attempts, consents or
takes any steps to perform such act;
380 Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975. Se. 54(1) in
Alexander Y. and Nanes A. (eds.). Legislative Responses to Terrorism. 1986 p155 cited
by Murphy J.F. 'Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out Of The Quagmire'. Israel
Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19. 1989. pp13-37. p24.
381 Israel's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 1948 declares that "Terrorist
organisation" means a body of persons resorting in its activities to acts of
violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or threats of such acts of
violence".
382 Section 7 automatically proscribes as terrorists any group whose members
commit acts of violence. Section 8 allows the Government to identify and proscribe
specific organisations. 107
(iii) conspires with any other person to commit, bring about or perform any
act or threat referred to in paragraph (i) or any act referred to in paragraph (ii),
or to aid in the commission, bringing about or performance thereof; or
(iv) incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures
any person to commit, bring about or perform such act or threat, shall be guilty of
the offence of terrorism and liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by
law for the offence of treason."383
Another example of this method is provided by the 'all embracing'
definition contained within both the UK's Prevention of Terrorism Act
and the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act. A definition
which is equally applicable to the State's threat or use of violence to
uphold its counter-terrorist laws. For within these two pieces of
legislation the term 'terrorism' means:
"the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear" 384.
Generally speaking the attempts of national legal entities to produce
counter-terrorist legislation contribute little to the quest for a
definition of terrorism or state terrorism. The main reason for this is
that a nation's politicians are primarily interested in producing a
stipulative definition which solves the particular political problem
which they face. As a result counter-terrorist legislation does not need
to concern itself with the nuances of an universally applicable
academic definition (indeed it does not even need to produce a definition
of terrorism). Instead the State usually labels as terrorism the actions,
organisations and sometimes even aims, of those who it perceives as a
threat in order to deal with this de-legitimised enemy within.
383 Internal Security Act 1982 54(1) in Alexander Y. and Nanes A. (eds.). Legislative
Responses to Terrorism. 1986 p189, 202 cited by Murphy J.F. 'Defining International
Terrorism: A Way Out Of The Quagmire'. Israel Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19.
1989. pp13-37.p24. [My emphasis].
384 Section 9(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974.
Section 28(1) of Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act 1973. 108
Bilateral and Regional Legal Treaties.
Following the examination of the national counter-terrorist legislation
Murphy's conclusion that "[n]o bilateral agreement contains a
definition of international terrorism" 383 is hardly unexpected. Nor is it
a surprise that neither of the three existing regional conventions to
combat international terrorism have attempted to define the term386.
Likewise neither a bi-lateral or regional agreement has yet to produce a
crime of 'state terrorism'. Instead the regional conventions produced by
the Organisation of American States and the Council of Europe -'The
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the
Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that Are of
International Significance' and 'The European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism' - merely list a series of crimes that state
parties are to exclude from the political offence exception to their
extradition treaties between themselves 387 . Whilst the other regional
agreement -'The Agreement Concerning the Application of the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism among the
Member States'- is, as its title suggests, simply a mechanism for
promoting the application of the European Convention within the
European Union as this regional body is now called388.
Within the E.U. itself, the inter-governmental TREVI (Terrorism,
Radicalism, Extremism and Political Violence) group did produce a
385 Murphy J.F. 'Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out Of The Quagmire'. Israel
Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19. 1989. pp13-37. p22. So although numerous nations
states have produced legislation to counter acts of terrorism, include some which
defines the term, it is impossible for this author to examine each of the definitions
produced for a number of reasons. The first is that this author has to rely upon
secondary sources in order to identify such examples, the alternative whcih is to
acquiring all the criminal statutes of the existing 180 or so nation states in order to
identify any reference to the term 'terrorism' is far too long and complicated for this
thesis.
386 The Convention of Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that Are of International Significance (2
February 1971): European Convention on the Suppression of Terrroism (27 January
1977): Agreement Concerning the Application of the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism among the Member States (4 December 1979) respectfully.
387 Murphy J.F. 'Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out Of The Quagmire'. Israel
Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19. 1989. pp13-37. p20-21.
388 Murphy J.F. 'Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out Of The Quagmire'. Israel
Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19. 1989. ppl 3-37. p21 109
definition for their own workings, although not strictly speaking a
legally enforceable one. TREVI defined terrorism as the use, or the
threatened use, by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of
warfare) to effect political aims 389. Presumably TREVI does not consider
states to constitute "cohesive groups of individuals", otherwise it would
have to consider the use of violence by its constituent states to enforce
their laws the acts of terrorism.
International Legal Attempts to Define Terrorism. 
In contrast to some national attempts, 'international public law' has
failed to produce either specific counter-terrorism legislation never
mind a definition of what constitutes (international) terrorism'. Indeed
it has been argued that the international organisation known as the
United Nations has yet to produce any international law which
legitimises a states use of violence in response to international
terrorism. A view which will be examined later.
At first glance such claims are a little surprising given both the history
of attempts to deal with the problem of international terrorism, and the
fact there has been more international legislation produced since the
second world war than in the rest of recorded history. Yet on reflection
the conclusions are hardly surprising given the 'inter-national' nature
of its production process. However what this author does find
surprising is the fact that the issue of 'state terrorism' was actually
raised within an international organisation. It is primarily for this
reason as well as the fact that it might produce useful insights into a
definition of insurgency terrorism, that this thesis proceeds to give a
detailed examination of the debates on international terrorism that took
place within the League of Nations and United Nations.
International Organisations And Terrorism: A History
389 Schmid cites Handelingen (Dutch Parliamentary Proceedings) I, 1986/87, Bilagen
19700, Hoofdstuk VI nr.30, p5 as cited in Peter Klerks, Terruer Bestrijiding in
Nederland 1970-1988 (Amsterdam: Ravijn, 1989.). p22. Schmid A.P. 'The Response
Problem as a Definition Problem' in Schmid A.P. and Crelinsten R.C. (ed.). Western
Responses to Terrorism. (Frank Cass. London. 1993.). pp7-13. p9. 110
Attempts by global legal entities to produce legislation to combat
terrorism can be traced as far back as the inter-war years, during
which a number of International Conferences for the Unification of
Penal Law were held under League of Nations auspices. It was at the
Third (Brussels) International Conference for the Unification of Penal
Law (26-30 June 1930) that the term 'terrorism' was used for the first
time in an international penal instrument to refer to the activities of
individuals 390 . However neither a convention, nor any other binding
steps were taken at the conference391.
Four years later the Council of the League of Nations resolved that states
had a duty not to encourage or tolerate terrorist activity in their
territory which was directed against other States 392 . More importantly
1934 also saw the assassinations of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the
French foreign minister Barthou in Marseilles on October 9th. These
killings can be seen as the catalyst for the successful production of two
international covenants relating to terrorism. Following the killings,
the League of Nations established a committee of experts to produce a
draft convention to repress such 'crimes', and as a result of the progress
it made in its three sessions between 1935 and 1938, the League
sponsored a conference on terrorism at Geneva in November 1935.93
Here two new pieces of legislation on the issue were produced and made
available to signatories. The first was 'The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism' which was directed mainly at
crimes against heads of state and other public officials. It also required
participating states to prevent and punish acts of terrorism which were
defined as:
390 Franck T. and Lockwood B. 'Preliminary Thougts Towards an International
Convention on Terrorism ' American Journal of International Law Vol. 68. p69, 73 n
23 1974. Cited by Murphy J.F. 'Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out Of The
Quagmire'. Israel Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 19. 1989. pp13-37. p14-15.
391 Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius Publications
Cambridge.1990.). p28.
392 Lambert cites the League of Nations Official Journal 1839. Lambert J.L. Terrorism
and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius Publications Cambridge.1990.). Ftn82. p29.
393 Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.).
International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New
York. 1976.).pp 323-348. p323. 111
"criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state
of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons, or the general
public"394.
The second piece of legislation was the accompanying 'Convention on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court'. It specifically
obliged signatory states to prosecute those who committed such acts
which fell within the meaning of this definition. Such acts included
inter alia attacks on the lives of and physical integrity of heads of State
and other public officials, destruction of public property, and acts
calculated to endanger the lives of the members of the public395.
However whilst the 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism' gained more than 24 signatories, it was ratified by only one
country and therefore never came into force as a piece of international
legislation 396 . The reasons suggested as to why the signatory states
failed to ratify the Convention, include a lack of agreement on the
definition of terrorism, its over ambitious scope and the tense
international atmosphere prior to the outbreak of World War 11.397
394 Lambert cites L.N.Doc. C.546(1).M.383(1). 1937.V. reprinted in Hudson ed.
International Legislation Vol. VII. 862 (1941). Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in
International Law. (Grotius Publications Cambridge.1990.). p29.
395 Lambert cites Hudson generally and L.N.Doc. C.546(1).M.383(1). 1937.V. reprinted
in Hudson ed. International Legislation Vol. VII. 862 (1941). p862 Lambert J.L.
Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius Publications
Cambridge.1990.).p29.
396 Falvey cites Walters F. A History of the League of Nations 1952. p20 Falvey A.
'Legislative Responses to International Terrorism: International and National Efforts to
Deter and Punish Terrorists'. Boston College International and Comparative Law
Review. Vol 9.(2) 1986. pp323-359. p326. and Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism
and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.). International Terrorism: National,
Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New York. 1976.).pp 323-348. p323.
397 Lambert cites Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics 	 and
Countermeasures. (Cambridge Univ.Press. Cambridge. 1982.). p105, and Zlataric,
'History of International Terrorism', in Bassouni (ed.) International Terrorism and
Political Crimes, p478-480(1975).p482. Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in
International Law. (Grotius Publications Cambridge.1990.). p29. 112
The United Nations Legislative Attempts to Combat
International Terrorism. 
In the first twenty years of the existence as the League's successor, the
United Nations paid only incidental attention to the issue of terrorism.
In 1954 its International Law Commission produced a draft 'Code of
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind', which repeated
the League's condemnation of encouraging and tolerating terrorism398.
Article 2(6) labelled as an offence against the peace and security of
mankind:
"the undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist
activities in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of
organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State"399.
The Code however remained unfinished as the General Assembly set up
a Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression 400 . The
subsequent General Assembly 'Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression' (3314 (XXIX) of 14 Dec. 1974) did not specifically mention the
word 'terrorism', but in articles 3 (f) and (g) it condemned the
involvement of states with armed bands, groups, irregulars and
mercenaries carrying out such acts of force in other states. In between
the publication of these two documents the U.N. General Assembly
passed the 'Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations And Co-operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations'.((2625) XXV Oct. 24. 1970). It had
demanded that:
398 Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.).
International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New
York.1976.).pp 323-348. p324.
399 UNGA report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Sixth session.
Supplement 2 (A/2693) cited by Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United
Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.). International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global
Perspectives. (Praeger. New York. 1976.).pp 323-348. p324.
400 Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.).
International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New
York. 1976.).pp 323-348. p324. 113
"no State shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive,
terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of the regime of
another State"
The work on the Draft Code resumed following the General Assembly's
adoption of the Definition of Aggression, but it has yet to be finished. In
1972 however the United Nations made its most deliberate attempt to
address the problem of terrorism. Following the Munich Massacre of
Israeli athletes at the Olympic village, the then Secretary General Kurt
Waldheim took the unusual step of proposing to the General Committee
of the General Assembly that the latter body should consider:
"Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take
innocent human lives and jeopardise fundamental freedoms".
It was within the General Committee's discussions on the agenda for the
debate at the General Assembly, that the notion of state terrorism was
first raised. According to Finger, the term was used to refer to the
suppression of colonial peoples by force and was described as a far more
noxious form of terrorism than that carried out by individuals and
guerrilla groups, and more costly in lives 401 . From now on the issue of
state terrorism would play a crucial role in contributing to the failure
of the United Nations to produce any legislation to counter-
terrorism402.
After much discussion and debate Waldheim's original proposal was
accepted, and the issue was placed on the agenda of U.N. General
Assembly. Here an amendment was passed and added to the end of it,
which according to the chair of the UN Sixth Committee at the 27th
session, had the effect, if not the intention, of preventing concrete
measures being adopted403 . The proposal which was passed to the
401 Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.).
International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New
York. 1976.).pp 323-348. p330.
402 For example in the 1977 discussions of the Ad-Hoc Committee, the U.S.
representative is summarised as having said that the third obstacle to progress in
eliminating international terrorism is the decision to nclude those who terrorized
others through repressive policies. Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on International
Terrorism. GA 32 Sess. Supplement no.37 A. 32/37. 1977. para. 23. p24.
403 Erik Suy. Reflexions sur la Definition et la Repression du Terrorisme. (Bruxelles.
Edition de l'University de Bruxelles. 1974,)p194-6 cited by Finger S.M. 'International 114
General Assembly's Sixth (legal) Committee, and a 35 nation Ad-Hoc
Committee set up especially by the General Assembly to deal with the
issue, now read:
"Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take
innocent human lives and jeopardise fundamental freedoms and study of the
underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which live in
misery, frustration grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice
human lives, including their own and in an attempt to effect radical change" (my
emphasis)
However before its appearance before Ad-Hoc Committee, the (legal)
Sixth Committee considered the issue and yet again the notion of state
terrorism was raised. In its report the Sixth Committee condemned the:
"continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial racist and alien regimes
in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and independence
and other human rights and fundamental freedoms"404.
Such a definition, if one can call it that, is far too broad to be used in
any definition of state terrorism for it labels any action against those
fight for self-determination as state terrorism. However the issue does
not end there for this was not the only time the idea was mentioned.
Another precise, yet still far too broad notion of terrorism being carried
out by the State could also be deduced from an amendment put forward
by Lesotho which declared:
"that the use or threat of violence by individuals, organisations in or organs of the
State against the innocent citizens or persons of other States or their property
Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.). International Terrorism:
National, Regional and Global Perspectives, (Praeger. New York. 1976.).pp 323-348.
p331.
404 Report of the Sixth Committee UN Doc A18969 27 Sess. 1972 Entitled, "Measures
to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent
human lives and jeopardise fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of
those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which live in misery, frustration
grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including
their own and in an attempt to effect radical change". para. 20.4. pl 6. 115
either for securing political objectives or for purposes of extortion constitutes
International Terrorism"405.
In addition to debating the issue within the Sixth Committee, U.N.
members were requested to transmit observations on the matter to the
General Secretary whose study was in turn provided to the Ad-Hoc
Committee. One of the 34 replies received by the Secretary-General had
been produced by Syria. In a rather descriptive reply Syria noted that :
"official terrorism...contains the most drastic form of savagery and barbarism and
the greatest dangers threatening the security and safety of peoples. Any
consideration that evades coming face to face with terrorism practised by the State,
as the real source of violence, blackmail, domination and illegitimate exploitation,
would defeat the very purposes and objectives of the Charter it intends to
defend"4°6
In contrast, other representatives pointed out that the Declaration on
Friendly Relations amply covered interstate violence, and acts
committed by armed forces during military operations were already the
subject of extensive treaty law and were being considered in the context
of the protection of human rights in armed conflicts407.
The Ad-Hoc Committee met in 1973, and after an initial debate, split into
three sub- committees in order to facilitate its work. These were The
Sub-Committee of the Whole on the Definition of International
Terrorism, The Sub-Committee of the Whole on the Underlying Causes of
International Terrorism, and The Sub-Committee of the Whole on the
405 Report of the Sixth Committee UN Doc A18969 27 Sess. 1972. Entitled "Measures
to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent
human lives and jeopardise fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of
those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which live in misery, frustration
grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including
their own and in an attempt to effect radical change". para. 15.4. p11.
406 See A/AC./60/2. (June 22. 1973.) Cited by Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism
and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.). International Terrorism: National,
Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New York. 1976.). pp 323-348. p334.
407 Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.).
International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New
York. 1976.).pp 323-348.p334. Unfortunately Finger does not specifically name these
representatives. 116
Measures for the Prevention of International Terrorism408 . Despite the
split each of sub-committees remained deadlocked and unable to come to
any meaningful consensus. Ironically each was plagued by the same
issue which had prevented the whole of the Ad-Hoc Committee from
producing a definition in the first place, and which would ensure that
all of the U.N.'s attempt to produce a piece of international legislation
specifically designed to combat terrorism would fail.
For example within the Sub-Committee of the Whole on the Definition of
International Terrorism, there was disarray as to both the necessity of
producing a single definition never mind the content of it. Similarly
differences also emerged in the sub-committees studying the
underlying causes of terrorism, and in that dealing with the
preventative measures to be taken. Many developing States argued that
a study of the underlying causes of international terrorism -that is the
pursuit by certain countries of colonialism, occupation, racism,
apartheid domination and exploitation as well as poverty and the lack
of political participation- should be the starting point of the U.N.'s
treatment of the problem409 . The implication being that such state
terrorism was the worst type of terrorism, and that it lead to sub-state
terrorism which would itself disappear when state terrorism its
underlying cause, ended410.
Also of interest to this section is the fact that Algeria is recorded as
having made a rather vague suggestion as to what form state terrorism
took during the sitting of The Sub-committee of the Whole on the
Underlying Causes of International Terrorism. According to Algeria,
state terrorism the form of mass imprisonments, the use of torture, the
massacre of whole groups, widespread reprisals, the bombing of civilian
population, the use of defoliants, the destruction of the economic
structures of a country etc. 4 11 Although like all the proposed
408 Baxter R.R. 'A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism'. Akron Law Review.
Vol.7 (3).1974. pp380-387.
409 Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius Publications
Cambridge.1990.). p38.
410 Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on International Terrorism UN GOAR, 28th Sess.
Supp. 28, para 49, 54 and 62-63 cited by Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in
International Law. (Grotius Publications Cambridge. 1990.). p38.
411 Algeria to the Sub-committee of the Whole on the Underlying Causes of
international Terrorism. Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on International Terrorism.
UNGAOR 28th Sess. Supp. 28. 1973. UN Doc. A/9028 Paragraph 24. 117
'definitions' of international terrorism, this was not accepted by the
U.N. body discussing it.
The main issue which prevented the production of a consensus in all of
the U.N. debates on international terrorism was that of (anti-)
colonialism or self-determination. Many, though by no means all third
world nations and former colonies, often backed by the Soviet bloc,
argued that 'colonialist' or 'imperialist' states were the major terrorists
in the world. They therefore insisted that the U.N. focus on official
'reigns of terror' rather than 'sieges of terror', and that it exclude the
activities of 'national liberation movements'. In contrast various
western nations argued that certain acts should be regarded as
illegitimate regardless of the (anti-colonialist) cause of the perpetrator.
At the heart of the matter was the fact that many third world leaders,
many of whom had themselves gained independence for their nations
through armed struggle, were sympathetic to groups fighting for their
own national liberation against colonial states. They saw the attempts by
western nations to label particular types of acts as 'terrorism' regardless
of the nature of the cause either as an attempt to weaken those seeking
to free themselves from the colonialist's oppression412 , or as an attempt
to divert attention from the 'real' terrorism of the colonial powers. For
these representatives, violence should be seen in the context of the
anti-colonialist cause, or of the individual case in which the liberation
movements were usually far worse off both militarily and financially
than their oppressors.
In the end the Ad-Hoc Committee could do no more than submit a report
on its proceeding to the General Assembly stating that there was a
"diversity of existing views" 413 . Thus, the only real agreement reached
was the recognition that terrorism by the other side was morally
412 For example within the Sixth Committee the representative of China claimed that
the effect of the attempt to focus upon acts such as hijacking and hostage taking was a
pretext to oppose national liberation. UN GAOR 31 Sess. C.6.(58mtg.) paras 26-27
UNDoc A/C.6/31/SR58(1976). Cited by Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in
International Law. (Grotius Publications Cambridge.1990.). p30.
413 Report of the Ad-Hoc Committe on International Terrorism UN GOAR, 28th Sess.
Supp. 28, para 24-25, 38, 64, 68. UN. Doc. A/9028 (1973) cited by Lambert J.L.
Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius Publications Cambridge.1990.)
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wrong414 . Following the failure of the Ad-Hoc Committee to reach any
sort of consensus the issue was deferred for a number of years, before
being revived on a number of occasions only to face the same diversity
of views. In its 1977 meeting for example the issue was raised by
various counties including Syria, Tunisia and Greece 415 and even the
United Kingdom is reported to have said:
"The existence of state terrorism required the protection of life, liberty and
security of persons against servitude, torture and inhuman punishment or
treatment, and arbitrary arrest"416.
This description can be seen as giving a little more detail to the claims
by those who argued that state terrorism had long been the concern of
the instruments and mechanisms which have been adopted by the U.N.
to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms 417 . In contrast
however Algeria considered that state terrorism included the acts of
countries following a policy of expansion and hegemony, of those
practising racial discrimination, apartheid and colonial domination, of
those exploiting the natural resources of a country or systematically
destroying the vegetation, population or economic or transport
structure of a country, and of those using armed intervention against
another state, under conditions that did not conform to the definition of
a state of war in international law418.
414 Nef J. 'Some Thoughts on contemporary Terrorism: Domestic and International' in
Carson J. Terrorism in Theory and Practice (Atlantic Council of Canada. Toronto.
1978.).pp3-31. p9. cited by Sproat P.A. 'Can The State Be Terrorist?' Terrorism: An
International Journal. Vol. 14.(1). Jan-Mar 1991. pp19-29. p20.
415 Syria associated it with foreign and colonial regimes, (p 29); Tunisia with
Palestine, Rhodesia and South Africa (p. 32); and Greece mentioned state terrorism in
para. 24.p32/33. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. GA.32nd
Sess. Supp. 37. A(32/37) 1977.
416 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. GA.32nd Sess. Supp.
37. A(32/37) 1977. Para.29. p34.
417 This observation was made in the concluding statement of the Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on International Terrorism. GA.32nd Sess. Supp. 37. A(32/37) 1977. Para.
2. Also the 1977 discussions of the Ad-Hoc Committee, in which the U.S.
representative is summarised as having said that the third obstacle to progress in
eliminating international terrorism is the decision to include those who terrorized
others through repressive policies. Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on International
Terrorism. GA 32 Sess. Supplement no.37 A. 32/37. 1977. para. 23. p24.
418 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. GA.32nd Sess. Supp.
37. A(32/37) 1977. para. 74. p46. 119
The recommendations of the Ad-Hoc Committee were taken on board by
the General Assembly in resolution 34/145 of 17 December 1979, which
unequivocally condemned all acts of international terrorism which
endanger or take human lives or jeopardise fundamental freedoms - the
first such condemnation of political acts of terrorism by the General
Assembly419 . Yet in terms of the specific issue at hand the 1979
resolution still condemned:
"the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien
regimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and
independence and other human rights and state terrorism"420.
Since then various General Assembly resolutions have been passed
which condone anti-colonial terrorism421 . However two years later a
similarly entitled General Assembly Resolution on the issue did not
specifically mention the idea of terrorism by states, neither did the
Report of the Sixth Committee in this year. The notion of state terrorism
419 Cited by Lambert J.L. Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius
Publications Cambridge.1990.). p41.
420 Point 4 of UN GA Resolution 34/145 (1979) Entitled "Measures to prevent
terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives and
jeopardise fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of
terrorism and acts of violence which live in misery, frustration grievance and despair
and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own and in an
attempt to effect radical change" As compiled by Elagab 0.Y. International Law
Documents Relating to Terrorism. (Cavendish Publishing. London. 1995.). p26-27. p27.
421 Just as it has it has been accused of creating and legitimising a new just war (or at
best for creating this impression through its deliberate use of ambiguous language), the
U.N. can be accused of promoting (if not actually legitimising) the idea that those
attempting to achieve their goal of self determination may utilise "all necessary
means" at their disposal including armed force. For example Resolution 2708 ()0(V) of
14 December 1970 which justified "by all means at their disposal" Wilson
H.A.Intemational Law and The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford.
Clarendon Press. 1988) p97. Authors who believe that the U.N. had legitimised the use
of terrorism by national liberation movements include Asmal K.'Apartheid and
Terrorism-The Case of South Africa' pp129-158 and Ate B.E."Terrorism in the
Context of Decolonization" pp 79-96 both within H.Kiichler (Ed) Terrorism and
National Liberation (Frankfurt. Verlag Peter Lang. 1988) and Friedlander
R.A.'Terrorism and National Liberation Movements:Can Rights Derive From Wrongs'
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol 13(2) 1981. pp281-289. The
former two are in favour of the U.N.'s actions the latter against. At best the position
seems to be that identified by Roberts who concluded that, "UN resolutions have given
no clue as to whether liberation struggles ought to be fought within limits derived from,
or akin to, the laws of war" A.Roberts. 'Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-
occupied Territories 1967-88' in Playfair E. (Ed) International Law and the
Administration of Occupied Territories:Two Decades of israeli Occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. (Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1992) pp25-86. p64. 120
was also omitted from U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on the issue422
in 1983, 1989, 1993 and 1994. Yet despite the removal of the contentious
issue of state terrorism, it was still not possible to produce a definition of
(sub-state) terrorism.
In light of the impasse in producing a definition of terrorism and
criminalising it, the U.N. has merely adopted what has been described as
a 'piecemeal' or 'object-oriented' approach to the criminalising of sub-
state terrorism. That is instead of producing an international treaty
prohibiting (sub-state)'terrorism', it has helped to create various multi-
national treaty provisions on the suppression of aircraft hijacking;
unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation; unlawful acts against
diplomats and other internationally protected persons; the taking of
hostages; and the theft of nuclear materials423 . However unlike like the
regional organisations which also took this approach, it has been said
that some of the U.N. sponsored conventions contain a clause excepting
their application to those who carry out such acts in their struggle for
self-determination424.
422 See UNGA Resolutions 36/109 (1981), 38/130 (1983), 40/61(1989) all entitled
"Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take
innocent human lives and jeopardise fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying
causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which live in misery,
frustration grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human
lives, including their own and in an attempt to effect radical change" and UNGA
Resolutions 48/122 (1993) and 1994/46 (1994) both entitled "Human Rights and
Terrorism" in Elagab O.Y. International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism.
(Cavendish Publishing. London. 1995.). p28-29, 29-30, 30-32 and 32-33, and p34
respectively.
423 Namely The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft (1963); Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (1970 ); Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation(1971); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (or New York Convention) (1973);
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages(1979); Montreal Protocol Supplementary
Protocol to the Montreal Convention (1988) and Rome Convention and Rome Protocol
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Maritime Security, and
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located On the Continental Shelf (1988). Three conventions with a regional scope hve
been adopted in an effort to combat international terrorism. These include the
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance (OAS
Convention): The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (The European
Convention): and The Agreement on the Application of the Application of the European
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (the Dublin Agreement).
424 Wardlaw claims that the resolution (UNGA 28th session, 1974. resolution 3166) to
which the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons (1973) is annexed expressly provides at paragraph 121
Therefore despite all their debates, sub-committees and conferences,
no single inclusive definition of international terrorism has been
accepted by the United Nations or in generally accepted multi-lateral
treaty425 . This situation allowed Baxter, a Professor of International
Law at Harvard University and United States Judge on the International
Court of Justice, to declare that: "[w]e have cause to regret that a legal
concept of 'terrorism' was ever inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise;
it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose"426.
However because various nations at the United Nations have claimed
that state terrorism was covered by either existing human rights
treaties and/or the laws of war427
 it is necessary to examine what
together can be, and have been on occassion, termed international
humanitarian law428 , even if this usage is not widespread.
International Humanitarian Law and State Terrorism.
4 that the Assembly 'recognises that the provisions of the annexed convention could not
in any way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and
independence...by peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign
occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid". Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism:
Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (2nd edition. Cambridge Univ.Press. Cambridge.
1989.).p110. For both the view that this convention does not legitimise the taking of
hostages by national liberation movements, and the debate generally see Lambert J.L.
Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. (Grotius Publications Cambridge. 1990.).
p264-5.
425 Schacter 0. 'The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases'. Houston
Journal of International Law. Vol. 11. 1989. p389 cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J.
International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge.
London. 1993.). p140.
426 Baxter R.R. 'A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism'. Akron Law Review.
Vol.7 (3).1974. pp380-387.p380. Also cited by Murphy J.F. Punishing International
Terrorists: The Legal Framework for Policy Initiatives. (Rowman and Allanheld. New
Jersey.1985).p3. Likewise the Mallisons have declared that terrorism does not "have
any widely accepted meaning in legal doctrine" hence the word does "not refer to a
unitary concept in either fact or law". Mallison W.T. and Mallison S.V. 'The Concept of
Public Purpose Terrorism in International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the
Destruction'. Howard Law Journal. Vol. 18. 1974. ppl 2-28. p12.
427 Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander'( (ed.).
International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New
York. 1976.).pp 323-348. p334. Unfortunately Finger does not specifically name these
representatives.
428 Cohen uses this phrase and explains the debate about its usage. Cohen E. Human
Rights in Israeli Occupied Territories. 1967-82. (Manchester University Press.
Manchester. 1985.). pxiv. 122
Despite the fact that there is no specific mention of any word
corresponding to 'terrorism' within the various human rights
conventions and treaties, the previous section has shown that various
state representatives have claimed that 'state terrorism' is linked to
them429 . Academics have also made such claims. For example in reply to
this author's questionnaire, Jackie Smith asserted that human rights
violations: "can be considered terrorist acts if used systematically to
alter the behaviour of a political challenger" 430 , whilst Bowen wrote:
"[w]hen the definition of legal acts contravenes broadly recognised
international standards of human rights , then and only then are legal
acts also state terrorism" 431 . Indeed one third (40/120) of those
generally 'Western' academics replying to this authors questionnaire
indicated that 'human rights abuses' constitute state terrorism (without
qualification).
Yet it is not just in response to this authors prompting that such
opinions have been given. The Mallisons for example asserted that the
result of terrorism (by state or non-state actors) was to deprive its
victims of their most basic human rights 432 . Terry in an article entitled
'State Terrorism: A Judicial Examination in Terms of Existing
International Law', claimed that coercion applied by regimes to enforce
policies not in accord with humanitarian principles can be thought of
as "authorised terror" 433 , similarly Paust claimed that "strategies of
impermissible terrorism, regardless of name, are already proscribed
under human rights law"434.
429 Including the U.S.A.which by hinting that such actions were already covered by the
U.N. Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Definition of Aggression,
tried to encourage the other nations to focus upon insurgency terrorism within the
debate. Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on International Terrorism. GA 32 Sess.
Supplement no.37 A. 32/37. 1977. para. 23. p24.
430 J.Smith in reply to question 7.
431 G. Bowen in reply to question 9. Also K. Jeffrey and Maxwell Taylor who after
answereing 'Yes' to the same question 9 wrote 'Where the legal system does not
generally protect human rights' and "Domestic laws can violate human rights"
respectively.
432 Mallison W.T. and Mallison S.V. 'The Concept of Public Purpose Terrorism in
International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction'. Howard Law
Journal. Vol. 18. 1974. pp12 -28.p18
433 Terry J.P. 'State Terrorism: A Judicial Examination in Terms of Existing
International Law'. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 10 (1). 1980.pp94-117.p95.
434 Paust J.J. 'An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and The Law'
Connecticut Law Review Vol. 19(40 Sumer 1987. pp679-. Certain pages sent by Paust
with his reply to this author's questionnaire. p733. 123
Likewise in regards to that other part of humanitarian laws known as
the laws of war (or armed conflict) various nations at the UN hinted435
that state terrorism has been covered by them, and numerous
terrorologists have also linked violations of this legislation with state
terrorism. Alfred Rubin, for example claimed that there was an analogy
between terrorism and war crimes, at least in reference to what he
termed the international legal order 436 , whilst the Mallisons claimed
that: "a serious effort to reduce international terrorism may be assisted
by reference to the laws of war"437 . Solf seemed to imply that the
analogy might apply to both the actions of the state at home and abroad
when he said about a particular work on terrorism:
"Their definition excluded "State terrorism" such as state violations of human
rights, state sponsored violations of diplomatic immunity, acts of genocide and
violations of the norms of international law applicable to armed conflicts for the
protection of civilians, POWs and other victims of war" 438
This author's questionnaire also produced some statistics to support the
analogy between state terrorism and the laws of war. Thirty-eight
percent (or 46) of the 120 respondents indicated that 'War crimes'
constituted terrorism by those in power without reservations, and two-
thirds (80) of the respondents indicated that the assassination of
political leaders by the state constituted such terror/ism. Surprisingly
the number of respondents who felt that the assassination of political
leaders constituted terrorism by the State was (two) more than the 78
respondents (65%) who indicated that 'acts of violence that deliberately
target the enemy's non-combatants' could constitute such terrorism.
435 Finger S.M. 'International Terrorism and The United Nations' in Alexander Y (ed.).
International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New
York. 1976.).pp 323 -348. p334. Unfortunately Finger does not specifically name these
representatives.
436 Rubin A. 'Current Legal Approaches to International Terrorism: Difficulties of
Legal Control' in Han H.H. (ed) Terrorism and Political Violence: Limits and Possibilities
of Legal Control. (Oceana. London. 1983.). pp213-223. p214.
437 Mallison W.T. and Mallison S.V. 'The Concept of Public Purpose Terrorism in
International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction'. Howard Law
Journal. Vol. 18. 1974. pp12 -28. p23.
438 SoIf W.A. 'International Terrorism in Armed Conflict' in Han (ed). Terrorism and
Political Violence:Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control. (Oceana Publishers. London.
1993.). pp317-331. p317-318. 124
However because many of the authors previously noted shy away from
either identifying or naming the particular war crimes (or
conventions) to which they refer, their comments may not be as useful
as they first appeared, at least in regards to attempts to produce a legal
definition of terrorism. Other more useful authors in this regard are
the Belgian researcher David, who claimed that a terrorist act is:
"any act of armed violence which, being committed for a political, social,
philosophical, ideological or religious end, violates, among the prescriptions of
humanitarian law, those interdicting the use of cruel and barbaric methods, attack
of innocent objects or objects of no military interest"439;
Blakesley who wrote that:
"A war crime is a form of criminal terrorism; it is criminal terrorism when the
state allows, or ignores, purposeful or criminally reckless killing of innocents-
those hors du combat; or of the peacetime equivalent of those hors du combat.
Crimes against humanity, such as genocide, torture or apartheid are forms of
terrorism" 440.
and Baxter, who even noted a specific convention when he claimed that
if the perpetrators of acts of terrorism, -which he described as "the
deliberate killing , wounding, or deprivation of the liberty of innocent
civilians for political purposes in time of armed conflict (but not
incident to conflict), whether accomplished by members of regularly
constituted armed forces or persons not recognised as belligerents"-
were to be recognised as acting on behalf of a State, their acts directed
against civilians who take no part in the hostilities would constitute war
crimes. For they would be 'grave breaches' of the Geneva
439 David E. 'Le Terrorisme en droit international'. In Reflexions sur la definition et la
repression du terrorisme. (Editions de l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles. Brussels. 1974)
p125 cited by Blishchenko I. 'Acts of Terrorism Punishable Under International Law'.
in Kochler H. (ed.). Terrorism and National Liberation. (International Progress
Organisation. Peter Lang. Frankfurt. 1988.).pp281-303. p287.
440Blakesley C.L. Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the Protection of Human
Liberty. A Comparative Study of International Law, the Nature, Rule and Impact in
Matter of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, War and Extradition. (Transnational
Publishers. Inc. NY. 1992). p42. 125
Conventions441. Whilst in response to this author's questionnaire
Yaeger wrote:
"If a nation's legal system or constitution, allows acts which violate the United
Nations' Declaration of [Human] Rights, then I believe that international legality
and morality eclipses a "legal system" in a sovereign state which allows such a
violation" 442.
The most notable incorporation of specific pieces of human rights
legislation and laws of war into an attempt to define state terrorism, is
that by the Soviet author Blishchenko, and it is to his definition that the
thesis now turns in order to illustrate the problems of attempting to
incorporate any existing international humanitarian law into one's
definition of state terrorism.
441 Baxter R.R. 'A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism'. Akron Law Review.
Vo1.7 (3).1974. pp380-387.p381.
442 C.H. Yaeger wrote in reply to question 9 "Can legal acts of violence carried out
by those in power within the area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled as
'terror/ism'?" 126
Blishchenko's Definition of State Terrorism. 
Blishchenko first qualified his definition of terrorism by the state by
claiming that a terrorist act or a policy of terror in general can be
practised both in peace and in wartime 443 . Writing in the late 1980's
Blishchenko declared that:
"In peacetime, a terrorist act can be committed by the authorities of a state in
respect of some of its citizens with a view to intimidating them or suppressing the
opposition... .or as part of the policy of racial discrimination, racial superiority, or
as acts of genocide....These acts fall within the appropriate provisions:
1) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal Art. 6, paragraph "c"
contains the following statement:
a) Crimes against humanity; namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated;
2) 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
3) 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
4) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination;
5) 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights;
6) 1968 International Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity;
443 Blishchenko I. 'Acts of Terrorism Punishable Under International Law'. in Kochler
H. (ed.). Terrorism and National Liberation. (International Progress Organisation. Peter
Lang. Frankfurt. 1988.).pp281-303. p287 127
7) 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid."
Although he had preceded this "peacetime" part of his definition of state
terrorism with the claim that:
"As to wartime, international law already provides for a series of standards to
govern the prohibition and punishment of terrorist acts with regard to prisoners of
war, civilians, combatants and non-combatants who will have stopped participating
in hostilities even in the event of a conflict of other than international character;
guerrillas and militia squads whose status while in captivity is held to be
equivalent to that of war prisoners coming from standing armies, as well as in
respect of cultural property during an armed conflict. These standards comprise:
1. Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Art. 6, b, c).
2. Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victims , and
respectively:
-Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field (Arts. 1, 12, 13);
-Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of armed Forces at Sea (Arts 3, 12, 13);
-Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Arts. 3, 4, 13,
27, 32, 33).
3. The Hague convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of
Armed conflict, concluded under UNESCO auspices in 1954.
4. Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity of 1968, which was considered to be an indispensable
procedural addition to the standards of international law directed towards the
suppression of war crimes and crimes against humanity"444.
Indeed the grounds for linking state terrorism to the laws of war are in
one sense stronger than linking them to human rights treaties, in that
the word 'terrorism' is actually mentioned in a number of the individual
laws of war treaties, and this reference to terrorism can be interpreted
444 Blishchenko I. 'Acts of Terrorism Punishable Under International Law'. in Kochler
H. (ed.). Terrorism and National Liberation. (International Progress Organisation. Peter
Lang. Frankfurt. 1988.).pp281-303. p287-288. 128
as state terrorism seeing that most of these pieces of legislation cover
only the activities of states and can be signed and ratified only by states.
For example Article 33 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV 'Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War' declared that:
"No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally
committed. Collective penalties and the likewise all measures of intimidation or of
terrorism are prohibited".
whilst (undefined) "acts of terrorism", "are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever" by Article 4 (2) (d) of the 1977
'Geneva Protocol II -Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts'. Similarly the word 'terror' in included within Article
13 (2) of this Geneva Protocol. It declared that:
"The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited".
Yet ironically the other (and first) Geneva Protocol of 1977 has been
described as a charter for terrorism, a "pro-terrorist treaty
masquerading as humanitarian law" by a US Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defence for negotiations (policy).445
However despite the tendency of various authors and states to link
humanitarian law and state terrorism there are a number of good
grounds for rejecting any attempt to incorporate specific pieces of
international legislation. This thesis now goes on to explain these
reasons starting with an examination of the human rights laws
including all of that incorporated into Blishchenko's definition, and
this is followed by a similar examination of the laws of war and of
international law generally.
445 Feith D.J. 'Law in the Service of Terror'. The National Interest. No.1. 1985. p47.
Cited by Sassoli M. 'International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism' in Wilkinson P. and
Stewart A.M. Contemporary Research on Terrorism. (Aberdeen University Press.
Aberdeen. 1987.).pp466-474. p467. 129
Human Rights Legislation. 
Until the end of World war Two, most legal scholars and governments
held to the view that international law did not impede the natural right
of each equal sovereign power to be monstrous to its subjects446.
However during the final stages of the war, the victorious allies decided
to prosecute the leaders of the Germany and Japan. In the Nuremberg
trials, those surviving leaders of Nazi Germany were prosecuted not
only for waging aggressive war and for killing foreign citizens i.e. for
'crimes against the peace', and 'war crimes', but also for the slaughter of
their own citizens. In pressing this last matter, under the heading of
'crimes against humanity' the victorious powers were opening new
territory447.
This judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
(the so called Nuremberg Principles) implied a core of obligations
applicable to all sovereign powers concerning the treatment of their
citizens. It has since been given unanimous approval by the UN General
Assembly and in this way has became a piece of international
customary law for many legal scholars. For others the Nuremberg
Principles were applicable only to particular crimes committed during
a particular time, for the Principles state "before or during the [Second
World] wari,.448
Blishchenko specifically included two parts of the Nuremberg
Principles in his definition of state terrorism, but only Article 6(c)
entitled "Crimes against Humanity" will be examined here for this
section that concentrates solely upon human rights law. The other
relevant part entitled "War Crimes" mentioned within the wartime part
446 Bilder R. 'An Overview of Human Rights Law', in H.Hannum (ed). , Guide to
International Human Rights Practice (Philadelphia,) 1984, pp4-5, cited by Farer T.M.
and Gaer F. 'The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning' in Roberts A. and
Kingsbury B. United Nations Divided World The U.N.'s Role in International Relations
(2nd ed. Clarendon. Oxford. 1993) pp240-296. p240
447 Farer T.M. and Gaer F. 'The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning' in
Roberts A. and Kingsbury B. United Nations Divided World The U.N.'s Role in
International Relations (2nd ed. Clarendon. Oxford. 1993) pp240-296. p244.
448 It is of course possible to suggest that their use against the Nazi's could not be
considered lawful for it went against the legal principle that the victim cannot be
punished by a retrospective piece of legislation. 130
of Blishchenko's definition will be considered shortly within the next
section dealing with the laws of war. Article 6(c) declares as Crimes
against Humanity:
"Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution
of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime"
However because of its linkage to war crimes the assessment of its
incorporation into any definition will be addressed later in the section
on war crimes.
At about the same time as the Nuremberg Principles were being drafted,
interventionist thinking was affecting the work of the founders of the
United Nations. The resulting U.N. Charter specifically allowed for the
Security Council to interfere in the internal affairs of its member states
(if not non-members). A point which is lost on those who mistakenly
quote only the first part of the authorising article to deny that the U.N.
has any authority to intervene in domestic affairs of its members.
Article 2(7) states that:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII".
It is necessary to include this enabling article here because the UN
Charter also made a number of references to human rights. The
'Preamble' affirmed faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small. Whilst within the chapter entitled 'Purposes',
Article 1(3) stated the aim of "promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion".449 The means to
achieve this end were stated within both Article 13(1) (b), which
449 This aim was repeated in article 55.	 131
mandated the General Assembly to initiate studies and make
recommendations "for the purpose of....assisting in the realisation of
human rights", and Article 68 which required the U.N.'s Economic and
Social Committee to set up a commission for the promotion of human
rights. The latter was duly set up and was soon joined by a complex
network of committees and procedures. Between them these committees
monitored the abuse of human rights both territorially and
thematically and drafted new human rights treaties and the single issue
conventions prohibiting for example racial discrimination and
genocide.
However in terms of the reality of international law, the actual wording
of the Charter does not even demand observance of human rights from
its members of the organisation (never mind non-members). Instead
the Charter talks merely of the promotion of such rights 450 . Even the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (or U.D.H.R.) which was passed
unanimously by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948, and is
accepted by every new member, is not legally binding even on U.N.
members for it is merely a declaration of the General Assembly451.
Indeed it has been argued that the U.D.H.R. was unanimously accepted
precisely because it was a merely a forward looking non-binding
declaration of the UN General Assembly. 452 Whilst even if one did claim
that the U.D.H.R. (or at least some of it) has subsequently become a
piece of international customary law as a result of its usage by U.N.
human rights committees to produce other human rights treaties, and to
450 As such it is future orientated, it does not demand immediate implimentation.
Thus the preamble states that the General Assembly:"Proclaims this Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and
all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories
under their jurisdiction."
451 "In view of the greater solemnity and significance of a "declaration" it may be
considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation that
members of the international community will abide by it. Consequently, in so far as the
expectation is, gradually justified by state practice, a declaration may by custom
become recognized as laying down rules upon states" UNSCOR,33d Sess, UN Doc.
E/CN4L at 610 para. 4(1962). W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe. 'Self Determination' in Schachter 0.
and Joyner C.C. (Eds.) United Nations Legal Order ( Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge.1995) pp349-389. p369.
452 Robertson A. H. Human Rights in the World. (3rd. ed. J.G. Merrils. Manchester.
1993.). p96. 132
monitor gross violations of human rights, it still poses a number of
problems for those, like Blishchenko, who would include it within their
definition of state terrorism.
The first problem for those who would incorporate the U.D.H.R. into
their definition, is that it contains thirty articles which would make any
definition of terrorism rather long. One could of course decide to limit
this on the grounds that only some of them constitute customary
international law, but then one would have to decide which parts did so
(and why). Either way, the task of incorporating the wording is
complicated by the fact that many of its provisions are contradicted by
other clauses that blunt their effects. Article 19 for example which
supposedly guarantees that:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers"
is blunted by both Article 29(2) which states that in the exercise of
these rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject:
"....only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in
a democratic society".
and by Article 30 which states that:
"Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein".
Indeed knowing that the U.D.H.R. was merely a declaration of the
General Assembly with more of a moral than legal status, the U.N. itself
decided to produce human rights legislation which would impose legal
obligation on those who would sign and ratify them. The result was that
many of the human rights contained within the U.D.H.R. were
eventually codified within two different pieces of legislation eighteen
years later. These two covenants -the International Convention on Civil 133
and Political Rights (or I.C.C.P.R.) and the International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (I.C.E.S.C.R.)- were made available
for signature in 1966, and once they had achieved the appropriate
number of ratifications they entered into force in 1976. The fact that
they were by no means signed by all members of the U.N. never mind
non-members may create a problem for some of those who would
include only customary international legislation, although this would
ultimately depend upon their rationale. The details of the I.C.E.S.C.R.
will not be considered here, for two reasons. The primary one is that
neither Blischchenko, nor any other source noted by this author, has
specifically included any part of this treaty within their definition of
terrorism or state terrorism. The secondary reason is the fact that whilst
the thesis applies the various definitions of state terrorism to particular
counter-terrorist policies of Israel, the application does not examine the
economic or social elements of these policies. Therefore the only part of
the I.C.E.S.C.R. which will be considered is Article 1.1. for the exact
wording of the clause is shared with Article 1.1 of the I.C.C.P.R. It
declares that:
"All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development."
If Article 1.1 was taken as the confirmation of the view that states do not
have the right to use violence to resist the right of undefined peoples to
achieve self-determination then its inclusion would pose a problem
when one was trying to assess the use of violence by states such as
Israel in their fight against nationalist 'terrorist' groups such as the
Palestine Liberation Organisation, like this author is. However the
inclusion of this article poses no particular problem for assessing the
violence of states who were fighting nationalist 'terrorist' groups, as
long as one considers it to be one of those rights to which states can
derogate in accordance with Article 4(1) of the convention. Such
derogations from the rights mentioned within the treaty are permitted
"in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed"453.
453Article 4(1). states, "In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the 134
As for the inclusion of the remaining 53 articles contained within the
I.C.C.P.R. in one's definition of state terrorism this would again produce
a rather long definition. In addition there is a problem of incorporating
'positive' rights. For example Article 25 declares that every citizen shall
have the right and the opportunity amongst other things:
"To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors".
To say that a state which does not have genuine periodic elections is
committing an 'act of terrorism' may get support from those authors
who would like to label certain actors as 'terrorist states' 454 , is going too
far for this author who would prefer to label a state terrorist according
to the actions it takes.
There is also the problem of interpreting the meaning of articles which
are blunted by 'clawback' clauses, or by other articles that negate them
under certain circumstances. An example of the former is provided by
Article 19. Point 2 of which states that "Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression...", only for point 3 to state that :
"It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as
are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion or social origin".
454 Perhaps it would get support from those such as Wilkins who wrote, "the states
monopoly of violence cannot be justified simply because it exists but only by a
demonstration that it is morally legitimate". Wilkins B T. Terrorism and Collective
Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.). p63. Or Lovas and Anderson who wrote
that legitimacy is not a question of the facts of power but a question of who morally has
a right to wield power and rule". Lovas I. and Anderson K. 'State Terrorism in Hungar:
The Case of Friendly Repression'. Telos (Special Issue on Terrorism and State
Terrorism). No54. Winter 1982-83 pp77-86. p85. Or one of the anonymous authors
who after indicating in question 9 that legal acts of violence could constitute state
terrorism wrote that 'When the "legal' acts are actions of a tyrannical government. For
example, Stalin's vast gulags were 'legal' under Soviet "law". Similarly after
indicating that legal acts could be labelled state terrorism, A. Geifman wrote 'when the
government perpetuating these acts is totalitarian'. 135
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals."
If this were not enough article 4(1) of the I.C.C.P.R. allows the state to
ignore this right along with nineteen others "In time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation". Leaving only the
seven rights (of the I.C.C.P.R.'s 27 rights) listed within Paragraph (2)
of Article 4 which may not be derogated under any circumstances455 .
Penultimately, Blishchenko also noted two single issue treaties produced
under U.N. auspices. The first was the 'Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide' made available for signature following its
adoption by the General Assembly on 9 December 1948. In Article 1, the
contracting parties undertook to prevent and to punish genocide, which
was a crime under international law whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war. Genocide was defined as meaning any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group:
"(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
455 Article 4(2). declares that no derogations may be made under this provision from
articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18. Article 6 declares that
everyone has "the right to life", which "shall be protected by law", but it also allows
for the death penalty. It does however declare that "No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life". Article 7 states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 8(1),and 8(2) declare
that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude respectively. Article 11 declares that
"No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual
obligation". Article 16 declares that everyone shall have the right to recognition
everywhere as a person before the law. Finally Article 18 states that Everyone shall
have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, although according to
point 3, "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." 136
Whilst Article 3 of the convention also made it an offence to conspire,
attempt or to actually commit genocide, along with complicity in or
direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Unfortunately this
definition of genocide is so broad and vague as to outlaw not only inter-
state war on the grounds that it involves the killing of members of
another national or ethnic group, but also any use of violence by the
State to fall foul of its wording. The only way around such an
interpretation is to say that these activities constitute genocide only
when the intent was to commit these acts upon all members of the
group, not just the immediate (combatant) victims.
In contrast 'The International Convention on the Elimination of All
forms of Racial Discrimination' (7 March 1966) does not pose any
particular problems for anyone wanting to include it within a
definition of state terrorism, apart from perhaps its size. At 25 articles it
would also produce a rather longwinded definition. It would of course be
possible to integrate the main thrust of the convention which is
contained within points (a) and (b) of Article 2. These declare that
those who have signed and ratified the convention will, "engage in no
act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of
persons or institutions" nor "sponsor, defend or support racial
discrimination by any persons or organisations". The main problem
with incorporating such a convention into one's definition is that it
means incorporating positive rights which would mean labelling the
State's inactivity as terrorism. For example it would mean labelling as an
act of terrorism a state failure to declare as an "offence punishable by
law", "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or
incitement to such acts" in accordance with Article 3(a).
Finally, the inclusion of the 'International Convention on Non-
Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity' and the 'International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid' would produce no particular
additional problems once apartheid was actually identified, except for
adding many more articles to the length of the definition (the term "the
crime of apartheid " is defined within Article 2 of the latter as including
policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination similar
to those practised in South Africa). This is because the only thing they 137
add which has not already been dealt with here (or will be dealt with in
the next section) is the crimes of apartheid. The latter of the two
conventions declares this to be a "Crime against humanity" whilst the
former specifically outlaws "eviction by armed attack or occupation and
inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid' in Article 1(b).
138
The Laws on War. 
The term 'laws of war' is used here to refer to treaties that prohibit
particular weapons of war, and to those that prohibit the use of violence
against particular targets. Although in its widest sense it can also be
used to refer to 'Crimes against the Peace' and 'Crimes against
Humanity' also mentioned within the (Nuremberg) Charter of the
International Military Tribunal.
The origins of the contemporary laws of wars can be traced back to
biblical times or even Ancient Greece and Rome. Deuteronomy for
example advised against a scorched earth policy 456 , whilst the Greeks
and Romans customarily observed certain humanitarian principles
which have become fundamental rules of the contemporary laws of
war457 . Similar humanitarian limitations in the form of the rules of
chivalry were customarily adhered to by medival knights in Europe
and were also be to found in canon law around the same time. As the
body of international law began to develop in Renaissance Europe early
writers such as Victoria and Grotius gave priority to the consideration
of hostility in international relations 458 . Although the foundation of
the contemporary legal regime is thus very old 459 , the development of
the laws of war since ancient times is far from linear. It was only in the
second half of the nineteenth century that the customary principles
began to be codified in particular binding multi-lateral agreements be
it declarations, conventions or protocols 460 . According to Roberts and
Guelff the first such agreement was the 1856 Paris Declaration on
456 Deuteronomy for example advised that:"When thou shalt besiege a city a long time,
in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing
an axe against them: for thou mayest eat ther fruit, and thou shalt not cut them down
(for the tree of the field is man's life) to employ them in the siege". Deuteronomy
Chapter 20. Verse 19 in The Holy Bible. King James Version. (Collins. London. 1953.).
457 They cite Phillipson C. The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and
Rome. (Macmillan. London, 1911.). Vol II, pp166-384. Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.).
Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1989.). p2.
458 Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon
Press. Oxford. 1989.).p2. They cite Victoria F. de Relectiones Theologicae (Lyons.
1557) and Grotius H. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, libri tres (Paris. 1625.) amongst others.
458 Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon
Press. Oxford. 1989.). p2.
460 Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon
Press. Oxford. 1989.). p2-3. 139
maritime war, soon to be followed by the 1864 Geneva convention on
wounded and sick and the 1868 St. Petersburg declaration on explosive
projectiles461 . It was also during the late nineteenth century, 1863 to be
precise, that the International Committee of the Red Cross which would
have such a dramatic influence on the laws of war was also formed.
The process of codification accelerated at the turn of the century
following the first and second Hague Peace Conferences which
produced sixteen conventions and four declarations between them. At
the conclusion of the First World War the Treaty of Versailles and other
peace treaties expressly recognised that certain methods of conducting
warfare were prohibited, and in the inter-war years a number of
agreements came into force most notably the 1925 Geneva Protocol on
gas and bacterial warfare and the 1929 Geneva convention on prisoners
of war462 . Since World War Two various international agreements have
been concluded, including the previously noted Nuremberg Principles,
the UN Genocide Convention of 1948, and the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949, to which the two 1977 Geneva Protocols were additions. Also
worthy of note are the 1954 Hague Convention and Protocol on the
Protection of Cultural Property and the UN Convention on Statutory
Limitations Regarding War Crimes for they are both mentioned within
Blishchenko's definition of state terrorism.
Again there are specific problems with incorporating the individual
laws of war mention by Blishchenko, although Article 6(b) of the
Nuremberg Principles-the section entitled "War Crimes"- does not
create any. This is because the wording can be read to legitimise any
wartime "destruction" justified by military necessity 463 . If this is the
correct interpretation, then this catch all category ironically negates
any point in including the said article in any attempt to define acts of
state terrorism, unless of course one wanted to say that all uses of
461 Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon
Press. Oxford. 1989.). p3.
462 Paragraph based upon Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of
War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1989.). p3.
463 Article 6 (b) declares as War crimes: "Violations of the laws or customs of war
which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-
labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages,
or devastation not justified by military necessity". 140
military might equals state terrorism464 . Here it should be noted that
the incorporation of the offences contained within Article 6(c) entitled
"Crimes against Humanity" namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation does not pose any problems unless one
believes that they apply only to such actions committed during World
War Two. The only problem would be deciding upon what constitutes
"other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population"465.
Apart from making any definition rather long, the only specific
problem with incorporating the articles of the various Geneva
Conventions of 1949, as Blishchenko did, is the incorporation of its
positive rights. For example it seems absurd to call a states' failure to
supply sufficient quantity of "underwear and footwear" that is
appropriate for the climate of the region to any prisoners of war held
by a state in accordance with Article 27 of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, as 'state terrorism' .
As for the incorporation of 'The Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict' it would adds little
extra to any definition which had incorporated the previous pieces of
international law except detail. For whilst it specifically protects
cultural objects which it defines in Article 1 and 8 these would surely
fall within the non-combatant provisions of the other laws of war.
Although this matter is confused by the fact that Article 4(2) states that
the protecting provision "may be wavered only in cases where military
necessity imperatively requires such a waiver". The inclusion of this
Hague Convention would unfortunately mean the addition of 40 extra
articles to a definition including some positive rights such as that
declared within Article 7, which says that the high contracting parties
undertake to introduce in time of peace into their military regulations
464 Perdue for example wrote, 'Mt is ironic that in the political lexicon of terrorism,
war between states is routinely omitted...Perhaps in addition to the waging of war, the
preparation and planning for mass destruction in the nuclear age should be redefined as
the ultimate form of terrorism".Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of
Domination Through Fear (Praeger New York. 1989.). p19-20.
465 Article 6(c) states: "Crimes against Humanity; namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the juridiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated". 141
or instructions such provisions as may ensure observance of this
convention, and to foster a spirit for the respect of cultural property.
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International Law
Apart from those problems inherent within the specific pieces of
international humanitarian law noted within the previous two sections,
there are more general and perhaps more important reasons for not
incorporating international law within a definition of state terrorism.
Although this author can see the attraction of judging each state
equally against a standard which appears to be contain universal
values, the standard of international law is not as solid as it might seem.
Indeed one can credibly ask whether an identifiable international legal
system exists, for as Akehurst noted "the population believe that
international law is not really law"466 . The reasons for holding this
latter view can be derived from the observation that there is an absence
of a criminal code, and a international police force, nor is there an
international court with compulsory jurisdiction to which states are
required to subrnit467.
The second question to be answered by those who would incorporate
international law within their definition of state terrorism is 'Which
pieces?' (and why?). An issue that begs the questions 'What constitutes
international law?' and 'How is international law produced?'. The
answers to these questions arguably contain enough uncertainty to
deter anyone from incorporating any international law into their
definition of state terrorism. In identifying the sources of international
law authors invariably refer to Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice which states that:
"The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognised by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
466 Akehurst M. A Modern Introduction to International Law (6ed. Routledge. London.
1992.) . p1.
467 Wallace R.M.M. International Law: An Introduction. (Sweet and Maxwell. London.
1986.). p217 and p3. 143
(d)....judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
law".
Whilst identifying international treaties is straightforward, the
applicability of each to the circumstances in hand is often disputed as
the debate over the applicability of the Geneva Convention (IV) to
Israel's occupation of the West Bank reveals 468 . There is also question of
which of the many international treaties should be incorporated into a
definition of state terrorism (and why). One way around this is to
incorporate only those relevant 'pieces' which have achieved the status
of international customary law. Unfortunately the identification of
international customary law is highly contentious for it is based upon a
vague formula involving the proving of "constant and uniform"469
usage, which is dependent upon factors such as the acceptance by an
sufficiently large number of states including all the concerned states
over an unspecified number of years470.
Then there is the question of whom does the international law bind.
This and the question of which international law to include come
together within the debate between the 'monists' and the 'dualists'. The
468 For details of the debate from both sides see Bar-Yaacov N. 'The Applicability of
the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria (The West Bank) and to the Gaza Strip' Israeli
Law Review. Vol. 24. No.3-4. 1990. pp485-506, and Qupty M. 'The Application of
International Law in the Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgement of the high
Court of Justice in Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration
of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. (Clarendon. Oxford. 1992.). pp87-125.
468 Dixon citing the words of the Permanent court in the Lotus Case. Dixon M.
Textbook on International Law. (2nd. ed. Blackstone Press. London. 1993.). p26. Dixon
also wrote, "Mt is not enough for the formation of customary law that there is
general, uniform and consistent state practice. In order that this practice is to
constitute law, States must recognize it as binding upon them as law" and "pit is,
however, impossible to determine exactly how many staes must participate in a
practice, for international law is not concerned with percentages, nor does it operate
by way of majority vote'.
470 Dixon M. Textbook on International Law. (2nd. ed. Blackstone Press. London.
1993.). He also wrote "[t]he ICJ has not presented any clear guidelines on the time
required for the formation of customary law". p28. William O'Brien wrote "No begin
with there is the problem of...balancing qualitative verses quantitative evidence of
custom. By qualitative, I mean evidence that the most powerful states and/or those
most relevant to a subject accept a rule of customary interntional law. By quantitative,
I mean evidence that many states, irespective of power and relevance accept that
rule 	 A further difficulty with customary international law is temporal....how long it
takes before a rule of customary international law is clearly established.." O'Brien W.
Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p83. 144
former believe that international law binds all states and prevails over
municipal law471 , the latter claim that international law and municipal
law are two distinct systems 472
 and at best international law is in
existence only when it does not clash with the individual states
municipal law. Most states including Israe1 473 can be seen to take the
dualists position, in that whilst they may automatically incorporate
international customary law its provisions are overruled by any
conflicting piece of municipal law. Of course those who would
incorporate international law within their definition of terrorism do
not have to take such a view, but they may want to keep it in mind when
contemplating the reasons why they are including those pieces of
international law that they do. Another issue which they would need to
consider is the debate between the traditionalists and the modernists, a
debate which revolves around the impact that the creation of the United
Nations (including The International Court of Justice, which is the
judicial body of the United Nations) has had on international law. This is
particularly important in regards to the issue of the use of force abroad
and is therefore relevant to many conceptions of state terrorism. Thus
for many publicists the legal rules or 'laws' that surround the United
Nations are valid only in relation the existing notions of international
law, whilst others believe that the United Nations Charter has
revolutionised international law. However because the latter -so called
modernists- seem to have established a virtual hegemony over the
contemporary debate as a result of their pervasive presence it is
therefore to the modern interpretation of international law that this
thesis now focuses itself.
For the modernists, the production of international public law cannot
be separated from the workings of this institution, its constitution and
its rules. Modernists claim that Article 2(6) of the U.N.'s constitution
enables its actions to constitute 'international law' 474 . Although on this
471 Dixon M. Textbook on International Law. (2nd. ed. Blackstone Press. London.
1993.). p69.
472 Dixon M. Textbook on International Law. (2nd. ed. Blackstone Press. London.
1993.). p70.
473 Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'. Israel Law Review.
Vol 24 (3-4). 1990. pp450-485. p452.
474 Article 2(6) states, "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security". 145
point even they would accept that its court is still far from attaining a
centralised judicial authority even amongst the membership of the UN,
and some of those who have accepted its jurisdiction have attached
reservations which can weaken or defeat its effect475 . However most
modernists would also accept that the mere declarations and resolutions
of the General Assembly do not automatically constitute international
law as some commentators mistakenly assume, although such
resolutions and declarations might help create customary international
law. These views contrast sharply with those of the traditionalists who
distinguish the non-voluntary basis of obligations within the U.N. to its
rules from the voluntary basis of participation in it. Thus there exists a
debate over whether or not the pronouncements of the United Nations'
Security Council which legally bind its members also bind the handful
of nations in the world who are not members. For the traditionalists,
Security Council resolutions do not bind non-members, for the U.N. is
merely an international body with its own court of justice and
constitutional rules founded by multi-lateral treaty and as De Lupis
noted (but refused to accept) contracting parties to a treaty cannot make
that treaty bind third States; "No such third states the treaty is not
binding, for it is a transaction between others, a res inter alios
action" 476 . The result of this is that United Nations action would be
illegal if it concerned non-member states477.
Whatever one's view on the disputes noted above, those who would wish
to integrate international law into a definition of state terrorism would
first of all have to decide which treaties, paragraphs and/or principles,
they were going to incorporate and the rationale behind this. The
importance of the rationale here is one of consistency. Those who would
incorporate international legislation within their definition of state
terrorism must have a reason, and this is important not just in itself, but
for the sake of consistency in one's definition. For example, it is not
illogical to suggest that if those incorporating international
475 Fawcett J. Law and Power in International Relations. (Faber and Faber.
London.1982.).p44. Fawcett also noted that its compulsory jurisdiction has been
recognized by barely a third of the countries of the world.
476 De Lupis I.D. The Law of War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
1987.).p343In this light the founders of the U.N. rejected compulsory membership,
refused to prohibit withdrawal and made provision for expulsions.
477 De Lupis cites Thomas A.V. and Thomas A.J. Non-Intervention (Dallas.1956) in De
Lupis I.D. The Law of War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1987.). p226 146
humanitarian law within their definition might incorporate just those
pieces of legislation that constituted international customary law
(whatever that is). However if one did this consistency would surely
demand that those who would incorporate international law as it relates
to the State's use of violence within its area of jurisdiction, should also
incorporate international law as it relates to the use of force abroad, or
otherwise justify their omission. Secondly it is necessary to think of
any incorporation in terms of its effect on one's definition of sub-state
terrorism, otherwise there may be little connection between one's
definition of state terrorism and of insurgent terrorism.
One's rationale is also important for other reasons. One of the problems
of contemporary international law is that it contains many
contradictory parts in that certain paragraphs of one treaty conflict
with other pieces, customs of international law. This is perhaps
nowhere more apparent than in regards to international legislation
regarding the right to use force abroad. An examination of this area
also allows the author to provide specific criticisms of those pieces of
this type of legislation which Blishchenko incorporated into his
definition.
For probably the vast majority of modernists, and international law
scholars, the international law legitimising the use of force outside
each state's area of domestic jurisdiction has changed dramatically due
to impact of the United Nations, although it is possible to claim that this
occurred with the creation of the U.N.'s predecessor. 478 Traditionally,
states could institute war at any time to vindicate their rights. The only
real qualification of this right that was accepted by states during this
period was the requirement that war be declared. Hence a state simply
declared war, and it was lawful 479 . This arguably changed in the
twentieth century with either the Covenant of the League of Nations,
the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928, the Nuremberg Principles of 1945
and/or the UN Charter. Whichever it was, all non-traditionalist scholars
accept that the UN Charter now contains the rules for the use of force in
478Amend and Beck point out that under the League of Nation's Covenant an elaborate
set of procedures was established to restrain the recourse to force. For the debate on
the issue see Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond
the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p19-21.
479 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p17. 147
international relations. It is to this that the thesis now turns, but it
attempts to explain why it is not a good idea to use international law to
define state terrorism committed abroad, by revealing the confusion
surrounding the right of states to use violence in respond to acts of
international terrorism.
The United Nations and the Use of Force in the International
System of States. 
If one were to attempt to incorporate international law into one's
definition of state terrorism the key question to be answered would be
'Under what circumstances, if any, may a state lawfully use force within
the international arena?'(and if the answer to this was positive, then
the second question to be answered is 'How, if at all, may a state do so?').
This part of the thesis attempts to illustrate the problems involved in
any answer to this by revealing the answers to the specific question
'Under what circumstances, if any, may a victim state lawfully respond
with armed force to the incidence of sub-state terrorism? 480 . This is
important because one would require an answer to this question if one
were to ask, like this author does, whether any of Israel's counter-
terrorist actions constituted state terrorism?.
Whilst attempting to answer this question on lawful responses to sub-
state terrorism, Amend and Beck noted that 'publicists' on the issue have
failed both to agree on the parameters of the terrorist threat
engendering a state 's right to use force in self defence; as well as how a
state may legally respond with force to terrorist acts. This thesis will
now illustrate these points by explaining the U.N. made law
surrounding the use of force.
Like its predecessor, the League of Nations, the U.N. was founded out of
a desire to restrain and regulate the use of force in international
relations. Hence the Preamble states:
"WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
480 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN 148Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p157.
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, to unite our strength to maintain
international peace an security, and to ensure by the acceptance of principles and
the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest"
Whilst Article 1 declared that:
"The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."
In line with this assertion Article 2(3) stated that:
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered"
whilst Article 2(4) noted that:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations"
The uncertainty surrounding the right of states to use force in the
international sphere surrounds the meaning of this latter article.
Article 2(4) proscribes only that use or threat of force which is "against
the territorial integrity or political independence of another state" or is
otherwise "inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations".
Unfortunately this vagueness causes tremendous problems for anyone
attempting to identify the (modern) international law on the use of
force. Indeed ultimately it constitutes one of the reasons for rejecting
the legalistic approach.
Additional, if perhaps less well known, problems surrounding the
149contemporary international law on the use of force, arise as a result of
the fact that the Charter also mentions four other explicit exceptions to
Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the "use of force". A phrase that will now
be used to include "the threat" of such force for the sake of avoiding
unnecessary repetition. These four explicit exceptions to Article 2(4)'s
prohibition on the use of force are:
1) force used in "self-defence", both individual and collective, in
accordance with Article 51, which states,
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
2) The use of force authorised by the Security Council of the United
Nations as mentioned in Article 51. The parameters for this are set out in
detail within Chapter 7 which is entitled 'Actions with respect to Threats
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. Specifically
Article 42 contained within this Chapter enables the Security Council
to:
"take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security"
Action may include intervention in the internal affairs of constituent
member states. A point which is lost on those who mistakenly quote only
the first part of the authorising article (Article 2(7)) to deny that the
U.N. has any authority to intervene in domestic affairs. This states that:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII".
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This oft forgotten sentence refers to the aforementioned Article 42 and
other Articles within Chapter VII which outline the duties of U.N.
members in this respect. These include the key articles 39 and 24 which
respectively state that :
"The Security Council [of the U.N. which] shall determine the existence of any
threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security".
and
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI,
VII, VIII, and XII.
3) Force undertaken by the five major powers, who would soon become
the five permanent members of the Security Council before the
Security council was functional in accordance with Article 106481.
These are also known as the Transitional Security Arrangements.
4) The use of force against the 'enemy' states of the second world war in
accordance482 with Article 107. The 'enemy states' in question were
481 Article 106 states"Pending the coming into force of such special agreements
referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the
exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation
Declaration, signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as
occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint
action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security".
482 Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any
state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the
present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having
responsibility for such action. 151
according to Article 53 48 3 those states which had been an enemy of any
signatory of the present Charter during the Second World War.
However once these latter two legal uses of force have been discarded
on the grounds that are no longer applicable (or even if they are, they
do not cover Israel whose actions are the main concern of the
application of the various definitions within this thesis), one is left with
Article 51, which legalises the use of force in self-defence, as well as
Security Council violence. The wording of which leaves too many
important questions unanswered. Perhaps the most relevant of these
unanswered questions is, 'Does a state have a right to use force in
response to a 'terrorist' attack from outside of its area of jurisdiction?'.
Unfortunately the answer is far from clear, as it depends upon one's
definition of an armed attack? 484
 For example there is the assertion that
either the 'scale' and /or 'intensity' of certain cross border attacks
means that they cannot be considered sufficient provocation to justify a
legal armed response. Brownlie for example claimed that fedayeen -like
cross-border raids do not constitute an 'armed attack' under Article 51,
especially if such attacks are 'isolated or sporadic' 485 . Similarly Garcia-
Mora noted that there is an "almost total absene" of a conviction among
governments that the activities of armed bands constitute an armed
attack, thus justifying measures of self-defence under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter486 . However just to show the complexity of the matter is
483 Article 53 states "1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures
against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for
pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of
aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization
may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for
preventing further aggression by such a state. 2. The term enemy state as used in
paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has
been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter".
484 For example whether one believes that an armed attack can differ from an act of
'aggression', the latter of which was mentioned in Chapter VII of the Charter' and was
later defined by the UN General Assembly within one of its resolutions.
485 Brownlie 'International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands' International and
Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol 7. 1958. p731 cited by Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-
Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International
Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p16.
486 Garcia-Mora M. International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons
Against Foreign States. (1962). p129 cited by Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen
Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law'.
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p16. After studying 152
worth noting that Brownlie also noted that a "co-ordinated and general
campaign by powerful bands of irregulars, with obvious or easily
proven complicity of the government of the State from which they
operate, would constitute an "armed attack" under Article 51"487.
In addition, it has been argued that since Article 51 refers to self-
defence as an 'inherent right' the purpose of the article was not to
restrict the pre-existing customary right only to cases of armed attack,
but rather to supplement it, and to make it clear that it would definitely
apply when an armed attack occurred. It has therefore been suggested
that an armed attack may be only one of several circumstances under
which action in self defence could lawfully be taken488.
It has also been claimed that Article 51 allows the use of force when it
does not threaten the "territorial integrity" or "political independence"
of the state attacked, and/or when it is in accord with the aims of the
United Nations as noted within the vague article 2(4). In relation to the
assessment made within this thesis it is worth noting that there is a
dispute as to whether the goal of the P.L.O. was ever the "violent
U.N. Security Resolutions on the issue of Israeli incursions into Lebanon in response to
fedayeen attacks between 1968-78, Levenfeld concluded that: "[t]he message of the
Security Council in dealing with Israeli exercises of its alleged right of self-defense or
reprisal is clear: they are completely unlawful. No amount of fedayeen activity can
justify the resort by Israel to armed force since fedayeen activities do not constitute
armed attacks" Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-
Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48.p19 Levenfeld also noted that, "[in the
decade from 1968 to 1978, the specfic question of Israeli counter-fedayeen activities
directed at Lebanon was the subject of eleven Security council resolutions. These
eleven resolutions condemn israel for violating the territorial integrity of Lebanon or
for engaging in forbidden militry reprisals'.Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen
Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law'.
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p17. O'Brien
complained that, "[f]or those for whom international law is deduced from the
resolutions of organizations like the Security Council and the official pronouncemts of
states, Israel's 1982 Lebanon war was not a permissable exercise of the rights of self
defence". O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge.
London. 1991.). p145.
487 Brownlie 'International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands' International and
Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol 7. 1958. p731 cited by Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-
Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International
Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p16.
488 Arend and Beck cite Moore (no initial given). 'The Secret War in Latin America and
the future of World Order. American Journal of International Law. Vol. 80 (1986). p23,
82-83. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p36. 153
overthrow" of Israe1489 . With this last point in mind, it easy to see how
some authors have claimed that the use of force to achieve human
rights is not illegal under the Charter. Such a conceptual leap is aided
by those such as Teson who have claimed that "the promotion of human
rights is as important a purpose in the Charter as is the control of
international conflict" 490 . A view which relies on the fact that fact
that Article 56 of the Charter states that:
"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
This latter article repeated the demand that the UN, shall promote
"universal respect for and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion". Other developments which can be seen as
supporting this interpretation, is the fact that the United Nations has
legitimised the use of force by non-state actors in order to achieve self
determination491 , which has been accorded the status of a human right,
and the even stronger legal claim that the U.N. has outlawed the use of
force by states against those who seek to achieve self-determination492.
489 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p7.
490 Teson F. Humanitarian Intervention 5. 1988. p5.Cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J.
International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge.
London. 1993.). p131.
491 A conclusion shared even by authors of mainstream Western textbooks on
international law, including Akehurst who wrote that there is "general agreement that
peoples who have a legal right to self-determination are entitled to fight a war of
national liberation". Akehurst M. A Modern Introduction to International Law (6th Ed.
London. Routledge. 1991.). p 299. For details of the debate see Sproat P.A. 'The United
Nations' Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: Time to Abandon the Right
to Self- Determination?'. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 8.(1). Spring 1996.
pp93-113 generally.
492 De Lupis for example claimed that "the rule of self-determination which
undoubtedly furnishes a legal title for resisting (but not starting to employ) use of
force in contemporary international society. Naturally, it is difficult to determine when
and who 'starts' to use force. But, if it is a 'clear' question of 'second' use, it may be
legitimised under modem international law, not as self-defence but under the heading of
self determination". De Lupis I.D. The Laws of War (Cambridge. Cambridge University
Press. 1987) p83 cited by Sproat P.A. 'The United Nations' Encouragement of
Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: Time to Abandon the Right to Self- Determination?'.
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 8.(1). Spring 1996. pp93-113. Ftn. 37, p98. 154
In regards to the second question raised by Arend and Beck, there are
unsolved disputes about the nature of the response allowed to acts of
international terrorism. The first is the issues of 'time' in regards to
one's response. The main question being 'Does a (would-be victim) State
have to wait for the other side to actually strike first before it can
defend itself?'. In line with this many authors challenged the
traditional interpretation of self defence given by Webster the then
U.S. Secretary of State for Defence's remarks over the 'Caroline' incident
which demanded that it must be "instant, over-whelming, and leave no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation"493 , by promoting the
ideas of 'pre-emptive' strikes or controversially biding one's time in
responding, a view used to justify the US 'counter-terrorist' raid on
Libya in 1986. This brings the issue back to the not unrelated issue of
'What constitutes 'aggression'?'. An issue not helped by the
contradictions contained within the Declaration on Aggression also
included within his definition of state terrorism by Blischenko. Most
notably Article 7 of which stated that none of those acts listed as
examples of acts of aggression within article 3:
"could in any way prejudice the right to self determination, freedom and
independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that
right and referred to in the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist
regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of those peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support in accordance with the
principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned
Declaration" 494.
493 Daniel Webster said to the British Foreign Secretary that Britain would have to
show that the "necessity of self-defence is instant, over-whelming, and leave no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation". Moore J. The Caroline Digest of
International Law. 2: 412. (1906), cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law
and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).
p18.
494 Sproat P.A. 'The United Nations' Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic
Cleansing: Time to Abandon the Right to Self- Determination?'. Terrorism and Political
Violence. Vol 8.(1). Spring 1996. pp93-113. p99. Wilson claimed that the U.N.
deliberately chose the ambigious term struggle to allow it to be passed unopposed.
Although she also notes that the debates on the resolution reveal that most members of
the Assembly understood the resolution as refering to armed struggle. Wilson H.A.
International Law and The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford.
Clarendon Press. 1988) p99. One author who takes this view is Pekane who claimed
that "Recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle for self-determination...amounts to 155
Secondly there are questions in relation to the issue of 'How may a state
lawfully use force within the international arena?' which must be
solved, and although publicists have generally agreed that a victim
state's use of force must be 'proportionate', they have failed to agree on
how 'proportionality' should properly be calculated495 . For example in
an article on the American bombing of Libya, Intoccia wrote that any
response to an act of aggression which employs a level of violence
"which is greater than is necessary to counter any continuing
immediate threat must be viewed as impermissible" under international
law496 . In contrast to this minimalist view of proportionality, Roberts
wrote in an article on combating state supported terrorism that
proportionality can be calculated on the basis of prior events.
Therefore, "an accumulation of small events, such as minor terrorist
attacks, can justify a single larger retaliatory responce in certain
instances"497 . Others such as Schachter have said that:
"If proportionality consists of a reasonable relation of means to ends, it would not
be disproportionate if in some cases the retaliatory force exceeded the original
attack in order to serve its deterrent aim. One might say that the force would have
to be sufficient to cause the terrorist to change his expectations about costs and
benefits so he would cease terrorist activity.H498
recognising the legality of the use of force by these [National Liberation] Movements".
Pekane T.S. 'Reflections on Apartheid and the Legal Status of National Liberation
Movements' in Ginther K. and Benedex W. (eds) New Perspectives and Conceptions of
International Law (Springer-Verlag. Wien.1983.). pp181-185. p184. See Sproat P.A.
'The United Nations' Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: Time to
Abandon the Right to Self- Determination?'. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 8.(1).
Spring 1996. pp93-113. p100 and 98 respectively.
495 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p165.
496 lntoccia G. 'American Bombing of Libya'. Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law. Vol. 19. (1987). p206 cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J.
International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge.
London. 1993.). p165.
497 Roberts G. 'Self Help in Combatting State Sponsored Terrorism' Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 19. (1987). (no page reference given), cited
by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p165.
498 Schachter 0. 'The Right of States to Use Armed Force', Michigan Law Review. Vol.
82. (1984.). p1620 1637 cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the
Use of Forc:e Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p166. 156
This view was echoed by William O'Brien who claimed that
proportionality could be judged in terms of the total context of
hostilities including the broad political-military strategic context. Thus
O'Brien could write: "counter-terror measures should be proportionate
to the purposes of counter-terror deterrence and defense" 499 . Hence,
the "referent of proportionality" should be "the overall pattern of past
and projected acts" 500. As for who or what can constitute a legitimate
target that will be discussed in the next chapter.
499 O'Brien W. 'Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defence' in Counter-terror Operations'
Va. J. Int. Law (1990). p477, cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and
the Use of Forc:e Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p166.
500 O'Brien W. 'Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defence' in Counter-terror Operations'
Va. J. Int. Law (1990).p472, cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and
the Use of Forc:e Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p166. 157
A Legalistic Attempt: Conclusion
The legalistic approach to identifying the concept of state terrorism,
has been rejected for various reasons. The first is that no legal body has
yet to produce a crime of state terrorism, although it has been suggested
that state terrorism is already covered in some way by international
humanitarian law. The second is that even when authors have
incorporated pieces of international humanitarian law within their
definitions, they produce very long definitions. In addition the
incorporation of those which contained 'positive rights' would mean
that a state could be labelled as terrorist for not doing something (a sin
of omission). Thirdly and perhaps more importantly there is the
question of why incorporate it. This author can see the appeal of using
one global standard but the reality of international law is far less
straightforward as it may first appear. Not only are there questions of
whether an international legal system can be said to exist, and the
problems of identifying international law and what they mean in
practice, but as a whole its contents are at best elusive, at worst
contradictory, due to the ad hoc and political nature of the international
law production process. This latter point was illustrated by this section's
examination of the contemporary legal regime pertaining to the use of
force by states outside their own area of domestic jurisdiction. Thus
even if one was to identify a legal system there are tremendous
problems facing those who would like to equate state terrorism with
some coherent set of legal violations.
This said, it does not mean that the process was not worth while for the
examination has undoubtedly provided insights not only on what
cannot constitute state terrorism but also provides ideas for what might
be included within a definition of state terrorism. It is in this sense that
the author believes that one can produce a definition of international
law which will find itself supported by elements or norms found within
international law. This thesis will attempt to do thisvia an analytical
approach.
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Chapter 4.
An Analytical Attempt. 
Crime,
The first question to be asked in this analytical attempt to define
terrorism is: 'Should the notion of terrorism incorporate that of crime?'.
At first there appears to be a strong case for doing so. This author would
go as far as suggesting that the vast majority of acts of terrorism, be
they 'from above' or 'below', are criminal in terms of the domestic laws
of the country in which they take place. Other authors go further in
suggesting that: "terrorism = crime plus something else". For example in
reply to this author's questionnaire Woy-Hazelton wrote: "I'd say all
illegal acts of violence are terrorism" 501 , whilst the U.S. National
Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals declared
that:
"Political terrorism is characterized by, (1) its violent, criminal nature; (2) its
impersonal frame of reference; and (3) the primacy of its ulterior objective, which
is the dissemination of fear throughout the community for political ends or
purposes"502.
Moreover, although the word "criminal" was mentioned in a
surprisingly low 6% of the definitions recorded by Schmid, the idea of
terrorism as crime, constitutes the foundation of many works on the
topic, and therefore numerous definitions of terrorism, even if some of
the terrorologists are not aware of this. This crime approach to the
concept of terrorism captures a good deal of ordinary thinking about
terrorism, partly because it derives from the position of Western
governments, who prefer to say that they treat the terrorists as
501 S. Woy-Hazelton in reply to question 10.
502 U.S. National Advisory Commitee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Report
of the Task. force on Disorders and Terrorism. (GPO. Washington. D.C. . 1976.). See
also Gibbs long definition. Gibbs J.P. 'Conceptualization of Terrorism'. American
Sociological Review. Vol. 54. 1989. pp329-340. p331. 159
criminals rather than as political prisoners503, soldiers or even war
criminals.
Yet despite this author's sympathy towards this approach, the notion of
'crime', however worded, is not considered to be an essential part of a
definition of terrorism, primarily because the inclusion of it, or
elements of legality, adds little, except perhaps confusion (although this
is not to say that legality might not have some sort of role in a definition
of state terrorism). This reasoning is perhaps at its strongest when
attempting to define the State side of political terrorism. As noted within
the previous chapter no legal body has yet to produce a crime of state
terrorism, nor is there likely to be one. Moreover the State can quite
easily legalise acts of state terrorism committed within its area of
jurisdiction 504 , including the actions of particular pro-state groups.
Historical and contemporary practice also shows that states often except
from prosecution or extradition the perpetrators of 'criminal' actions if
they approve of their cause when the terrorists actions are illega1 505 .
In terms of insurgency terrorism, only a small number of states have
created a crime of terrorism, and there is significant variation in those
definitions produced, indeed it is not unknown for different
departments of an individual state to use different definitions for the
production of their policy documents 506 . Therefore if this element of
legality was included, it would mean that one's definition of terrorism
would vary from state to state in accordance with its own definition of
terrorism (or crime), and if it were the former, acts of terrorism could
not exist in those nations which have yet to produce a legal definition of
the term.
503 After Gilbert, although he terms it a "political crime model". Gilbert P. Terrorism,
Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy.
(Routledge. London. 1994.).p50
504 R. Crelinsten in reply to question 9 wrote "Much of Soviet and Nazi law permitted
acts of terrorism". See also section on The State.
505 For example the privileges enjoyed by persons exiled to Siberia by the Tsar of
Russia, political offenders including Adolf Hitler in Weimar Germany, and the
contemporary practice of presidential pardons..
506 See for example the 10 definitions used by the various U.S. governmental
departments, listed in Appendix B by Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political
Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC.
Amsterdam. 1988.).p32-33 160
One could of course look to international law to provide the solution to
this latter problem, for this would also have the added advantage of
being able -at least theoretically- to deal with the actions of the State
committed outside its area of jurisdiction, which reference to national
laws cannot. Unfortunately as the last chapter revealed there are a
great number of problems that are inherent within any incorporation
of international law into a definition of terrorism. Not only has
international law failed to define the term 'terrorism', but it has yet to
produce an universally recognised criminal court, never mind a world
police to enforce international law. International law is also full of
contradictions and even when authors have incorporated pieces of
international humanitarian law within their definitions, they produce
very long definitions, some of which mean that a state could be labelled
as terrorist for not doing something (a sin of omission) because
international law often contains 'positive rights'. Moreover if the
international law relating to both the use of force abroad and to human
rights within a nation were to be the standard by which one would
measure state terrorism, one would face another decision as to which
international law one was to incorporate. In this case one based on the
concept of time. For example if one wanted to compare the Nazi's use of
state terrorism with that of a contemporary regime, from which era
would one take the international law by which one would produce a
model of state terrorism? (and why?). That is, a definition of state
terrorism based upon today's international law would differ greatly
from that based on the international law of the 1930s and 1940s when
state terrorism was rife in Germany and the Soviet Union.
After rejecting the incorporation of crime (or legality) into one's model
of terrorism, the chapter goes on to examine the relationship between
terrorism and another element in Schmid's list, that of violence. The
immediate question to be addressed within the thesis is 'Does terrorism
equal violence?' and if not: 'How can one distinguish violence from
terrorism?'
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Violence and Terrorism.
In his work on defining the term 'terrorism' Schmid noted that there is
hardly a definition of terrorism where the definiens (i.e. the right hand
side of the equation 'terrorism=') does not contain the word violence507.
Indeed it has been said that there is little prospect of coming to a
satisfactory definiton of terrorism without the inclusion of this word.
The former claim can be seen to be backed up by statistics in that the
word violence was the most frequently cited element in the 109
definitions of terrorism identified by Schmid, and was found in 83.5% of
them508 . It is therefore not a surprise that this thesis concurs with the
view that in order to define terrorism it is necessary to include the term
violence and to define it509 . Therefore the immediate question that this
thesis must address is 'What is violence?'.
Unfortunately there is no clearly demarcated, widely accepted concept
of violence510 . For Schlesinger the author of this last sentence, the
word 'violence' -like that of 'terrorism'- is a contested term of political
discourse with many meanings and conjures up a variety of image511.
Such a view can be seen to be supported by Van der Dennen's work
Problems in the Concept and Definition of Aggression, Violence and
Some Related Terms which listed 48 definitions of the term512 . Van Der
507 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). pl 1.
508 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). Table 5. p76-77.
509 Second part of the sentence is referenced to Karanovic M. 'The Concept of
Terrorism' in Kravitz M. (ed). International Seminars: A Collection of Selected
Translation in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Vol 3. (National Criminal Justice
Reference Service. US Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. April
1979). pp81-89. p85.
510 Schlesinger P. Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities.
(Sage. London. 1991.).p5. Similarly Gregor wrote, "there seems to be considerable
conceptual disorder surrounding the entire problem of human violence, in general, and
the problem of terrorism in particular'. Gregor A.J. 'Some Thoughts on State and Rebel
Terror' in Rapoport D.C. and Alexander Y. The Rationalization of Terrorism. (University
Publications of America. Frederick MD. 1982). pp56-79). p57.
511 Schlesinger P. Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities.
(Sage. London. 1991.).pl . Also Newman G. Understanding Violence. (J.B. Lippincott Co.
London. 1979.). p1.
512 Van Der Dennen M.G. Problems in the Concept and Definition of Aggression,
Violence and Some Related Terms. (Polemological Institute. Gronigen. 1980.). p117-
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Dennen also usefully noted that many of the definitional problems that
plague analysts of terrorism also blight those who attempt to define
violence. For him the word 'violence':
"has been defined in terms of force, coercive power, authority, (il)legitimacy. It
has been defined in terms of behaviour, motives, intentions....violation of
territorial or spatial integrity, moral and legal integrity, violation of rules and
expectations, even violation of self-esteem, dignity, autonomy....The term has been
used to blame, to indicate disapproval....to inflame passions, to mobilize support,
to define the guilty party, to justify and condone our own actions. Violence is
mostly what others do. Violence, like beauty, is very much in the eye of the
beholder"513.
Similarly Skolnick, in a sentence that was also reminiscent of the
debates explaining the marginalisation of state terrorism, complained
that:
"The kinds of acts that become classified as "violent" and equally important those
which do not become so classified, vary according to who provides the definition
and who has superior resources for disseminating and enforcing his
definition"514.
These disagreements over the definition of the term 'violence' could be
the results of political intrigue, alternatively they may simply be the
result of the two different perspectives on the origins of the word. For
Wilkins:
"violence is the combination of two Latin words, vis and latus 'force' and 'carried.
From this, it would seem that the important thing about violence is that it is force
plus something else and this something else has to do with the way that force is
carried or applied"515.
513 Van Der Dennen M.G. Problems in the Concept and Definition of Aggression,
Violence and Some Related Terms. (Polemological Institute. Gronigen. 1980.). p59.
5 1 4 Skolnick J.M. (ed.). The Politics of Protest (Simon and Schuster. New York.
1969.). p4. in Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts,
Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p1 4.
51 5 Wilkins B T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.).
p53. 163
Newman also acknowledged that definition of violence whose root is
violenta (physical force), although he preferred to use the term as
derived from the Latin root viola tio which means 'violation' - as he saw
it of rights516 . This etymology might help explain how opponents of
constituted authority tend to use a broader definition of violence (and
politics), whilst those who would defend the constituted authority tend
to produce definitions that restrict violence to those uses of physical
force which are prohibited by a normative order presumed to be
legitimate, usually the law of a state. Whatever, the use of such physical
violence or force by authorities is usually viewed as social control, law
enforcement or the preservation of order or conflict management517.
The thesis however, rejects the widely held view of violence that
attempts to confine the word solely to acts committed by insurgents, or
to illegal acts with authorities' violence being termed 'force', including
that of Dinstein who defined violence as "the unlawful exercise of
physical force" 518 (although in regards to the use of violence within its
area of jurisdiction this author's definition produces very similar
results). Similarly the thesis does not accept the assumption pointed to
by authors such as C.C.O'Brien that democracy and violence somehow
conflict 519 . On the other hand, it also rejects definitions such as
Galtung's, which label anything which prevents the individual's
somatic and mental potential being reached as 'structural violence' or
'psychological violence'. Such definitions embrace far too much to be
useful, making it difficult to distinguish violence (and therefore
terrorism) from any other thing involving any avoidable suffering!520
516 Newman G. Understanding Violence. (J.B. Lippincott Co. London. 1979.). p3.
517 Nardin I. Violence and the State (Sage. Beverely Hills. 1971.).pl 3 cited in Synder
D. 'Theoretical and Methodological Problems in the Analysis of Governmental Coercion
and Collective Violence' Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol 4. Fall. 1976.
pp277-293. p283.
518 Reply of Dinstein Y. to Schmid's questionnaire Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam. North
Holland. 1984.).pl 2. See also that of Macfarlane who defined violence as "the capacity
to impose, or the act of imposing one's will upon another, where the imposition is held
to be illegitimate". MacFarlane L.J. Violence and The State. (Thomas Nelson. London.
1974.). p46.
519 C.C.O'Brien for example wrote, "the force used by a democratic state is legitimate
while the violence of the terrorist is not legitimate". Written in answer to Schmid's
question "When do you label the use of violence legitimate". Schmid A.P. Political
Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North
Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p32.
520 Schmid cites Galtung J. 'On Violence in General and Terrorism in Particular'
Geneva Unitar.1978. (unpublished paper). p 1 . Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A 164
Instead the thesis will accept the view of violence that is related to the
use of physical force, although it is not one that distinguishes between
the two apriori on grounds of 'right authority' or the ends to be
achieved by its use.
However despite Van Der Dennen's claim that the majority of
interpretations of violence adopt a definition in terms of physical
force 521 , the matter of defining violence is still far from clear cut.
Wilkins, for example, has argued that acts of violence should refer only
to acts that involve harm or injuries which are in no way consented to,
or allowed under the rules of some game. To which he added that what
counts as an act of violence is not, to be determined solely on
behavioural evidence but is context dependent522 . For only in this
manner could one accept the more limited version of violence as the
"intentional rupture of human body tissues for non-surgical
purposes" 523 . However such a definition would be considered too
narrow for the purposes of the definiton of terrorism because it does
not allow for violent attacks upon property. Instead this thesis
generally accepts Van Den Haag's definition of violence as a working
proposition. A definition which allows for the use of violence in the
acquisition or exercise of power and in order to challenge authority or
to enforce it. Van Den Haag defined violence as:
"physical force used by a person, directly or through a weapon to hurt, destroy or
control another, or to damage, destroy, or control an object (e.g. territory or
property) "524
It may of course be possible to produce a better definition of violence if
one were to devote far more time to examining the finer detail in terms
of one's rights and the context of the violence, but that could be a thesis
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam. North
Holland. 1984.). p13.
521 Van Der Dennen .M.G. Problems in the Concept and Definition of Aggression,
Violence and Some Related Terms. (Polemological Institute. Gronigen. 1980.). p68.
522 Wilkins B T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.).
p61.
523 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (Amsterdam. North Holland. 1984.). p15.
524 Van Den Haag E.. Political Violence and Civil Disobedience (Harper Row. New York.
1972.). p54. Cited by Bauhn P. Ethical Aspects of Political Terrorism. (Lund University
Press. Lund, Sweden. 1989.). p33. 165
in itself. Van Der Dennen, for example, wrote more than an hundred
pages on the issue and his work is not the only book produced on the
topic. However rather than produce a number of doctorate length
investigations of each of the 22 terms that are under consideration for
their inclusion within the equation 'terrorism =', this thesis attempts
merely to investigate each in order to decide whether or not to include
it, and to produce a 'working definition' of any of the elements included
within this author's terrorism equation. As long as one incorporates a
'physical force' definition which allows for violence against both
persons and property 525 , and one applies it consistently to the acts of
all terrorist actors, then the exact nature of the definition does not
matter here, since the aim of this thesis is to produce a definition of
terrorism equally applicable to the violence of both insurgent and state.
After defining violence in this way the immediate question to be
answered becomes: 'Does terrorism = violence?'. To some observers
almost any act of violence may be included in the rubric of terrorism.
Such a conclusion is possible if one accepts the logic of Levy and Ross
who noted that: "[e]very act of violence contains some degree of terror,
of extreme anxiety or fear"526.
The view that 'terrorism = violence' is of course far too broad, as the
reader will soon discover, yet in another sense it is far too narrow, in
that such an equation excludes those often very successful acts of
terrorism which do not involve the use of violence, they merely
involve the use of a threat of violence. It is therefore necessary to
include this element within any definition of terrorism. So from now on
when the word violence is used in relation to this author's definition, it
will automatically be assumed to include the threat of such violence.
This proviso is necessary in order to avoid the clumsy repetition within
each relevant sentence of the fact that the threat of such violence is
sufficient.
525 Teichman for example took the opposite view, she claimed that "[d]estruction of
property is not terrorism unless it is a precursor of a different kind of action i.e. part
of a campaign, which includes physically harming human beings". Teichman J. 'How to
Define Terrorism'. Philosophy. Vol. 64. 1989. pp505-517. p512.
526 Levy J. and Ross P. 'The State of Political Violence in Latin America'. Australian
Quarterly. Vol.58. (3).1987. p269-277. p269. 166
The Threat of Violence
The element "threat" was noted within 47% of the 109 definitions
identified by Schmid and was the fourth most frequently cited element
within his list527 . However whilst it may be true that all terrorism is
necessarily violent (or at least involves the threat of violence), not all
violence (or threat of it) is necessarily terrorism 528 . The immediate
question to be answered becomes: 'What distinguishes terrorism from
other forms of violence?'. Weisband and Rogely have claimed that:
"violence in order to be terrorism must be political" 529 , for it enables a
distinction between terrorism and similar activities undertaken by
mafioso-type criminals purely for personal or private gain 530 . Likewise
Hocking noted that descriptions of terrorism which do not consider it as
primarily a political phenomenon are unable to provide a satisfactory
means of distinguishing between terrorism and other crime, or between
the terrorist and the psychopath 531 . Yet not all authors agree with the
view that terrorism must be politically motivated. Both Clutterbuck and
Wilkinson for example have both noted that criminals have used it to
obtain ransom and other forms of private gain, whilst psychopaths
have terrified others from motives that even they may not fully
understand. 532
 This situation is complicated both by the fact that
527 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p76-77.
528 After Quinton, although Quinton does not use the idea of a threat. Quinton A.
'Reflections on Terrorism and Violence 'in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.) Terrorism,
Power and Protest. (Edward Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp35-43. p35.
529 Weisband E. and Rogelby D. 'Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy, and
Legitimacy' in Alexander Y. (ed). Terrorism, International, National, Regional and
Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New York. 1976.) cited without page reference in
Thackrah J.R. The Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge, Kegan
and Paul. London. 1987.). p60
530 Weisband E. and Rogelby D. 'Palestinian terorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy, and
Legitimacy' in Alexander Y. (ed). Terrorism, International, National, Regional and
Global Perspectives. (Praeger. New York. 1976.) cited without page reference in
Thackrah J.R. The Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge, Kegan
and Paul. London. 1987.). p60.
531 Hocking J. 'Orthodox Theories of Terrorism': the Power of Politicised
Terminology'. Politics (Sidney). Nov. 1984. pp 103-110. p105. See also Quinton who
wrote "terrorism is violence directed towrds a public or social end rather than to a
private or personal one or, a fortiori, to no end at all beyond the act itself". Quinton A.
'Reflections on Terrorism and Violence 'in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.) Terrorism,
Power and Protest. (Edward Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp35-43. p36.
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criminals and psychopaths sometimes justify their actions using
political slogans and by the propensity of terrorist movement to recruit
assistance from, and to collaborate with, the criminal underworld 533 . It
has also been noted that political groups sometimes degenerate into
criminal gangs retaining no more than a facade of a political cause and
only the remnants, if any, of allegiance to their political party.534
Indeed these problems can also be seen to affect the violence of
individual states, for without doubt some statesmen and women have
been psychopaths, many have been corrupt and some have personally
benefited, among with other members of their class, from the
uncorrupted political system which they govern.
Clutterbuck and Wilkinson's conception of terrorism as a wider
phenomenon can be seen to be found within Schmid and De Grad's
three part typology that separated the topic of terrorism per se into
these various types535 , and they are also implicit in Hacker's book
which was entitled Crazies, Crusaders and Criminals 536 . However for
the purpose of this doctorate in politics such a typology is rejected, for it
raises too many problems for the political analyst. To include violence
undertaken for purely 'private' or 'psychological' reasons would be to
over extend the concept so that it almost became meaningless as a tool of
political analysis. That is it would become very difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish terrorism from many (if not most other)
forms of violence, for as noted earlier every act of violence contains
some degree of terror, or extreme anxiety or fear537 . The requirement
532 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London.
1986.).p51 and Clutterbuck R. Kidnap and Ransom:The Response. p5 cited by Hoffman
R.P. Terrorism A Universal Definition (Claremont Graduate School. Ph.D. 1984). p4.
533 Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.).
p51
534 Clutterbuck R. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion: The Response. (Macmillan.
Basingstoke. 1987.). p6.
535 See Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.).Table 1.6 .p48.
Crelinsten in reply to question 12 wrote "I know most people think of terrorism as
"political", but, again, a universal definition must (1 believe) take an almost
behavioural/istic approach. Why exclude the Mafia, "narcoterrorism", much criminal
gang activity, and even much domestic violence. All these have political ramifications
too!.
536 Hacker. J. Crazies, Crusaders and Criminals: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time
(Norton. New York. 1986.).
537 Levy J. and Ross P.'The State of Political Violence in Latin America'. Australian
Quarterly. 1987. Vol.58. (3). p269. 168
of political motivation is therefore accepted by this author, and it is a
view which is accepted by the majority of the specialists in the field538.
This latter claim, made by both Crenshaw and R.P. Hoffman, can be seen
to be supported by the statistics provided by Schmid's content analysis
of the 109 definitions. Schmid's list reveals that the term "political" was
found within 65% of the definitions, and it constituted the second most
frequently cited element of the twenty-two in Schmid's list539.
538 Crenshaw M. 'Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective".
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Vol.15 (1).1992. pp1-11.p1. and Hoffman R.P.
Terrorism A Universal Definition. Claremont Graduate School. Ph.D. 1984. p14.
539 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). Table 5. p76-77. 169
political (Violence),
As a result of this author's decision to include 'political' within the
equation "terrorism =", the immediate question that this thesis must
address is: 'What do we mean by political?", or at least 'What do we mean
by political violence?'. Unfortunately as this last sentence implies there
is even a lack of consensus as to whether here one is examining two
words, that is, political and violence, or one term, that is, 'political
violence', never mind the meaning of each in this context.
Just as there is a lack of agreement about the term 'violence', consensus
exists in the use of the term 'political'. For Schmid the "semantic range"
of the word politics is "extremely broad" 540 and he notes that even
within the area of political science the term 'politics' is usually defined
in terms of one or more of the following be it policy, power, the State,
conflict or allocation of resources 541 . Whilst in reference to the phrase
'political violence'. Crenshaw similarly noted:
"Disagreement over defining terms a major impediment to the development of
research on terrorism, is not unique to terrorism. The concept of political violence
is inherently ambiguous and its usage can be extremely arbitrary"542.
Thus within the area of 'sexual politics' it has been claimed that
domestic violence constitutes a form of political violence, the logic of
which means that the 'personal is political'. Similarly it is not
uncommon to hear radicals claim that everything is 'political' and that
those who declare themselves to be 'apolitical' are really declaring
themselves to be politically 'conservative' for they are happy with the
status quo. This thesis will reject these wider interpretations and
concentrate on the 'traditional' liberal view of 'political' as in the
540 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (Amsterdam. North Holland. 1984.). p20.
541 He writes this with reference to Hoogerwoef A. Politico/ogle. Begrippen en
problemen (Alphen a.d. Rijn. Samson. 1979). p39. Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland.
Amsterdam. 1984.). p20.
542 Crenshaw M. 'Current Research on Terrrorism: The Academic Perspective".
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Vol.15(1).1992. ppl-11. p2. 170
distinction between state and civil society within non 'totalitarian'
states. Thus it will accept the Amnesty International definition:
"A political act can be defined as an act in as much as it is directed at the
furthering of changes in current laws or existing governmental policy. The defence
of a current law or current governmental policy is also a political act"543.
Here it should be made clear that this is taken to include the
transnational political violence that occurs within the international
system of states. This is crucial because without this distinction, one
would be excluding apriori, that political violence which would
otherwise be called international or transnational terrorism (never
mind that which occurs between states). To accept any definition as
referring only to violence that occurs within the State or is internal to
the polity would be to fall into the trap in which apparently most of the
macroquantative literature has apparently fallen544.
Moreover it should be made clear that it is not merely that the actor is
politically motivated, the act of violence must be carried out to achieve a
political goal. This criteria enables the analyst to exclude the violence
committed by nominally political organisations when they degenerate
into criminal gangs retaining no more than a facade of a political cause,
and only the remnants of an allegiance to their political party, as
Clutterbuck and Wilkinson asserted 5 45 . It also excludes the use of
violence to achieve other goals such as fund raising, when political
organisations resort to bank raids for example. This definition of
politics also has the advantage of being able to label as terrorism those
543 Ruitenberg H. Politiek en Misdaad. Wardt Vervolgd. Berichten Van Amnesty
International. 78. 6 June 1978. p3 cited by Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland.
Amsterdam. 1984.). p26.
544 Van Der Dennen. M.G. Problems in the Concept and Definition of Aggression,
Violence and Some Related Terms. (Polemological Institute. Gronigen. 1980.). p60. Van
Der Dennen also notes that most discussions of political violence concentrate on
violence 'from below' , i.e. violence against power structures ('insurgent' or 'partisan'
violence), while ignoring the violence 'from above', the violence by power structures
('incumbent' violence)" Van Der Dennen. M.G. Problems in the Concept and Definition of
Aggression, Violence and Some Related Terms. (Polemological Institute. Gronigen.
1980.).p70. He goes on to suggest that "[p]erhaps the preoccupation with violence
against power structures is due to its sporadic, aberrational nature, as opposed to the
ubiquitous repression of the state, which is largely taken for granted?". p71.
545 Clutterbuck R. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion: The Response. (Macmillan.
Basingstoke. 1987.). p6. 171
acts . of political violence carried out by those who belong to nominally
social (single issue) or religious groups whose actions would otherwise
be excluded. However yet again the most important issue is not the
finer detail of this 'working definition' but an application of whatever
definition of politics to all the potential actors.
At this stage of the sieving process it is necessary to ask the question:
'Are all acts of violence that aim to produce a political goal, acts of
terrorism?'. The answer to which is 'no', primarily because such a
definition would fail to distinguish acts of terrorism from other forms of
violence that also fit the equation, including those that go by the name
of war and war crimes, and even that riotous type of behaviour which
occurs during rebellions and revolutions. So although terrorism
involves the use, or threat, of political violence, not all political
violence is in fact terrorism546 . Political violence is a larger set that
includes the sub-set terrorism along with many other sub-sets
containing concepts such as acts of war, war crimes, and riotous
behaviour, some of which may overlap on occasions with the sub-set
terrorism.
It follows then that one would ask: 'How can one distinguish between
those acts of political violence carried out in order to achieve a political
goal that go by the name of 'terrorism' from these other politically
motivated acts of violence?'. After all an analogy between war and
terrorism has been made on a number of occasions. For example after
citing Clausewitz's claims that war: "is an act of violence intended to
compel our opponent to fulfil our will" and: "war is a mere continuance
of policy by other means" 547 , and Mao-Tse-Tung's assertion that "[w]ar
cannot for a single moment be separated from politics...politics is war
without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed" 548 , Taylor
wrote:
546After Thackrah, although he didn't include the term threat. Thackrah J.R. The
Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge, Kegan and Paul. London.
1987.). 1357.
847 Clausewitz C Von. On War. (Trans. J. Graham. Penguin Books. Harmondsworth.
1968.) cited without page reference by Taylor M. The Terrorist. (Brassey's Defence
Publishers. London. 1988.). p62.
548 Mao-Tse-Tung Selected Military Writings. (Fotreign Language Press. Peking.
1963.) cited without page reference by Taylor M. The Terrorist. (Brassey's Defence
Publishers. London. 1988.). p62. 172
"terrorism is the explicit use of violence to further political ends and, by these
accounts, so is warfare. Terrorism may be seen therefore, in these terms, as a form
of warfare, and the rhetoric of the terrorist, which frequently seeks justification
for acts of violence in terms of the logic of warfare, appears to be accurate at one
level" 549.
One place to look for an answer to the question is the concept of 'war'
itself.
549 Taylor M. The Terrorist. (Brassey's Defence Publishers. London. 1988.). p62
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Conceptions of War.
The term 'war' like the terms 'terrorism', 'violence' and 'politics' is the
subject of much definitional dispute. Dinstein, a famous legal scholar
noted that in ordinary conversation, press reports or literary
publications the term 'war' is a flexible expression suitable for an
illusion to any serious strife, struggle or campaign550 . He also noted
that even within his own field that of international law that there was:
"no binding definition of war stamped with the imprimatur of a multi
lateral convention of force" 551 . Similarly Gibbs, after attempting to
answer his own question: "How does terrorism necessarily differ, if at
all, from conventional military operations in a war, civil war, or so
called guerrilla warfare?, claimed that: "there are no clearly accepted
definitions of conventional military operations, war, civil war and
guerrilla warfare"552
For some authors, the notions of 'war', 'guerrilla warfare' and
'terrorism' can be distinguished from one another on grounds of the
size of the forces involved. Lacquer for example claimed that:
"Nerrorist groups in contrast to guerrilla units do not grow beyond a
certain limit" 553 . Although within its ordinary usage the term
'guerrilla' (especially if prefixed with the word 'urban') has often been
associated with the term 'terrorist' (if not used interchangeably) 554 . A
view which can be seen in the work of Thornton whose table below
shows both types existing at the base of an escalator of political
violence.
550 Dinstein Y. War, Aggression and Self Defence. (Grotius Publications. Cambridge.
1988 . ). p7.
551 Dinstein Y. War, Aggression and Self Defence. (Grotius Publications. Cambridge.
1988. ). P8.
552 Gibbs .LP. 'Conceptualization of Terrorism'. American Sociological Review. Vol.
54. 1989. pp329-340. p332.
5 5 3 Lacquer W. Terrorism (Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. 1972.). p218.
554 See for example Halweg W. 'Are Urban Guerillas possible?' In Niezing J. (ed.)
Urban Guerilla: Studies in the Theory Strategy and Practice of Political Violence in
Modern Society (Rotterdam Univesrity Press. Rotterdam. 1974.) p12. Cited by Schmid
A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and
Literature (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). p39-40. 174
Thornton's Five Stages of Insurrection555
Phase	 Characteristics
I	 Preparatory	 Previolent
II	 Initial Violence	 Terror
III	 Expansion	 Guerrilla Warfare
IV	 Victorious	 Conventional Warfare
V	 Consolidation	 Post Violent
It is easy to see how such views have arisen, since resorting to
unconventional 'hit and run' tactics by both guerrillas and terrorists
may be the result of the limited resources of a small armed force. For
while they aim to become a conventional army (or even ultimately the
state) that occupies territory, their immediate inferiority in terms of
resources means that they are likely to capture mental, rather than
physical, space or territory in the near future556.
Other authors have attempted to define 'war' according to a different
concept of size. Rather than identifying war on the basis of the size of
the organisations or forces involved it is possible to differentiate on the
basis 'scale' and 'intensity' of the political violence. The latter for
example can be deduced from the United Kingdom position on recent
'laws of war' treaties. On signing the first Geneva Protocol of 1977 the
U.K. government added a proviso in which it insisted that "a certain
level of intensity of military operations" must be present for it to apply
the Protocols to a particular armed conflict557 . The "certain level"
555 Thornton T.P. 'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation' in Eckstein H. (ed).
Internal War Problems and Approaches .(The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan.
London. 1964.). pp71-100. p92.
556 After Wordemann Terrorismus (Piper. Munchen. 1978.) cited by Schmid A.P.
Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature
(North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p43. [no initial].
557 See wording of reservation to first Geneva Protocol 1977. Cited by Roberts A. and
Guelff R. (eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
1989.). p467. Interestingly the U.S.A. added a reservation which can be seen as capping
the definition of armed conflict in that it stated that the U.S.A. did not consider "the
rules established by this protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do not
regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons". Cited by Roberts A. and Guelff R.
(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1989.).
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which they required was that contained within Article 1 of the second
Geneva Protocol. It mentioned armed conflicts:
"which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
force and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol".
Each type of size distinctions can be seen within De Lupis' definition of
'war' which was specifically designed to distinguishing it from
terrorism (and riots) whilst fitting in with existing international law
(including the right to self-determination). She claimed that war is:
"a sustained struggle by armed forces of certain intensity between groups of a
certain size consisting of individuals who are armed, who wear distinctive
insignia and who are subject to military discipline under responsible
command" 55 8 .
One could of course distinguish unacceptable acts of political violence
including acts of terrorism from acceptable acts of political violence
(which are equated here with 'war') on either, or all of these grounds
mentioned by De Lupis. However the idea that it is either the size of the
armed forces perpetrating such violence, or the scale, intensity or
sustainability of the political violence that is the most appropriate
factor to use to differentiate between war, which is seen by all but the
pacifists as an acceptable form of political violence, and terrorism
which is not, is rejected here, for a number of reasons. Whilst De Lupis'
last criterion that of wearing an insignia will be dealt with later.
The main reason for rejecting these approaches is that there does not
seem to be any credible reason why the size of the perpetrator, the
scale, intensity or sustainability of its violence should be important to a
distinction which is primarily a moral one (nor interestingly enough
do such authors appear to suggest a particular size, scale, or level of
558 De Lupis I.D. The Law of War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1987.). 176
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intensity or what constitutes sustainability!) 559 . Here it should be
pointed out if the size of the perpetrator, the scale, intensity of the
violence was actually accepted as the basis for differentiating between
an act of war and an act of terrorism, then consistency would imply that
those not traditionally viewed as 'terrorists' such as Tito's partisans, the
French Resistance in World War II, or the American 'minutemen', as
well as members of special forces engaged in low intensity warfare,
would also acquire this pejorative label.
As for reasons for not including 'sustainability' within a definition,
firstly this element has ironically also been raised as a requirement
within the definition of the term 'terrorism'. Wilkinson for example
claimed that political terrorism: "is a sustained policy involving the
waging of organised terror either on the part of the state, a movement
or faction, or by a small group of individuals" (which interestingly
contrasted with "political terror" which occurred "in isolated acts").
Therefore, for Wilkinson, neither one isolated act nor a series of
random acts is terrorism560 . The requirement of 'sustainablilty' can also
be seen to be contained within Schmid's list, that is if one accepts its
meaning to be broadly the same as the group of words "repetitiveness,
serial or campaign character of violence" noted within 7% of the 109
definitions identified by Schmid, and ranked number 20 within table
entitled 'Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions'.
Secondly Wardlaw declared:
"The difficulty with excluding an isolated act from the compass of terrorism,
however, is that it is not possible to know how to classify any particular act until
it is seen that it is or is not part of a series....Imagine that a political group
possesses a nuclear device and threatens to detonate it unless certain demands are
acceded to by the government. Imagine further that this is the first act on the part
of the group. Surely one would not have to wait until the group perpetrated another
act for the first to be an instance of terrorism"561.
559 Thus whilst this author views them as irrelevant, if one did think they were
relevant it still does not really matter what figure(s) constitute the threshold for the
qualifying size or intensity or sustainability, as along as one was consistent in their
application to each perpetrator of such political violence.
560 Wilkinson P. Political Terrorism (Macmillan. London. 1974.). p17.
561 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures.
(Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1982.). p13. 177
In this way a requirement of sustainablility would make a definition of
terrorism too limited and it would exclude apriori what would be
important, if extreme, instances of terrorism. This thesis then is in line
with Wardlaw's reasoning and more specifically with the words of Paust
who claimed that: "terrorism can occur at an instant and by one act"562.
This author is therefore in agreement with Teichman who wrote that
terrorism: "is not to be identified by the scale of operations: it is not a
quantitative notion" 563
Whilst on the topic it is worth examining the suggestion that 'intensity'
could be used as a means of distinguishing terrorism from politically
motivated riotous behaviour 564 . This was rejected because it was
believed that it would create relatively more problems than the
alternative which was eventually chosen. Firstly there is the question
of where to set the level, and the reasons behind it, for without a
convincing rationale the level set would appear random or arbitrary.
For example, if the distinction between riotous behaviour and war or
terrorism, was based upon the perpetrator's use of weapons, it would
exclude various acts such as 'kneecapping', or 'punishment beatings'
which should have the chance of being included within a definition of
terrorism due to their widespread use by 'terrorist groups'.
Alternatively one could have used another of the 22 elements, that of
"purposive, planned, systematic, organised action" noted in 32% of the
definitions565 to distinguish between terrorism and acts of riots (and
war), by including it in one's definition of the former. Again this
author has great sympathy with including these elements of planning
or systematic within one's definition of terrorism, as most acts of
terrorism (and war) are pre-planned and systematic, whilst most acts of
riotous behaviour are not. Its inclusion would mean that any acts of
terrorism committed 'spontaneously' by a member of an organisation
562 Paust J.J. 'A Definitional Focus' in Alexander. Y and Finger S. (eds). Terrorism:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives. (McGraw-Hill. Maidenhead.1977.).pp18-29. p21. It is
also worth noting that conversely one could have a short victorious 'war' without a
shot being fired back in anger, if the threat of political violence was sufficient to
persuade the enemy there was nothing to gain by resisting.
563 Teichman J. Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied Philosophy. (Blackwell.
Oxford. 1986.). p91.
5 64 Conversation with supervisor David George. July 1996.
565 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). Table 5. p76-77. 178
during an ongoing incident, could not be called terrorism. Perhaps a
better way of distinguishing between the two is to incorporate into
one's definition of terrorism (and for that matter an act of war) another
of the 22 elements found within Schmid's list. Like the element of
planning the inclusion of this element also enables one to distinguish
between an 'act of terrorism' (as well as an act of war), from those
political motivated 'acts of riot' that occur within a rebellion or
revolution without affecting the issue of the moral acceptability. The
advantage it has over using a particular level of violence is that it
enables one to distinguishes an act of politically motivated riot or armed
sectarian violence from that of war and terrorism. The relevant
requirement of both an act of terrorism and war, or war crimes is that
unlike their riotous moral equivalents, these acts of politically
motivated violence must be carried out by an organisation.
Organisation
Support for the view that 'organisation' is a necessary part of a
definition can be found in the words of Wilkinson who claimed that
political terrorism: "invariably entails" some organisational structure,
however rudimentary 566 . The term also appears in Schmid's list as part
of the set "Group, movement, organisation as perpetrator". As such it
was noted within 14% of the 109 definitions analysed by Schmid, albeit
as part of this larger category567 . The inclusion of this factor enables a
distinction to be made between war and war crimes, and terrorism and
those similar politically motivated acts of violence that occur during
'riots' or inter communal violence, it also allows one to distinguish
unorganised politically motivated riotous behaviour that occurs during
rebellions from that of political revolutionaries when they attempt such
actions as storming the Winter Palace. Of more practical value is the fact
that the requirement of being an organisation enables each side in the
political dispute to end the conflict, and to treat the perpetrators of what
would otherwise be 'crimes', as prisoners of war and to keep them
until the signing of a peace treaty with the enemies organised group.
566 Wilkinson P. Political Terrorism (Macmillan. London. 1974.). p17-18.
5 67 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.).Table 5. p76-77. 179
From this position it is not difficult to see how many authors could argue
that it is 'status' or 'proper authority' which is the distinguishing factor
between 'war' and those forms of political violence including terrorism
that are considered unacceptable or illegitimate. An example of someone
who takes the former view is the lawyer Oppenheimer. He claimed that:
"War is a contention between two or more States through their armed forces, for the
purpose of overwhelming each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the
victor pleases" 568
 .
It is not surprising that a legal author should produce such a conclusion
seeing that traditionally only states could sign the legal documents that
codify the 'laws of war' (or 'laws of armed conflict' as they were later to
become generally known) and create customary international law.
However even within the contemporary 'state-centric' field of
contemporary international public law, mainstream western textbooks
assert that the U.N. has legitimised the use of armed force by particular
non-state actors -namely 'peoples'- to achieve their aim (of self-
determination) 569 . Allowing both those who approve and disapprove of
such violence to claim that the U.N. has legitimised acts that would
otherwise be termed 'terrorist' 570 . Whilst the Red Cross' has enabled
568 Oppenheimer. International Law. (7th ed.) Lautepaucht H. International Law. 957,
202. cited by Dinstein Y. War, Aggression and Self Defence. (Grotius Publications.
Cambridge. 1988.). p8.
569 Akehurst for example wrote that there is "general agreement that peoples who
have a legal right to self-determination are entitled to fight a war of national
liberation". Akehurst M. A Modern Introduction to International Law (6th Ed. London.
Routledge. 1991.). p 299. For details of the debate see Sproat P.A. 'The United Nations'
Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: Time to Abandon the Right to Self-
Determination?'. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 8.(1). Spring 1996. pp93-113
generally.
570 Examples of those who believe that the U.N. had legitimised the use of terrorism
by national liberation movements include K. Asmal K. 'Apartheid and Terrorism-The
Case of South Africa' pp129-158 and Ate B.E. 'Terrorism in the Context of
Decolonization' pp 79-96, both within Michler H. (ed) Terrorism and National
Liberation (Verlag Peter Lang. Frankfurt. 1988.), and Friedlander R.A. 'Terrorism and
National Liberation Movements: Can Rights Derive From Wrongs' Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law. Vol 13 (2) 1981. pp281-289. The former two are in
favour of the U.N.'s actions the latter against. At best the position seems to be that
identified by Roberts who concluded that "UN resolutions have given no clue as to
whether liberation struggles ought to be fought within limits derived from , or akin to,
the laws of war" Roberts A. 'Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-occupied
Territories 1967-88' in Playfair E. (ed) International Law and the Administration of
Occupied Territories: Two Decades of israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. (Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp25-86. p64. All cited by Sproat 180
national liberation groups to become a party to these laws of war571
within the wording of the 1977 Protocols to the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. Thus organisations known as national liberation
movements can now formally adhere to the first Geneva Protocol: "by a
simple unilateral declaration" 572 . State practice can also be seen to lend
support to this view in other ways. States themselves are also known to
treat politically motivated perpetrators of violence differently to those
individuals who have committed essentially identical acts of violence
for non-political motives. This can be seen not only in their treatment
of violence committed elsewhere, for example in their policies on
accepting requests for extradition or asylum seekers, but also in
regards to acts of violence committed at home573.
The view that the right to wage and conduct war belonging solely to
states (or perhaps more accurately to their divinely ordained
monarchs) can be traced back further than the origins of international
law, to the theological origins of the 'just war' tradition with which it is
associated. The origins of this can be traced at least as far back as St.
Augustine's attempts to justify Christian participation in Roman
P.A. 'The United Nations' Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: Time to
Abandon the Right to Self- Determination?'. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 841).
Spring 1996. pp93-113. Ftn 56. p101.
571 It is of course possible to argue as McCoubrey does that the Protocols insist that
only national liberation movements that are capable of adhering to them i.e which have
control of territory presumably upon which they can keep prisoners of war can be a
signatory to them. McCoubrey H. International Humanitarian Law:The Regulaton of
Armed Conflicts. (Dartmouth Publishing Co. Aldershot. 1990.). p172. From which one
can imply that only they can commit acts of war. However If one accepts this
consistency would demand that any military action by a state that likewise did not
allow the perpetrators to take prisoners of war would not qualify. Thus if a campaign
solely involved the use of air strikes (or submarine warfare) in which the belligerent
involved would not be capable of taking prisoners of war this too would not qualify.
Surely just as one could allow the States use of surgical air strikes (which
distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable targets) without being able to take
P.O.W.s then one could allow land based national liberation movements or other non
state actors to fight without being able to take P.O.W.s permanently if they don't want
to, as long as they don't kill any who have surrendered in the meanwhile. Ramsey
seems to suggests that it might be legitimate to kill those who have surrendered in a
fluid jungle war situation where it it is impossible to insure that he will stay
surrendered). Ramsey P. The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. (University
Press of America. Lanham MD. 1983.). p435.
572 De Lupis I.D. The Law of War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1987.).
p44.
573 For example the privileges enjoyed by persons exiled to Siberia by the Tsar of
Russia, political offenders including Adolf Hitler in Weimar Germany, and the
contemporary practice of presidential pardons. 181
wars 574
 at the turn of the fifth century, if not to biblical times 575
 or
even Ancient Greece 576 . It is because the just war tradition has been
used as a means of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable acts of
political violence by organisations (indeed it has been described as "the
dominant intellectual tradition of thought about the morality of
war" 577 ) that this thesis now turns to it, to try to distinguish
unacceptable acts of political violence carried out by organisations such
as terrorism (and war crimes), from the acceptable acts of organised
political violence which are here labelled as acts of war.
574 O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981 .). p4.
575 Deuteronomy for example advised that:"When thou shalt besiege a city a long time,
in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing
an axe against them: for thou mayest eat their fruit, and thou shalt not cut them down
(for the tree of the field is man's life) to employ them in the siege". Deuteronomy
Chapter 20. Verse 19 in The Holy Bible. King James Version. (Collins. London. 1953.).
576 According to Roberts and Guelff, the Greeks are said to have customarily
observed certain humanitarian principles which have become fundamental rules of the
contemporary laws of war. They cite Phillipson C. The International Law and Custom of
Ancient Greece and Rome. (Macmillan. London. 1911.). Vol II, pp166-384. Roberts A.
and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
1989.). p2.
577 Norman R. Ethics Killing and War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
1995.). p117. 182
The Just War Tradition
The just war tradition is a set of recurrent issues and themes in the
discussion of warfare and reflects a general philosophical orientation
towards the subject578 . As a result of this and because it is neither
possible to speak of a single doctrine of just war, to point to a lineal
development of a single idea, nor to say that it has a continuous
history579 , it is probably more accurate to talk about a just war tradition
than a 'just war doctrine' or 'just war theory' as some authors do.
Although one author has claimed that the term 'permissible' would be a
more accurate descriptive adjective than the term 'just', to describe the
moral/legal guidelines concerning the contemporary use of armed
conflict580 . Whatever, there are two main parts to the just war tradition.
In the classical language of Latin these are known as jus ad bellum, and
jus in hello. The first of which concerns itself with the question of
whether a resort to force is justified, the second with whether a
particular form of the use of force is justified 581 . According to Johnson,
Medival Christianity produced the jus ad helium , whilst the jus in
hello came out of the customs and sensibilities of the knightly class582.
Other authors such as Lammers note the influence of Medival Canon
law such as the "Peace of God' which forbade attacks upon particular
groups of people including pilgrims, women, children, the aged and the
infirm, and the "Truce of God" which forbade battle on particular
(religious) days583 . It has been said that since the Peace of Westphalia
ended the 'Wars of Religion' the focus of the tradition has said to have
moved towards the jus in bello part584, as a result of the influence of
'natural law' and later international law. Meanwhile interest in the
578 Clark I. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. (Clarendon. Oxford. 1988.).
p31
579 Clark I. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. (Clarendon. Oxford. 1988.).
p31.
580 O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981.). p14.
581 Johnson J.T. Can Modern War Be Just. (Yale University Press. 1984.). p18.
582 Johnson J.T. Can Modern War Be Just. (Yale University Press. 1984.). p14.
583 Lammers S.E. 'Approaches to Limits on War in Western Just War Discourse' in
Kelsay J. and Johnson J.T. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation
of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.
1990.).pp51 -78. p64.
584 Weinberg L.B. and Davis P.B. An Introduction to Political Terrorism. (McGraw-Hill.
London. 1989.). p156. 183
issue has been rekindled by the great wars of the first half of the
century and the development of weapons of mass destruction.
lus ad bell urn.
According to O'Brien, the three major categories of jus ad helium
guidelines which must be satisfied if the decision to go to war is to count
as 'just' concern 'competent authority', 'just cause' and 'right
intention' 585 . A view which echoes that of St.Thomas Aquinas who also
attempted to justify the involvement of Christians in warfare in stating:
"for a war to be just three conditions are necessary. First, the authority of the
ruler within whose competence it lies to declare war. A private individual may not
declare war.. ..Nor has he the right to mobilise the people, which is necessary in
war586 ....Secondly, there is required a just cause; that is those who are attacked
for some offence merit such treatment.... 587Thirdly there is required a right
intention on the part of the belligerents: either of achieving some good object or
avoiding some evil"588".
Other authors claim there is more to jus ad bellum than these three
criteria, Johnson for example added to these, the requirements of
'proportionality' (in the sense of total good and evil anticipated) and of
'last resort' 589 . Whilst Norman added two more criteria to this enlarged
list, these being a 'reasonable hope of success' and a 'formal declaration
of war' 590 . It is to these jus ad bellum requirements that this thesis
585 O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981.). p16.
586 St.Thomas Aquinas. 'Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae',. No 15. Q.40. Art1. in
D'Entreves A.P. (ed.).Aquinas: Selected Political Writings. (Blackwell. Oxford. 1948.)
p159 cited by O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York.
1981.). p17.
587 St.Thomas Aquinas. 'Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae',. No 15. Q.40. Art1. in
D'Entreves A.P. (ed.).Aquinas: Selected Political Writings. (Blackwell. Oxford. 1948.)
p159 cited by O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York.
1981.). p20.
588 St.Thomas Aquinas. 'Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae',. No 15. Q.40. Art1. in
D'Entreves A.P. (ed.).Aquinas: Selected Political Writings. (Blackwell. Oxford. 1948.)
pj 59. Cited by O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York.
1981 . ) . P33.
589 Johnson J.T. Can Modern War Be Just. (Yale University Press. 1984.). p18.
590 Norman R. Ethics Killing and War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
1995.). p118. 184
addresses itself in the hope that they may help to distinguish acceptable
from unacceptable acts of political violence and thus help identify acts
of terrorism. This will be achieved by examining what O'Brien termed
the main three criteria before examining the rest. The method was
chosen primarily because of the difficulty separating the first three
criteria. St. Augustine, for example, noted the requirement of
'competent', 'proper', 'right' or 'legitimate' authority' when he claimed
that for "the natural order of men to be peacefully disposed requires
that the power and decision to declare war should be with the
rulers" 591 , and he mixed the latter two when he wrote in Super Josue :
"[t]hose wars generally defined as just which avenge some wrong, when a nation or a
state is to be punished for having failed to make amends for the wrong done, or to
restore what has been taken unjustly" 592 .
Unlike the previous factors that may have constituted the basis for
distinguishing between illegitimate and legitimate acts of political
violence (that is, the size of the participants, or the scale, intensity or
duration of the conflict), it is easy to see how the issue of acceptability
is confused with that of possessing 'proper authority' or 'just cause' and
'right intention'. The claim that acts of political violence committed by
non-state actors cannot be equated with the acts of war committed by
the State, opens the way to inferring that the unacceptable political
violence known as terrorism is committed by non-state actors. Of course
this thesis rejects such an equation and finds support from other
academics for its rejection as well as support from within the 'just war'
tradition itself, albeit the jus in bello part of it.
It is unsurprising that this investigation of what constitutes the
acceptable form of organised violence known as war (and the
unacceptable form of political violence known as terrorism) should
reject the view that the acceptability of an act of political violence
591 St. Augustine. Contra Faustum (XXIII), 73 cited by St.Thomas Aquinas. 'Summa
Theologica, Secunda Secundae',. No 15. Q.40. Artl . in D'Entreves A.P. (ed.).Aquinas:
Selected Political Writings. (Blackwell. Oxford. 1948.) pl 59 cited by O'Brien W. The
Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981 .).O'Brien W. The Conduct
of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981.). p17.
592 St. Augustine. Book DO(XIII,qu.X.cited by St.Thomas Aquinas. 'Summa Theologica,
Secunda Secundae',. No 15. Q.40. Art1 . in D'Entreves A.P. (ed.).Aquinas: Selected
Political Writings. (Blackwell. Oxford. 1948.).p 1 59. O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just
and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981.). p20. 185
should be primarily linked to the idea of possessing 'proper authority'
(although this is not to say that the author cannot be connected, in that
the unacceptability of a particular act of political violence may be
linked to the fact that a particular authority is given the right to use
particular forms of violence for specific purposes). In this way this
author is in agreement with Johnson who noted that perhaps more than
any of the jus ad bellum requirements, right authority, which has
traditionally served to legitimise the use of force by princes and later
by states, seems irrelevant in today's cynical age 593 . A point reflected
by Conor Cruise O'Brien's comment that:
"[t]hose who are described as terrorists...make the uncomfortable point that
national armed forces, fully supported by democratic opinion have in fact
employed violence and terror on a far vaster scale than what liberation' movements
have been able to attain. The freedom fighters' see themselves as fighting a just
war. Why should they not be entitled to kill burn and destroy as national armies,
navies and airforces and why should the label 'terrorist' be applied to them and
not national militaries?"594.
As for the necessity for possessing a 'just cause', it has its modern day
equivalent which is to be found within international law. It appears
that almost all of the publicists accept that the United Nations Charter of
1945 allows for the use of such political violence by signatory states in
the just cause of 'self-defence' (at least until the new 'proper authority'
-the United Nations Security Council- steps in). Whilst a number of
authors that almost all publicists accept such political violence in the
(just) cause of promoting 'human rights' 595 especially that of aiding or
achieving the 'peoples' right to self-determination 596 . However in
593 Johnson J.T. Can Modern War Be Just. (Yale University Press. 1984.). p22.
594 O'Brien C.C. 'Liberty and Terrorism'. International Security Vol.2 (Fall). 1988
.p50-51, Cited in Kegley C.W. Jnr., Sturgeon T.V. and Wittkopf E.R. 'Structural
Terrorism: The Systematic Sources of State Sponsored Terrorism' in Stohl. M and
Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.
1988.). pp13-34. p15.
595 Teson for example claimed that "the promotion of human rights is as important a
purpose in the Charter as is the control of international conflict" Têson F. Humanitarian
Intervention 5. 1988. p5. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of
Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p131.
596 A conclusion shared even by authors of mainstream Western textbooks on
international law, including Akehurst who wrote that there is "general agreement that
peoples who have a legal right to self-determination are entitled to fight a war of
national liberation". Akehurst M. A Modern Introduction to International Law (6th Ed. 186
reference to the requirement of possessing a 'just cause', De Lupis
wrote that:
"Mlle various just war theories had considerable flaws, above all concerning who
was to assess whether a war was just. Since there could be few objective criteria it
appeared that the test, in the final analysis, must be a subjective one"597,
Likewise Lammers asked: 'Who in our pluralistic world is • to provide the
definition of justice and judge the justness of the cause?' 598 . Those who
would claim that possession of a 'just cause' is the basis of distinguishing
between acceptable and unacceptable acts of violence must therefore
overcome three problems. The first is that agreement on which
particular (political) 'causes' are 'just', (or which 'rights' have been
wronged), does not exist nor is it likely to. It is difficult to see a
consensus developing in agreement with for example Mao-Tse-Tung's
view that all wars in history may be divided into two kinds, all
revolutionary wars and those waged by communists being just, all wars
waged by imperialism being unjust. This problem is also illustrated in
the debate within international law concerning the State's right to use
force outside of its area of domestic jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the
majority of the world's nation-states have signed the U.N. Charter which
most authors claim legitimises a state's use of violence outside of its area
of jurisdiction only in the cause of self-defence, others say that such
force can be used to achieve certain human rights.
Secondly even in the unlikely event of political agreement being found
and a particular 'just cause' identified as such, then one would have the
problem of defining whatever (contested) concept, constituted the 'just
cause' (and unjust cause), for example what constituted 'revolutionary'
or 'imperialism' to use Mao's example. Indeed even when the vast
London. Routledge. 1991.). p 299. For details of the debate see Sproat P.A. 'The United
Nations' Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: Time to Abandon the Right
to Self- Determination?'. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 8.(1). Spring 1996.
pp93-113 generally.
597 De Lupis I.D. The Law of War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1987.). p
126-7.
598 Lammers S.E. 'Approaches to Limits on War in Western Just War Discourse' in
Kelsay J. and Johnson J.F. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and
Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Connecticut. 1990.). pp51-78. p60. Similarly Kunz J.L. 'Bellum Justum and Bellum
Legale' American Journal of International Law. Vol 45(3). 1951. pp528-534. p531. 187
majority of nation states have agreed that self-defence constitutes one
of those occasions when the use of external state violence is legitimate,
there is no consensus on what constitutes sufficient grounds (or 'good
cause') for the use of such violence in self-defence, never mind the
scale and immediacy of the provocation necessary to justify its use, nor
the size and timing of it. Similarly the UN itself has failed to define the
term 'people' a grouping which possesses a right to self-determination
which entitles it to use all means necessary to achieve its aim599.
Finally even if one had both an agreement on a 'just cause' and a clear
definition of it, one then has to ask 'Are limitations on the means to
achieve the just ends necessary'?. For if it is the chosen instrument of
God for the punishment of the wicked on earth, then we have an excuse
for the slaughter and mutilation of the enemy be they armed or
unarmed prisoners of war or civilians 600 . So unless one wants to claim
that the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable acts of
political violence nature is based solely upon the nature of the causus
belli, i.e. that war can be distinguished from acts of terrorism because
599 Nowhere in the voluminous documentation of the UN is the concept of a 'people'
defined in an unambiguous manner. An interpretation which is also accepted by many of
those who support the United Nations 'legalisation' of an unrestricted application of the
'right to self determination'. Michalska states that "no definition of that notion is
provided in international law" . Michalska A. 'Self Determination in International Law
in W. Twinning (ed) Issues of Self Determination. (Aberdeen University Press.
Aberdeen. 1991.). p71-90 p73. A fact reflected in both the UN's attempts to define the
term 'peoples' in the 1980's. For example Aureliu Critescu, the UN Special Rapporteur,
on the historical and current development of the right to self determination gave the
following ambigious definition in his 1981 report :
"(a) the term 'people' denotes a social entity possessing a clear identity and its own
characteristics;
(b) it implies a relationship with a territory, even if the people in question has been
wronly expelled from it and artificially replaced by another population;
(c) a people should not be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, whose
existence and rights are recognised in Article 27 of the ICCPR" (UN Doc.
E/CN.4/sub2/404/rev.1,1981): Cited by Professor T. Hadden in Liberty. Broken
Covenants Violations of International Law in Northern Ireland. (National Council For
Civil Liberties. London. 1993). p144. Whilst even Dr Yvo Peters a supporter of such
rights is noted on the same page as saying that a group of experts organised by the UN
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to try to define the concept of
a 'people' were unable to reach agreement as recently as December 1989. Nor has the
UN established a definitive list of peoples who may legitimately claim the 'right to self
determination' Ofuatey-Kodjoe W. 'Self-Determination' in 0.Schachter and C.C. Joyner
(eds) United Nations Legal Order. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1995)
pp349-389. p378. all cited by Sproat P.A. 'The United Nations' Encouragement of
Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing: Time to Abandon the Right to Self-Determination?'.
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 8.(1). Spring 1996. pp93-113. p102.
600 Melzer Y. Concepts of Just War. (A.W. Sijthoff. Leiden. 1975.). p58. 188
terrorists do not have a 'just cause', then one must find an alternative
basis for distinguishing between such acts. Unfortunately it is precisely
this point that dogs the debate on terrorism leading to the expression
the term 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'.
As for the requirements of 'proportionality' (in the sense of total good
and evil anticipated), 'last resort', 'reasonable hope of success' and a
'formal declaration of war' there appears even less reason to use these
to help distinguish acceptable and unacceptable acts of political
violence. Like the idea of a possessing a 'just cause', the jus ad bellurn
requirement of the use of the political violence being a 'last resort',
fought with a 'reasonable hope of success' and in proportion to one's
aim are also vague and it is difficult to see how the fulfilling of these
criteria automatically make it a 'just' use of violence. Since the Kellogg-
Briand pact outlawed the use of war as instrument of national policy601
states have been loathed to declare that they are about to war on other
states. Instead they prefer to claim that they are engaged in hostilities
short of war, or some other euphemism. The point is that few people
would consider that the acts of organised violence that occur during
such conflict were illegitimate as a result of the failure to declare war.
In addition a strict application of this criteria would mean that surprise
attacks could only be considered as unacceptable or illegitimate acts of
political violence, even if they hit only legitimate targets.
In its aim of distinguishing between acceptable acts of political violence
perpetrated by organised entities, labelled here as 'war', and
unacceptable acts of political violence, especially those labelled
'terrorism', this thesis has rejected the view that the distinction should
be based upon the size of the military entities involved, the scale,
intensity or duration of the conflict, or the cause or 'status' of the
perpetrator. Whilst the latter two reasons have a more credible link to
the issue of acceptability of such political violence and therefore its
'legitimacy', both of these factors constitute attempts to answer the
question, "Under what (political) conditions is waging war justified?".
Unfortunately this is the wrong question to be answered. Instead the
601 De Lupius for example wrote "[t]he Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928 finally outlawed
not only aggressive war but all types of war for the solution of international
controversies or as an instrument of national policy'. De Lupis I.D. The Law of War.
(Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1987.). p26. 189
task is to focus on that of the methods of war (jus in bello) rather than
the justification (jus ad bellum) in order to find out what factors (if
any) enable people to view certain acts of political violence as
acceptable and others as unacceptable. A view that is in line with
McGurn who argued that:
"[a]lthough Just War principles have been perverted notoriously, to make moral
crusades out of wars of national interest, their intention is just the opposite - to
ensure that having a justification for going into battle is not taken to sanction an
open license once in battle"602.
Similarly Arnold can be seen to have added precision to this, when he
asserted that all laws of war must assume that both parties are equally in
the right603 . This work then will echo these last two comments, and
those made by Brian Jenkins who criticised those who suggest that
there can be no objective definition of terrorism on the grounds that
there are no universal standards of conduct in peace and war.
According to Jenkins even war has commonly accepted (if not always
observed) rules outlawing the use of certain tactics 604 , namely those
rules against bombing, assassination, kidnapping, hostage taking and
hijacking of civilians - the type of actions that make up 95 percent of
what is most often described as "terrorism" 605 . The view that war is a
rule-governed activity is the opposite of saying that war is hell in
which everything goes 606 . This idea of war as a rule governed activity
which forbids indiscriminate targeting is not merely wishful thinking,
it pertains to the nature of war itself. Thus if war is, as Clausewitz's
maintained, the continuation of policy by other means, then it will be
(at least minimally) restrained by those underlying principles' for a
602 McGurn W.'Terrorist or Freedom Fighter?. The Cost of Confusion'. (Institute for
European Defence and Strategic Studies. London . 1987. Occassional Paper No.25). p16.
603 Best G. Humanity in Warfare. (Columbia University Press. New York. 1980).p.7.
After Arnold T. Introductory Lectures on Modern History (1842). p162.
604 Jenkins B. A Strategy for Combatting Terrorism (Rand. Santa Monica. California.
Paper Series 66628. May 1981.) p. 67. cited by Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction'
in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global
Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conecticut. 1984.).pp3-10. p9.
605 After Jenkins B. International Terrorism: The Other World War. (Rand. Santa
Monica. California. 1985) p.12 cited by Der Derian J. Anti - Diplomacy: Spies, Terror,
Speed and War. (Blackwell. Oxford. 1992.).p.98. I have replaced his use of the word
states with that of political organisations.
606 Clark I. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. (Clarendon. Oxford. 1988.). 190p31.
policy entails a political society, a moral community guided by reason
and prudence 607 . Indeed without the idea of war being a rule governed
activity it is impossible to talk about 'war crimes' instead one could only
talk of the crime of war, (or 'Crimes against the peace' as the
Nuremberg Principles classified it). The immediate question to be asked
then is: 'What is the nature of the rules which govern the conduct of
war within the just war tradition? (from which flows the idea of war
crimes other than the crime of war), the answer to which is be found
within the jus in bello part of the just war tradition.
Ius in bello.
As already noted at the start of the section on the just war tradition, a
consensus exists that there are only two criteria or tests that are
applicable in determining the justice of war's conduct according to the
just war tradition. These are the principle of proportionality and the
principle of discrimination 608 . Interestingly the former principle has
already been mentioned in relation to the jus ad bell urn part of the
tradition and therefore proportionality has implications for both the
initiation of war and for waging of war once begun 609 . The link
between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello parts are most obvious
within the principle of proportionality. However this author, like
Walzer, takes the view that it is possible to view the jus ad bellum and
jus in bello elements of the just war tradition as "logically independent"
610 .
 Decisions of proportionality are made by both at the strategic and
607 Phillips R.L. 'Combatancy and Noncombatancy and Noncombatant Immunity in Just
War Tradition' in Kelsay J. and Johnson J.F. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The
Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Connecticut. 1990.). pp179 -195. pi 80.
608 See for example Ramsey P. The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility.
(University Press of America. Lanham MD. 1983.). p428, Johnson J.T. Can Modern
War Be Just. (Yale University Press. 1984.).pl 8, Norman R. Ethics Killing and War.
(Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1995.).p119.0'Brien W. Law and Morality in
Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p42.
609 Johnson J.T. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical
Inquiry. (Princeton University Press. Princeton. New Jersey. 1981.). p219-220 cited
by O'Brien W. 'The International Law of War as Related to the Just War Tradition' in
Kelsey J. and Johnson J.T. Just War and Jihad. (Greenwood Press. Westport,
Connecticut. 1991.). pp163 -193. p179.
610 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p195. 191
tactical level. That is the decision as to whether the actions are
proportionate to the object of war -the 'just cause'- is taken by the
politician, whilst the decision as to whether the actions are
proportionate to a discrete legitimate military objective is taken by the
military commander. Of the two types of proportionality within the just
war tradition it is far easier to judge the 'proportionality' of military
means to the jus in hello military ends. Although that does not mean it
is easy to do at all, indeed the difficulty of identifying 'proportionality'
constitutes the main reason why the 'principle of proportion' is not
included within a definition of terrorism. Even at this tactical level
'proportionality' is far too vague a concept to be credibly used to
produce a definition of terrorism. The issue of whether a particular use
of force is a military necessity at a given is always open to debate611
and nature of the principle of proportion is therefore "elastic" 612 . This
problem has already been illustrated by the variety of views held by
legal publicists, for although they agree that a victim state's use of force
must be 'proportionate', there is no such agreement on how
'proportionality' should properly be calculated 613 . Intoccia, for
example, claimed that any response to an act of aggression which
employs a level of violence "which is greater than is necessary to
counter any continuing immediate threat must be viewed as
impermissible" under international law 614 . In contrast Roberts claimed
that: "an accumulation of small events, such as minor terrorist attacks,
can justify a single larger retaliatory response in certain instances"615.
Whilst William O'Brien asserted that the "referent of proportionality"
should be "the overall pattern of past and projected acts"616.
611 Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon
Press. Oxford. 1989.). p5.
612 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p42.
613 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p165.
614 Intoccia G. 'American Bombing of Libya'. Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law. Vol. 19. (1987). p206 cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J.
International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge.
London. 1993.). p165.
613 Roberts G. 'Self Help in Combatting State Sponsored Terrorism' Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 19. (1987). (no page reference given), cited
by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p165.
616 O'Brien W. 'Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defence' in Counter-terror Operations'
Va. J. Int. Law (1990).p472, cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and
the Use of Forc:e Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p166. 192
The second reason for excluding proportionality at the tactical level
from this definition of terrorism applies only to those interpretations of
proportionality that consider a response to be proportionate only to a
previous act of violence, rather than some less tangible 'threat of
violence'. That is to say because one cannot apply this narrower view of
'proportionality' to all acts of violence, for the first shot in a political
dispute has no predecessor to which the jus in bello 'proportionality'
can be assessed, any definition of terrorism that incorporated it would
therefore not be applicable to all acts of political violence.
Finally, the inclusion of any concept of proportionality would mean
that it is very difficult if not impossible to produce a definition of
terrorism which could then be applied to those acts of violence which
the State commits within its own area of jurisdiction to enforce the law.
The element of proportionality is often considered by the State for
practical reasons in determining its application of violent sanctions.
Generally speaking the more proportionate and therefore 'natural' its
justice appears the more likely the State will dare to use the sanction.
The more automatic the sanction implemented by the State, the more
credible its use of political violence to deter its inhabitants from
committing criminal acts. So if the element of 'proportionality' was
considered as a means of distinguishing between 'terrorist' and 'non-
terrorist' acts then, it would also have to be used to assess the State's use
of political violence against its own citizens, with all the problems of
assessing the proportionate nature of culturally different punishments
by politically different actors. Therefore in addition to the problems of
political bias that affect any assessment of proportionality, any
evaluation of proportionality faces great (if not insoluble) cultural
difficulties especially when like actions were not compared to like. This
problem is evident in the stark 'cultural' differences of opinion that
surround the use of particular acts of physical violence as punishment
by Middle Eastern states. Acts which some European states had abolished
centuries ago. Consistency therefore requires the issue of
proportionality to be sidelined from the production of a definition of
terrorism that aims to include the violence of the state and insurgents.
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In contrast to this jus in bello principle, the principle of
discrimination can be specified rather more precisely 617 , for it is in the
nature of the principle of discrimination to remain rigidly opposed to
various categories of means irrespective of their necessity to success in
war618 .
 With this in mind it is not surprising, then, that: "most debates
about the morality of modern war have focused on the principle on
discrimination" 619 . Likewise the principle of discrimination has also
been seen as an essential part of a definition of the term 'terrorism',
Perlstein for example claimed that:
"Nile main distinguishing feature of terrorism in the modern era is that it does
not recognise the rules and conventions of war. There is no distinction made
between the combatant and the non combatant"620.
It is therefore to the element of discrimination that the thesis now turns
in order to try and distinguish between those acts of political violence
such as war which are considered legitimate and those of terrorism and
war crimes which are not.
617 Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon
Press. Oxford. 1989.). p5.
618 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p42.
619 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p42.
620 Perlstein G.R. 'The Changing Face of Terrorism: From Regicide to Homicide'
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. Vol.30. 1986.
87-1 93. p118. 194
The princi.ole of discrimination. 
According to Hanle the principle of discrimination was perhaps the
most widely accepted criteria used to define abnormal force in war621.
Walzer claimed that of all the existing laws of war the issue of targeting
was the one most closely connected to universal notions of right and
wrong, and although their details may vary from place to place it is
these rules that point toward a general conception of war as a combat
between combatants. A conception that has turned up again and again
in anthropological and historical accounts 622 . Similarly Johnson
claimed that it was one of the strongest and most regular themes within
the just war tradition623.
The discrimination aspect of the just war tradition has essentially three
things to say. The first is that non-combatants must never be made the
(primary) object of direct attacks. According to Phillips, this is but one
instance of the application of the categorical prohibition of murder to
the realm of war624 . This fact was not lost on Blakesley who argued that:
"[k]illing an enemy combatant during war is akin to killing an attacker for which
there is justification, but during war, one may not intentionally or wantonly kill
non-combatants or even captive former combatants. Non-combatants were never
"attackers", so they may not be summarily killed. "625
From here it is easy to see how Sederberg could claim that the
distinction between combatant and non-combatant is perhaps one of the
621 After Hanle, although he actually refers to attacks on non combatants especially
civilians. Hanle D.J. Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare. (Pergammon-Brasseys.
New York. 1989.). p106.
622 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p42.
623 Johnson J.T. Can Modem War Be Just. (Yale University Press. 1984.). p27.
624 Phillips R.L. 'Combatancy and Noncombatancy and Noncombatant Immunity in Just
War Tradition' in Kelsay J. and Johnson J.F. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The
Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Connecticut. 1990.).pp179-195. p181.
625 Blakesley C.L. Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the Protection of Human
Liberty. A Comparative Study of International Law, the Nature, Rule and Impact in
Matter of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, War and Extradition. (Transnational Publishers.
Inc. New York. 1992.). p38. 195
last firebreaks of civil order 626 . Once breached, no one can feel secure
while the combatants in a political struggle slaughter one another the
remainder of the community may take some comfort as long as they are
not inadvertently caught in the cross fire.
The second implication is that criminal charges in accordance with the
laws of the locality should not ordinarily be brought against captured
combatants for their actions in war (except of course for breaches of
these 'laws of war', that is, for 'war crimes'); and thirdly, since they no
longer pose a threat of harm, prisoners of war should be treated as
humanely as possible 627 . This latter reasoning allows the combatant to
change their status to that of a non-combatant through capitulation,
surrender or capture, soldiers can be 'reasonably certain that their lives
will be saved. Or in Walzer's words, a soldier who surrenders enters into
an agreement with his captors he will stop fighting if they will accord
him what the legal handbooks call "benevolent quarantine" 628 . This
latter issue is important for it was with this point that Schmid and
Jongman countered Trotsky's view that Red Terror is not
distinguishable from war or the armed insurrection of which it is the
direct continuation. For them:
"[w]hat Trotsky in his attempt to justify mass terrorism failed to mention is that
soldiers are armed and can (as a rule) save their lives, by capitulating, while
victims of terrorism are generally non-combatants' and are granted no prisoner of
war' status when kidnapped or taken hostage H629 .
In this way combatants can do something in a war situation to avoid the
infliction of political violence by surrendering, handing in their
weapons or promising non- resistance unlike the prisoners of terrorists
who as either kidnapped individuals or as a group of trapped hostages,
cannot affect their own fate by modifying their behaviour630.
626 Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. (University of
Southern California. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 1989.). p41.
627 Wilkins B T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.).
p69.
62 8 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p46.
629 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p9.
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The important exception to this 'targeting' rule are the injuries and
deaths of non-combatants that are usually termed 'collateral damage'.
For many authors of the just war tradition collateral damage is allowed
under the principle of double effect. As Sederberg put it the acceptable
effect is the destruction of the opposing combatants, the unacceptable
effect is the incidental destruction of unfortunate by-standers 631 . It
demands that military action should, in its primary objective thrust, as
well as its subjective purpose, discriminate between directly attacking
combatants or military objectives and directly attacking non-
combatants or destroying the structures of civil society as a means of
victory632 . This issue is especially controversial because of the moral
issue involved, for as Herman and G.O'Sullivan noted such killings are
not inadvertent they are the systematic and inevitable result of
calculated military policy 6 3 3 . It can also be seen as making an
assessment of the targeting more difficult than simply asking if there
were any non-combatants injured or killed, it does not really make the
task of assessing whether or not an act is one of terrorism any more
difficult for this involves an assessment of intent to start with. So whilst
this author's definition will allow for this exception, it would be quite
credible to assert that all such violent attacks on illegitimate targets
should be considered as acts of terrorism (if all other qualifying criteria
are met). Again the point is whichever of the two views on collateral
damage one chooses, one must be consistent in one's application. It is
also worth noting here Sederberg's interesting comment that whilst
severe "collateral damage" from combatant warfare is not commonly
considered "terrorist", at some point of wanton excess such as in the
situation of nuclear war "it certainly could be"634.
Generally speaking then those acts of violence carried out in order to
achieve political goals which are considered as acceptable, are those
which aim to damage or destroy 'legitimate' targets. Those acts of
631 Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. (University of
Southern California. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 1989.). p35.
632 Ramsey P. The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. (University Press of
America. Lanham MD. 1983.). p428.
633 Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. "Terrorism' as Ideology and .Cultural Industry' in
George A.(ed.) Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp39-75. p51.
634 Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. (University of
Southern California. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 1989.). p39. 197
political violence which do not aim to damage or destroy 'legitimate'
targets are considered to be unacceptable. The former therefore can be
seen as the moral equivalent of 'war' and the latter as 'war crimes',
whilst the fact that they are committed by organised groups makes the
analogy even stronger. It is of course possible to object to this by
saying that war crimes are those actions which breach the legal
provisions, and there are good reasons for this. But presumably
advocates of such a view would have to use these legal concepts
alongside political concepts such as war and terrorism or give up using
the latter terms which have yet to be defined by international law. Here
the idea is to identify an act of terrorism by explaining its relationship
to other similar political concepts in a meaningful manner, in the way
one can talk of the concept of genocide without meaning the exact
wording of the 'legal' 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide'.
Here it is worth noting that it would be a mistake to see such attacks on
illegitimate targets as the only type of war crime. There are also those
identical acts of violence directed against legitimate targets which use
either illegitimate means or an illegitimate mode. That is they use
illegitimate weapons such as dumb-dumb bullets or bacteriological
warfare635 , or they use treacherous or devious means (perfidy) such as
disguising themselves as illegitimate targets. These two groups can also
be seen as qualifying for the term 'war crimes' for they can be seen to
breach those norms that are contained within actually existing
international law. Some might also add 'Crimes against the Peace' to this
list.
This in turn raises the question of 'How does one differentiate between
an act of terrorism and other essentially similar 'war crimes' which
inflict violence upon illegitimate targets?'. The answer is that whilst
both may involve similar targeting of illegitimate victims, an act of
terrorism is designed to communicate a message to an audience beyond
the immediate target (victim) in order to affect the audience's
behaviour. Thus within this 'tripartite' model of terrorism, insurgent
terrorists target an immediate victim (or instrumental target), whilst
635 1 899 Hague Declaration 3 Concerning Expanding Bullets and the 1 925 Geneva
Protocol on gas and bacteriological warfare. 198
their 'target for attention' (or 'audience' or 'primary target') is
different. The physical condition (death or injury) of the victim of
their violence itself is therefore often of secondary import to the
terrorists636 . In contrast essentially similar 'war crimes' such as
massacres or genocide (by small groups) 'merely' involve the physical
elimination of a particular group of illegitimate targets, and cannot be
classified as terrorism because the intention is not to influence the
behaviour of others but . merely to destroy the immediate target group
or victims637
 (although strictly speaking genocide could also involve
the killing of combatants for any of these would also have to be killed if
one was trying to exterminate a whole genus).
It is from all of this that insurgency terrorism has been defined in one
of the better attempts as:
"the purposive use of violence by the precipitators against an instrumental target
in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of violence so as to coerce the
primary target into behaviour attitudes through intense fear or anxiety in
connection with a desired power (political) outcome"638.
Although of course, this author would insist that the immediate victim
was an 'illegitimate' target.
Therefore this author's definition can be seen to include, albeit not in so
many words, the elements of "Victim-target differentiation" and
"Demands made on third parties", noted within 37.5% and 4% of the 109
definitions analysed by Schmid 639 . This author would therefore go
636 After Schmid who does not use the term 'often'. Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J.
Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC.
Amsterdam. 1988.). p8.
637 Note the difference between my definition of genocide and the UN's all embrasive
one. Genocide was defined as meaning any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group:
"(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
63 6 Nef J. 'Some Thoughts on Contemporary Terrorism' in Carson J. (ed.). Terrorism
in Theory and Practice. (The Atlantic Council of Canada. Toronto. 1978.). pp3-31. pl O.
639 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). Table 5. p76-77. 199
along with the first part of Schmid's claim that: "the victim - target
differentiation is an important if not the most important specific
feature of terrorism" 640 . A view which Schmid claimed there was
"considerable support" for. It would also go along with the view that
terrorism involves an act of "Coercion, extortion, induction of
compliance", "Intimidation", also mentioned in Schmid's table641.
although at this stage of the process these criteria are no longer
necessary, whilst coercion is perhaps a little to broad. The definition
can also be seen as to acknowledge, if not incorporate, other elements
noted in Schmid's list notably those of "Fear, terror emphasised", the
"Publicity aspect" and "Symbolic aspect, demonstration" 642, and here
seems an appropriate place to address each of them.
640 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p110.
641 "Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance" was mentioned in 28% of the 109
definition analysed by Schmid, and "Intimidation" was noted within 17%. They were
ranked 10th and 14th respectively. Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide
to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.).
Table 5. p76-77.
642 "Publicity aspect" was mentioned in 21.5% of the 109 definition analysed by
Schmid and was ranked 11th, "Demands made on third parties" was ranked at 22nd
and was cited in 4%of the definitions,whilst "Symbolic aspect, demonstration" was
ranked at number 17 and cited in 13.5% Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research
Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam.
1984.). Table 5. p76-77. 200
Terror and Terrorism.
It is unsurprising that the grouping "Fear, terror emphasised" was
noted in 51 per cent of respondents definition of terrorism, lying third
behind the terms violence (or force) and political 643 . It also seems the
appropriate place to mention a rather ambiguous element noted in
Schmid's list, that of "(Psych.) effect and (anticipated) reactions"644,
which is not incorporated precisely because of its vague meaning. The
two elements can be seen to come together in Aron's famous claim that:
"an action of violence is labelled "terrorist" when its psychological
effects are out of proportion to its purely physical result" 645 . A view
which has led some to see terrorism as a form of psychological
warfare 646 . Again whilst this author is sympathetic to including this
element, 'terror' is not considered as an essential requirement to this
author's definition of terrorism for a number of reasons. Firstly, as
Maley noted terror and violence have much in common, but not all
violence qualifies as terror, it depends on the prevailing norms within
a society, for it is these norms that determine the character of the
general psychological reaction prompted by a particular action647.
Thus not only do we have different thresholds of fear, but as Thackrah
noted, the response to an act of terrorism can vary greatly depending
on the danger of repetition and degree of identification with the victim.
If the observer's identification is not with the victim but with the target
of the terrorist it is unlikely to be terror, and if the identification of the
643 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.).Table 5. p76-77.
644 "(Psych.) effect and (anticipated) reactions" was noted by 47% of the
respondents and ranked 5th. Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to
Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam.
1984.).Table 5. p76-77.
645 Aron R. Peace and War (Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. 1966.). p170 cited in
Vincent R.J. 'Introduction' in Freedman L., Hill C., Roberts A., Vincent R. J., Wilkinson
P. and Windsor P. Terrorism and International Order (Routledge. Kegan Pau1.1986.).
pp1-6. p1.
646 Wardlaw for example wrote "[t]his work is concerned with the employment of
terror as a weapon of psychological warfare for political ends". Wardlaw G. Political
Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (Cambridge University. Press.
Cambridge. 1982.). p9.
647 Maley W. 'Social Dynamics- The Disutility of Terror: Afghanistan, 1978-1989' in
Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. (eds.) State Organized
Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992). pp113-131. p113. 201
observer is with the terrorist, it may be euphoria 648 . Secondly one must
realise, as David George did, that to say that whoever terrorises is ipso
facto a terrorist is either an etymological confusion, or else an
arbitrary stipulation of meaning 649 . Thus any attempt to quantify
terrorism purely by studying terror wherever it is produced like
Aron's, will run into great difficulties. As David George noted there are
such acts which terrorise no one. They include expressivist bombings of
buildings and similar properties which are carried out because of their
symbolic significance to the terrorist650 . Conversely whilst the term
terrorism does not refer to any or all actions that produce terror,
neither does it automatically exclude all actions that do not produce
terror. It is the purpose of the act, the aim behind it, rather than its
effects, that is the key characteristic in identifying the perpetration of
an act of terrorism.
Any attempt then to include elements of the outcome of terrorism in the
definition is both unnecessary and confusing 651 . However as Levy and
Ross have noted there is a practical problem with this emphasis on
labelling acts of terrorism in accordance with the criteria of intent. In
that given many objectives, immediate and long term it is difficult to
sort out the goal of any one action, or even series of actions 652 . Yet
some indication of the purpose is unavoidable. To take an analogy that
Schmid and Jongman made, it would be difficult to distinguish surgery
from mutilation or torture if no purpose were given 653 . Thus, excluded
from any definition are all actions that are not intended to produce such
fear but that are aimed "solely or primarily" toward "physical
848 Thackrah J.R. The Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. (Routledge,
Kegan and Paul. London. 1987.). p57.
848 George D. 'Terrorism or Freedom Fighter' in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.)
Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp54-67. p.56.
650 George D. 'Terrorism or Freedom Fighter' in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.)
Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp54-67. p56.
651 Merari cited in reply to his questionnaire by Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland.
Amsterdam. 1984.). p10.
652 Levy J. and Ross P. The State of Political Violence in Latin America'. Australian
Quarterly. Vol. 58 (3).1987. pp269-277. p265.
653 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 7988.). p11. 202
harming" or toward "elimination" of the immediate victim, including
assassination or genocide654.
654 Duvall R.D.and Stohl M. 'Goverance by Terror' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of 203Terrorism. (3rd ed. Marcel Dekker. New York. 1988.).pb231-272. p235.
Publicity.
As for the element of publicity, noted within 21.5% of the definitions
this element has been singled out by many authors including Brian
Jenkins who used the metaphor of 'terrorism as theatre' to express his
view that "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people
listening and not [necessarily] a lot of people dead" 655 . Whilst Hacker
tried to quantify this view by writing: "if you could cut out the
publicity, I would say you could cut out seventy five percent of the
national and international terrorism" 656 . However whilst all acts of
terrorism crave publicity in that a message needs to be communicated to
an audience, they do not all crave publicity in that they want everyone
else to know all of the time. It has been said that this latter point is
especially true of the terrorism of the State.
It is because the terrorist hopes to influence the behaviour of a target
or an audience other than the immediate victims, that the victim is
often described as being "symbolic". The idea of such actions being
symbolic was found within 13.5% of Schmid's 109 definitions as part of
the category "Symbolic aspect, demonstration" 657 . Unfortunately whilst
655 Jenkins B.M. 'International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict' in D.Carelton and
C. Shaerf (eds) International Terrorism and World Sceurity (Croom Helm. London.
1975.). pl 5.1n a similar manner Crenshaw claimed that, "[t]he most basic reason for
terrorism is to gain recognition or attention"Crenshaw M. 'The Causes of Terrorism'
Comparative Politics July 1981.p386. (no other reference) cited by Schmid A.P.
Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature
(North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p214.
656 Statement of Dr. F. Hacker 14 August 1974 in US Congress House Committee on
Internal Security Hearings. Part. 4 93rd Congress. 2nd. Session. Washington D.C. GPO.
1974 p3030. cited by Kupperman R.H. and Trent D.M. Terrorism Threat, Reality,
Responses. (Hoover Institute. Stanford. Ca 1979.). p421 Cited by Schmid A.P. Political
Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North
Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p221 also Watson's statement that terrorism must not be
defined only in terms of violence, but also in terms of propaganda for the two are in
operation together. Watson F.M. Political Terrorism: The Threat and the Response.
(Robert b. Luce. Washington D.C. 1976.). pl 5 cited by Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism:
A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland.
Amsterdam. 1984.). p219.
657 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.) Table 5. p76-77. Young for
example wrote "the terrorist group employs violence to intimidate and promote fear
among certain people. Generally, these people will be symbolic or representaive of
some policy or sector of the populace which the terrorist wishes to attack". Young R.
Revolutionary Terrorism, Crime and Morality'. Social Theory and Practice. Vol. 4. 204
there must be some connection between the actual victim and the
audience whose behaviour the terrorist hopes to affect (be it to modify
or to remain the same) the author prefers not to include the
requirement of the victim being symbolic for it is too vague a
description of the relationship between the two. It generally fails to add
anything to the description whilst it could narrow it if the analyst could
not find any symbolic connection between the two. Whilst the
demonstration aspect is considered to have been covered within a
previous section on target-victim differentiation.
Interestingly it is this process of communication and the victim-target
differentiation which highlights the necessity for claiming that the
immediate victim of an act of terrorism must be described as an
illegitimate one, for without this form of discrimination it would be
impossible to distinguish an act of terrorism from an act of war which
also contains the process of communication and the victim-target
differentiation. That the purpose of the threat or use of violence in war
is also to instil fear in a target watching in order to modify its
behaviour becomes obvious when one remembers Clausewitz's assertion
that success within war could be achieved by one of two means. The first
was the use of physical force to destroy the enemy's war fighting
capability i.e. its armed forces. The second was the (threat or) use of
physical force to destroy the enemy's will to continue the fight. A fact
that allowed Napoleon, who so influenced Clausewitz the author of this
commonly cited phrase, to declare that "the morale is to the physical as
three is to one".
Those who would attempt to distinguish between 'war' and 'terrorism',
without differentiating between the type of targets, would have
difficulty in distinguishing an act of war from an act of terrorism, for if
the purpose of an act (or even threat) of war is simultaneously to instil
terror into one's victims and their leaders in order to destroy both their
wills to fight, then an act of war also fits this latest version of the
terrorism equation. The crucial difference between the two is that in
acceptable acts of political violence 'war' the instrumental target
(victim) are considered as combatants, whilst in an act of terrorism the
immediate victim (or instrumental target) are non-combatants. The
pp287-302. p289 cited by Bauhn P. Ethical Aspects of Political Terrorism. (Lund 205University Press. Lund, Sweden. 1989.). p41.
importance of the process of 'communication' within an act of terrorism
has been therefore been overstated, for without distinction as to targets
the expression 'propaganda of the deed' is as valid a description of 'acts
of war' as it is an act of terrorism. It is in this way that many authors
have overlooked the place of communication within other acts of
political violence.
In addition without this identification of the communication process, it
would be impossible to distinguish those acts of war which merely aim
to destroy the enemies capability to fight (their armed forces) from
(most658 ) acts of genocide which merely aim to destroy an illegitimate
target.
With this last qualification in mind it becomes possible to produce an
initial definition of terrorism, one that covers the actions of 'sub-state'
groups (and the actions of states outside their own area of jurisdiction.
The two being equated on the grounds that a state has as much right to
use violence in some other states are of jurisdiction, as a substate group
has within the jurisdiction of a state). So when carried out by non-state
organisations anywhere (or the state outside its area of jurisdiction)
terrorism can be described as:
"the threat or use of violence by organisations for political purposes
when such actions are intended to modify the behaviour of target(s)
wider than the immediate illegitimate victim(s)".
The final issue to be decided then is the who, what constitutes a
legitimate and an illegitimate target, or how does one make such a
distinction.
However before going on to examine the basis for the discrimination
and for identifying the legitimate targets, this seems a logical place to
examine the remaining elements listed by Schmid which are neither
examined in the following section nor incorporated within the
definition. In light of the importance of the principle of discrimination
to this author's definition of terrorism it is easy to see how various
658 By definition genocide would have to include the killing of any members of the 206genus who took up arms against it.
terrologists incorporate any of the elements of "Arbitrariness;
impersonal, random character' 65 9 and/or "Incalculability,
unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence" found
within 21% and 9% of those 109 definitions identified by Schmid
re spec tively 660 . Whilst there is some similarity between these latter
notions and this author's insistence on including the idea of illegitimate
targets within any definition, this does not mean that these other terms
should be used. The main reason that the terms "Arbitrariness" or
"random" are not included is that victims of terrorist attacks are not
arbitrarily or randomly chosen, otherwise the supporters or even
members of the terrorist group would occasionally be the victims of the
terrorist's own campaign. It is more accurate to say that the particular
class of persons to be targeted by the terrorist has been carefully
selected albeit in a manner that is considered too broad and
indiscriminate by most people including this author. The broad group of
those attacked is therefore both broadly predictable and selective, even
though the individuals targeted within this group are not. It is
therefore from the perspective of the victim (and other non terrorists)
the selection as victims appears random or arbitrary, because they pose
no direct military threat to the terrorists. In this sense it is easy to see
how the terms contained with Schmid's category "Incalculability,
unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence" have
occurred. But the violence of the terrorist is far from incalculable,
unpredictable, or unexpected in relation to their political goals,
although the terrorist may try and make their violent attacks upon that
large group whom they do not mind killing as incalculable,
unpredictable, or unexpected as possible in order to avoid being caught.
In this way outsiders and neutrals might be caught up within the
659 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.) and ranked 12th Table 5. p76-
77. For example Kupperman and Trent who wrote that "Nerrorist violence is by its
nature random". Kupperman R.H. and Trent D.M. Terrorism Threat, Reality, Responses.
(Hoover Institute. Stanford. Ca 1979.). p14 cited by Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A
Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature. ( North Holland.
Amsterdam. 1984.). p78.
660 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature ( North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.), and ranked 18th.Table 5.
p76-77. For example Galtung J. 'Zur strategie der Nichtmilitarischen Vertidigeng -
Probleme und LOsungsvorschlage' in Galtung J. Andersveteidigen (Rowablt. Reinbek.
1982.). p238 wrote that terrorism was "the unpredictable use of violence in order to
compel submission" cited by Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to
Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.).
p78. 207
terrorists apparently random act of violence but they cannot logically
constitute the primary target of the terrorist's violence. This is because
if the terrorists were to deliberately target only those who were outside
the conflict or neutral to it, it would be very unlikely for such action to
concern their audience, whilst they might produce a new enemy who
the terrorist could then not target by definition.
Various authors, including Thornton, and Boire, have emphasised the
extraordinary nature of the terrorist's attacks within their definition of
terrorism661 . Indeed for Wardlaw it is this "extranormalness" which
sets terrorism apart from all other forms of force employment 662 . Yet
Wardlaw also correctly suggests that such writers are then faced with
the difficulty of defining 'extranormal' which few do. The importance
of this is highlighted by Schmid identification of five ways of
conceptualising extranormality663.
661 Thornton wrote 'in an internal war situation, terror is a symbolic act designed to
influence political behaviour by extranormal means entailing the use or threat of
violence". Thornton T.P. 'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation' in Eckstein H. (ed).
Internal War Problems and Approaches. (The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan.
London. 1964.). pp71-100. p73.
662 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures.
(Cambridge Univ.Press. Cambridge. 1982.). p10.
663 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature. (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p107-11. His identification
of 5 groups is even greater than that of Sederberg who identified three i.e. the weapons
chosen, the time and place of the threat, or the covert nature of the attack is extra-
ordinary. Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. (University of
Southern California. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 1989.). p26. 208
Extranormality.
The first of the five ways of conceptualising extranormality identified
by Schmid is "The Weapon Utilised for the Terror-Inducing Act is
Extranormal". It is the equivalent of what this author describes as
illegitimate means. Its inclusion within any definition of terrorism
seems unconvincing for a number of reasons. The first is whilst it fits
the prohibition of particular weapons demanded by the laws of wars,
this author has yet to come across anyone insisting that it constitutes
part of a definition of the term terrorism. Secondly Schmid himself
noted that most terrorist acts are committed with quite common weapons
so that this category cannot represent a necessary property of
terrorism664 . The second way by which extranormality might be
conceptualised- "The Nature of the Terrorist Act Shows Extranormal
Features"- is a more credible element to include in any definition. As
Wardlaw put it in a passage that links so many elements of the terrorism
formula:
"[w] hat differentiates terrorism from other forms of violence is its unexpected
nature, its element of surprise and shock. It is this quality which makes terrorism
frightening rather than the actual physical impact of any incident"665.
However whilst it may be true that terrorist acts often involve acts such
as knee capping, or mutilating the victim of a ransom demand, again
such an inclusion of this element would unnecessarily restrict any
definition of the term terrorism as many acts of terrorism do not
involve such extranormal features. This reasoning is also an apt excuse
for excluding the notion of extranormal when it means "The Time and
Place of a Terrorist Attack are Extranormal", for many acts of terrorism
are not geared to primetime television. Schmid's fourth suggestion-"The
Clandestine, Covert Nature makes Terrorism Extranormal"- is the
equivalent of what this author terms an illegitimate mode (perfidy) and
will be evaluated later. Finally the necessity for including
extranormality when it means "The Deliberate Violation of Basic Human
664 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). p107.
665 Wardlaw G. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures.
(Cambridge Univ.Press. Cambridge. 1982.). p16. 209
Rules of Conduct is Extranormal" is rejected for the notion of "Basic
Human Rules" is too vague and therefore too broad. This said, the author
is sympathetic to the notion generally, indeed his own conception of
state terrorism is based upon the 'norm' of discrimination in warfare
and punishment in law enforcement.
It is therefore no surprise that this rather ambiguous notion-
"Extranormality. In breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian
constraints"- was mentioned within 30% of the 109 definitions he had
examined. 666 It is primarily because of its ambiguous nature that the
word is not considered as an appropriate term for inclusion into a
definition.
The final element noted by Schmid which is neither examined in the
following section or incorporated within the definition is that of
"Method of combat strategy, tactic" 667 . Both the idea of terrorism being
a strategy or terrorism being a tactic is not included because neither
can deal with all of acts of the terrorist state for the same reason that
the element "Criminal" is excluded. Both the idea of terrorism as a tactic
(or strategy), or terrorism as crime, imply that terrorism should be
approached from the position that it is either solely war or solely
crime, whilst excluding the other, when in fact it can be either
depending upon the circumstances. This is no more obvious when it
comes to assessing the State's use of violence against its own citizens,
and abroad. However first it is necessary to return to the issue of
discrimination and how one distinguishes between legitimate and
illegitimate targets.
666 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). Table 5.p76-77 and ranked
9th.
667 Noted within 30.5% and ranked 8th. Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research
Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam, North Holland.
1984.).Table 5. p76-77. 210
Making a distinction. 
The principle of discrimination within targeting raises a number of
questions, the most important of which is 'Upon what basis does one
discriminate?', from which flows 'Who constitutes a 'legitimate' and
'illegitimate' target for attack?'. There is also the related question of
'What terms should be used to describe the illegitimate target?', for
when examining the literature which has attempted to answer these
questions, one is struck with is the variety of terms that are used to
describe illegitimate targets, all of which have slightly different
implications. Some authors use either of the terms 'innocent' 'civilian'
or 'non-combatant' to describe such targets, whilst others use them
interchangeably. The term 'innocent was included within 15.5% of the
109 definitions analysed by Schmid 668 . He also noted that the terms
"Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims" were
included within 17.5% of the definitions he analysed669.
In one sense it is not surprising that the terms are often used
synonymously. Uniformed soldiers are often considered combatants for
they are armed. This said, non-combatants need not be civilians, they
are often found in uniform as prisoners of war 670 , chaplains or medics.
Civilians are often considered illegitimate targets for they are not
armed. A fact which sometimes gains them the label of innocent.
Schmid's comment that to his knowledge not one author has made an
attempt to develop criteria for establishing this innocence 671 , surely
only applied to the terrorologists at the time of writing. Yet many
authors are willing to claim that all civilians are not necessarily
668 As part of the category "Innocence of victims emphasised". Schmid A.P. Political
Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North
Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.) and ranked 15th.Table 5. p76-77. Oruka for example
wrote "terrorism is the intentional (and usually violent) infliction of pain or harm upon
the innocent or else it is punishment which goes beyond a reasonable maximum". Oruka
0.H. "Legal Terrorism and Human Rights' Praxis International. Vol.1 1982. pp376-385.
p376.
669 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.) and ranked 13th. Table 5.
p76-77.
670 Sederberg P. Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. (University of
Southern California. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 1989.). p25.
671 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p79. 211
illegitimate targets. Probably the most frequently cited examples are
politicians who whilst unarmed 'order' troops into battle, and those
munitions workers and farmers who are involved in supplying the
armed forces with weaponry or food, all of whom have been considered
as less than 'innocent'.
Supporters of such indiscriminate violence have argued that in an age
of 'revolution', 'government by the people', 'totalitarianism' and/or
'total warfare' no one is innocent. When this position is taken by those
already established in authority they are known as 'realists', although
perhaps the most infamous expression of this view was made by George
Habash, leader of the 'terrorist group' The Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, when he declared that "[in today's world no-
one is 'innocent' and no one is a neutral" 672 . Some, and not just
pacifists, have taken the opposite view when they question whether
conscripted soldiers (or even professional) soldiers can be considered to
be guilty of something. In addition to these issues there are the
secondary questions such as are off duty members of the armed forces
legitimate targets?. An issue that is particularly relevant to the position
of those in guerrilla armies or minutemen style militia.
To decide whether or not one the author's definition will use the term
non-combatants, civilians or innocents to describe unacceptable or
illegitimate victims, it is useful first of all to examine the substance or
purpose of the discrimination part of the 'laws of war'. The immediate
question to be asked then is 'What is the nature of the rules which
govern the issue of discrimination?' for there is no doubt that to a
certain degree the differences in choice of terminology reflect genuine
philosophical disputes about how and where to draw the lines between
various categories 6 73 . It is also true that debates on the issue of
672 Habash in Wilkins B T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge.
London. 1992.). p66. (no other reference). In full he said, "In the age of revolution, of
peoples oppressed by the world's imperialist system there can be no geographical or
political borders or moral limits to the operations of the people's camp. In today's
world no-one is 'innocent' and no one is a neutral" Cited in Phillips R.L. 'Combatancy and
Noncombatancy and Noncombatant Immunity in Just War Tradition' in Kelsay J. and
Johnson J.F. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in
Western and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.
1 990.).pp179 - 195. p187-8.
673 Clark I. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. (Clarendon. Oxford. 1988.). 212p92.
discrimination are complicated by the opportunities afforded to expand
or contract it by interpretation of its component elements 674 . The
important point, however, is whatever reasoning is finally chosen,
consistency is the key. The question of who qualifies for each label
poses no special problem for this study as long as the reasoning behind
them is consistently applied regardless of the motive of the perpetrator.
Here then this author will attempt to explain the rationale behind both
his working definition of 'illegitimate' target, and his preferred label.
A good starting place when looking to find the fine detail of such a
distinction is the area of international law. Despite the fact that there
are the problems relating to both international law generally and to the
applicability and meaning of specific treaties, various pieces of the laws
of armed conflict distinguish between legitimate targets, although they
of course vary in detail from one another. For example in a book
entitled International Law in Ancient India , Viswanantha wrote that an
ancient Indian text stated that those not subject to the exigencies of
battle included:
"[t]hose who look on without taking part, those affected with grief....those who are
asleep, thirsty or fatigued or are walking along the road, or have a task in hand
unfinished, or are proficient in fine art"675.
These parameters are of course considered too wide and some too vague,
by this author, for some of them appear to have little connection with
the purpose of organised political violence. This latter point cannot be
said of those pieces of contemporary international law. The 1907 Hague
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, for
example, which is often considered customary law of war contains
Article 1 which states that:
"The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable for his subordinates;
674 O'Brien W.	 The Conduct of Just and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981.).
p42.
675 Viswanantha S.W. International Law in Ancient India (Bombay. 1925.). p156 cited
by Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p46. 213
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war;
Similarly the Geneva Conventions of 1949 stated that to be a combatant,
an individual would have to be:
"(a)....commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b)....having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c)....carrying arms openly;
(d)....conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war"676.
Unfortunately these requirements are often confused with the wearing
of uniforms for as De Lupis rightly claimed there is no textual support
for the idea that members of regular armed forces should wear
uniforms. For many commentators on war and the just war tradition the
wearing of a uniform is a key requirement for the creation of a
legitimate act of war. This tendency is reflected in the literature on
terrorism where its absence is often seen as an important element in
identifying an act terrorism. Although this requirement to wear a
military uniform is usually expressed as the idea that terrorism is a
form of 'covert' warfare. Schmid himself notes clandestine methods in
his 1988 definition677 . Indeed the covert nature of an act was alongside
the term "Clandestine" ranked 19th by Schmid in his analysis of the
676 Article 13 of both the Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva Convention II for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, and Article 4 of Geneva Convention III Relative to Treatment of
Prisoners of War.
677 For Schmid and Jongman "Terrorism is an anxiety -inspiring method of repeated
violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors....".
Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors,
concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.).p28. Gibbs for example includes
the requirement of "secretive" within his definition. Gibbs J.P. 'Conceptualization of
Terrorism'. American Sociological Review. Vol. 54. 1989. pp329-340. p331. Hughes
similarly wrote: "By terror and terrorism I mean a war in which a secret army- one
whose members have other covert occupations, wear no uniforms and do not otherwise
admit their membership - spreads fear". 'Terrorism and National Security'. Philosophy
Vol. 57. p5. In contrast Lodge claims that "state terrorism is the overt use of violence,
coercion and torture as normal government'. Lodge J. (ed.) Terrorism: A Challenge to
the State. (Martin Robertson. Oxford. 1981.). pl O. 214
definitional elements found within 109 definition, noted within a
surprisingly low 7% of the definitions678.
There is no doubt that if a member of a political organisation who
carried out an act of political violence were to disguise himself as an
innocent peasant and overtake a group of soldiers and turn around to
fire on them, this act would constitute a war crime 679 . It may enhance
the prospects of success, but it would also contravene the prohibitions
of perfidy and treachery 680 . For many just war theorists the purpose
of these rules of discrimination is to specify for each individual a single
identity; he must be a soldier or a civilian. To attack stealthily or
deviously without warning and in disguise is to violate the implicit trust
upon which the war convention rests is that soldiers must feel safe
among civilians if civilians are ever to be safe from soldiers 681 . For as
Clark noted:
"[u]niforms perform a dual function both by way of liability and a protection. They
are a liability in so much as they advertise the wearers availability as a legitimate
target of war: They also serve as protection by guaranteeing the wearer certain
rights, encoded in the laws of war"682
For some authors the logic of this is that the use of perfidy by one side
makes that side's civilian population a legitimate target for an attack,
for those who have been attacked by the enemy disguised as civilian
can no longer trust them 683 . Although for others such as Fotion and
Elfstrom the deception inherent in fighting without a uniform is not in
itself immoral, it is only deception relative to the standards established
676 Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (Amsterdam, North Holland. 1984.). Table 5. p76-77.
679 Bindschelber R.D. 'A Reconsideration Of The Law of Armed Conflict' in Carniegie
Endowement for International Peace. The Law of Armed Conflict (Carnigie Endowement
for International Peace. New York. 1971.). pp1-62. p43-4.
680 Campbell C.S. 'Moral Responsibility and Irregular War' in Kelsay J. and Johnson
J.F. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western
and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1990.). pp103-128.
p114.
681 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p182.
682 Clark I. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. (Clarendon. Oxford. 1988.).
p90.
683 By shifting the burden of discrimination on their enemies. See Walzer M. Just and
Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p186. Also Ramsey P. The Just War: Force
and Political Responsibility. (University Press of America. Lanham MD. 1983.). p435. 215
by establishment powers684 . For them: "Nile moral problems covering
the use of organised destructive force will remain the same whether
employed by military or neo-military organisations" 685 . Indeed since
the production of the more recent, albeit less popular, Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of 1977, the four points noted by both the Hague
and Geneva Conventions have become two - that is having a fixed
distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; and carrying arms openly-
or even just one. According to De Lupius:
"Protocol I of 1977 even recognizes that it is not always possible for guerrillas to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population and provides that they will
still retain the status of [lawful] combatants provided they carry arms openly
during each military engagement and during such time as they are visible to the
adversary while not engaged in military operations preceding an attack....Due to
the difficulties caused by the application of the Geneva Conventions with respect
to the requirement of 'openly' carried arms, this condition has now been revised to
imply that arms must be carried openly during actual fighting"686
This author takes the view that the failure of a those engaged in
perpetrating an act of violence to carry their arms openly and to wear a
fixed emblem that is recognisable from a(n undefined) distance,
constitutes a war crime. This raises the question of whether such
actions either, automatically constitute an act of terrorism?, or are an
essential requirement for the application of the label 'terrorist'?. For
this author the answer to both these questions is no, and therefore the
view that secrecy is an essential element in defining terrorism is
rejected. The reasons for this are numerous.
The first can be seen to be derived from the view held by various just
war theorists including Clark, that "Nile wearing of a uniform is not
sufficient to define the category of combatant 687 . A point that comes to
life with Ramsey's assertion that people in command positions are
684 Fotion N. and Elfstrom G. Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War. (Routledge,
Kegan and Paul. London. 1986.). p213.
685 Fotion N. and Elfstrom G. Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War.
(Routledge, Kegan and Paul. London. 1986.). p213.
888 De Lupis I.D. The Law of War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1987.).
p113-114.
887 Clark I. Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction. (Clarendon. Oxford. 1988.).
p92.
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combatants even though they wear tweed suits rather than military
uniforms; a man still in uniform, after he surrenders is not one of the
combatants that it would be just to repress (although he does suggest
that in a fluid jungle war situation where it is impossible to insure that
he will stay surrendered); and that closeness of military co-operation
may define a civilian as a combatant688 . On this latter point Ramsey is
joined by others including Walzer who also allowed attacks on
munitions workers689.
The second reason for claiming that the clandestine, covert nature of
the act is not considered as an essential part of a definition of terrorism
is that its inclusion would also include things such as the actions of
undercover units and agents that are traditionally not considered as acts
of terrorism. Thirdly, it is questionable whether or not there is any
practical value in the requirement of combatants to wear a distinctive
emblem recognisable from a distance, when the victim of their violence
may be situated many miles (or even continents) apart. Finally, despite
its criminal nature within the laws of war, the decision not to include
the requirement of wearing a distinctive sign is not considered as
morally reprehensible as the deliberate targeting of non combatants.
They are arguably more likely to be refused this if there was no
apparent connection between the victim of the violence and the
political cause. Indeed whilst the latter requirement might mean that an
individual is refused political asylum or even extradited, the issue of
wearing a disguise is far less important and indeed it could be argued
that states tacitly accept it in their habit of swapping 'spies'.
On the issue of identifying legitimate targets then, this thesis can be
seen to be line with those such as Fotion and Elfstrom who declared that
too much can be said on behalf of the uniform, even if it is a useful
sorting device690 . It is undoubtedly true that those in uniform should be
treated differently from those not in uniform691 , but the key point is
688 Ramsey P. The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. (University Press of
America. Lanham MD. 1983.). p435
689 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p146.
690 Fotion N. and Elfstrom G. Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War. (Routledge,
Kegan and Paul. London. 1986.). p212.
69 1 According to De Lupis, "[Ole principle of distinction is of importance. If a person
fulfills the requirements for combatant status he is entitled to the 'rights' of a soldier,
notably to enjoy prisoner of war status if captured, if he does not fulfil the 217
that the loss of immunity from attack is not limited to those in uniform.
Legitimate targets are not restricted to those defined as 'lawful
combatants' by the existing laws of war. One can attack both those who
are attacking us and who are supplying them with the means (guns or
ammunition) for such attacks 692 , regardless of whether or not the
enemy has engaged in perfidy. Or as Walzer put it, the relevant
distinction was not between those who work for the war effort and those
who do not, but between those who make what soldiers need to fight and
those who make what they need to live like the rest of us693 . Civilians
bear no arms to threaten or harm anyone in contrast to the armed
combatants who are legitimate targets only in, and because of the
political violence and through whom the war is waged by belligerent
parties. As armed agents of a belligerent they attack enemy combatants
in order to disable them from further fighting. The exception to this
rule is that of munitions workers and others involved in making what
soldiers need to fight. Here the author goes along with Fotion and
Elfstrom's notion of the immediacy of the threat. Those with weapons in
or out of uniform can be shot close up694 , whilst those partly assimilate
civilians such as munitions workers can be killed in their factories but
not in their homes, a view also taken by Walzer 695 . The criteria for
identifying the legitimate targets will therefore be something like
Phillips suggestion of:
"classes of people engaged in an occupation that they would perform whether or not
a war were taking place, or services rendered to the combatants both in war and out
are considered immune from direct attack and targeting"696.
requirement, he is an unlawful combatant and may be shot"De Lupis I.D. The Law of
War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1987.). p113
692 Phillips R.L. 'Combatancy and Noncombatancy and Noncombatant Immunity in Just
War Tradition' in Kelsay J. and Johnson J.F. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The
Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Connecticut. 1990.).pp179-195. p187.
693 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p146.
694 Fotion N. and Elfstrom G. Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War. (Routledge,
Kegan and Paul. London. 1986.). p196.
695 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p146.
696 Phillips R.L. 'Combatancy and Noncombatancy and Noncombatant Immunity in Just
War Tradition' in Kelsay J. and Johnson J.F. Cross, Crescent and Sword: The
Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Connecticut. 1990.).pp179-195. p187. 218
This brings the thesis back to the question of terminology, 'By what
labels should the illegitimate targets of terrorism be described -P. The
choice of this author is for 'innocent' for a number of reasons, in
addition to the fact that certain authors have claimed that "[i]nnocence
is the quintessential condition of terrorist victimology" 697 . The
alternatives of civilian is too narrow for this would exclude those
soldiers who have surrendered, and those who work in munitions
factories. Whilst there is great sympathy for the use of the term
combatants and non-combatants, the decision to choose 'innocents' over
this can only be understood in relation to the aim of this part of the
thesis which is to apply such a definition to the actions of the State, for
unlike the term non-combatant, the term innocent is also used to refer
to victims of the State's violence against its own citizens.
The term innocent is however not beyond criticism and in terms of the
actions of the sub-state terrorist (and State abroad), as Norman noted,
what is meant here cannot be moral innocence in any general sense.
There is no reason to suppose that civilians are in general morally
superior to members of the armed forces. The bombing of a town may
kill all sorts of morally disreputable individuals 698 . Instead the
meaning of the term is used by reference to the etymology of the term
'innocent, as the negative of the Latin word nocens, which means
'harming'. Kenny for example wrote that:
"The most important of the traditional condition for a just war was that it should
not involve the deliberate killing of non-combatants. This was sometimes called
the prohibition on 'killing the innocent', but the innocence in question had
nothing to do with moral guiltlessness or lack of responsibility: the 'innocent'
were those who were not nocentes in the sense of engaged in harming one's own
forces" 699.
697 Friedlander R.A. Terrorism and the Law: What Price Safety?. (IACP. Gaithersburg,
MD. 1980.). p3 cited by Schmid A.P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to
Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (North Holland. Amsterdam. 1984.). p78
698 Norman R. Ethics, Killing and War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
1995.). p161.
699 Kenny A. The Logic of Deterrence. (London. 1985.). (no publisher noted) cited by
Norman R. Ethics, Killing and War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1995.).
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Similarly Nagel wrote: "we must distinguish combatants from non-
combatants on the basis of their immediate threat or harmfulness"700.
What is wrong with attacking civilians in a political conflict is that the
attack on them cannot be justified in terms of what they are doing701.
After identifying what constitutes an illegitimate target the issue then
becomes how does one incorporate the meaning of terrorism as
expressed within this preliminary definition of terrorism as: "the threat
or use of violence by organisations for political purposes when such
actions are intended to modify the behaviour of target(s) wider than the
immediate innocent victim(s)", into a wider definition that is also
applicable to the actions of the State?. It is therefore to the concept of
the State that the thesis now turns.
700 Nagel T. 'War and Massacre' Philosophy and Public Affairs" Vol. 1. (1972.).p139-
140. Similarly Walzer wrote innocent is a 'term of art' which means that they have
done nothing and are doing nothing that entails the loss of their rights. Walzer M. Just
and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p146.
701 After Norman R. Ethics, Killing and War. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 	 220
1995.). p174.
Chapter 5.
Terrorism and the State. 
"The terrorist and the policeman both come from the same basket"
Joseph Conrad. The Secret Agent702.
The State.
David Held noted in his book States and Societies : "[t]here is nothing
more central to political and social theory than the nature of the State
and nothing more contested" 703 . Indeed as far back as 1931, Titus
managed to identify no fewer than 145 definitions in what he modestly
called a "cursory examination" of the various meanings of the term! 704.
A total which even surpasses the 109 definitions (of terrorism)
identified by Schmid. This diversity of opinion has encouraged some
contemporary authors to ridicule the notion of the State. For example in
a sentence ominously reminiscent of a problem that plagues the
definition of terrorism Ferguson and Mansbach asserted: "[w]hat is one
person's 'state' is another person's 'government' and vice versa" 705 . A
point which leads them to conclude that the concept of the State: "has so
many meanings that it is practically useless as an analytical tool and a
building block of theory" 706 . Yet ironically even Ferguson and
Mansbach were forced to write: "Nile present authors would certainly
agree that a working definition is all that can be achieved"707.
Conveniently this is all that this thesis requires for there is little doubt
that a definition of the term the State could also constitute a thesis in
702 Conrad J. The Secret Agent. (Penguin. Harmondsworth. 1963.). p64.
703 Held D. "Central Perspectives on the Modern State' in Held D. et al. State and
Societies. (Martin Robertson Press. Oxford.1989.).pl -58. p1.
704 Titus C.H. 'A Nomenclatura' in American Political Science Review. Vol.25.(1).
Mar.1931. p45 cited by Y.H.Ferguson and R.W.Mawbach. The State, Conceptual Chaos
and the Future of International Relations Theory. (Lynne Rienner Press. London. 1989.).
p39.
705 Ferguson Y.H. and Mansbach R.W. The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Future of
International Relations Theory. (Lynne Reinner. London.1989.). p20.
706 Ferguson Y.H. and Mansbach R.W. The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Future of
International Relations Theory. (Lynne Reinner. London.1989.). p1.
707 Ferguson Y.H. and Mansbach R.W. The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Future of
International Relations Theory. (Lynne Reinner. London.1989.). p21. 221
itself. The immediate question then is what conception of the State does
this thesis adhere to?.
Like most works on international law and international relations this
thesis accepts that the State can be identified as such, despite the
problems inherent within the definition of the State, especially that of
recognition. Both disciplines accept the idea of states existing de facto,
even if the de jure legitimacy of the regime or government in power is
not recognised. In this way the State is identified as an entity which has
a defined territory, a permanent population is under the control of a
government which engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other entities 708 . Its territory is defined as the
geographical area within which it exercises sovereignty, and this is in
itself determined by effective control maintained with the intention of
permanency. Over this area the State has exclusive jurisdiction and can
prescribe (and proscribe), adjudicate and enforce its laws 709 . It is this
latter aspect of the state that is crucial to an understanding of this
author's definition. Here the State is recognised as a result of the
identification of a constitutional system including a judicial one in
which the state uses violence to deter the breaking of its laws. As Gilbert
put it: "[w]hat is required for a notion of [an] act of state is, of course the
idea of a constitution within which such acts are performed"710.
Like some, if not most definitions of the term 'the State' in social
scientific analysis this author's working definition incorporates the
Weberian notion that the State is characterised by legitimacy and a
monopoly of the means of coercion within its area of domestic
jurisdiction. Within Weber's classic definition of the State as a "relation
of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate
(i.e., considered to be legitimate violence) violence", political violence
and the State are intimately bound together as part of the latter's raison
708 Wallace R.M.M. International Law: An Introduction. (Sweet and Maxwell. London.
1986 . ). P53.
709 Joynt C.B. and P.E.Corbett P.E. Theory and Reality in World Politics. (Macmillan
Press. London. 1978.). p107.
710 Gilbert P. 'Political Suppression and the Violence of the State'. Paper presented at
E.C.P.R. Workshops. Essex. 1991. p.15. 222
d'être 711 . As a result of this, the State frequently enjoys a special
treatment born of political socialisation and the power of ideology, and
what is done in the name of protecting the State, the country or the
leadership is often held up to a different measure 712 . Producing a
double standard on internal violence, one for the State and the other for
its opponents (although one should note that there are acceptable
grounds for a less problematic double standard). In this way the
legitimacy and power of the State tend to cloak any overt forms of its
violence in different guises, such as arrest instead of abduction,
imprisonment instead of hostage taking, execution instead of murder
and coercive diplomacy instead of blackmail713 . This author then
acknowledges a 'double standard' in his treatment of acts of violence
perpetrated by sub-state political organisations and those perpetrated
by the State within its area of jurisdiction. The reason being that such a
double standard cannot be avoided, for it is inherent within the nature
of the difference between the two political entities. Without the a priori
ascription of legitimacy to (at least some of) the State's use of violence
within the area of domestic jurisdiction, it would be impossible to
identify the State and distinguish it from these other (less successful)
political organisations. The validity of this latter statement can be seen
in the conceptual analogy which has be constructed between the
practices of punishment and terrorism. Boire for example noted that:
"the practices of punishment and terrorism are intentional behaviour
patterns pursued to achieve similar ends" 714 . Walter also drew this
analogy when he wrote:
711 Weber (no other reference) in Gerth H. and Mills C.W. From Max Weber. (Glencoe.
Illinois. 1938.). p78.cited by Stohl M. 'National Interests and State Terrorism'. Political
Science. Vol. 36(1). July. 1984. pp37-52. p39.
712 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger New York. 1989.).p13. Similarly Falk wrote, "[a]ny examination of official
practices would disclose the adoption of a wide series of terrorist undertakings, veiled
in secrecy and disguised by the antiseptic semantics of covert operations, low intensity
warfare and indirect mode of conflict". Falk R. 'Revolutionaries and Functionaries. The
Dual Face of Terrorism'in Kegley C.W.(ed.). International Terrorism: Characteristics;
Causes; Controls. (St.Martin's. New York. 1990.). pp39-44.
713 Crelinsten R.D. 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the
Communication Structure' in Wilkinson P. and Stewart A.M. Contemporary Research
on Terrorism (Aberdeen University Press. Aberdeen. 1987.). pp419-452. p440.
714 Boire M.0 'Terrorism Reconsidered as Punishment: Toward an Evaluation of the
Acceptability of Terrorism as a Method of Societal Change and Maintenance'. Stanford
Journal of International Law. Vol.20(1). 1984. pp43-143. Further depth to the analogy
is produced by Beccaria's description that "the political end of punishment is to
intimidate others" Beccaria (1964.p43) cited by Bean P. Punishment: A Philosophical
and Criminological Inquiry. (Martin Robertson. Oxford. 1981).p30. 223
"[s]ince violent punishments do evoke fear and are often justified by their punitive
deterrent value, it is sometimes hard to distinguish the administration of
punishment from the process of terror".715
Similarly Gibbs stated that his definition of terrorism would extend to
the imposition of legal punishment by government officials to promote
general deterrence 716 . Whilst Goodhart asserted that if punishment
cannot deter then we might as well scrap the whole of our criminal
law717 . More specifically Boire recognised that like an act of terrorism,
the State's use of violence used within the process of punishment aims
to instil fear in a target in order to modify its behaviour separate to the
immediate victim:
"As with punishment, the actual harm of the punitive act must be publicised
among the primary target audience and be credible enough to impress deterrent
fear into their minds. And, as deterrence theory would predict, the actual harm
done is vastly disproportionate to the psychological effect achieved and the
resultant behaviour modification in the primary target" 718 .
715 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p22.
716 Gibbs J.P. 'Conceptualization of Terrorism'. American Sociological Review. Vol.
54. 1989. pp329-340. p332. According to Morris every criminal law system in the
world, except Greenland has deterrence as its primary and essential postulate. Morris
N. 'Impediments to Penal Reform'. The University of Chicago Law Review. 1966.
Summer. 33 (4).pp 627-656. p631.
717 Sir Arthur Goodhart cited in Morris N. 'Impediments to Penal Reform'. The
University of Chicago Law Review. 1966. Summer. 33 (4).pp 627-656.p631. Morris
p631. Yet because this utilitarian case for punishment justifies it primarily on the
grounds of deterring the actual implementation of the violence is not necessarily
required but like any of the most successful uses of terrorism, the technique intends to
work by threat. Wilkins claimed that there are two principal rationales for punishment
in any criminal justice system, retribution and deterrence. Of which he argues moral
philosophers for the most part seem to be happier with the latter. Wilkins B T.
Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.).p140. Although as
one author noted the two cannot be totally divorced for the implementation of a
deterrence involves an act of retribution.
718 Boire M.0 'Terrorism Reconsidered as Punishment: Toward an Evaluation of the
Acceptability of Terrorism as a Method of Societal Change and Maintenance'. Stanford
Journal of International Law. Vol. 20(1). 1984. pp43-143. p97. This is in line with
Aron's often cited statement that the psychological effects of terrorism are
disproportionate to the physical ones. A view echoed by Andenaes who noted that in
continental theories of criminal law, a basic distinction is made between the effects of
punishment on the man being punished. What he terms the 'individual prevention' or
'special prevention' and the effect of punishment upon the members of a society in
general or 'general prevention'. Thus by both means of criminal law and by means of
specific application of the law "messages" are sent to members of a society. Andenaes 224
Yet whilst acknowledging that such a double standard is inherent in
this author's conception of the State, it should be pointed out that this is
not the (extra) ideologically motivated double standard of those who
would differentiate between the legitimacy of acts of violence on the
basis of the (just) political cause of the particular state (or claimant to
its authority) or the nature of its politics. Nor does this double standard
mean that the State cannot commit acts of terrorism, be it at home or
abroad. It is to the latter that this thesis turns for it is the easiest place to
understand that the State can commit acts of terrorism.
J. 'General Prevention: A Broader View of Deterrence in Gerber R.J. and McAnamy P.D.
(eds.). Contemporary Punishment: Views, Explanations and Justifications. (University
of Notre Dame Press. London. 1972.). p158 225
Terrorism and The State's Use of Violence Abroad. 
After accepting this particular concept of the State, it is easy to see how
the State can be potentially considered as terrorist in regards to the
actions it undertakes outside of its area of effective jurisdiction i.e.
abroad. That is, it is because the thesis takes the view that the individual
state has as much or as little right to carry out acts of violence in the
international system of states as a sub-state group has anywhere that
the violence of the State can be seen to be possessing the equivalent
amount of (Mlegitimacy as a non-state actor. The view that the State can
commit acts of terrorism outside its area of effective jurisdiction is a
popular one, for example in response to this author's question "Can acts
or threats of violence carried out directly by agents of one power
outside its area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled 'terror/ism'?"
95% of the respondents indicated "Yes" 719.
Yet the fact that the vast majority of respondents came to the same
conclusion as the author does not necessarily mean that they reached it
by using the same reasoning as either this author, or each other.
Usefully one of the respondents to the questionnaire noted the two main
alternatives to this author's approach in replying to the previous
question noted above. After indicating that acts or threats of violence
carried out directly by agents of one power outside its area of domestic
jurisdiction could be labelled 'terror/ism, Eubank added: "Wile acts may
be illegal in other jurisdictions or considered to be a violation of either
international law, such as it is, or moral/ethic norms elsewhere"720.
Other respondents also claimed that the legitimacy of a State's actions
abroad can be judged vis-a-vis actually existing international 1aw721,
7 19 To question 11, 108 indicated that 'acts or threats of violence carried out directly
by agents of one power outside its area of domestic jurisdiction' could 'be labelled
'terror/ism' 6 indicated that they could not. Six failed to answer.
720 W. L. Eubank refered to his answer to question 9, which read, "[t]he acts may be
illegal in other jurisdictions or considered to be a violation of either international law,
such as it is, or moral/ethic norms elsewhere".
721 In answer to this question P. Buchanan answered, "Any act, as defined earlier,
carried out without the formal engagement of hostilities and outside international
standards for the conduct of war". H. Tittmar similarly indicated that acts or threats
of violence carried out directly by agents of one power outside its area of domestic
jurisdiction could be labelled 'terror/ism and added "When going beyond their U.N.
remit" and "when breaking the Geneva Conventions". A.P. Rubin refered to his answer 226
but if this path is chosen, it leads to the numerous problems resulting
from the lack of consensus regarding the legality of the State's right to
use force abroad mentioned previously in the chapter on a legalistic
approach. Notably the questions of 'What is the correct interpretation of
self-defence within the U.N. Charter?, What constitutes an armed attack
against which one can defend oneself?, as well as questions of timing
and proportionality of the response.
However when viewed from the position that the State has as much or as
little right to use force abroad as the sub-state actor does where ever it
is, it is easy to see how various acts of coercive diplomacy, including
both the active (one-sided) and passive (retaliatory) threats of counter-
value strikes by states -including those using indiscriminate weapons of
mass destruction- meet the denominative criteria as Stohl had
claimed722 , albeit using a different definition to him. The use or threat
of violence comes from an organisation and the violence is used to
achieve political ends. It aims to affect the behaviour of an audience (or
primary target) -the enemy's government- by threatening an innocent
or illegitimate target, the civilian population living in major towns and
cities. Even if the aim is to produce a decision not to act in a particular
way, its aim is to modify the behaviour of government leaders and to
dissuade them from engaging in particular acts. Unfortunately however
not all authors see the situation this way. Schmid for example refused to
label nuclear deterrents as "atomic terror" due to his belief that the
historical record of the first forty years of the superpowers nuclear
diplomacy did not provide any substantial evidence of blackmail and
extortion comparable to what is produced by a terrorist organisation723,
coupled with his view that:
"[d]eterrence implies that one wishes to prevent the other side from doing
something. As long as the other-side is doing nothing nobody is directly
threatened. In an embassy siege however a third party (not the hostages) is
to question 9, the most relevant part read "Domestic law is not relevant to the
international law questions".
722 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conecticut. 1984.).pp43 -58. p43-44 and 48-50.
723 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p12. 227
compelled to do something to assume the survival of the hostages. Doing nothing is
not enough"724.
Similarly Wilkins claimed that:
"[t]he bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while obviously intended by the
American government to alter the policies of the Japanese government seemed for
all the terror they involved more an act of war than of terrorism"725.
Although he then 'pulled the rug from under his own feet ' by saying:
"which is not to say that the state of being at war precludes terrorist
activities directed against the enemy" 726 . If he had kept to his original
comment he could have been supported by authors such as Wilkinson,
Thornton and Noel O'Sullivan 727 , all of whom deliberately excluded the
acts of terrorism which often accompany war from their works. The
latter author justified this omission by claiming that the concept of
terrorism is only intelligible in reasonably settled and stable contexts,
within which it is possible to contrast the illegal practises of the
terrorist with the constitutional procedures prescribed for established
state representatives 728 . However despite the attempts at excluding it
from the definition nuclear deterrence -like all such indiscriminate
deterrents be they chemical, biological or conventional- is according to
724 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p13.
725 Wilkins B. T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.).
p17.
726 Wilkins B. T. Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. (Routledge. London. 1992.).
p1 7.
727 Wilkinson P. 'Some Observations on the Relationships between Terrorism and
Freedom' in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.) Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward
Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.). pp44-53. p44. Thornton wrote, "we shall thereby exclude
manifestations of terror in international war (like strategic bombing)". Thornton T.P.
'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation' in Eckstein H. (ed). Internal War Problems
and Approaches. (The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier Macmillan. London. 1964.). pp71-
100.p71. O'Sullivan N. wrote that "excluded [from his definition of political terrorism]
is the terrorism [sic] which in various forms accompanies war since the concept of
terrorism is only intelligible in reasonably settled and stable social contexts within
which it is possible to contrast the illegal practices of the terrorist, with the
constitutional procedures prescribed for the established state representatives".
O'Sullivan N. 'Terrorism, Ideology and Democracy' in O'Sullivan N. (ed.). Terrorism,
Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Book. Brighton. 1986.).pp3-26. p4.
728 O'Sullivan N. 'Terrorism, Ideology and Democracy' in O'Sullivan N. (ed.).
Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution. (Wheatsheaf Book. Brighton. 1986.). pp3-26. p4. 228
this author's definition, a form of direct (if mutual and passive) state
terrorism729.
It would be wrong to claim, however, that all nuclear strategies
constitute terrorist threats, for excluded are those that involve highly
accurate, low-yield warheads which are (to be) used merely for
destroying the enemy's counter-force capability within a war-fighting
doctrine. As acts of violence targeted against legitimate targets these
actions would constitute what this author term 'acts of war' in the
previous chapter. In this way both Schelling, who asked whether any
organisation that acquired such weapons can be anything but terrorist
in the use of such weapons 730 , and Perdue who suggested that the
preparation and planning for mass destruction in the nuclear age
should perhaps be redefined as the ultimate form of terrorism731
 can
be seen to have gone too far in their claims.
729 Sproat P.A. 'Can The State Be Terrorist?' Terrorism: An International Journal.
Vol. 14.(1). Jan-Mar 1991. pp19-29.p24. Stohl cites Schelling T.C. 'Thinking About
Nuclear Terrorism'. International Affairs. Vol. 6.(4). Spring 1982. pp61-77.p66. Stohl
M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The
State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Conecticut. 1984.).pp43-58. p49.
730 Schelling T.C. 'Thinking About Nuclear Terrorism'. International Affairs. Vol. 6.(4).
Spring 1982. pp61-77. p66.
731 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger. New York. 1989.). p19-20. 229
Terrorism and the State's Use of Violence Within its Area of
Jurisdiction. 
After accepting that the State can be judged to have committed acts of
terrorism in relation to its activities outside its area of jurisdiction using
the same formula for labelling the non-state actor, the immediate
questions to be answered becomes 'Can the State commit acts of
terrorism within its area of domestic jurisdiction?'. Can one, as Duvall
and Stohl claimed (but did not substantiate) 732 , define the State in
Weberian terms of physical violence without having to relinquish the
ability to label the State as terrorism'? (and if so, how?). The answer to
the first two of these three questions is 'Yes', and again Gilbert aids an
understanding of the production of such answers. This time by claiming
that we are concerned here, not with the general questions about the
moral foundations of government activity or the moral justification of
violence opposition to it, but with a moral comparison between the
actions of a state and the actions of an insurgent 733 . He also suggested
that further light could be thrown on to this question by asking what
moral difference is there between on the one hand, its ordinary
activities of law enforcement and the maintenance of internal security
and, on the other, those extraordinary activities that go by the name of
state terrorism?734.
As noted in an earlier part of this chapter, the State is identified as an
entity which has a defined territory. Its territory is defined as the
geographical area within which it exercises sovereignty, and this is in
itself determined by effective control maintained with the intention of
permanency. Over this area the State has exclusive jurisdiction and can
prescribe (and proscribe), adjudicate and enforce it's laws735 . Once this
judicial system has been identified the State can be said to exist. It is this
latter aspect of the State that is crucial to an understanding of this
732 Duvall R.D.and Stohl M. 'Governance by Terror' in Stohl M. (ed.) The Politics of
Terrorism. (3rd ed. Marcel Dekker. New York. 1988.). pp231-272. p232-233.
735 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p128.
734 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality:An Introductory Study in Applied
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London.1994.). p128.
735 Joynt C.B. and P.E.Corbett P.E. Theory and Reality in World Politics. (Macmillan
Press. London. 1978.). p107. 230
author's labelling of the State's use of force at home as terrorist, for as
already noted what is required for a notion of an act of state is, of course
the idea of a constitution within which such acts are performed 736 . This
author's definition is therefore concerned with the nature of the
regime's acts in relation to the legal-constitutional laws it enforces,
rather with nature of the regime's legal claim to power 737 . In this way
the author's concept of terrorism not only allows for any group to
become the State -once it has established a legal system- but it can avoid
the problems associated with the rule of a tyrant noted by David George:
"[c]onstitutional government takes many forms, but in each the cardinal feature is
the rule of law and it is this which makes it the direct opposite of tyranny.
Strictly, tyranny is an exercise of a claim to subject people to the absolute and
arbitrary power of the claimant; to do with him as he pleases without
restriction...all rights are rejected"738.
The identification of an 'act of state' in accordance with a legal system
and constitution makes it easy to see how the political analyst can
subsequently label those domestic acts of political violence committed
by agents of the State outside of a constitutional-legal framework, be it
physically i.e abroad, or legally, that is extra-judicial, as 'illegitimate'
and therefore potentially 'terrorist' (subject to satisfying other
qualifying criteria). This is because by acting beyond the powers
ascribed to it (ultra vires) the State can be described as acting 'illegally'
and therefore such actions can be treated as being on a par with those
of a sub-state actor.
736 Gilbert P. 'Political Suppression and the Violence of the State'. Paper presented at
E.C.P.R. Workshops. Essex. 1991. p15.
737 Certain authors appear to label particular types of states constitute terrorist
states. In reply to question 9 which asked "Can legal acts of violence carried out by
those in power within the area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled as
'terror/ism'?" R.S. Ezekiel answered, "[m]ost acts of authoritarian states to control
their populations include an element of violence that can be considered state terror'; A.
Geifman indicated yes and added "when the government perpetuating these acts is
totalitarian"; likewise F. Homer answered yes and added "by authoritarian regimes",
whilst an anonymous respondent wrote "When the "legal' acts are actions of a
tyrannical government. For example, Stalin's vast gulags were 'legal' under Soviet
laws H.
738 George D. 'Terrorism or Freedom Fighter' in Warner M. and Crisp R. (eds.)
Terrorism, Power and Protest. (Edward Elgar. Aldershot. 1990.).pp54-67.p64.
Similarly Gilbert wrote "an act cannot be an act of state simply by conforming to the
will of a dictator for there would be no difference between an act of state and his
private act". Gilbert P. 'Political Suppression and the Violence of the State'. Paper
presented at E.C.P.R. Workshops. Essex. 1991. p15. 231
This view that those acts of violence perpetrated within its area of
domestic jurisdiction which are 'illegal' in relation to the State's own
laws, may qualify for the label of state terrorism poses few problems
except for legal writers who don't accept that such acts constitute 'acts
of state' 739 . The holding of the view that illegal acts of a state can be
labelled as terrorist is far from unique, for in reply to this author's
question, "Can illegal acts of violence carried out by those in power
within the area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled 'terror/ism", a
surprisingly high 97% of the respondents answered 'Yes' 740 • Although
again this is not to say that all of them used the logic of this author.
Sandra Woy-Hazelton for example went as far as to suggest that: "all
illegal acts of violence are terrorism" 741 , whilst many of these authors
conceived legality in terms of international law, just as they had in
reply to other questions noted earlier 742 , Tittmar for example said that
the label could be applied to the State: "when breaking U.N.
resolutions"743.
The main conceptual difficulty in producing a definition of state
terrorism is in relation to those legal acts of violence perpetrated by
the State within its area of domestic jurisdiction. Can the legal acts of
the State constitute acts of terrorism when they are committed within
the State's effective area of jurisdiction?. It is easy to understand how a
state's legal use of politically motivated violence in order to punish and
deter others from breaking its laws cannot (generally speaking)
799 Skubiszewski for example said that in "terms of law, in contrast to the language of
politics and diplomacy, the State cannot perpetrate the crime of terrorism".
Skubiszewski K. 'Definition of Terrorism'. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol. 19.
1987. pp39-54. p48. Whilst Gilbert wrote that it is only in an extended sense that acts
of state terrorism are acts of state at all!. A criminal act by an agent of the State is,
normally, only the private act of an individual. Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and
Nationality:An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy. (Routledge.
London.1994.). p134.
740 To question 10, 111 indicated that 'illegal acts of violence carried out by those in
power within the area of domestic jurisdiction' can never 'be labelled 'terror/ism' .
Three indicated that they could not, and 6 failed to answer.
741 See reply to question 10.
742 In answer to question 11, P. Buchanan answered "Any act, as defined earlier,
carried out without the formal engagement of hostilities and outside international
standards for the conduct of war"and in answer to question 9, A.P. Rubin wrote
"Domestic law is not relevant to the international law questions".
743 H. Tittmar in reply to question 10, 232
constitute acts of terrorism if legitimacy is ascribed to (at least some)
actions of the state apriori .
The original element of this author's concept of state terrorism is
therefore not that it allows legal acts of political violence to qualify as
acts of state terrorism. This is also true of those authors who refer such
actions against some higher legal authority such as the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or some other
piece of international law which has prohibited the use of particular
violent acts744. Indeed in answer to this authors question "Can legal acts
of violence carried out by those in power within the area of domestic
jurisdiction ever be labelled as 'terror/ism'?" a surprisingly high 84%
answered "Yes" 745 . Again not all answered in the affirmative because
they referred to international law. Weifelder, for example, indicated
that acts performed in accordance with the domestic laws of the state
could be considered as acts of terrorism "When the rule of law and
independence of the judiciary is non-existent"; whilst Adam Roberts
wrote "They can be so labelled in cases where the legal framework
allows (or turns a blind eye to) such acts as intimidation by police,
arbitrary arrest and even torture"746.
The originality of this authors definition of terrorism is in the way in
which this answer is produced. Here legitimacy is ascribed only to those
threats or acts of state violence (i.e. punishment) used to maintain its
laws which allowed the guilty to have had a chance to alter their
behaviour. This distinction in targeting made within the State's area of
jurisdiction approximates to the jus in hello principle of discrimination
between, rather than simply between the State's legal and illegal
activities. Generally speaking ,acceptable acts of punishment are aimed
only at those genuinely suspected of being malefactors (guilty or non-
744 For example Bowen wrote 'When the definition of legal acts contravenes broadly
recognized international standards of human rights, then and only then are legal acts
also state terrorism"; Yaeger wrote "If a nation's legal system or constitution, allows
acts which violate the United Nations Declaration of [presumably Human] Rights, then I
believe that international legality and morality eclipses "legal system" in a sovereign
state which allows such violation" and Jeffrey who wrote that "Where the legal
system does not generally protect human rights".
745 Eighty eight respondents to question 9, indicated that 'legal acts of violence
carried out by those in power within the[ir] area of domestic jurisdiction' can 'be
labelled as 'terror/ism' , 17 indicated that they could not. Fifteen failed to reply to this
question.
746 R.F. Weisfelder and A.Roberts reply to question 9.
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innocent) rather than at innocent, therefore only would be malefactors
are the intended objects of any terror produced by the laws threat of
punitive violence. However the would-be victims can avoid the expected
harms by simply refraining from doing the punishable acts, just as the
soldier can surrender. The victim of terrorism does not have that
recourse. 747
 As Walter noted, in the terror process, no one can be sure,
for the category of transgression is, in reality, abolished. Anyone may
be a victim, no matter what actions he or she chooses 748 . However the
conditions of legality must imply that there must be a way of being
innocent, because if there is no path left open to avoid transgression or
if people are bound to be charged falsely with offences they did not
commit, then it is not possible to be innocent749 . This distinction is
analogous with that made within the jus in bello war convention, for,
according to Walzer, what lies behind this part of the just war tradition
and makes it plausible:
"is the moral difference between aiming at a particular people because of things
they have done or are doing and aiming at a whole group of people indiscriminately
because of who they are"750.
747 Narveson J. 'Terrorism and Morality' in Frey R.G. and Morris C.W. (eds).
Violence, Terrorism and Justice. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
1991.).pp116-169. p118.
748 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p26.
749 Walter E.V. Terror and Resistance: A Study in Political Violence. (Oxford
University Press. Oxford. 1969.). p26. Also Hill T.E. Jnr. 'Making exceptions without
abandoning the principle: or how a Kantian might think about terrorism' in Frey R.G. and
Morris C.W. (eds). Violence, Terrorism and Justice. (Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge. 1991.) ppl 96-229. p209-210. Galtung succinctly summed up many of the
necessary conditions for the State's legal acts to avoid the label terrorism in one
paragraph. After noting that "The individual whom should not be predictable" he went
on to say that "Under the rule of law the state administers evil in the form of
something destructive....But there should be a high element of predictability. The where
and the when and how punishment is carried out is prescribed in the law: the why is
defined by the illegal act, the whom is in principle knowledgeable to the individual(s)
transgressing the fine line of law in advance. The rule of law is predictable ; the rule of
terror unpredictable". Galtung J. 'On the Causes of Terrrorism and their Removal' in
Kochler H. (ed.). Terrorism and National Liberation. (International Progress
Organisation. Peter Lang. Frankfurt. 1988.). pp51-66. p52.
780 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.). p200. Rapoport
wrote abot the French Revolution thus, "[e]nemies of the People were considered
dangerous to the revolution not simply because of what they did but more fundamentally
because of who they were and what they might do". Rapoport D.C. 'Introduction to Part
II' in Rapoport D.C. and Alexander Y. The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular
Justifications. (Pergamon Press. London. 1982.).pp127-132. p128. 234
Within this author's conception of state terrorism legitimacy is ascribed
apriori only to some of the actions of the State, and yet whilst this
author's definition of state terrorism may be original as a result of this,
the method by which the legitimacy is given (or denied) is not.
Interestingly this author's method of ascribing illegitimacy to legal acts
of state, is in accord with the existing 'principle of legality' found
within jurisprudence and held by lawyers who advocate a 'procedural
justice' approach to the rule of law, and it is to this that the thesis now
turns.751.
Leg.4_11y...
According to Mathews, the fundamental notion that underlies the
concept of 'legality' is that of government under law rather than
merely by law. In this sense and in contrast to a pure 'law enforcement
approach' of dry 'legalism', which would imply that all legal acts are
legitimate, the notion of 'legality' contains a procedural aspect in its
approach to justice. As a result the notion of 'legality' demands that (in
order to be considered legitimate) laws have to be formulated so that
they will constitute a clear guide to human conduct. It is of no surprise
then that the leading proponents of this approach demand amongst
other things, that legal government promulgates (clearly worded)
rules; prohibits retroactive laws; avoids rules that demands the
impossible 752 . According to Mathews, vaguely worded laws mean that:
"Wile conduct made punishable is too loosely described to enable the
citizen to determine what the law commands or forbids" 753 ; laws which
are not prospective cannot serve as a guide to human conduct and
therefore retroactive penal laws are irreconcilable with the legality
751 Mathews A.S. Freedom State Security and the Rule of Law. (Juta and Co. Cape
Town.1986.). p3. Mathews goes on to say that the notion of legality is without doubt
"an important, rich and fruitful concept which no satisfactory theory of the rule of law
can dispense with". p9.
752 Fuller who is see as the leading light of this school claims that there are eight
'imperatives' of legal government. The three noted here are in accordance with
numbers 2 (and 4) ; 3;6 of the eight. Fuller L.L. The Morality of Law. (Yale Univerasity
Press 1964) p39, 46-94 as cited by Mathews A.S. Freedom State Security and the
Rule of Law. (Juta and Co. Cape Town.1986.). p6.
753 Mathews A.S. Freedom State Security and the Rule of Law. (Juta and Co. Cape
Town.1986.). p3-4. 235
principle; and the requirement that laws be 'open' restates the
proposition (originally made by Fuller) that the laws should be
promulgated and accessible to the citizens.754
However whilst this procedural justice approach demands specific
requirements concerning the form and manner of administration of
the laws it avoids prescribing content of laws. The result of which is
that these requirements of legality are equally applicable to autocratic
states as they are to democracies755.
754 Mathews A.S. Freedom State Security and the Rule of Law. (Juta and Co. Cape
Town.1986.). p6.
755 Hall J. General Principles of Criminal Law (2 ed. Bobbs-Merrill Co. Indiannapolis
1947.). p68. cited by Mathews A.S. Freedom State Security and the Rule of Law.
(Juta and Co. Cape Town.1986.). p9. 236
A Comprehensive Definition of Terrorism. 
These requirements provide a certain amount of precision that
differentiates the state terrorism part of this definition from previous
definitions of state terrorism. So at the end of the sieving process, one is
left with a definition that is much qualified in terms of motive (political
rather than private), intention (to instil fear rather than merely to
destroy), targeting (of 'innocents') and status (that allows certain legal
violent activities of the state at home, which, if committed aboard, would
qualify as terrorism to exist as legitimate punishment), while enabling
particular arbitrary and/or indiscriminate actions to be labelled as
domestic 'state terrorism'. Thus, for the political analyst terrorism
should be identified as:
"the threat or use of violence for political purposes by either non-state
organisations anywhere, or the State outside its area of jurisdiction, when such
actions are intended to modify the behaviour of target(s) wider than the immediate
innocent victim(s); or the use of such purposive violence by the State (when it
claims the authority over the immediate victim) when its actions are either illegal
(according to its own legislation), or legal but fail to allow the individual victim
the opportunity to avoid such purposive violence for example through the
retrospective, secret, vague or indiscriminate nature of its enabling legislation, or
legislation which does not allow the victim the opportunity to prove their
innocence in a court of law".
The notion of "when it claims the authority over the immediate victim"
is necessary to get around the problem of the State's otherwise illegal
treatment of enemy combatants on its soil to whom the normal police
rules of engagement are not applied despite their existence. The
advantage of this is that it allows the State to chose to treat a political
organisation differently to the privately motivated individual. In this
way the thesis gets around the problem noted by Gilbert: "[i]f an act of
state terrorism were morally permissible as an act of war the State
should acknowledge it as war" 756 . Gilbert presumably could not take
this author's position because he took an international law
756 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality:An Introductory Study in Applied 	 237
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p132.
approach757 , and as he himself said, the status of prisoners of war is not
applicable to a state' own citizens under the doctrine of international
law758.
Examples of legislation which prevent the individual from avoiding the
State's acts of violence have been evident in the so called 'classical'
examples of reigns of terror or terrorist state, although the existence of
such legislation may not have been the (sole) reason for the accusations
of state terrorism levelled against them.
Secret legislation for example was widespread in the former U.S.S.R. in
the form of the "literally millions" of unpublished enactments at all
levels of the state apparatus during the period known as the Stalinist
Terror759 . Whilst it has also been noted that the Nazi's used secret laws
"to effectuate the most barbarous aspects" of its genocide
programme760.
Indiscriminate 'catch all' or 'blanket' pieces of legislation for example
were often used in the periods of military rule in South America in the
1970's and 1980's. As Pion Berlin noted, "[s]pecific charges were rarely
brought" against the disappeared and abducted. Instead the authorities
accused them broadly of conducting subversive or terrorist activities.
In Brazil those who allegedly committed subversive acts were seeking
the "transformation of the existing order" 761 . Whilst in Argentina the
justification for such counter-terrorism was even less precise, as
757 Gilbert wrote, "Nerrorism which is legalised by the State involves making
exceptions to laws which protect citizens in times of peace from being killed, wounded
or imprisoned without the application of recognised legal processes. Acts of legalised
terrorism thus constitute a grave infringement of human rights. In such cases it may be
argued that, although legislation has been carried through which is technically in order,
the fact that it breaches human rights invalidates it under international law - lex
invista non est lex' ". Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory
Study in Applied Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p133.
758 Gilbert P. Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied
Political Philosophy. (Routledge. London. 1994.). p169.
759 Butler W.E. 'The Rule of Law and the Legal System' in White S., Pravda A. and
Gitelman Z. (eds). Developments in Soviet Politics. (Macmillan. Basingstoke. 1990.).
p105.
760 Richard D.A.J. 'Terror and the Law'. Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 5 (2). 1983.
pp171-190. p180.
761 Pion-Berlin cites Dassoli (ed). Torture in Brazil (Vintage Books. 1986). p132.
Pion-Berlin D. The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression
in Argentina and Peru. (Lynne Reinner. Boulder. 1989.). p4. 238
military President General Jorge Videla labelled as subversive "anyone
who opposes the Argentine way of life". A specific example of such
legislation is that of the Institutional Act of June 18, 1976, by which the
Argentine military junta assumed:
"the power and responsibility to consider the actions of those individuals who
have injured the national interest", on grounds as vague and ill-defined as failure
to observe basic moral principles in the exercise of public, political or union
offices or activities that involve the public interest"762
Similarly legislation which produced other unavoidable accusations
would be considered illegitimate. This includes not only retrospective
legislation which interestingly many of the human rights conventions
outlaw763 , but also any that create a crime of 'suspicion' of a particular
offence for this surely a self-fulfilling prophecy. An example of the
latter is the Soviet decree that made it an offence to be suspected of
sabotage764.
Ascriptive legislation which made it an offence to be something which
one could not change rather than to do something, for example, being a
particular colour, sex, or coming from a particular family has also been
widespread. The most obvious example was its used against the Jews in
Nazi Germany765
 and against various races in apartheid South Africa.
762 Corradi J. E. 'The Mode of Destruction: Terror in Argentina' Telos (Special Issue
on Terrorism and State Terrorism). No54. Winter 1982-83. pp61-76. p70-71. He goes
on to say "[I]awlessness became paradoxically an official routine".
763 Article 8(1),and 8(2) of the I.C.C.P.R. declare that no one shall be held in slavery
or servitude respectively.
764 Unfortuantely Maier does not name it. Maier C. The Unanswerable Past: History,
Holocaust and German National Identity. (Harvard University Press. London. 1988.).
p79.
765 Richard wrote "the hallmark of the Nazi terror was precisely its war on this ideal
[of personal autonomy by which persons are subject to legal sanctions only for conduct
culpably undertaken with some fair warning of the consequences]. The appropriateness
of punishment would turn merely on the fact that the person was a Jew, or a gypsy, or
subject to a health disability, or homosexual". Richard D.A.J. 'Terror and the Law'.
Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 5 (2). 1983. pp171-190. p181. This author would exclude
the last of his examples on the grounds that one has a choice whether or not to carry
out any sexual act. Likewise it is possible to introduce legislation that discriminated
against Jews (or any other religous group for that matter) which is not ascriptive in
that it allowed existing believers to modify their behaviour and to stop carrying out
practices that were asociated with being of that faith. However as Gregor noted in Nazi
Germany there "was no volunatry behaviour any Jew might have undertaken that would
have insured him or her against the threat of deadly force". He goes on to say "[i]f
there had been something that they might have done to comply with the wishes of the 239
Whilst in Stalin's Soviet Union Article 58 of the Criminal Code provided
the death penalty for flight abroad which is not problematic in itself,
however if military personnel took such actions, members of their
family who were aware of the intended offence were subject to ten
years imprisonment, whilst: "the remaining adult members of the
traitor's family and those living with him or dependent on him at the
same time were made liable to five years edle"766.
However it should be remembered that such legal but illegitimate acts do
not necessarily constitute state terrorism, for only when there is the
intention of making the immediate victim serve as a symbol that is to be
an instrumental victim in a process of communication with the real
target audience of the State's message can such activities be classified
so. This author's definition of state terrorism would therefore not have
covered the use of the death penalty against those in apartheid South
Africa for writing of letters to Africans likely to encourage feelings of
hostility between the whites and other inhabitants. An activity which
was criminalised by apartheid South Africa's law on terrorism767.
Nor would it label most acts of genocide as state terrorism, for despite
the fact that political violence is used against an innocent victim, there
is no target audience whose behaviour the State aims to modify via this
use of violence. Although the legal genocide of one particular ethnic
group for the purpose of intimidating another ethnic group that shares
with the former a difference from another ethnic group (the
perpetrators themselves), would qualify as an act of state terrorism for
here is a target audience whose behaviour the State aims to modify as
well as legal violence which did not allow the victim of its violence the
opportunity to change their behaviour and avoid the violence.
national security then the word violence used against them would have qualified as just
that- violent repression or intimidation- but it would not have been terror". Gregor
A.J. 'Some Thoughts on State and Rebel Terror' in Rapoport D.C. and Alexander Y. The
Rationalization of Terrorism. (University Publications of America. Frederick MD.
1982). pp56-79. p71.
766 Article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code 9th June 1934. Conquest R. The Great
Terror: A Reassessment. (Pimlico. London.1992.). p75.
767 Kittrie claims this citing Section 2 of the Terrorism Act No.83 of 1967 as cited
by Rubin L. 'Apartheid in Practice' UN Public OPI/553 (1976) p40. Kittrie N.N. 'A New
Look at Political Offences' in Livingstone M.H. (ed) International Terrorism, in the
Contemporary World. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut. 1978.). pp.354-376.
p366. 240
However this author's definition would allow the State to legally repress
many peaceful actions such as political demonstrations, religious
ceremonies, or publications without such threats or uses of violence
being labelled state terrorism as long as the prohibition was made clear
in advance so that the individual could choose to avoid doing these
activities in public. This author's definition would also enable the state,
if it so desired, to execute the members of political parties or religious
organisations and the practitioners of particular sexual practices
(appalling as this would be) without its being called state terrorism, as
long as this prohibition was made clear in advance so that existing
members could modify their behaviour and leave. This refusal to label
politicide or this type of religious genocide or the genocide of
practicing homosexuals would be in line with (Walzer's 768 ) criteria of
aiming at a particular people because of things they have done or are
doing rather than aiming at a whole group of people indiscriminately
because of who they are.
To recap for a state's legal threat or use of violence to qualify as
legitimate, the immediate victim must have the opportunity to gain
knowledge of the law in order to modify his behaviour in relation to
previously publicised legislation- however trivial its prohibition.
Without this qualification based on having the chance to gain
knowledge of the legislation, the unwary lawbreaker, who is
subsequently incapacitated or even exterminated by the state's legal
violence, would not have been punished for breaking the law in the
true sense of the word. Instead they like the victims of insurgency
terrorism, would have would have been (from his perspective)
arbitrarily or randomly victimised merely for being, rather than doing
something that he could have chosen to avoid. As such the individual
victim can be classified as an 'innocent' victim of this legal but
illegitimate punishment and possible act of domestic state terrorism.
This view contrasts with those who define state terrorism as the State's
prohibition of particular human rights, or international law generally.
This author's de facto definition allows the State to maintain unlimited
authority and jurisdiction over all areas of life, that is to aim for
total(itarian) control within its area of domestic sovereignty if it so
chose.	 i
768 Walzer M. Just and Unjust War. (Allen Lane. London. 1978.).p.200. 	 241
However before going on to apply this definition to the counter-
terrorist actions of Israel, it is useful to remember that there are of
course a number of potential alternatives to that proposed by this
author, indeed the number of alternative definitions of terrorism using
just the 22 noted by Schmid is over 4 million! However of more practical
value is the identification of the major approaches to the concept of
state terrorism, all which were summarised by Gurr when he wrote:
"State terror should be judged not in the absolute but against some standard.
Normatively, the standard might be that of international law (which at present
condemns genocide but not state terrorism), or the domestic laws of the state in
question, or the laws of culturally similar states, or some not-yet-codified
conception of global human rights"769.
As already noted this author rejects the approach of those who would
identify state terrorism by reference to international law mainly
because of vague nature and contradictions of much of it. However
there is no doubt that international law especially that humanitarian
law covering human rights and the laws of war does provide examples
of things which should be covered by a definition of state terrorism,
and it is this overlap that may gain this author's definition support from
those legally trained. Given the result of this author's reading of the
topic of terrorism noted within the introductory chapter, and the
approach of many legal documents, it is not surprising that some
authors take a piecemeal approach and merely list 'offences'. Teichman
for example wrote:
"State terrorism' is characterised by such activities as the kidnapping and
assassination of political opponents of the government by the police or the secret
service or the army; imprisonment without trial; torture; massacres of racial or
religious minorities or of certain social classes; incarceration of citizens in
concentration camp, and generally speaking government by fear" 770•
769 Gurr T.R. 'The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical
Analysis' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.) Government Violence and Repression: An
Agenda for Research. (Greenwood Press. NY.1986.).pp45-72. p49.
770 Teichman J. 'How to Define Terrorism'. Philosophy. Vol. 64. 1989. pp505-517.	 242
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Similarly Agyeman wrote that:
"terrorism is committed in today's world....when the aborigines of Australia are
killed for sport, when Libya invades and at the point of a gun occupied the land of
Chad; when the Turks slaughtered large numbers of human beings called
Armenians; when the United States rains bombs on Libya, when South Africa
massacres defenceless children and Soweto; when the USSR invades Afghanistan;
when the CIA assassinates Patrice Lumumba, or when; through a maelstrom of
violence, it overthrows the Allende government in Chile"771.
This last example is interesting because Agyeman seems to be bordering
on producing a rather politically motivated 'definition'. Others who
have produced rather ideological definitions include those who equate
state terrorism with a particular form of government. For example in
reply to this author's questionnaire , Petras defined state terrorism as:
"Mlle use of systematic violence to intimidate a population to accept the
power of corporate and political elites" 772 , whilst others have equated it
with totalitarianism773.
This author's definition of state terrorism undoubtedly fits with Gurr's
idea of judging it in relation to "the domestic laws of the state in
question", although as noted earlier there can be a number of
variations on the theme including taking a "dry legalism' approach
which declares only illegal acts as illegitimate. Some are too narrow in
that they concentrate solely upon illegal activities. For example in
answer to this author's questionnaire Alexander George gave a
definition of terrorism by those in power as the: "commission of (or
771 Agyeman 0. 'Terrorism: A Non Western View'. Monthly Review. Vol.39. (1). 1987.
pp43-53. p52.
772 J. Petras in answer to question 4.
773 In reply to both question 9 which asked "Can legal acts of violence carried out by
those in power within the area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled as
'terror/ism'?" and question 10, "Can illegal acts of violence carried out by those in
power within the area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled 'terror/ism" A.
Geifman answered yes and added "when the government perpetuating these acts is
totalitarian". M. Anderson claimed that "[d]uring the post-war period state terrorism
has been analysed as a function of the totalitarian state; the models have been, despite
their own vast differences, Stalinism and Nazism. The images and theories of such
state terror are owed principally, to Orwell and Arendt. And the central image of state
terrorism indelibly linked with Stalinism and Nazism is the police state, implacable and
all-knowing, total, as in the totalitarian state". Anderson K. 'Beginning to Theorise
about Internal State Terrorism in the Third World'. Terrorism and Political Violence.
Vol. 2 (1). 1990. pp106-111. p107. 243
threat to commit) acts of unlawful violence with a view to influencing
the political behaviour of citizens (Approximately)" 774 . Whilst
Scarpaci defined it as:
"Rillegal acts (defined by state/civil codes) unleashed upon the citizenry when the
latter are usually denied due process of civil courts, thereby subject to military
courts and military law."775
But at the same time this author's definition cannot escape the
accusation of being culturally based as it applies various norms which
underlie the use of state violence at both abroad and at home -that of
principle of discrimination found within the just war tradition and the
laws of war, and some of the principles found in the notion of legality.
However this is not the same as those who say that terrorism exists
where the culture disapproves of it. An example of the latter is the
definition of "terrorism by public authority" suggested by Boire as:
" (1) It is an international act of violence or terror- inspiring activity, or the
threat of such an act;
(2) by a power politically motivated actor.
(3) directed against an instrumental target comprised of persons or property
(4) which is intended to create in a larger primary target audience a psychological
condition of fear, anxiety, terror and vulnerability greatly disproportionate to the
physical result of the act of terrorism.
(5) for the purpose of modifying the primary target members behaviour or attitude
and coercing them into supporting and/or effectuating the politically related
objective desired by the terrorist actor and
(6) is beyond the ordinary legitimate coercion right of the terrorist actor as
recognised by the actors political society"
Article 6 is particularly important to Boire's definition for it is the basis
of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate types and degrees
of force. Notably, this distinction has not been defined as being
774 A. George in answer to question 4.
775 J. Scarpaci in answer to question 4. Also C.A. Watson who wrote, "government
orchestrated or tolerated (but knowningly) actions against its on citizens who received
no legal protection or due process'. 244
determined by legality 776 , but in terms of the community's view of it. It
is on these grounds that he excludes much insurgency violence which
would otherwise fit his definition of terrorism.
The next part of the thesis attempts to apply this author's definition to a
particular set of activities along with a number of other notable
definitions, none of which belong to the school of international law, for
this would make an application extremely difficult. However in order to
illustrate this point the following description of Israeli counter-
terrorist activities does make reference to relevant legal controversies.
776 Boire M.0 'Terrorism Reconsidered as Punishment: Toward an Evaluation of the
Acceptability of Terrorism as a Method of Societal Change and Maintenance'. Stanford
Journal of International Law. Vol.20(1). 1984. pp43-143. p55. 245
Part II.
An Application of Various Definitions of State
Terrorism. 
"..the ideological battle over the nature of terrorism both embodies and alters
relations of power with implications for the direction of societal change. To
illustrate, deciding on what constitutes "real terrorism" may mean that authentic
movements of national liberation will come to limit vendetta in their ranks and
thereby gain global support at the level of the nation state. It is also possible that
a Habermas-style "legitimation crisis" (1975) may result if and when forms of
state violence are redefined as institutional terrorism. Stated simply, broad-scale
rejection of that state violence masquerading as "counter-terrorism" may push
states into new modes of conflict resolutions".
W. perdue.777
"There are two ways to approach the study of terrorism. One may adopt a literal
approach, taking the topic seriously, or a propagandistic approach, construing the
concept of terrorism as a weapon to be exploited in the service of some system of
power. In each case it is clear how they proceed. Pursuing the literal approach, we
begin by defining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the
phenomenon..."
N. Chomsky.778
777 Perdue W. Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear
(Praeger. New York. 1989). p8.
778 Chomsky N. 'International Terrorism: Image and Reality' in George A.(ed.) 246Western State Terrorism. (Polity Press. Oxford. 1991.). pp12-38. p12.
Chapter 6.
Counter-terrorist Policies Within Israel and the
West Bank. 
This section attempts two tasks. The first is to describe the counter-
terrorist legislation and policies in force within particular areas ruled
(or 'administered') by Israel between June 7 1967 and 1 May 1994. The
second is to apply the various definitions of (state) terrorism to this
description.
In order to start this analytical part of thesis it is first of all necessary to
identify the definitions which will be applied. These are:
1) the author's own definition of (state) terrorism:
"the threat or use of violence for political purposes by either non-state
organisations anywhere, or the State outside its area of jurisdiction, when such
actions are intended to modify the behaviour of target(s) wider than the immediate
innocent victim(s); or the use of such purposive violence by the State (when it
claims the authority over the immediate victim) when its actions are either illegal
(according to its own legislation), or legal but fail to allow the individual victim
the opportunity to avoid such purposive violence for example through the
retrospective, secret, vague or indiscriminate nature of its enabling legislation, or
legislation which does not allow the victim the opportunity to prove their
innocence in a court of law".
2) Stohl and Lopez's definition, which has been used by numerous other
authors within the literature779 , and was also one of the two most cited
779 Denemark and Lehman's definition can be described as Stohl like. See Denemark R.
A. and Lehman H.P. 'South African State Terror: The Costs of Continuing Repression' in
Stahl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence
and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conecticut. 1984.). pp143-166. p147.
Also Howard R.E. 'Repression and State Terror in Kenya 1982-1988' in Bushnell P.T.,
Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. (eds.) State Organized Terror
(Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.). pp77-98. p78. 247
by respondents to this authors questionnaire780. It stated that terrorism
is:
"The purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour
in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat"781
3) Schmid and Jongman's comprehensive definition of terrorism found
within in their 1988 book Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. It was also one of the two most cited by
respondents to this author's questionnaire 782 . For Schmid and Jongman:
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal,
or political reasons, whereby -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative
or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.
Threat -and violence- based communication processes between terrorist
(organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the
main target audience(s), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a
780 R.E. Howard declared "I wrote an article on Kenya in Schlapentokh et al. I used the
Stohl + Lopez definition, which I still find satisfactory". Howard refers to Stohl M. and
Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist:
The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport.
Conecticut. 1984.).pp3-10.p7-8. Howard R.E. 'Repression and State Terror in Kenya
1982-1988' in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. (eds.)
State Organized Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.).pp77-98. p78. An anonymous
respondent wrote 'See attached from a (text) book .... I've used other definitions but
this gives a sense of my perspective' uses Stohl and Lopez "the purposeful act or threat
of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and /or audience of
the act or threat". J. Hart wrote "The editors- Michael Stohl + George Lopez provided
their own definition which I found reasonable". Reference to Hart J.A. 'U.S.
Interventions in Latin America since World War II' in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible
Beyond Endurance (Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.1988) pp59-84. p60.
Stohl's definition is that found within Stohl M. 'National Interests and State Terrorism
in International affairs'. Political Science. Vol. 369. July 1984.).
781 Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State
as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport. Conecticut. 1984.).pp3-10. p7.
782 As well as being cited by Schmid himself, B.A. Scharlau wrote that he used it,
when he wrote, "Schmid/Jongman, 1988. This occurs in an article (still awaiting
completion) on international relations and terrorism". 248
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is
primarily sought"783
4) The definition contained within the Prevention of Terrorism Act (and
within the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act784 since its
introduction in 1973). Section 9(1) of the 1974 version of the PTA stated:
"terrorism" means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear"
5) An 'Israeli' definition. One derived from Section 1 of Israel's
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 1949 which stated that "Terrorist
organisation" means a body of persons resorting in its activities to
acts of violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or
threats of such acts of violence". In this derived definition terrorism
means:
"acts of violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or threats of such
acts of violence"
6) The definition of terrorism use by the Office of the Co-ordinator for
Counterterrorism in the production of the U.S. Department of State's
'Patterns of Global Terrorism'. Contained in Title 22 of the United States
Code, Section 265f(d). As well as being slightly different to the British
and 'Israeli' definitions this was chosen because the US Government sets
the agenda for much academic, political and media discussions of
terrorism and has employed this definition for statistical and analytical
purposes since 1983. Within the act:
"The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience"785.
783 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p28.
784 Section 28(1) of Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act 1973.
783 U.S. State Department. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993. (Department of State
Publication 10136, Office of the Secretary Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism.) states "[f]or purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant"
is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of
the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. We also consider as acts of terrorism
attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of 249
The main aim of using all six definitions is primarily to illustrate the
problems involved in consistently applying any definition of
terrorism, and it is expected to lead to a greater insight in the task of
defining insurgency terrorism. In addition the section will provide a
unique legal description of particular counter-terrorist policies
followed by Israel in the West Bank and Israel over the period 1967-
1994, and a detailed history of Israeli counter-terrorist actions abroad.
Like all 'histories' the selection of time and space is rather artificial and
abstract. The areas in which the counter-terrorist measures under
scrutiny take place are Israel- that is the enlarged area lying within
borders established by force of arms in 1948-9 and the West Bank. As
noted within the introductory chapter, the main reason to apply the
various definition of state terrorism to the counter-terrorist actions of
Israel was to fill two apparent 'gaps' in the terrorism literature. The
author's preliminary reading gave the distinct impression that the vast
majority, of 'terrorologists' could not conceive of terrorism being
undertaken by Western democratic states 786 ; whilst a content analysis
of Schmid's bibliographical chapter on the topic of 'Regime terrorism
and Repression' reveals that the term 'counter-terrorism' or 'counter-
terror' was mentioned only once within either the title of the reference
or the brief resume of the article and that was a conference paper
entitled 'Terror and counter-terror in Nazi Occupied Poland'787.
military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in
Europe or elsewhere".
786 Few of the author's read used examples from contemporary 'Western' states. Bell
for example wrote that although state terror has long been with us, it has been only a
relatively rare option for democratic governments. Bell J.B. A Time of Terror: How
Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (Basic Books. New York.
1978). p3. Whilst other authors went as far as claiming that 'terrorism' was the
antithesis of the 'rule of law', see for example Wilkinson P. Terrorism and the Liberal
State. (2nd ed. Macmillan. London. 1986.). p66, if not 'Western' values, see for
example Netanyhu B. (ed.). Terrorism: How The West Can Win. (Farrar Strauss and
Giroux. New York. 1986.). A view which seems to be supported by a content analysis
of the relevant references within the sub-section of Schmid and Jongman's bibliography
in their book Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions, authors, concepts and
databases. It reveals that only not one of the 196 English language references within
the section entitled 'Regime Terrorism and Repression' specifically mentioned Israel.
See Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). pp259-269.
787 See Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.). p264. Interestingly
many of the alleged examples of state terrorism were justified in order to counter
terrorism including some of Stalin's show trials, Hitler's reprisals and the repression
of various Latin American governments in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 250
The decision to include an area 'occupied' and 'administered' by Israel
was taken because it would test the definitions even further and
highlight the problems of the alternative approaches to the concept of
terrorism. The choice of the West Bank is a practical one. An application
of the various definitions of terrorism to the legislation within the
other areas occupied by Israel in 1967 -the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and
Sinai Peninsula- would add little in return for amount of effort invested.
This is because the counter-terrorist activities within these other
regions do not differ significantly from those enforced within the West
Bank, although the numbering, title and basis of the enabling
legislation and military orders do. Therefore the vast majority of the
'results' of the application of the various definitions can be deduced
from the analysis of the West Bank. In addition there is also a relatively
large body of work on Israel's policies within the West Bank upon
which to base this work, for it is here that the majority of Palestinians
live. Although this section will include examples/statistics which
include the Gaza Strip (or other areas of occupied territory) to illustrate
various points, for many sources of information do not distinguish
between the two.
The starting date of 7 June 1967 was chosen for it was then that the
Israeli forces took over the administration of the West Bank 788 after
defeating the armed forces of various Arab nations. This defeat is also
significant for it is often seen as having persuaded many Palestinian
Arabs that only they remained to fight for Palestine. The result of
which was an upsurge in Palestinian violence, including terrorism789.
788 On December 17 1967 the area became known as Judea/Samaria. Shehadeh R. and
Kuttab J. The West Bank and the Rule of Law:A Study. (International Commission of
Jurists. Geneva .1980.).p10. According to the J.M.C.C. the full title of the relevant
legislation was 'Military Order 187. Order Concerning Interpretations (Additional
Instructions) (Amendment 3 to Military Order 130)'. Rabah J. and Fairweather N.
Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-1992. (2nd. Ed.
Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. Jerusalem. 1995.). p26. Alternatively
Yahav calls it 'The Order Concerning Interpretation (Further Provisions) No. 3. The
West Bank Area No. 187. 1967' of 17 December 1967. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The
"Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p24.
789 Alon wrote "Palestinian terrorism increased greatly after the Six Day war. In
fact, it was the Arab defeat in the 1967 War that boosted terrorism". Alon H.
Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel. Towards a Policy Analysis of
Countermeasures. (Rand. Santa Monica. August 1980.). p41. She also notes that on 20
June 1967 Al-Fatah announced it was moving its headquarters into the occupied areas 251
The closing date of 1 May 1994 was chosen for it was then that Israel and
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (or P.L.0.) began to implement the
self-government arrangements for the Palestinians in Jericho and the
Gaza Strip in accord with the Declaration of Principles which they had
signed in September of 1993.790  The P.L.O.'s commitment to resolve the
conflict with Israel through peaceful negotiations in this latter year
coupled with its renunciation of the use of terrorism and other forms of
violence also helped produce a significant reduction in anti-Israeli
violence. Although other 'Palestinian groups' such as Hamas remained
committed to the use of violence including acts of terrorism.
It is because many definitions of state terrorism (including this
author's) include a reference to law be it domestic or international791
that it is necessary to explain the constitutional and legal basis of its
actions in order to describe and analyse aspects of Israel's attempts to
counter what it labels 'terrorism'. The description of Israel's counter-
terrorist policies is complicated by constant changes in the legislation
throughout the period of this analysis, and by disputes over what
constitutes the correct interpretation of the law, especially in the
'administered region' of the West Bank. In regards to the latter point, it
is not unknown for the courts of certain countries to incorrectly
interpret the wording of the law for political reasons, a point that is
potentially relevant here in terms of The Israeli Supreme Court's
disputed interpretation of the wording of particular provisions of
international law. Once an explanation of both the constitutional
and attempted to mobilise the masses into fighting a popular liberation war against
Israel.
790 These agreements followed an earlier exchange of letters, in which the P.L.0
recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security, and Israel recognized the
P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people which themselves can be traced
back to the Madrid Conference of October 1991.
791 An example of the former, given in response to this author's questionnaire are
Alexander George's view that state terrorism is the "commission of (or threat to
commit) acts of unlawful violence with a view to influencing the political behaviour of
citizens (Approximately)", and B.A. Scarpaci's claim that "[i]llegal acts (defined by
state/civil codes) unleashed upon the citizenry when the latter are usually denied due
process of civil courts, thereby subject to military courts and military law" constitute
state terrorism. The latter can be seen in the following comments also given in reply to
this author's questionnaire. G. Bowen wrote "[w]hen the definition of legal acts
contravenes broadly recognized international standards of human rights, then and only
then are legal acts also state terrorism"; C.H.Yaeger similarly claimed "[i]f a nation's
legal system or constitution, allows acts which violate the United Nations Declaration
of [presumably Human] Rights, then I believe that international legality and morality
eclipses "legal system" in a sovereign state which allows such violation". 252
history of Israeli rule in these two areas, and the place of 'international
law' within both has been done the six definitions will be applied to the
various counter-terrorist policies in order to ascertain whether such
practices can be labelled as (state) terrorism. Finally references from
this analysis will be used in the concluding chapter in order to
illustrate the problems of applying definitions of terrorism.
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A Constitutional History of Israel and the 'Administered' 
Territory of the West Bank. 
The Creation of Israel.
Israel is generally seen as having been created on the 14 May 1948
following the issuing of 'The Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel' by members of the People's Council's which represented
the Jewish Community within Palestine and the Zionist movement
abroad 792 . Immediately prior to Israel's rule, the area which would
become 'Israel' had been governed as part of Palestine by the United
Kingdom since the latter gained a mandate from the League of Nations
on 24 July 1922.793
 Twenty-six years later the U.K. parliament passed
the 'Palestine Act 1948' which provided that "His Majesty's jurisdiction
in Palestine" would terminate at midnight of 14/15 May 1948.794  This
piece of legislation followed both the U.K.'s declaration in 1947 that it
would evacuate Palestine by August 1948 at the latest, and the U.N.
General Assembly's passing of the non-binding Resolution 181(2) of 29
November 1947 which envisaged the establishment of both an Arab and
Jewish state in Palestine795.
On the day the Mandate was to expire (14 May 1948) two notable events
occurred. Firstly, a territorial claim based upon the Balfour Declaration,
the aforesaid U.N. General Assembly Resolution and the "historic and
traditional attachment" of the Jewish people to this land, was made by
representatives of various Jewish groups within 'The Declaration of
the Establishment of the State of Israel'796 . Secondly that 56% of
792 See wording of 'The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel'.
Published by Iton Rishmi No2. Supp.1. May 21. 1948. p1; Laws of the State of Israel.
(The Government Printer.) Vol.1 p7. reproduced by Badi J. (ed.). Fundamental Laws of
the State of Israel. (Twayne Publishers. New York. 1961.).p. 8-11. p8.
793 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p19.
794 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p47.
795 Quigley J. Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice. (Duke University Press.
Durham, USA. 1990.). p48. For details of the debate over its legality see pages 45-53.
796 Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An Introducton (2nd ed Rubin Mass
Jerusalem. 1992.). p3 Footnote 7. 254
Palestine797
 allocated for a Jewish nation under the original U.N. plan
was 'invaded' by armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.
Intermittent fighting continued for some fifteen months from this
date, although sporadic fighting between Arab and Jewish insurgent
groups and the British authorities798
 had in fact been going on
throughout the mandate period and increased dramatically following
the U.K.'s notice to quit and the U.N. resolution 181(2) in late 1947.
During the first few months of 1949, direct negotiations were conducted
under U.N. auspices between Israel and each of the invading countries,
and this lead to armistices with each of these Arab states (except Iraq
which refused to negotiate with Israel) 799 . The area now ruled by the
State of Israel reflected the situation at the end of the fighting.
Accordingly, the coastal plain, Galilee and the entire Negev came within
Israel's sovereignty, the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian administration,
whilst the West Bank of the River Jordan came under Jordanian rule.
The city of Jerusalem was divided, with Jordan controlling the eastern
part (including the Old City) and Israel the west. However as already
noted this 'expanded' de facto Israel of 1949 would not be the only area
to be administered by the Israeli authorities. Following the Six-Day War
of 1967, the government of Israel found itself administering 70,000 or so
square kilometres of territory, compared with the 26,000 of pre war
Israe1800 . The newly occupied territories contained a population of just
797 Quigley J. Palestine and Israel:A Challenge to Justice. (Duke University Press.
Durham, USA. 1990.).p36. National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-
Occupied West Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers
Guild. New York. 1988.). pl.
798 It has been implied that a culture of terrorism developed within Israel, as former
leaders of insurgent groups such as lrgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang [Lehi] and even
Haganah continued to use in office the 'terrorism' that they had used in the 'war'
against the British and Palestinian Arabs. See for example Quigley J. Palestine and
Israel: A Challenge to Justice. (Duke University Press. Durham, USA. 1990.).p42 Also
P.L.O.'s claim that "Terrorism has been systematically pursued by Israel as an intrinsic
policy measure since the signing of the Armistice Agreements in 1949. Although
terrorism was practiced by the Zionists before the Israeli state was proclaimed"
Palestine Liberation Organisation. (Department of Information and National Guidance).
Crime and No Punishment. (PLO. Beirut. 1974.). p5.
799 According to Cattan, Israel signed an armistice with Lebanon on 23 March 1949;
Egypt on 24 February 1949; Jordan on 3 April 1949; and Syria on 20 July 1949.
Cattan H. Palestine and International Law: The Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict. (Longman. London. 1973). p24.
800 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p35. 255
over one million persons, almost all of whom were Arab 801 . In order to
facilitate its rule in this occupied land, Israel divided this newly
conquered area into four distinct administrative districts which
generally corresponded to the law in place in each, all of which were
headed by a regional Military Commander of the Israel Defence Force
(I.D.F.)802. These were the West Bank (soon to be renamed as
Judea/Samaria); the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai803 ; the Golan
Heights804; and the Solomon Region of the Sinai Peninsula805.
The West Bank ( Tudea and Samaria) 
The West Bank as it as was generally known until 17 December 1967,
consists of 5,878 sq. km. of land situated to the east of the 1949 Armistice
Line and to the west of the River Jordan. On that date it was renamed
'Judea/Samaria' by the Israeli authorities in accordance with Military
Order 187 entitled 'Order Concerning Interpretations (Additional
801 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p35. Citing S.Gazit The Administered Areas: Aspects of
Israel's Policy. Information Briefing. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information Division.
Jerusalem. 1971.). p1.
802 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p35.
803 Like Egypt, Israel never laid a de jure claim to sovereignty over the 363 sq. km
coastal strip that constitutes the Gaza Strip, Its 356,300 inhabitants remained
stateless under Israeli administration. This contrasted them with the 33,400 Egyptian
citizens of the Northern Sinai region with whom they would now be ruled in one
administrative unit, until this latter area was returned to Egyptian sovereignty on 26
April 1982. See Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester
University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p36.
804 During the Six-Day War the vast majority of the inhabitants of this plateau fled,
leaving practically only the 7,500 Druse inhabitants in their villages. As a result of
this depopulation as well as the unavailability of Syrian law books, Israel replaced the
existing Syrian legal framework with its own military government and security
legislation. The Golan Heights was administered in this way until 14 December 1981
when the Knesset passed 'The Golan Heights Law' which extended 'the law, jurisdiction
and administration of the State of Israel' to the Golan Heights region in the manner in
which it had incorporated, though not legally annexed, Jerusalem fourteen years
earlier. Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester
University Press. Manchester. 1985.).p35-36 and p42-43.
805 Situated in the south of the Sinai Peninsula, the Solomon region is a barren desert
belonging to Egypt. Under Israeli occupation the inhabitants- mainly 8,000 nomadic
Bedouin- retained their Egyptian citizenship and were administered according to the
existing Egyptian laws until it was handed back to Egypt on 26 April 1982. Cohen E.
Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press.
Manchester. 1985.). p36. 256
Instructions) (Amendment 3 to Military Order 130) 1806 . The smaller
more barren upland plateau of Judea is divided from the larger more
populated north which corresponded to biblical Samaria, by the
Jerusalem Corridor807 . The 400,000 inhabitants of the region
(excluding East Jerusalem), were allowed to retain their Jordanian
citizenship by the Israeli occupiers despite the latters' refusal to
recognise Jordan's claim to the sovereignty of that area 808 . Through a
series of legal and administrative measures in late June 1967 809 Israel
announced that the former Jordanian ruled section of East Jerusalem
and the surrounding villages were no longer to be regarded as 'occupied
territory' (even if its sovereignty was disputed). Instead they were to be
administered as part of Israel rather than as part of the West Bank.
Although this led to debates as to whether or not these enabling
measures constituted the formal 'annexation' of East Jerusalem, this area
was formally 'annexed' in accordance with Israeli 1aw810
 (but not
806 On December 17 1967 the area became known as Judea/Samaria. Shehadeh R. and
Kuttab J. The West Bank and the Rule of Law:A Study. (International Commission of
Jurists. Geneva .1980.).pl O. According to the J.M.C.C. the full title of the relevant
legislation was 'Military Order 187. Order Concerning Interpretations (Additional
Instructions) (Amendment 3 to Military Order 130)'. Rabah J. and Fairweather N.
Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-1992. (2nd. Ed.
Jersualem Media and Communications Centre. Jerusalem. 1995.). p26. Alternatively
Yahav calls it 'The Order Concerning Interpretation (Further Provisions) No. 3. The
West Bank area No. 187. 1967' of 17 December 1967. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The
'Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.).p24.
807 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p36.
808 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p37.
809 On 27 June, the government passed two relevant pieces of legislation. The Law and
Administration Ordinance (Amendment No.11) Law stated that, '[t]he law, jurisdiction
and administration of the State shall extend to any region of Eretz Israel [the land of
Israel] designated by the government by order'; whilst 'The Municipal Corporation
Ordinance (Amendment) Law' allowed the Minister of the Interior to enlarge any
municipality. The next day this was duly done. The municipality of Jerusalem was
enlarged with the additon of the eastern part of Jerusalem, and some nearby villages.
An enlarged eastern Jersualem was 'incorporated' into Israel in accordance with
section 11 b of the 'Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No.11) Law'
following a government order. Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied
Territories. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p38-9.
810 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p42. For the debates surrounding this and the earlier
change in the legal status of Jersualem, see Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli
Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p38-43. 257
international law811 ) with the passing of the new (Basic) law entitled
'Jerusalem The Capital of Israel' on 30 July 1980.
811 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p43. 258
The Constitutional Form of The State of Israel
The Constitution of Israel
The much cited U.N. resolution 181(2) proposed that the two states in
Palestine should have a written constitution 812 . However because the
'The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel' was drafted
to satisfy as many different 'Israeli' political parties as possible, it
deliberately left open the contentious questions 'What constitutional
form should this new political entity take? 813 , and 'Where should its
boundaries lie?'. 'The Declaration of Independence' as 'The Declaration
of the Establishment of the State of Israel' is better known, explicitly
stated that a Constituent Assembly specifically elected for that purpose
should draft a constitution within a few months and no later than
October 1948 814 . On 14 January 1949 the Provisional Council issued 'The
Transition to the Constituent Assembly Ordinance' 815 , Article 3 of which
conferred temporary legislative powers on the Constituent Assembly816
(unless it wanted otherwise 817 ). The Constituent Assembly with all its
legislative and constitutional powers was duly elected 818 on 25 January
1949 and sat for the first time on 14 February 1949. Three days later it
passed the 'Transition Law' according to which it would be called the
first Knesset819.
812 Sprinzak E. 'Elite IIlegalism in Israel and the Question of Democracy' in Sprinzak
E. and Diamond L. (eds.). Israeli Democracy Under Stress. (Lynne Reinner, Boulder.
Colorado. 1993.). pp173-198. p183.
813 Elazar D. 'Constitution-Making:The Pre-eminently Political Act' in D.Elazar (ed)
Constitutionalism: The Israeli and American Experiences. (University Press of
America. London. 1990.). pp3-29. p19.
814 Zamir I. Introduction: Two Contrasting Constitutional Experiences. in Elazar D.
(ed.). Constitutionalism: The Israeli and American Experiences. (University Press of
America. London. 1990). Ppxix-xxi. pxix
815 Lucas N. The Modern History of Israel. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London.1974.).
p281.
816 sharfman cites Rubenstein A. Constitutional Law in Israel (Tel Aviv: Shocken.
1969.). p9 (Hebrew). Sharfman calls it the Transition to the Constituent Assembly Act
of 1949 .Sharfman D. Living Without a Constitution. ( M.E. Sharpe. London. 1993.).
p38.
817 Lucas N. The Modern History of Israel. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London.1974.).
p281.
818 Medding P.Y. The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967. (Oxford University
Press. Oxford. 1990.). p16.
819 Sharfman cites Klein C .'A New Era in Israeli Constitutional Law'. Israel Law
Review. Vol. 6 (3). 1971. p379. Sharfman D. Living Without a Constitution. ( M.E. 259
Later that year the Knesset passed the 'Harari compromise' which stated
that a constitution would be enacted gradually in a series of 'Basic
Laws' 820
 to be prepared and submitted to the Knesset by its Constitution,
Justice and Law Committee 821 . Subsequently a number of 'Basic Laws'
have been passed, but because the Knesset has not produced any
legislation that gives prominence to these over its ordinary laws, the
Supreme Court of Israel has held that the 'Basic Laws' have no inherent
superior status. It was also because of the absence of a law giving the
'Basic Laws' superior normative status the Supreme Court held that 'The
Declaration of Independence' was not a "constitutional law which
determines the validity or invalidity of ordinances and statutes" 822 . The
result is that if one takes the term 'constitution' to mean a single
written document of a special nature, endowed with a force superior to
that of other laws, then Israel -like the United Kingdom- does not have a
written constitution 8 2 3 . Instead the Knesset -like the House of
Commons- has the power to pass any law it likes 824 . Therefore at best,
Israel -like the U.K.- possess only a "fragmentary written
cons titution" 8 2 5 consisting of various documents and statutes of
constitutional standing. These include those precepts of 'The Declaration
of Independence' which bind the legal and administrative authorities in
their application of the law (even if this binding force is at best equal
to that of any other legislative enactment and subject to the rule that a
Sharpe. London. 1993.). p38. See also Gross who claimed that on April 4. 1951, the
First Knesset adopted the Transition Law (1951), transferring its authorities, rights
and duties to the Second Knesset, and to every subsequent Knesset. Gross G.M. 'The
Constitutional Question in Israel' in Elazar D. (ed.). Constitutionalism: The Israeli and
American Experiences. (University Press of America. London. 1990.).pp51-86. p70.
820 Zamir I. Introduction: Two Contrasting Constitutional Experiences. in Elazar D.
(ed.). Constitutionalism: The Israeli and American Experiences. (University Press of
America. London. 1990).pxix-xxi.pxix. Also Sharfman D. Living Without a Constitution.
(M.E. Sharpe london England.1993.). p44. Kretzmer calls it the "Constitution and Law
Committee". Kretzmer D. The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview Press
Boulder. 1990.). p8.
821 Medding P.Y. The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967. (Oxford University
Press. Oxford. 1990.). p38.
822 see Zeev v. Gubernik (1948) 1 P.D. 85. cited by Kretzmer D. The Legal Status of
the Arabs in Israel. (Westview Press Boulder. 1990.). p8.
823 Bin -Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An lntroducton (2nd Ed. Rubin Mass.
Jerusalem. 1992.). p36.
824 Kretzmer cites Per Berinson J. in Rogozinski v. State of Israel (1970) 26 P.D. I
129, 136. Kretzmer D. The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview Press
Boulder. 1990.).p8.
825 Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An Introducton (2nd. Ed. Rubin Mass.
Jerusalem. 1992.). p32. 260
later law prevails over the earlier) 826 ; and various 'Basic Laws' whose
constitutional import is derived from their nature or from the inclusion
of "entrenched clauses" which require a special majority to amend.
Finally whilst 'The Declaration of Independence' contains a list of civil
rights, it does not constitute a 'bill of rights', nor does it confer upon the
citizen legally enforceable rights. As the then Prime Minister Ben
Gurion put it in a sentence that is equally applicable to the UK: "In a
free country like Israel , there is no need for a declaration of freedoms.
In this state a person is free to do anything not prohibited by law"827.
Instead 'The Declaration' merely expresses society's concept of life, and
every authority must be guided in its actions by the principles of it828.
Put bluntly, the Knesset is the supreme legislative authority and the
Supreme Court can merely carry out a 'judicial review' of the
legislature's legislation and its administration in accordance with the
procedural rules of 'natural justice' 829 . The Supreme Court, then fulfils
two main functions, it serves as a High Court of Justice and it serves as
the final court of appeal in both criminal and civil actions. In its
former capacity it could issue orders to all bodies exercising public
functions under law, to do or to refrain from doing, any act in the
fulfilment of their duties.830
The Constitutional Basis of Israeli Legislation. 
The Declaration of Independence stated that:
826 Bin-Nun citing Akzin B. Reflections on Law and Political Science. (Jerusalem.
1976.) p137 (Hebrew). Bin -Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An Introducton (2nd
Ed. Rubin Mass. Jerusalem. 1992.). p37
827 Sharfman cites Ben-Gurion Knesset protocols Vol.4 p819. Sharfman D. Living
Without a Constitution. ( M.E. Sharpe. London.1993.). p44.
828 Bin-Nun cites HCJ 262/62,DSC vol 16.p2113. Bin -Nun A. The Law of the State of
Israel: An Introducton (2nd. Ed. Rubin Mass. Jerusalem. 1992.). p37.
829 Kretzmer D. The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview Press Boulder.
1990.).p14. Whilst Bin-Nun wrote that in its capacity as the High Court of Justice, the
H.C.J. is called upon to preserve those rights and to grant the citizen the requested
relief when one of his basic freedoms is infringed by an act of the authoritites. See HCJ
151/71 DSC vol 2591) p782. Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An
Introducton (2nd ed Rubin Mass , Jerusalem. 1992). p61.
830 Kretzmer D. The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview Press Boulder.
1990.). p13. 261
"until the establishment of the elected regular authorities of the State in
accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected
Constituent Assembly not later than 1 October 1948, the People's Council shall act
as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's
Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be
called "Israel" "831.
The 'People's Council' -which became the 'Provisional Council of State'
following 'The Declaration of Independence'- had been formed in
March of 1948. It consisted of the elected representatives of both the
National Council of the Jewish Community (in Palestine) and the Zionist
Executive and co-opted members of various groups not represented in
these two bodies832 . Following 'The Declaration of Independence' the
first act of the new Provisional Council of State was to issue a
'Proclamation' on 14 May 1948 by which it declared itself to be the
'legislative authority' for the State of Israel. In addition, in order to
prevent the emergence of a legal vacuum the 'Proclamation' provided
some continuity for the legal system by proclaiming that:
"So long as no laws have been enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of
State, the law which existed in Palestine on 5 Iyar 5708 (14th May 1948) shall
continue in force in the State of Israel, in so far as such continuance in force is
consistent with the contents of this Proclamation, with the future laws and with
the changes arising from the establishment of the State and its authorities"833
To reinforce this idea, a week later 834
 the Provisional Council passed
the 'Law and Administrative Ordinance' (which is also known as 'Law
and Government Ordinance'). Section 11 provided for the continuation
and retention of the existing laws by stating:
831 Quoted by Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South
Africa and Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984). p65. The
Constituent Assembly was not actually elected until 25 January 1949.
832 Medding P.Y. The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967. (Oxford University
Press. Oxford. 1990.). p14.
833 'Proclamation' Published by 'ton Rishmi. No.1 May 14. 1948. p3; Laws of the State
of Israel. (The Government Printer.) Vol.1 p6. reproduced by Badi J. (ed.). Fundamental
Laws of the State of Israel. (Twayne Publishers. New York. 1961.). p12.
834 Gross G.M. 'The Constitutional Question in Israel' in Elazar D. (ed.).
Constitutionalism: The Israeli and American Experiences. (University Press of
America. London. 1990.). pp51-86. p72. 262
"The law which existed in Palestine on 5 Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948) shall remain
in force, in so far as there is nothing therein repugnant to this Ordinance or other
laws which may be enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of State, and
subject to such modification as may result from the establishment of the State and
its authorities" 835.
Whilst Section 23 of the 'Law and Administrative Ordinance' declared
that it was to have effect retroactively 836 as from the eve of 15 May
1948. This method of 'absorbing' existing legislation paralleled that of
the British when they took over the rule of Palestine from the Turks 26
years earlier. Using Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922,
the British insisted that the prevailing Ottoman law would remain in
force unless modified by its legislation. The result was that during the
British Mandatory period and in the immediate period of Israeli control,
most of the law in force in Palestine was Ottoman (except for matters of
personal status, marriage and divorce which were handled by each
religious community in accordance with the Ottoman millet system).
Whilst any gaps between the three were filled by the courts using the
rules of British common law and equity837.
It was via this absorption process that Israel incorporated the existing
Criminal Code Ordinance (1936), which the British Mandatory
authorities had themselves based on a colonial office model originally
prepared for Cyprus 838 . This piece of legislation was replaced in 1977
by the Penal Code - a spruced up, more logically arranged version of the
British code, expanded by the inclusion of offences and penalties from
the scattered provisions of Israeli special legislation 839 . The 'principle'
of using British common law to fill any legal gaps (or lacunae) was
ended by 'The Law and Administration (Amendment No.14)
835 Published by Iton Rishmi No2. Supp.I. May 21. 1948. p1; Laws of the State of
Israel. (The Government Printer.). Vol.1 p7. reproduced by Badi J. (ed.). Fundamental
Laws of the State of Israel. (Twayne Publishers. New York. 1961.). p13.
836 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .7984). p66. Footnote 8.
837 Kretzmer D. The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview. Boulder. 1990.).
p12.
838 Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An Introducton. (2nd Ed. Rubin Mass.
Jerusalem. 1992.). p104.
839 Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An lntroducton (2nd Ed. Rubin Mass.
Jerusalem. 1992.). p104. 263
Ordinance'840 and 'The Foundations of Law 1980 (Final Emancipation)
Act'841.
However in contrast to many other countries where the existence of
criminal evidence makes prosecution mandatory, Israel still retained
the Anglo-Saxon 'public interest' principle within its law, by which the
decision to prosecute is applied to each case. Although the law itself does
not disclose how the term "public interest" is to be understood842.
Finally in terms of Israel's constitutional framework it is worth noting
the relationship between international law and the domestic law of
Israel, but to do that it is necessary to make one or two points about
international law.
International Law and the Israeli Legal System. 
Basically there are two types of international law of concern to this part
of the thesis. The more tangible of the two is that known as
'international treaty law' or 'contractual international law'; the other is
that called 'international customary law' which is not generally found
within treaties, although it can be. If an international treaty merely
840 'The Law and Administration (Amendment No. 14) Ordinance' stated that: "Any
provision of a law that requires such laws or any expressions therein to be interpreted
in accordance with English law or with principles of legal interpretation obtaining in
England, shall no longer be binding". Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An
Introduction (2nd Ed. Rubin Mass. Jerusalem. 1992.). p20. Whilst in 1957, the
Supreme court decided that English case law was binding only in so far as it was in
force at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel Bin-Nun cites Civ A81/55,
DSC. Piskei-Din Vol.11.p225. Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An Introduction
(2nd Ed. Rubin Mass. Jerusalem. 1992.). p9-10.
841 The first section of which which repealed the use of English law as a subsidiary
source. Whilst the second section stated "Where the court, faced with a legal question
requiring decision, finds no answer to it in statute law nor in case law nor by analogy,
it shall make the decision in accordance with the principles of freedom, justice, equity,
and peace, found in Jewish tradition". Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel: An
Introducton (2nd ed Rubin Mass , Jerusalem. 1992.). p10. Also Kretzmer D. The Legal
Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview. Boulder. 1990.). p20.
842 Bin-Nun cites section 62 of the 'Criminal Procedures Law (Consolidated Version).
1982. which states "Where it appears to the Attorney general....that there is sufficient
evidence to charge a particular person, he shall prosecute him unless he is of the
opinion that public interest is not involved". Bin-Nun A. The Law of the State of Israel:
An lntroducton (2nd ed. Rubin Mass. Jerusalem. 1992.). p122. 264
codifies existing international customary law it can be described as
'cleclaratory' 843 . Alternatively if its contents are innovative it can be
described as a 'constitutive' treaty. Here it is worth noting that some
treaties contain both constitutive and declaratory elements and that
some treaties which were initially constitutive may become declaratory
with the passing of time, and the development of custom844.
The second point worth noting is that for those international law
scholars known as 'dualists' the fact that a nation has signed or even
ratified an international treaty does not necessarily make it's provisions
enforceable within the domestic jurisdiction of individual state
(although it would bind the state in regards to its inter-national or
state-to-state commitments). This is usually because the State in question
needs to pass specific domestic legislation to incorporate the relevant
provisions of the international treaty into its legal system and to make
its laws enforceable.
In the Israeli legal system (as in most states) international custom is
automatically part of municipal law, and there is no need for an act of
transformation845 . Although it should be noted that the existence of an
international custom must be proven by whoever wished to rely upon
it846 . Moreover this does not mean that such customs overrule any
domestic made law that contradicts the customary international law.
Indeed if there is a clear contradiction between the custom of
international law and a provisions of Israeli municipal law -and the
Israeli court could not resolve the issue after attempting to interpret
Israeli law as far as possible so that it may conform to the international
rule- then the Israeli courts (like the British) must prefer the
provisions of the municipal law847.
-
843 Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'. Israel Law Review.
Vol 24 (3 -4). 1990. pp450-485. p458.
844 Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'. Israel Law Review.
Vol 24 (3-4). 1990. pp450-485. p458.
845A position adopted very early by the supreme Court in Shimson v Attorney General
(1951) 9 P.E. 14., Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'.
Israel Law Review. Vol 24 (3-4). 1990. pp450-485. p452.. See also Yahav D. (ed.).
Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv.
1993.). p22.
846 Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'. Israel Law Review.
Vol 24(3-4). 1990. pp450-485. p455.
847 Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'. Israel Law Review.
Vol 24 No. 3-4 1990 pp450-485. p456 and 457. 265
In addition, even if Israel has signed and ratified a (constitutive)
international treaty, any provisions relating to the treatment of those
living within Israel are not absorbed automatically into Israeli law.
Instead further specific parliamentary legislation is required in order
to transform the provisions into Israeli law8 4 8 . Although if
international customs are contained in a constitutive convention, then
these rules will be absorbed automatically into Israeli law. In practice
however the Knesset often produces legislation which transform the
relevant provisions of a particular international treaty into municipal
law. Perhaps the most famous of these was the enactment of 'The Crime
of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law' of 1950 which
incorporated the 1948 international treaty into the Israeli legal
system849.
The importance of this issue to this section of the thesis can be
expressed as the question 'Are there any provisions of international law
which are both relevant to this study of counter-terrorist legislation in
Israel, which are enforced by the Israeli courts?'. The answer to this is
'No' 850 . So despite Israel's signing and ratification of both the
'Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
848 Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'. Israel Law Review
Vol 24 (3-4). 1990 pp450-p485. p455. The 'exception' to this rule (albeit based on
other constitutional grounds) was the decision by the Supreme Court to view the Terms
of British Mandate for Palestine 1922 as binding in municipal law despite the absence of
an act of transformation. See Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal
System'. Israel Law Review Vol 24 (3-4). 1990. pp450-p485. p469-470. The rationale
for this relies on the separation of powers doctrine. An acceptance of the automatic
incorporation of treaty law in Israeli law would allow the government which is
empowered to conclude and ratify treaties to introduce norms into the Israeli judicial
system without the consent of The Knesset. As Lapidoth has pointed out, the same logic
should apply to the absorption of customary laws which is the result of the
governments action or inaction. See Benvenesti E. 'The Applicability of Human Rights
Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied Territories'. Israeli Law Review
Vo126.(1).Winter 1992 pp24-35. p25.
849 Lapidoth R. 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System'. Israel Law Review.
Vol 24 No. 3-4. 1990. pp450-485. p462
850 Unless one includes the (all embracing) wording of The Crime of Genocide
(Prvention and Punishment) Law, 5710-1950. Article 1 (a) of which can be read as
forbidding the use of violence to uphold laws for it outlaws, as a result of the fact that
the "Killing' or "Causing serious bodily or mental harm to" members of a "national,
ethnical, racial or religious" group. This interpretation will be avoided by distinguishing
between the security forces use of violence against individuals of a particular group
from what they have individually done, rather than violence aimed at the group to
which such an individual may belong because of who they are. 266
Treatment or Punishment' (C.A.T. 851 ) -which outlaws the use of torture-
and the 'International Covenant Civil and Political Rights' (I.C.C.P.R. 852
 )
-which also outlaws torture 853
 amongst other things including
arbitrary arrest854- neither can be enforced within the courts of Israel
because neither piece of legislation has been incorporated into Israeli
law.
851 Signed 22 October 1986 ratified 4 August 1991.
852 Signed 19 Dec 1966, Ratified 18 August 1991, with a derogation on article 9,
which 'outlaws' "arbitrary arrest or detention" which could be interpreted as implying
that Israel realise that it does this to people.
853 Article 7 declares "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degradin g treatment or punishment...".
854 Article 9 declares" ...No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention..." 267
The Counter-Terrorist Legislation Enforced by Israel Within
Israel.
There are three main pieces of security legislation by which Israel
attempts to counter-terrorism in Israel itself, each of which constitutes
a piece of emergency legislation. The principal piece of security
legislation by which Israel attempted to counter terrorism in Israel up
until 1980 was 'The Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945' (or
D.E.R.). Like the Criminal Code itself the D.E.R. was introduced into
Israeli law via Section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance in
1949. The incorporation of the D.E.R. in this way meant that the only
notable differences from the previous British version was Israel's
repeal of those sections that aimed to prevent 'illegal' Jewish
immigration to Palestine; and which demanded the use of the English
language in law making 855 . The only other change was in terminology.
For example the term 'General Officer Commanding' for example was
replaced by that of 'Chief of the General Staff', whilst the powers of the
'High Commissioner', the 'High Commissioner in Council', or the
'Government of Palestine' were vested in the Provisional government,
which was in turn transferred to the Minister of Defence856.
The irony of Israel's incorporation of this law was that the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 were passed in order to grant the
military the powers to crush the growing Jewish resistance
movement857 . As such they had been castigated by many Jewish leaders
both before858 and after859
 the creation of Israel. The most relevant
855 By Sections14, and 13 (a) and 15(b) of the Law and Administration Ordinance
1948 respectively. Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in
South Africa and Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p66.
856 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p69.
857 Kretzmer cites Bracha B. 'Restriction of Personal Freedom Without Due Process of
Law. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol. 8. (1978) p296. Kretzmer D. The Legal
Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview. Boulder 1990.). p13.
858 According to Kretzmer these included Federation of Hebrew Lawyers. Kretzmer
cites the minutes of a protest meeting of the Jewish Lawyers Bar Association (7
February 1946), attended by leading members of the bar, some of whom, such as
Bernard (Dov) Joseph and Y.S. Shapira, were to hold major legal posts after
independence (See (1946) 3 HaPraklit 58), and Joseph B. British Rule in Eretz Yisrael,
The Failure of a Regime (Mossad Bialik. Jerusalem. 1948.). p220-229. Joseph who
would become Israels Minister of Justice, wrote of these Regulations (at 223):
"Freedom of the individual in Eretz Yisrael is something of the past or a hope for the 268
criticisms included the description of the D.E.R. (or aspects of it) as "the
terror laws of a repressive state" 860 ; "officially licensed terrorism,,861
and "legal terrorism" 862
 by none other than a future Israeli Prime
Minister (Menachem Begin); a future Minister of Justice (Dr Bernard
Joseph) and the intellectual leader of the right wing Gahal party (Hans
Klinghoffer), respectively. Indeed in Leon vs. Gubernik a n
unsuccessful legal challenge to the absorption of the Defence
Emergency Regulations was made on the grounds that a democratic
Jewish nation based on the 'rule of law' and protection of individual
civil liberties could not accept regulations which had been enacted by a
foreign occupier with the object of harming the Jewish population of
Palestine. 863 Other more convincing reasons for viewing the
absorption of the D.E.R. as 'illegal' were that some of its provisions
were contrary to the articles of the original British Mandate 864 ; and
future: in all events it does not exist at present. See also Bracha B. 'Restriction of
Personal Freedom Without Due Process of Law' Israel Yearbook on Human Rights Vol.
8.(1978) 296. Kretzmer D. The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. (Westview.
Boulder 1990.).p13. Sharfman similarly wrote "the prestate Jewish community
stongly protested these arbitary regulations, viewing them as an instrument of
suppression". Sharfman D. Living Without a Constitution. (M.E. Sharpe. London.
1993.).p46.
859 According to Sharfman, Arieh Ben-Eliezer of Herut contended that the law could be
turned against every citizen in the country and said that he considered it fascist".
Sharfman cites Knesset protocols Vol.2 p984. Sharfman D. Living Without a
Constitution. (M.E. Sharpe. London. 1993.).p46. He also notes that the Knesset adopted a
resolution stating that the emergency laws contradicted the fundamental principles of
democracy" Sharfman cites Knesset Protocols Vol.8. pp1828, 1831. Sharfman D.
Living Without a Constitution. (M.E. Sharpe. London. 1993.). p47.
860 Dowty cites, Menachen Begin in 1951 Knesset debate Divrei Haknesset May 21
1951 in Dowty A. 'Emergency Powers in Israel: The Devaluation of a Crisis ' in Leng. S
(ed.). Coping With Crisis (University Press of America. Lanham. 1990.). pp1-43. p7.
861 Adams cites (Jiryis who cites) Dov, "With regard to the Defence Laws
themselves, the question is: Are we all to become the victims of officially licensed
terrorism, or will the freedom of the individual prevail? 	 There is nothing to prevent
a citizen from being imprisone all his life without a trial 	 and the administration has
unrestricted freedom to banish any citizen at any moment" Dr. Bernard Dov in 1946
Jiryis S. The Arabs in Israel. Institute for Palestine Studies" Beirut (No other
reference) cited by Adams M. 'Israel's treatment of the Arabs in the Occupied Areas'
(International Committee for Palestinian Human Rights Paris. 1976.). p7.
662 Klinghoffer told Dershowitz that he was unalterably oppose to "this unpardonable
exception to the rule of law"."Terrorists must be imprisoned, " he declared , "but not
by means of legal terrorism." Dershowitz A. 'Preventative Detention of Citizens During
a National Emergency - A Comparison Between Israel and The United States. Israel
Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol.1 1971. pp295-321. p313.
8 63 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984). p66. Rejected in Leon vs
Gubemik.
864According to the Israeli Supreme Court in Leon vs Gubemik all Mandatory
Regulations including the D.E.R. were subordinate to the articles of the Mandate and 269
that the D.E.R. of 1945 had been revoked with effect from midnight of
13/14 May 1948 by the British via the 'Palestinian (Revocations) Order
in Council' 865 making its absorption of the D.E.R. in accordance with
Section 11 impossible and hence illegal. Although it must be said that
neither of these interpretations have persuaded the Israeli H.C.J. that
the D.E.R. do not constitute laws of Israel. The former had also been
rejected under Britain's rule, a tradition continued by the H.C.J. in the
Al-Karbutli case 866 ; whilst the view that the 'Palestinian (Revocations)
Order in Council' had revoked the D.E.R. was rejected on the grounds
that the former 'Revocation' had never become law because it was never
published within Palestine Gazette as Section 11 of the Law and
Administration Ordinance required 867
 .
therefore subject to the courts scrutiny. Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture.
Detainees Rights in South Africa and Israel: Comparative Study. (Juta and Co. Cape
Town .1984.).p66 Article 2 of which had provided for the "safeguarding [of] the civil
and religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race or religion".
Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town. 1984.). p63
665 The Palestinian (Revocations) Order in Council revoked the D.E.R. which was
originally made in terms of the Palestine (Defence) Orders in Council 1937. Rudolph H.
Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and Israel: A
Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town. 1984.). p66. See also Moffett M.R.
Perpetual Emergency: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Use of the British Defence
(Emergency) Regulations, 1945, in the Occupied Teritories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah.
1989.).p6-7.
866 Al-Karbutli v. Minister of Defence et al. Here the H.C.J. pronounced that
Regulation 111 "does not violate the general principle of the Mandate". HC7/48;2PDS.
Cited by Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa
and Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p66.
667 Section 11A of the Law and Administration Ordinance stated that "(a) An
unpublished law has no effect and never had any effect" (b) "Unpublished law" , in this
section , means a law within the meaning of the Interpretation Ordinance 1945, which
purported to have been enacted during the period between 16 Kislev 5708 (29
November 1947) and 6 lyar 5708 (15 May 1948) and which was not published in the
Palestine Gazette despite its being a law of a category publication of which in the
Palestine Gazette was, immediately prior to that period, obligatory or customary".
Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.).p66. It appears that
British law did not require this. Moffett M.R. Perpetual Emergency: A Legal Analysis of
Israel's Use of the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, in the Occupied
Teritories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1989.). p12-13. She also notes that it was not published
at all during April due to the civil war conditions. Al-Haq cite Lord Glenarthur, the then
Foreign Office minister in the House of Lords, who said, "Israeli apologists sometimes
argue that these punishments are provided for in regulations surviving from the British
mandate. Let me take this opportunity to make clear...that such is not the view of Her
Majesty's government, as a resultof the palestine (Revocations) Order in Council 1948,
the Palestine Defence Order in Council 1937, and the defence regualtions made under it,
have not been in force, as a matter of English law, since the making of the 1948
revocation order. If the Israelis now seek to apply the same or similar regualtions, that
is their decision for which they must take responsibility." Hansard (Official Records, 270
The D.E.R. was replaced in 1980 by the Emergency Powers (Detention)
Law 1979. The latter therefore constitutes one of the other two main
pieces of counter-terrorist legislation, along with the 'Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance 1948' (or P.T.0.). Whilst the former deals with the
(administrative) powers to detain and deport 'terrorists' from Israel
since 1979, the P.T.O. defines particular offences surrounding
membership and support for what are labelled 'terrorist' groups. Like
the D.E.R. both these pieces of counter-terrorist legislation constitute
pieces of emergency legislation, albeit of a different type than the
Defence (Emergency ) Regulations. In contrast to the incorporated
D.E.R. which stood alone as a distinct type of emergency legislation, the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 1948 and the Emergency Powers
(Detention) Law 1979 constitute legislative or Knesset made emergency
legislation. As such they require the existence of a state of emergency
in order to be valid although Israel has been in such a state of
emergency since one was declared in the Official Gazette on 21 May
1948.
Finally in terms of the legislation used to counter-terrorism in Israel, it
is worthwhile giving a mention to the third type of emergency
legislation that exists in Israel, that known as the executive made
temporary emergency legislation. Government ministers can issue
temporary emergency regulations under Section 9(a) of the Law and
Administration Ordinance of 1948. It states:
" [u]pon such declaration being published in the Official Gazette, the Provisional
Government [may]  authorise the Prime Minister or any other Minister to make such
emergency regulations as...seem to him expedient in the interests of the defence of
the State, public security and the maintenance of supplies and essential
services" 868.
House of Lords), 22 December 1988. p665. Cited by Welchman L. Israel's Demolition
and Sealing of Houses in the Ocupied Palestinian Territories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah.
1993.0ccasional Paper No.11.). p16.
868 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.).p67. Also R.Shedahah.
Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank. (Revised ed. Institute for Palestinian Studies.
Washington 1988.). p65. 271
Such emergency regulations could according to Section 9(b) be
promulgated to 'alter any law, suspend its effect or modify it.... ' 869 with
perhaps the exception of those laws that expressly forbid this such as
the 'Basic Laws' and other constitutional laws which some believe would
require cabinet approval to be valid 870 . According to Section 9(c) such
emergency legislation would expire 3 months after they were made,
unless they were either revoked at an earlier date, extended by the
Knesset, or and the state of emergency would continue until a contrary
decision was made by the Provisional Council of State (Section 9(d))871.
When that occurred the emergency regulations would expire on the
date or dates prescribed in the declaration 872 . Over 300 such emergency
regulations were enacted in this way 873 from 1948 to the end of 1985 . A
relevant example of this is the Emergency Regulations (Arrests in
Special State of Emergency) 5742-1982 which allowed government to
proclaim a special state of emergency (in Lebanon) during which a
military officer of the rank of Brigadier-General (Tat-Aluf 874) could
for security reasons arrest a person who is not a citizen or a resident of
Israe1875.
However before going on to explain the legal basis of Israel's attempts to
counter terrorism in the West Bank this is a useful place to explain the
fact that "a dual legal system" 876
 operates in the West Bank. The result
of which is that Jewish residents of the region are theoretically
accountable to 'both' the counter-terrorist legislation in force in Israel
and that legislation which covers the non-Israelis in the region. This
dual system was created on July 2, 1967 following the Knesset enacted
869 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p67.
870 Shetreet S. 'A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law: An Assessment
of the Israeli Law' Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol 14. 1984. pp182-220. p190.
871 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p67.
872 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p67.
873 Dowty A. 'Emergency Powers in Israel: The Devaluation of a Crisis ' in Leng. S
(ed.). Coping With Crisis. (University Press of America. Lanham. 1990.). pp1-43. p26.
874 Katz equates the two. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against
Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990.). p10.
875 Emergency Regulations (Arrests in Special State of Emergency) 5742-1982
Kovetz Hatakanot (Regulations issued by Israel Government Ministries) (No. 4361)
1182 (9 June 1982).
876 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68.p39. 272
'Emergency Regulations (Offences Committed in the Israel-held Areas-
Jurisdiction and Legal assistance) Law'. On the basis of these regulations
Israeli courts became competent to try Israeli offenders who committed
offences in the West Bank877 . This was renewed in December and
extended for a year until December 1968, and it has since been renewed
annually 878 . The 'Explanatory Note' which accompanied these
Regulations sheds light on their aims. It declares:
"Another aim of the Regulations was to enable the courts in Israel to try an Israeli
resident who committed in the Occupied an offence which would have been
punishable had it been committed in Israel. (Regulation 2)".
It also made clear that the new Regulation (2(c)) was designed to clarify
the original intention of the legislature. It now read: "This regulation
shall not apply to a person who at the time of the act or omission was a
resident of one of the regions". Then in 1975 Regulation 2 was amended
once more adding further precision to this requirement 879 . According
to Tsemel, this legislation has reversed the practice whereby Israelis
used to be tried before military courts in the West Bank for offences
against military orders and, in practise has restricted their use to
Palestinians only 880 . In one court case involving Jewish 'terrorists'
877 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68. p39.
Article 2(a) of which stated that: "A court in Israel shall be competent to try under
Israel law any person who is in Israel for an act or omission which occurred in any
region and which would constitute an offence if it had occurred in the area of
jurisdictionof the courts of Israel".
878 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68. p39-40.
In footnote 3 she notes that in 1977 the name was changed to the "Emergency
Regulations (Judea and Samaria, Gaza Region, Golan Heights, Sinai and Southern Sinai-
Criminal jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) (Extenson of Validity Law)'. See 32 Laws of
the State of Israel, at 58.
879 Regulation 2(a) and (c) now read: "2. (a) A court in Israel shall be competent to
try under Israeli law any person who is in Israel, or is registered in the Population
Register under the Population Registry law, 1965, for an act or ommission which
occurred in any region and which would constitute an offence if it had occurred in the
area of jurisdiction of the courts in Israel"
(c) This regulation shall not apply to a person who at the time of the act or ommission
was a resident of one of the regions and was not registered in the Population Register
as specified in subregulation (a)". 29 laws of the State of Israel, at 306.Tsemel L.
'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror Organization'.
Palestine Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68. p40.
880 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68. p40-1. 273
Justice Barak claimed that Regulation 2(a) had been introduced to
prevent a situation whereby an Israeli would be brought before a
military court for the committing acts of a "criminal" nature, since the
military courts were there to try security violators881.
The result according to Tsemel, is a "double standard" in the treatment of
those in the West Bank suspected of similar terrorist offences. Unlike
non-Israeli suspected terrorists, Israelis in the West Bank are usually
charged in accordance with the 'Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance',
the penalties for which are less severe than they are for similar
offences under the Defence Emergency Regulations, by which they
could have been prosecuted882
 and Arabs are. Although this double
standard and differential treatment does not apply within Israel where
both Jews and Arab-Israelis are judged by the same laws.
881 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68. p41.
The case of the Jwish Underground 1984.
882 See Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68.p42-45. 274
The Rule of Israel In The West Bank.
The Legal Foundations of Israel's 	 Counter-Terrorist
Legislation. 
As the Israeli Defence Forces (I.D.F.) established effective control over
areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on the 7 June 1967, it
announced that it was assuming the functions of government in
accordance with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations by issuing
'Proclamation of the Assumption of Government' (Proclamation No. 1).
On the same day the I.D.F. also issued Proclamation No.2, 'The Law and
Administration Ordinance' 883 . This provided for a secondary legislative
strata and set up a structure to administer the functions of government.
According to Article 3 of Proclamation No.2, each I.D.F. regional
commander assumed all the legislative and administrative powers of the
displaced government within his region and became the supreme
legislator 884 . Just as the Provisional Council of State in Israel had
incorporated the existing laws into the new state, the regional
commander incorporated the existing laws in the West Bank region via
Proclamation No.2. proclamation. Article 2 of which stated that:
"The law which existed in the area on 7 June, 1967 shall remain in force to the
extent that it does not contain anything incompatible with this Proclamation, any
other Proclamation or Order which will be enacted by me, and subject to such
883 Military Proclamation 2. Concerning Regulation of Authority and the Judiciary.
Rabah J. and Fairweather N. Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West
Bank. 1967-7992. (2nd. Ed. Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. Jerusalem.
1995.).p1
884 In detail "3(a) All powers of government, legislation, appointment, and
administration in relation to the area or its inhabitants shall henceforth vest in me
alone and shall be exercised by me or by whomsoever shall be appointed by me in that
behalf or act on my behalf. (b) Without derogating from the generality of the foregoing
it is hereby provided that any duty to consult, obtain consent and the like, prescribed in
any law as a condition-precedent for legislation, enactment or appointment, or as a
condition for the entry into force of any legislation or appointment - is hereby
repealed." Cohen cites P.O.A. (Judea/Samaria) No.1 p3. english translation
E/CN.4/1016/Add3.p5, amongst others. Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied
Territories. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p93. 275
modifications as may result from the establishment I.D.F. Government in the
Area."885
It is these Proclamations made by Israel and its establishment of an
identifiable judicial system that allows the author to treat it as the State
in the area and to ascribe a legitimacy to those acts of political violence
used to enforce its laws in the West Bank which would otherwise
constitute acts of terrorism.
Counter-Terrorist Legislation in the West Bank. 
The basic criminal security code of the West Bank -which established
the military courts, the legal procedure, administrative powers and
defined the offences- was published as an annex to Proclamation No. 3.
entitled 'The Order Concerning Security Regulations' 886 ( or 0.C.S.R.).
The 0.C.S.R. determined that security legislation was placed within a
hierarchy depending upon the rank of its maker. The commander of the
Israel Defence Forces in the region was empowered to enact primary
legislation whilst other army commanders could issue secondary
enactments. It also provided that security enactments superseded any
law effective in the region on the eve of the occupation, even if they
were not specifically annulled by the former (or other) legislation887.
In detail the 0.S.C.R. contained 74 articles 888
 which re-enacted
legislation similar to the Mandatory Emergency Regulations. According
to Cohen the alterations to the 0.S.C.R. in 1970 were implemented in an
885 Yahav cites Collection of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments (Judea and of
Smaria), 1967. p3. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The 'Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel
Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p51.
8 8 6 Also translated as Security Instructions or Provisions. Cohen E. Human Rights in
the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.).
p94.
887 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p94.
888 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p94. Like Cohen this author uses the translation of the
0.S.C.R. relating to the Golan Heights region rather than the West Bank, as provided by
the United Nations in Report of the Special Working Group of Experts Established Under
Resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights. UN/E/CN.4/1016/Add.3. On
page 8 the U.N. Committee noted "It seems that identical or similar security
instructions were issued for the other occupied territories". 276
attempt to adapt these laws to the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions 8 89. This is ironic in that Article 35 of the previous 0.C.S.R.
(of 1967) had already stated:
"A military court and the administration of a military court will respect the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 concerning the
Protection of the Civilian Population in Time of War in all matters concerning
court procedure and in case of conflict between this order and the said Convention,
the provisions of the Convention are superior"890.
This was replaced by an unrelated section in October by Military Order
No. 144 'Amendment No.9 to the Security Provisions Order' 891 and Israel
continues to deny the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to
the West Bank. Subsequent legislation deemed essential to the
maintenance of proper administration and security by the Military
Commander of the West Bank was usually (although not always) issued
in the form of proclamations and orders892 . These are published in the
889 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p94.
890 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p79. She cites the translation taken from U.N. document
E/CN.4/1016. She goes on to claim that this section "proclaims the supremacy of the
Fourth Geneva Convention over occupant's own security legilsation, served in certain
cases as a vehicle by which the military courts in the occupied territories could
criticise the acts and legislation of the occupant" Citing RM/144/68, Military
Prosecutor v Bakhis, I Selected Judgements. Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli
Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press.Manchester. 1985.). p79-80.
Qupty gives a slightly diferent translation the relevant expression being "with respect
to judicial procedures". Qupty M. 'The Application of International Law in the Occupied
Territories as Reflected in the Judgement of the high Court of Justice in Israel' in
Playfair E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories: Two
Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (Clarendon.
Oxford.1992.).pp87-125. p11 9. As does the J.M.C.C., the relevant expresion being
"regarding all matters relating to judicial procedure". Rabah J. and Fairweather N.
Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-1992. (2nd. Ed.
Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. Jerusalem. 1995.). p1.
891 Qupty M. 'The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territories as
Reflected in the Judgement of the High Court of Justice in Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.).
International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of
Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (Clarendon. Oxford.1992.). pp87-
125. pl 1 9. The J.M.C.C. date it as the 22 October. Also Rabah J. and Fairweather N.
Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-1992. (2nd. Ed.
Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. Jerusalem. 1995.). p21.
892 The editor of the Yearbook added the following footnote, "Military Orders are not
published by the Israeli occupying authorities in an Official Gazette, or in daily papers
or in any other easily available form. They are generally distributed on a limited scale.
ew lawyers have difficulty in obtaining old copies of Orders. Amendments to earlier
Orders are rather confusing because of the lack of availability of original Orders and 277
official gazette for each region in Hebrew and Arabic entitled
Proclamations, Orders and Appointments 893 . The legality of some of the
resulting military orders has been questioned on various grounds. The
first is that they breached a particular provision of the Hague
Regulations by which Israel has justified its rule in the West Bank. That
is Article 43 which specified that:
"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure,
as far as possible, public order and safety, respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country".894
The second is that some of these orders contravene provisions of the
Geneva Conventions.
In addition to such orders the Israel authorities have attempted to
counter-terrorism in the West Bank through the use of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations. Israel has claimed that this was in line with
Article 2 of Proclamation No.2 which stated that the "law which existed
in the area on 7 June, 1967 shall remain in force..." 895 . Probably the
strongest evidence supporting this view is the claim that Jordan used
the D.E.R. against residents of the area896 , although this has been
questioned by Palestinian groups and the Jordanian government
itself897 . Like some of the military orders the legality of the Regulations
the scarcity of earlier amendments". Kuttab J. 'Legislation. Military Orders'. Palestine
Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 1. 1984. pp175-6.
893 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press.Manchester. 1985.). p94.
894 Roberts and Guelff note that the French text uses the term "l'ordre et la vie
publique" instead of "public order and safety" Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents
on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1989.). p56.
895 Yahav cites Collection of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments (Judea and of
Samaria), 1967. p3. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel
Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p51.
896 Cohen cites Kutner T.S. 'Israel and the West Bank: Aspects of the law of belligerent
occupation' Israel Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol.7. 1977. pp166-221. p224-5. Cohen
E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press.Manchester. 1985.). p96.
897 Moffett for example wrote "during the course of the 19 years of Jordanian rule
over the West Bank, the British Defence Regulations were never used by the Jordanian
Government. This fact has been confirmed by a number of sources, including interviews
with Palestinian lawyers who practiced in the West Bank during the period of Jordanian
rule, and with officials of the Jordanian Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs".
Moffett M.R. Perpetual Emergency: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Use of the British 278
have been questioned. The legality of the D.E.R has been challenged on
the grounds that they were no longer in force on the day in
question8 9 8 , due to the issuing of the Palestinian (Revocations) Order in
Counci1 899
 which came into force at midnight of 13/14 May 1948, and/or
their repeal by virtue of the 'Addendum to Trans-Jordan Defence Law of
1935' and the Proclamation of the Jordanian Military Commander in May
1948, as Jordan took over the region known as the West Bank900.
Despite its insistence that the D.E.R. were in force in the region when
they took it over from the Jordanians in 1967, the Israeli Military
Government in the area introduced two other legislative orders to
remove any doubts concerning the validity of the D.E.R . The first of
these was the "Order Concerning Interpretation (Further Provisions)
(No. 10 (Judea and Samaria) (No.160). 1967'. Article 2 of this order
Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, in the Occupied Teritories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah.
1989.). p16. For name of interviewees cited by Moffett see footnote 44 p54.
898 According to Yahav, Jordan took the view at the U.N. that the D.E.R was not in
force in June 1967. He cites Report of the U.N. Special Committee to examine the
practice of the Israeli authorities affecting human rights of the population of the
territories. (U.N. Doc. A/8089 (1970). Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the
Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p51. Israel claimed that
because of their power under the Palestine Defence Orders in Council 1937 to override
any other acts of legislation they could only be repealed or amended explicitly, which
the Trans-Jordan Defence Law had failed to do. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada'
and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p52. According to
Cohen, Israel claims that they were incorporated via Jordan's 'The Law of Modification
of Administrative Procedures' effective 1 December 1949 amongst other legislation
Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press.Manchester. 1985.). p94. Dov-shefi claims that the provisions of the D.E.R. and
the Trans-Jordan Defence Law do not clash. For this and other reasons why the D.E.R.
are valid see, Dov-Shefi T. 'The Reports of the U.N. Special Commitees on Israeli
Practices in the Territories-A Survey and Evaluation' in Shamgar M. (ed.). Military
Government in the Territories Administered by Israel 1967-1980. (Alpha Press.
Jerusalem. 1982.). pp285-334.
899 The Palestinian (Revocations) Order in Council revoked the D.E.R. which was
originally made in terms of the Pales Provisions) No. 3. The West Bank Area No. 187.
1967 ' of 17 December 1967. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law.
(Israel	 Ministry	 of	 Defense.	 Tel	 Aviv.	 1 9 9 3 . ) .
? ? I:1 Alon wrote "Palestinian terrorism increased greatly after the Six Day war. In fact,
it was the Arab defeat in the 1967 War that boosted terrorism". Alon H. Countering
Palestinian Terrorism in Israel. Towards a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures. (Rand.
Santa Monica. August 1980.). p41. She also notes that on 20 June 1967 Al-Fatah
announced it was moving its headquauae where that is inconsistent with any provisions
of the Defence of TransJordan Law of 1935, or with any regulations or Orders issued
there under'. The claim to incompatibility is based upon the fact that the Jordanian
Defence Laws and Regulations also provide for administrative detention, deportation
and house demolitions, albeit via a Jordanian procedure. Moffett M.R. Perpetual
Emergency: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Use of the British Defence (Emergency)
Regulations, 1945, in the Occupied Teritories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1989.). p8-10, 15-
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decreed that "hidden law does not possess and never has possessed any
validity" 901 . Whilst article 1 had defined "A Hidden law" as:
"Any act of legislation purported to have been enacted in the Area during the
period between 29 November 1947 and 15 May 1948 which was not published in
the Palestine Gazette although it was of a type of legislative acts the publication of
which in the Palestine Gazette, was prior to that period, mandatory or customary"
902.
The effect of this piece of legislation was similar to that of Article 11A of
the Law and Administration Ordinance 1948 in Israe1903 , in that it
legalised the D.E.R which may otherwise have been invalidated by the
passing of the Palestine (Revocations) Order in council which had been
signed in London of 12 May 1948 but never made it into the Palestine
Gazette904.
The second order enacted to clarify matters was 'The Order Concerning
Interpretation (Further Provisions) (No.5). (Judea and Samaria)
(No.224)' of 1968. It too was introduced "in order to remove any
doubt" 905 that the D.E.R. was not applicable to the West Bank, following
claims made in court906 that the D.E.R. had been implicitly repealed by
other legislation introduced into the West Bank in between the rule of
the British and Israel, notably the 'Jordanian Constitution of 1952' and
the 'Trans-Jordan Defence Law, 1935 1907 . Article 3 of Israeli Order
901 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p51. The J.M.C.C. date it as 5 November 1967. Rabah J. and
Fairweather N. Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-
1992. (2nd. Ed. Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. Jerusalem. 1995.). p23.
902 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p51.
903 More precisly he implies that they would have been. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The
'Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p52.
904 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p52.
905 Yahav's term, although he has it in quotation marks as well. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel,
The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p53.
906 Yahav notes that these were raised by Arab lawyers but makes no further
distinction. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry
of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.).p52.
907 This the view of the Jordanian government. See Cohen who cites Shefi D. 'The
protection of human rights in the areas administered by Israel: UN Findings and Reality'
Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 3. 1973. pp337-361. p342. Cohen E. Human Rights in
the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press.Manchester. 1985.).
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Concerning Interpretation (Further Provisions) (No.5). (Judea and
Samaria) (No.224) of February 1968 stated:
"Emergency legislation which was in force in the area after 14 May, 1948 will
continue in force from (7 June, 1967) and onward as though it were enacted as
security legislation, unless explicitly repealed by citation of its name as
mentioned in Article 2(b), prior to (7 June, 1967)"908.
Yet despite these military orders, the legality of particular parts of the
D.E.R. have also been questioned on numerous occasions before Israel's
High Court of Justice, which has taken it upon itself to review the
actions of the Israeli authorities in the West Bank. The most relevant
challenges were those concerning orders for the confiscation,
demolition or sealing up of buildings 909
 issued under Regulation 119 of
the D.E.R., and deportation orders issued under Regulation 112. The H.C.J.
has in a long series of decisions concerning Article 119 held that the
D.E.R. remained in force in Judea and Samaria throughout the period of
Jordanian rule there910 . In the Abu-Awad v the Military Commander of
Judea and Samaria case in 1979 911 the H.C.J. took the view that the
D.E.R. was in place at the time Jordan invaded, and that Jordan had
absorbed the law via Article 128 of its 1952 constitution, which stated
that the laws and regulations in force in the kingdom were to remain in
force. Although it has been known for justices of the Supreme Court to
express doubts as to whether Regulation 112 remained in force in the
West Bank in light of Article 9(1) of the Jordanian Constitution which
stated that "a Jordanian shall not be exiled from the territory of the
908 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The 'Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.).p.53. J.M.C.C. date it at 20 February 1968. Rabah J. and
Fairweather N. Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-
1992. (2nd. Ed. Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. Jerusalem. 1995.). p30.
909 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The 'Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p53.
910 Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The 'Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of
Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p54.
911 "We were not presented with any proof that the [British] Defence Regulations
contradict the Jordanian defence Law of 1935, thus the conclusion is that at the time of
the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank in 1948, the above regulations were valid".
HC. 97/79. 33 (3) P.D. 309. Moffett M.R. Perpetual Emergency: A Legal Analysis of
Israel's Use of the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, in the Occupied
Teritories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1989.). pl O. 281
kingdom" 912 . Nevertheless in the 1980 Kawasme case Justice Landau
issued the judgement that even if the said provisions had been cancelled
by the Jordanian Constitution of 1952, -and that was doubted on the
grounds that Article 128 of the Constitution stated that "all laws,
regulations and other enactments in force in the Hashewite kingdom of
Jordan at the time of entry into force of shall remain in force until
abolished or amended by a law in accordance with this constitution"913-
it was reinstated by Order of the Israeli Military government914 . He
therefore did not even attempt to decide whether or not the D.E.R. was in
force in Jordan:915
The second basis for disputing the legality of particular parts of the
D.E.R. is their invalidation by other (international) legislation namely
the Fourth Geneva Convention (or G.C.I.V.). It has been said that articles
53 and 49 of the G.C.I.V. prohibit (at least certain) demolitions and
deportations. Although here it should be noted that Israel has taken the
position that they are not applicable to the area of the West Bank for a
number of stated reasons 916 and curiously the Israeli Supreme Court
has on occasion noted that particular 'deportations' and 'demolitions'
carried out by the I.D.F. with the West Bank do not breach these
912 Yahav mentions two justices within the second Kawasme case the Yahav D. (ed.).
Israel, The 'Intifada' and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.).
p54.
9 1 3 Section 128 Jordanian constitution of 1952, cited by Cohen E. Human Rights in the
Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press.Manchester. 1985.). p 95.
914 Cohen cites Kawasme case of 1980 HC 698/80. 35 P.D.617, 622-6 Cohen E.
Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press.
Manchester. 1985.). p 95.
915 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p 95.
916 See a very detailed and interesting paper by Bar-Yaacov N. 'The Applicability of
the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria (The West Bank) and to the Gaza Strip' Israeli
Law Review. Vol. 24. No.3-4. 1990. pp485-506. The official reason for the non-
application of the G.C.I.V. can be summed up in three points. (a) Article 2 stipulates that
the convention is to be applied to occupied teritories captured from states which held
sovereignty over those territories; (b) the territory of the West Bank was never under
Jordanian sovereignty as it was an occupying power; (c) If Israel were to agree to the
application of G.C.I.V it would be tantamount to Israeli recognition of Jordanian
soverighty over the West Bank. See Qupty M. 'The Application of International Law in
the Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgement of the high Court of Justice in
Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration of Occupied
Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
(Clarendon. Oxford.1992.).pp87-125. p101-102. 282
provisions of G.C.I.V.917 , even though it is not duty bound by Israeli law
to consider the G.C.I.V.. (Israel claims that it will apply the
humanitarian parts of the G.C.I.V. but does not name them).The issue of
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions is potentially important to
this thesis, because if it was applicable to the West Bank as many if not
most authors claim, then Israel's counter-terrorist policies of
'deportation' and 'demolitions' (under the D.E.R.) could be illegal and
could therefore qualify for the label of state terrorism according to this
author's definition (if additional criteria were fulfilled).
However rather than get embroiled in a discussion over the
applicability of this piece of international law to Israel's occupation of
the West Bank- an issue which is complicated by the fact that the
position of the Israeli government in international fora is different
from that of Israel's H.C.J. and that expressed by various international
bodies 918
 - this author will clearly state whether he thinks the G.C.I.V.
applies and the reasons for his decision. The importance of such a
decision derives from the fact that this author's definition of state
terrorism requires a decision of what is (il)legal according to the
wording of Israeli law (which is not necessarily the same as (any
'political') decision of its courts919).
917 Qupty cites the H.C.J. the Abu-Awad case HC97/79,316 as saying that the G.C.I.V.
"does not diminish the obligation of the administering power to tend to the preservation
of public order in the administered area, in keeping with Article 43 of the Hague
Convention of 1907, nor from its right to employ measures necessary for its own
security". Qupty M. 'The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territories as
Reflected in the Judgement of the High Court of Justice in Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.).
International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of
Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (Clarendon. Oxford.1992.). pp87-
125. p95. Qupty also summed up the H.C.J.'S view in the Jaber case in which the
petitioner challenged the right to demolish a room in accordance with Article 119 of the
D.E.R. . "According to this position of the Supreme Court, so long as there exists an
internal law in the territories, the internal law outweighs the provisions of the Geneva
Convention and the Hague Regulations as well, and in such instances there is no need to
examine the activities of the military government in accordance with the standards
established by internatonal law". Qupty M. 'The Application of International Law in the
Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgement of the High Court of Justice in
Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration of Occupied
Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
(Clarendon. Oxford.1992.).pp87-125. p107. This he points out conflicts with the
judgement in the Qawassmeh case where the court ruled that it was doubtful whether
the D.E.R. were stil in force in the West Bank on the eve of the I.D.F.'s entry in light of
Article 9(1) of the Jordanian Constitution of 1952. H.C.J. 698/80. 625.
919 Such as the U.N. and the International Committee for the Red Cross.
919 This should be distinguished from such interpretations of the courts that creates
Israeli law, by setting precedents. 283
The position taken here is that the G.C.I.V. has not been legally binding
on the actions of its security forces in the West Bank, since it replaced
Article 35 of the 0.S.C.R. in October of 1967, if then 920 . This is because
the G.C.I.V. is an international treaty it has not been transformed into
Israeli law. The same reasoning can also be used to show why other
pieces of international law such as the I.C.C.P.R. and the C.A.T. which
have been ratified by the Israeli parliament are not applicable to this
analysis of Israel's counter terrorist activities in the West Bank, despite
the fact that the signatories declare the provisions apply to any people
in the area of jurisdiction 921 . Here it should be noted that on this
occasion the Israeli government and Supreme Court hold the same
interpretation which is also that taken by this author.
To those who suggest that certain parts of the G.C.I.V. constitute Israeli
law due to the fact that they merely codify existing international
customary law, the author responds by saying that even if this were the
case, the fact is that it is the wording of the municipal law which has
precedence in Israeli law. This reasoning can also be used to refute
other important claims. The first of these is that particular military
orders introduced by the Israeli authorities in the West Bank are illegal,
because they do not conform to the requirement of customary
920 Article 35 stated: "A military court and the administration of a military court will
repect the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 concerning
the Protection of the Civilian Population in Time of War in all matters concerning court
procedure and in case of conflict between this order and the said Convention, the
provisions of the Convention are superior". Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli
Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p79. Perhaps
this meant only the procedure of the court. Although Cohen claimed that this section
"proclaims the supremacy of the Fourth Geneva Convention over occupant's own
security legilsation, served in certain cases as a vehicle by which the military courts
in the occupied territories could criticise the acts and legislation of the occupant" Citing
RM/144/68, Military Prosecutor v Bakhis, 1 Selected Judgements. Cohen E. Human
Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press.Manchester.
1985.). p79-80.
921 Article 2(1) of the I.C.C.P.R. declares that a state party undertakes to respect and
ensure the rights provided by it "to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction"; and article 2(1) of the C.A.T. declares that "each State Party shall
take effective legislative, administrative, judicial measures to prevent acts of torture
in any territory under its jurisdiction". Noted by Benvenesti E. 'The Applicability of
Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied Territories'. Israeli Law
Review. Vol.26. (1) Winter 1992. pp24-35. p. 33 and 34. He goes on to claim that the
fact that the phrase 'within the states jurisdiction' is tantamount to 'within its
effective control" seems to be beyond doubt today, much due to the elucidation of this
concept mainly by the European Court of Human Rights on its ruling on Turkish
occupation of Northern Cyprus (May 1975)"p34. 284
international law contained within Article 43 of Hague Regulations
which allows the occupying force to alter existing legislation only
when absolutely necessary 922 . Secondly this approach also helps by-
pass the potential problem created by Israeli government's claim that it
will abide by its humanitarian provisions of the G.C.I.V. but will not
name these provisions of customary international law.
Thus by simply answering the difficult question 'What is the law in
place in the West Bank as set out in statute by Israel?', this author's
definition avoids answering a series of even more complicated legal
questions which surround the legality of Israel's occupation of the West
Bank. Notably those which surround the influence of international law
on Israel's occupation. All of the alternative definitions based upon
international law are therefore far more complicated precisely because
to they must attempt to work out the answers to a number of the
following questions, relating to Israel's rule in the West Bank.
Including:
•Are all Israel's laws in those parts of Israel not ascribed to the Jewish
state in 1947 illegal?;
•Are all Israel's laws in the 'annexed' part of Jerusalem illegal?923;
', Are all of those laws which violate the G.C.I.V. illegal?. That is 'Does the
wording of article 2 (2) of the G.C.I.V. mean that it does not apply to the
West Bank?924 ; Does any of G.C.I.V. constitute international customary
law, and if so which parts?925 ; Are the laws which Israel uses to
922 "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety, respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country".
923 This can be seen to spring from the fact that East Jerusalem was formally
'annexed' in accordance with Israeli law, but not international law with the passing of
the new (Basic) law entitled 'Jerusalem The Capital of Israel' on 30th July 1980. For
the debates surrounding this and the earlier change in the legal status of Jersualem, see
Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p38-43.
924 This is the basis of Israel's refusal to apply it. See Qupty M. 'The Application of
International Law in the Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgement of the high
Court of Justice in Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration
of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. (Clarendon. Oxford.1992.).pp87-125. p101-102. and Bar-Yaacov N. 'The
Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria (The West Bank) and to the Gaza
Strip' Israeli Law Review. Vol. 24. No.3-4. 1990. pp485-506.
925 Judge Landau claimed that the Geneva Convention "does not constitute a part of
customary international law" HC698/80. 627. Cited by Qupty M. 'The Application of
International Law in the Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgement of the high 285
authorise demolitions and deportations in accord with articles 53 and 49
of the G.C.I.V. these as the Israeli H.C.J. claims?926.
•Does any of the legislation introduced by Israel into the West Bank
breach Article 43 of the Hague Regulations?927
•Do the laws which Israel use to authorise demolitions in the West Bank
violate Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations?928.
•Do the Nuremberg Principles constitute international law? and if so do
they outlaw the type of deportations made by Israel?, or its use of
'moderate physical pressure'929
*If the Israeli occupation is based on international law should not other
pieces of international law also apply to the region?930.
Court of Justice in Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration
of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. (Clarendon. Oxford.1992.).pp87-125. p109. He aslo cites other authors who
believe that it does constitute customary interntional law, including Pictet J.
Commentary on the Geneva Convention IV of 1949 (Geneva. 1958) p9; Yingling R.T. and
Ginnane R.W. 'The Geneva Conventions of 1949'. American Journal of International Law.
Vol. 46. (3) 1952. p393, 411. Qupty M. 'The Application of International Law in the
Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgement of the high Court of Justice in
Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration of Occupied
Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
(Clarendon. Oxford.1992.).pp87-125. p111.
926 In the Abu Awad case the H.C.J. established that Article 49(1) was intended to
prevent mass deportations as perpetrated by the Nazi Germans not those of individuals.
See Qupty M. 'The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territories as
Reflected in the Judgement of the high Court of Justice in Israel' in Playfair E. (ed.).
International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of
Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (Clarendon. Oxford.1992.). pp87-
125. p110. Article 53 of the G.C.I.V. prohibits the destruction of property "except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations". As
quoted by Welchman L. Israel's Demolition and Sealing of Houses in the Ocupied
Palestinian Territories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1993. Occasional Paper No.11.). p22.
927 Article 43 specified that: "[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country". Roberts and Guelff note
that the French text uses the term "l'ordre et la vie publique" instead of "public order
and safety" Roberts A. and Guelff R.(eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. (2nd. ed.
Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1989.). p56.
928 Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations declares; "It is especially forbidden ...(g)
To destroy or sieze the enemy's property, unless such destruction , or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war".
929 Article 6(b) of the Nuremburg Principles declared "deportation to slave labour or
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory" as a "war
crime", it also declares that "ill-treatment" of civilians of an occupied region as such.
Alternatively torture may be covered by article 6(c) which puts "other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population" under the title Crime against Humanity.
930 This is essentially derived from the view that if the role of the miltary commander
in the region was established by the international laws of war why then are the rest of
the international laws of war not applied. 286
At the end of this examination of the constitutional and legal basis of
Israel's counter-terrorist laws it is possible to identify those pieces of
legislation by which Israel attempts to counter those actions which it
terms 'terrorism' both within Israel (i.e. that established in 1949 and
Jerusalem) and the (rest of the) West Bank. As can be seen from this
examination, the law that is primarily used to counter-terrorism within
Israel during the period 1967-1994 in addition to the Criminal Code of
1936 which was replaced in 1977 by the Penal Code, are the 'Defence
(Emergency) Regulations' which was replaced in 1980 by the
'Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979' and the 'Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance 1948'.
Whilst within the West Bank the Israeli authorities use the British made
D.E.R. and 'Criminal Code', and since 1977 the Israeli 'Penal Code', and
'The Order Concerning Security Regulations' and the military orders
that derive from it to counter terrorism by non-Israelis. In addition
whilst these laws can be used against both Arabs and Jewish settlers in
the West Bank, in practice the likelihood is that Israeli's suspected of
similar terrorist offences will be dealt with under the 'Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance' and since 1980 'the 'Emergency Powers
(Detention) Law' which are not otherwise enforceable within the West
Bank.
However an examination of all of the actions undertaken by the Israelis
in accord with the legislation mentioned above would still be far too
large for a thesis. So instead of attempting to examine all of the counter-
terrorist actions under taken by Israeli forces within these two areas,
this thesis will concentrate only on a number of them. In detail these
are the powers to arrest terrorist suspects; the use of physical force
against those suspected of terrorism-be it in order to interrogate,
institute an arrest or to defend oneself; the deportation of suspected and
convicted terrorists; the confiscation, sealing or demolitions of their
property or that from which the attack was launched, the
administrative detention of suspected terrorists, and the imposition of
curfews. In concentrating on these themes, this thesis echoes the view
taken William O'Brien in his legal analysis of 'Israel's War with the
P.L.O.'. He wrote:
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"Since this book is primarily concerned with issues of recourse to armed force,
several controversial Israeli measures of great importance will not be discussed:
modification of existing governmental systems, acquisition of land, water rights
and restrictions on travel and correspondence, establishment of Jewish
settlements in the Occupied Territories, as well as economic coercive
measures" 931
In addition, it is precisely these policies which have also been the focus
of attention by organisations which attempt to monitor abuses of human
rights932 (which other authors equate with state terrorism933 ); and
moreover, each activity on the list has been identified as an example of
state terrorism. For example in relation to Israeli actions within the
areas it administered a Palestine Liberation Organisation document
declared that:
"The illegal acts of terror that have been perpetrated by Israel and condemned by
the world community for over 25 years include the following: arbitrary arrest and
detention; ill-treatment and torture of prisoners; destruction and demolition of
villages, town quarters, and houses; confiscation and expropriation of property;
....and indiscriminate killings"934
931 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p218.
932 For example all are mentioned within Al-Haq's Punishing The Nation: Human Rights
Violations During the Palestinian Uprising. Dec.1987-Dec.7988. (South End Press.
Boston. 1990.).
933 Indeed one third (40/120) of those academics replying to this authors
questionnaire indicated that 'human rights abuses' constitute state terrorism (without
qualification). Jackie Smith claimed that human rights violations "can be considered
terrorist acts if used systematically to alter the behaviour of a political challenger",
J.Smith in reply to question 7, and G. Bowen wrote in reply to question 9. that "When
the definition of legal acts contravenes broadly recognized international standards of
human rights , then and only then are legal acts also state terrorism"- Also K. Jeffrey
and Maxwell Taylor who after answering 'Yes' to the same question 9 wrote ,'Where
the legal system does not generally protect human rights' and "Domestic laws can
violate human rights" respectively.See also Terry J.P. 'State Terrorism: A Judicial
Examination in Terms of Existing International Law'. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol.
10 (1). 1980. pp94-117. p95. Paust J.J. 'An Introduction to and Commentary on
Terrorism and The Law' Connecticut Law Review Vol. 19(40 Sumer 1987. pp679-.
Certain pages sent by Paust with his reply to this author's questionnaire. p733.
934 Palestine Liberation Organisation. (Department of Information and National
Guidance). Crime and No Punishment. (PLO. Beirut. 1974.). p5. For others who describe
many if not all of these themes, as terrorism see Hadaw S. The Palestinian: Victim of
Conspiracy. (Arab Palestine Association. Toronto. 1981.). p4 and Free Palestine. 'Who
are the Terrorists?. The Zionists Record'. Part 7 in Free Palestine. Palestine
Information Kit. London. August 28. 1975. pl 0-11. 288
Whilst another Palestinian source noted:
"The practice of terror has continued since the June War of 1967. Inside occupied
territory, the Gaza Strip, for example, existed under a strict curfew for months as
the Israelis tried to suppress Palestinian opposition between 1968 and
1972 	 the destruction of houses is only one form of Israeli terror since the June
War"935 	
As for the actions of Israel abroad the same Palestinian source asserted
that:
"Outside Palestine, Israel has also adopted terror methods, against Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan and Egypt, and internationally. The attacks, by air, or by commando groups,
against the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, for example, are always
described by Israeli sources as aimed at military targets, such as guerrilla bases.
Over the past seven years of attacks against southern Lebanon, hundreds of
Lebanese farmers, and Palestinian women and children have been killed or
wounded in such raids. Villages have been destroyed, along with schools, health
clinics, and UN Relief and Works Agency facilities
	 Each of these acts is an
example of terrorism undertaken by the official forces of the Israeli state"936.
This section will now go on to examine and assess the various policies by
which Israel attempted to counter-terrorism within Israel and the West
Bank before describing and analysing the counter-terrorist actions of
Israel abroad.
935 Free Palestine. 'Who are the Terrorists?. The Zionists Record'. Part 7 in Free
Palestine. Palestine Information Kit. London. August 28. 1975. p9 and p11.
936 Free Palestine. 'Who are the Terrorists?. The Zionists Record'. Part 7 in Free
Palestine. Palestine Information Kit. London. August 28. 1975. p12-13. 289
Arrests.
There are many (security) offences which are eventually labelled 'acts
of terrorism' by Israeli spokespersons. Because there are so many legal
grounds by which a member of the Israeli security forces can arrest an
individual for an offence which has been labelled in this way, this
section deals only with those contained within the 'Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance' (or P.T.0.) and those contained within Articles 84
and 85 of the D.E.R. and Military Order 101. The reason for choosing
legislation other than the P.T.O. is that the Ordinance is not generally
enforceable within the West Bank region. The exception to the rule is
the fact that the Israeli courts can, and have tried, Israelis who
committed offences against the P.T.O. in the West Bank following the
Knesset's enactment of the 'Emergency Regulations (Offences Committed
in the Israel-held Areas-Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) Law' 937 . As
for the inclusion of these other pieces of legislation, these were chosen
because they have been cited as evidence of the differential legal
treatment between Jews and Arabs for essentialy similar 'terrorist'
offences938 and the extent of the reach of the Israeli legislation.
Published in the Official Gazette, No. 24 (29th September, 1948) the
'Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance' is the main specific piece of anti-
terrorist legislation applicable to all inhabitants of Israel and to Israeli
residents of the West Bank. Interestingly it was originally introduced to
deal with Jewish terrorist groups following the killing of U.N. envoy
Count Bernadotte by the Lechi (or Stern Gang) 939 . At the beginning of
937 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68. p39. Article
2(a) of which stated that: 'A court in Israel shall be competent to try under Israel law
any person who is in Israel for an act or ommission which occurred in any region and
which would constitute an offence if it had occurred in the area of jurisdiction of the
courts of Israel'. See Tsemel for detailed examination of treatment of the Jewish
Underground.
938 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of Human Rights. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68.
939 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in IsraeL (Dartmouth.Aldershot.
1996.). p161. Strictly speaking The Emergency Regulations for the Prevention of
Terrorism were passed on Sunday September 19, 1948 following the killing of the UN
envoy on the Friday. The Lechi and the Hazit Hamolet were declared to be terrorist
organizations and the Etzel were given an ultimatum to disband or face the same
consequences, which they did. On 23 September 1948 the Provisional State Council
convened and turned the Emergency Regulations for the Prevention of Terrorism into
the permanent Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance. Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and
National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.Aldershot. 1996.). p162-3. 290
1950s the Ordinance was also used against the Jewish organisation
known as the 'Zrifin Underground' 940 . After this, the P.T.O. was next
applied in 1980 when various Palestinian groups were named, four
years later it was used against the 'Jewish Underground' 941 . In contrast
to its use against Jewish organisations, Arab organisations can, and
have been proscribed under Article 84 of the D.E.R., regardless of
whether they were violent or encouraged such violence, although these
were not the only two pieces of legislation which prohibit
organisations942 . In the 1980's the Israeli's introduced alterations to the
P.T.O. to deter support for and meetings with particular Palestinian
groups which up until that time had even been able to stand for local
elections in the West Bank. The Military Order No. 101 was introduced
into the West Bank on August 27 1967. It was extended by Military Order
No. 938 in 1982, and Military Order 1079 on October 1979, although the
latter was not published until early 1984.943
The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance. 
The Legalities. 
Section 3 of the P.T.O. makes membership of a terrorist organization a
criminal offence liable to five years imprisonment. In addition to the
fact that Section 1 generally interpreted a terrorist organisation as: "a
body of persons resorting in its activities to acts of violence
calculated to cause death or injury to a person or to threats of such acts
of violence", the P.T.O. contained more specific articles on the matter.
Proof of the existence of a terrorist organisation was contained within
Section 7. It stated that:
940 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.Aldershot.
1996.). p164-5, 172
941 Tsemel L. 'Double Standard Justice in Israel: The Case of the Jewish Terror
Organization'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 2. 1985. pp37-68. p38.
942 Hofnung notes that five statutes deal with prohibited associations, in addition to
the P.T.O. and D.E.R., the Penal Law, the Nonprofit Societies Law (1980) and the
Parties Law (1992). Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel.
(Dartmouth.Aldershot. 1996.). pl 60. Kretzmer also notes that prior to the Penal Law
the Criminal Code of 1936 also contained a provision outlawing "unlawful association".
Kretzmer D. 'National Security and draconian law'. The Jerusalem Post. 1 July. 1988.
pp10-11. p10
943 Kuttab J. 'Legislation. Military Orders'. Palestine Yearbook of International Law.
Vol. 1. 1984. pp175-6. 291
"In order to prove, in any legal proceeding, that a particular body of persons is a
terorist organisation, it shall be sufficient to prove that-
(a) one or more of its members, on behalf or by order of that body of persons, at
any time after the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948), committed acts of violence
calculated to cause death or injury to a person or made threats of such acts of
violence.
(b) the body of persons, or one or more of its members on its behalf or by its
order, has or have declared that that body of persons is responsible for acts
of violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or for threats of such
acts of violence, or has or have declared that that body of persons has been
involved in such acts of violence or threats, provided that the acts of violence or
threats were committed or made after the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948)."
Section 8 also enabled the Government to identify and proscribe specific
organisations. It stated:
"If the Government, by notice in the Official Gazette, declares that a particular
body of persons is a terrorist organisation, the notice shall serve, in any legal
proceeding, as proof that that body of persons is a terrorist organisation,
unless the contrary is proved."
Individuals could also be identified as members of a terrorist
organisation in a number of ways. Section 9(c) stated that a person was
deemed to be a member of such a terrorist organisation if they were
found in a place that is used by the organisation for meetings or storage
unless one can prove that the circumstances do not justify this
conclusion. Whilst Section 1 interpreted the phrase "member of a
terrorist organisation" to mean:
"a person belonging to it and includes a person participating in its activities,
publishing propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation or its activities or
aims, or collecting moneys or articles for the benefit of a terrorist organisation
or activities."
Similar offences were described elsewhere within the act. Section 2 for
example made it an offence punishable by up to twenty years to
perform:
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"a function in the management or instruction of a terrorist organisation or
participating in the deliberations or the framing of the decisions of a terrorist
organisation or acting as a member of tribunal of a terrorist organisation or
delivering a propaganda speech a public meeting or over the wireless on
behalf of a terrorist organisation".
Whilst Section 4 made it an offence liable to three years imprisonment
"to support" a terrorist organisation by one of the following means:
"(a) publishes, in writing or orally, words of praise, sympathy or encouragement
for acts of violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or for threats of
such acts of violence; or
(b) publishes, in writing or orally, words of praise or sympathy for or an appeal
for aid or support of a terrorist organisation; or
(c) has propaganda material in his possession on behalf of a terrorist organisation;
or
(d) gives money or money's worth for the benefit of a terrorist organisation; or
(e) puts a place at the disposal of anyone in order that that place may serve a
terrorist organisation or its members, regularly or on one particular occasion, as
a place of action, meeting, propaganda or storage; or
(f) puts an article at the disposal of anyone in order that that article may serve a
terrorist organisation or a member of a terrorist organisation in carrying out an
act on behalf of the terrorist organisation."
Sections 5 and 6 enabled the State to confiscate or close down any
property belonging to the terrorist.
The list of specific offences contained within Section 4 was extended by
the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment) Law 1980. It made
it an offence to do:
"any act manifesting identification or sympathy with a terrorist organisation in a
public place or in such manner that persons in a public place can see or hear such
manifestation of identification or sympathy, either by flying a flag or displaying a
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symbol or slogan or by causing an anthem or slogan to be heard, or any other
similar overt act clearly manifesting such identification or sympathy as
aforesaid".
Two months later the ordinance was amended and for the first time
since 1953 the Israeli's declared certain organizations to be terrorist
groups, all 14 of which were Palestinian 944 . Hofnung suggests that the
effect of the Ordinance, which covered only Israel or Israelis in the
West Bank, "was more declaratory than real", for even before the
amendment individuals who identified with terrorist organisations
could be prosecuted under the provisions of the Penal Law which deals
with crimes of insurrection945.
In addition from 13 August 1986 (until its repeal on 27 January 1993) the
list of specific offences contained within Section 4 was extended by
another Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment) Law 1986946.
It made it an offence for an Israeli citizen or resident "knowingly and
without lawful authority", to make contact with a person representing
or "occupying a position in the directorship, council or other organ" of
a 'proscribed" terrorist organization unless they are a relative, or
attending a press conference or academic meeting (provided it was not
on an issue of policy).
944 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.Aldershot.
1996.). p171. Citing Yalkut HaPirsumim, Government Notices (Y.P.) 1981. p105
(23.10.1980). He also notes that this notice was repealed in 1986 by which a new
government proclamation by which 21 Palestinian and Lebanese organizations were
declared terrorist organizatons. Y.P. 1986. p1436. (27.2.1986). See also Y.P. 1991
p502 (15.11.1990), outlawing the Islamic Jihad organization. He also notes that
provisions granting wide powers to the Minister of Defence, Chief of Staff and other
army officers, were eliminated. Kretzmer noted that this included the P.L.O., Fatah, the
P.F.L.P. and P.D.F.L.P. Kretzmer D. 'National Security and draconian law'. The
Jerusalem Post. 1 July. 1988. pp10-11. p10.
945 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.Aldershot.
1996.). p171. Kretzmer notes that under section 91b of the Penal aLaw, a "terrorist
organization" is " an organization aiming at, or working for, the downfall of the state,
or the impairment of its security or that of its inhabitants, or the infliction of harm on
Jews in other countries" . Whilst membership of an unlawful association was dealt with
under Article 147. The difference was that under the latter the individual was liable to
only one years imprisonemnt not five as under the P.T.O. Kretzmer D. 'National
Security and draconian law'. The Jerusalem Post. 1 July. 1988. pp10-11. p10.
946 Section 4(h). 294
I ht_Application of the
Terrorism. 
Because this is the first assessment it is useful to be reminded that in
order to be labelled as an act of state terrorism by this author, an act
must fulfill certain criteria set out within the definition. Firstly, it must
involve the threat or use of violence. Secondly, the violence must be
threatened or perpetrated by an organisation. Thirdly, the violence
must be threatened or perpetrated for political rather than private
motives. Fourthly, the act of violence must be intended to alter the
behaviour of others wider than the immediate 'innocent' victims. The
only exception that this author's definition allows for, is the State's
threat or use of such politically motivated violence to uphold the law.
However even then if the State's laws fail to give the individual victim
of the State's violence the chance to avoid the infliction of such
violence -that is when such violence is used to enforce laws which are
either, retrospective in their effects; so vague as to be unavoidable;
based on ascribed criteria, such as skin colour, which one could not
possibly alter in order to avoid the laws' violence; or which have no
intention of leading to trial where the victim could prove their
innocence.'- then it too could qualify for the label of state terrorism if
the other qualifying criteria are met.
As already noted in the earlier part of this analysis of Israel's counter-
terrorist activities, all the various acts under scrutiny within this
chapter were chosen because they involve the use or threat of violence.
Secondly there seems little doubt that the Israeli defence forces, police
and Shin Bet constitute either organisations in themselves, or form
part of the organisation known as the State of Israel. Following this, one
must ask 'are the arrests for offences under the P.T.O. politically
motivated?'. The answer is 'yes', for even if one disputes that all laws
are politically motivated and reflect political choices, then surely one
would acknowledge that those used to counter (political) terrorism are.
This is not only because it was an offence under Israel's counter-
terrorist laws to fly the P.L.O. flag etc., but one would be claiming that
the P.L.O. actions could not have been terrorist for they were not
politically motivated. In line with these three answers the three
questions "Does it involve the threat or use of violence?', "Is it carried 295
out by an organisation" and "Is it politically motiovatectr will generally
be down played in the remaining assessments to try and avoid
unnecessary repitition.
Assuming that the arresting officer requires 'reasonable' suspicion of
the various offences, then the use of violence to make arrests for
practically all of the offences within the P.T.O. does not constitute state
terrorism under this author's definition. This is because it was possible
for the individual victim of the State's use of violence to know in
advance what actions to avoid and to modify his or her behaviour
accordingly.
So whilst, the proscription of terrorist groups by government decree
(authorised by Section 8) may appear harsh from a civil liberties
perspective and may, as Mathews claims, "violate all the requirements
of the rule of law" 947 , it was possible for the individual victim of the
State's use of violence to know in advance what actions to avoid and thus
to refrain from joining any proscibed 'terrorist' group. As already noted
the key here is the ability to avoid the act, so as long as the legal
labelling of a group was made public, and the crime of membership was
not retroactive, and those already existing members of an organisation
which was not proscribed were given an opportunity to leave once the
organisation was outlawed, then the State's use of violence in upholding
this law would not fit this author's defintion of terrorism.
In the case of the P.T.O. this latter problem could arise as a result of the
fact that the act allows for the automatic proscription of groups in line
with Section 7. It labels any group as a terrorist organisation once "one
or more of its members...on behalf or by order of that body of persons",
commits (or declares that it is responsible for) "acts of violence
calculated to cause death or injury to a person or made threats of such
acts of violence". This is unproblematic if those arrested are knowingly
involved in such a terrorist group, but there must be a get out clause for
those who did not know that the group was about to be involved in such
terrorist activities. Without this, such victims will have had no way of
avoiding the States use of violence. Section 9 does apparently provide a
947 "The banning process in Israel violates all the requirements of the rule of law"
A.S. Mathews A.S. Freedom State Security and the Rule of Law. (Juta and Co. Cape
Town.1986.). p253. 296
get out clause. It states that if it is proved that a person was at any time a
member of a terrorist organisation, that person shall be considered a
member of that terrorist organisation "unless he proves that he has
ceased to be a member of it".
It is also by this latter criterion that those offences contained within
Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 should also be judged, otherwise the individual
who, was instructing, managing or presenting a speech on behalf of a
group (Section 2); had their property confiscated or closed down
(Section 6); or was incarcerated for publishing praise, sympathy or
encouragement for such violence or groups; held their propaganda or
giving or placing money or any other article for the use of a terrorist
organisation; or gave money or money's worth for the benefit of a
terrorist organisation, would have been an innocent victim of the
State's use of violence (Section 4). Unfortunately a similar escape clause
is not built-in to these sections therefore acts of State violence in
support of these sections could constitute acts of terrorism on those
occasions (if any) in which the victim of the State's violence could not
avoid the State's violence.
The offences introduced between 13 August 1986 and its repeal on 27
January 1993 by the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment)
also have such an escape route built in for the otherwise unwitting
victim of the State's violence. The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
(Amendment) Law allows those who would otherwise be guilty of
breaking the law for having met or contacted terrorist organisations to
avoid the States' use of violence in this way for it spells out the
requirement by the use of the term "knowingly".
The other offences contained within The Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance (Amendment) Law successfully avoid this author's label. This
is because the offences named in the new section 4 (g), are relatively
unambigious (mainly due to the fact that the word "clearly" is used to
fence in the ambigious potential of the last sentence). The new section
4(g) read:
"any act manifesting identification or sympathy with a terrorist organisation
in a public place or in such manner that persons in a public place can see or
hear such manifestation of identification or sympathy, either by flying a flag or
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displaying a symbol or slogan or by causing an anthem or slogan to be heard or
any other similar overt act clearly manifesting such identification or sympathy as
aforesaid".
As for the other definitions, all of the offences within the P.T.O. fulfil
the criteria demanded by the U.K.'s Prevention of Terrorism Act, for the
State's use or threat of violence to uphold this piece of legislation would
ultimately involve the use of politically motivated violence, in addition
this was "for the purpose of putting any section of the public in fear"
notably the victim!. Likewise all the offences fulfil the qualifying
criteria demanded by Stohl and Lopez. That is, the State's use or threat of
violence to uphold the different sections within this piece of legislation
involve the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or
compliant behaviour in a victim and /or audience of the act or threat'.
Similarly the threat of violence inherent in making arrests for all of
the offences (with the exception of the confiscation of property)
constitutes an act of terrorism in accordance with the Israeli derived
definition, because the latter requires that the threats of violence are
calculated to cause death or injury to a person. One could of course say
that the arrest process is not implicitly intended to contain such
violence but consistency would then demand that kidnappings carried
out by insurgents would not qualify.
Such violence used to enforce the law does not however qualify for the
label in accordance with either the American definition or that
belonging to Schmid and Jongman's unless the Israeli forces arresting
the offenders are undercover for only in this way do they constitute the
clandestine or at least semi-clandestine forces required by these two
definitions respectively. If however any arrests were carried out by the
covert forces of the I.D.F. or the Israeli police or Border police, then
such the threat of violence inherent within the arrest process would
constitute an act of terrorism in accordance with the U.S. definition if
one believed that such actions were preplanned (in that the law was
already in place), and the victims were non-combanants.
As for Schmid and Jongman's definition it also requires "repeated"
action, (which exists in all but the first arrest), "human victims" who
"serve as message generators", but it is difficult to say that the main 298
target of such acts were elsewhere. The best one could say was that they
were equally important. It is on this basis that arrests carried out by
covert forces would not constitute acts of terrorism under Schmid and
Jongman's definition.
Articles 84 and 85 of the D.E.R. 
The Legalities. 
Article 85(1), parts a-i, list various offences similar to those contained
within the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinace. Despite this the
punishments meted out were potentially far greater as part (i)(a) stated.
One was liable on conviction by the Court of a Magistrate to
imprisonment for one year or by a District Court to imprisonment for
ten years for these offences. In detail these potential punishments were
available for:
"Any person who -
(a) is, or acts as, a member of an unlawful association, or
(b) manages, or assists in the management of, an unlawful association,
or holds any office or position in or under an unlawful association, or
(c) does any work or performs any service for an unlawful association,
unless he proves that he bona fide believed that the work or service was not for an
unlawful association, or
(d) attends any meeting of an unlawful association, or
(e) permits or suffers any meeting of an unlawful association to be held
in any house, building or place belonging to or occupied by him or under his
control, unless he proves that he did not know of or connive at the meeting or that
he bona fide believed that the meeting was not a meeting of an unlawful
association, or
(f) has in his possession, custody or control any book, account,
periodical, handbill, poster, newspaper or other document, or any funds, insignia
or property, belonging or relating to or issued by or in the interests of, or
purporting to belong or relate to or to be issued by or in the interests of, an
unlawful association, or
(g) writes or otherwise prepares or produces, prints, types or
otherwise reproduces, publishes, exhibits, sells or exposes for sale, distributes,
transmits, or knowingly handles, any such thing as is mentioned in paragraph (f),
or
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(h) collects, receives, requests or demands any donation or
subscription for an unlawful association or under pretence that it is for an
unlawful association, or
(i) by writing, words, signs, or other acts or representation, directly
or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, implication or otherwise, acts on
behalf of, or as a representative of, an unlawful association"
As for the meaning of the key term "unlawful association', Article 84
defined it as "any body of persons, whether incorporated or
unincorporated and by whatsoever name (if any)" which
"(a)...advocates, incites or encourages any of the following unlawful
acts". Namely; (i) "the overthrow by force or violence of the
constitution" of, or the "Government of' Israel; (ii) "hatred or contempt
of, or the exciting of disaffection against" the Government of Israel;
(iii) "the destruction of or injury to property of" the Government of
Israel; (iv) "acts of terrorism directed against servants of" the
Government of Israel; "or which has committed or has claimed to have
been responsible for, or to have been concerned in, any such acts as are
mentioned in sub-paragraph (ii), (iii) or (iv)" or (b) "is declared by the"
Israelis to be an unlawful association and included any branch, centre,
committee, group, faction or institution of any such body.
The Application of the Various Definitions of (State) 
Terrorism. 
Although the basis for proscription is different (it is both wider in that
no violence need take place, and narrower in that the activities have to
be anti-state) the results follow the same rationale. All of the offences
listed in Section 84(i) -namely membership in (a), or management of
(b), working for (c), attending meetings of (d), permitting a meeting of
an unlawful asociation (e), possessing material relating to unlawful
association, (f), writing for (g and i) or raising funds for (h), the acts of
State violence used to enforce these prohibitions do not constitute acts
of terrorism for the victims could easily have avoided these acts, as the
definition of what constitutes an unlawful association is clear.
Especially when in practicethe Israeli's declare which are unlawful in
line with Article 85(b). Therefore as so as long as the legal labelling of a
group was made public, and the crime of membership was not 300
retroactive, and those already existing members of an organisation
which was not proscribed were allowed to leave once the organisation
was outlawed, then the State's use of violence in upholding this law
would not fit this author's defintion.
As for the other definitions, all of the offences within articles 84 and 85
fulfil the criteria demanded by the UK's Prevention of Terrorism Act,
for the State's use or threat of violence to uphold this piece of
legislation would ultimately involve the use of politically motivated
violence "for the purpose of putting any section of the public in fear"
notably the victim!. Likewise all the offences fulfil the qualifying
criteria demanded by Stohl and Lopez. That is, the State's use or threat of
violence to uphold the different sections within this piece of legislation
involve the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or
compliant behaviour in a victim and /or audience of the act or threat'.
Similarly the threat of violence inherent in the making arrests for all
of the offences constitutes an act of terrorism in accordance with the
Israeli derived definition, because the latter requires that the threats of
violence are calculated to cause death or injury to a person.
Such violence used to enforce the law does not however qualify for the
label in accordance with either the American definition or that
belonging to Schmid and Jongman's unless the Israeli forces arresting
the offenders are undercover for only in this way do they constitute the
clandestine or at least semi-clandestine forces required by these two
definitions respectively. If however any arrests were carried out by the
covert forces of the I.D.F. or the Israeli police or Border police, then the
threat of such violence inherent within the arrest process would
constitute an act of terrorism if one believed that such actions were
preplanned (in that the law was already in place), and the victims were
non-combatants.
As for Schmid and Jongman's definition it also requires "repeated"
action, (which exists in all but the first arrest), "human victims" who
"serve as message generators", although it is difficult to say that the
main target of such acts were elsewhere. The best one could say was that
they were equally important. It is on this basis that arrests carried out
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by covert forces would not constitute acts of terrorism under Schmid
and Jongman's definition.
Military Order No. 101. 
The Legalities. 
As for Military Order No. 101 the 'Order Concerning the Prohibition of
Incitement and adverse Propaganda (West Bank)', and its relating
amendments. The key points are that Article 3 makes it an offence "to
carry out any march or convene a meeting except with a permit issued
by the Military Commander", whilst Article 10(a) also made it an offence
to organize a march or meeting without a licence, or to call, instigate,
encourage or participate in such a march or meeting.
Article 5 declared that: "It is forbidden to hold, raise, exhibit or attach
any flags or political emblems except after obtaining a licence issued by
the Military Commander". Whilst Article 6 also made it an offence:
"to print and publish in the area any publication, advertisement, proclamation,
picture, pamphlet or any other document which contains any material with a
political significance except after obtaining beforehand a licence from the
Military commander..."
Other offences which like those noted above were liable to ten years
imprisonment included, Article 7 (a) which outlawed attempts "whether
verbally or in any other manner to influence public opinion in the
Area in a manner which might endanger public security or order";
whilst 7(b) made it an offence to perform "any action" or obtain "any
thing whatsoever with the intention of carrying out or of facilitating
the attempt to carry out of any action mentioned " in 7(a).
An additional section (numbered 7A) was added by virtue of Military
Order No. 938. in October 1981. It made it an offence to publish in
"writing or verbally words of praise or encouragement or support for a
hostile organization, its activities, or aims."(Article 7A al). Whilst
Article 7A a.2 made it an offence to carry out:
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"any action likely to reveal or indicate leaning towards a hostile organization, its
activities or aims, or to support it, such as by raising a flag, or displaying insignia
and slogans, or by making heard a national anthem, or a symbol or any other
visible activity proving or indicating such leaning or support as aforementioned,
that being in a public place or in a place under conditions whereby the people
gathered in that place can see or hear such activity as being supportive or
encouraging [the hostile organization or unlawful association]" 948.
The term "writing or verbally" was deleted by the amendment Military
Order 1079 on October 1979.
The Application of the Various Definitions of (State) 
Terrorism. 
Assuming that the arresting officer requires 'reasonable' suspicion of
the various offences, then the use of violence to make arrests for
practically all of the offences within the Military Order No. 101. do not
constitute state terrorism under this author's definition of terrorism.
Thus despite the fact that the Israeli made legislation takes the
influence of the State deep into everyday life it was still possible for the
individual victim of the State's use of violence to know in advance what
actions to avoid and to modify his or her behaviour accordingly. This
was true of Articles: 7A a.2 -which made it an offence to carry out: "any
action likely to reveal or indicate leaning towards a hostile
organization, its activities or aims, or to support it"; 5 -which forbade
the exhibiting of any political emblems except after obtaining a licence
issued by the Military Commander"; 10 and 3 -which made organizing,
encouraging or carrying out a march or meeting without a licence an
offence; and Article 6 which prohibited the publication of any
document which contained any material with a political significance
except after obtaining beforehand a licence from the Military
commander.
948 Sction 7A.b made it clear that the term hostile organization would have the same
meaning as defined in the Order Concerning Training and contact with a hostile
organization from Outside of the area (West Bank) (Order No. 284) 1968; or an illegal
association as defined in Article 84 of the D.E.R.. 303
More problematic was the existing Article 7 (a) which outlawed attempts
"whether verbally or in any other manner to influence public opinion
in the Area in a manner which might endanger public security or
order"; whilst 7(b) made it an offence to perform "any action" or obtain
"any thing whatsoever with the intention of carrying out or of
facilitating the attempt to carry out of any action mentioned " in 7(a).
in that the term "public security or order" is inherently vague unless a
detailed explanation was provided. As this explanation is not apparent,
any act of violence used to uphold this vague and therefore unavoidable
law, is deemed potentially terrorist, and would qualify for this author's
label if the other definitional requirements were met, which it does as
any law aims to modify the behaviour of others.
As for the other definitions, all of the offences within Military Order
No. 101 fulfil the criteria demanded by the UK's Prevention of Terrorism
Act, for the State's use or threat of violence to uphold this piece of
legislation would ultimately involve the use of politically motivated
violence "for the purpose of putting any section of the public in fear"
notably the victim!. Likewise all the offences fulfil the qualifying
criteria demanded by Stohl and Lopez. That is, the State's use or threat of
violence to uphold the different sections within this piece of legislation
involve the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or
compliant behaviour in a victim and for audience of the act or threat'.
Similarly the threat of violence inherent in the making arrests for all
of the offences contained in Military Order No. 101 constitutes an act of
terrorism in accordance with the Israeli derived definition, because the
latter requires that the threats of violence are calculated to cause death
or injury to a person.
Such violence used to enforce the law does not however qualify for the
label in accordance with either the American definition or that
belonging to Schmid and Jongman's unless the Israeli forces arresting
the offenders are undercover for only in this way do they constitute the
clandestine or at least semi-clandestine forces required by these two
definitions. If however any arrests were carried out by covert forces,
then the threat of such violence inherent within the arrest process
would constitute an act of terrorism if one believed that such actions
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were preplanned (and some of them may have been), and the victims
were non-combatants.
As for Schmid and Jongman's definition it also requires "repeated"
action, (which exists in all but the first arrest), "human victims" who
"serve as message generators", both of which existed but it is difficult to
say that the main target of such acts were elsewhere. The best one could
say was that they were equally important. It is on this basis that arrests
carried out by covert forces would not constitute acts of terrorism under
Schmid and Jongman's definition.
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Shootings.
History.
In the attempt to counter-terrorism since 1967 hundreds of people949,
mainly in the West Bank, have been shot dead by the Israeli security
forces. These fatal shootings have involved a number of projectiles both
lethal (that is 'live' ammunition), and 'non-lethal' (or 'less lethal') such
as rubber bullets, plastic bullets, and CS gas. This latter fact encourages
the use of sections to deal with each projectile, however because the
laws that authorise the use of such force do not distinguish either
between the weaponry, nor for the most part between its lethal and less
lethal outcome, this section will examine only the use of deadly force
caused by live ammunition in order to avoid unnecessary repetition.
Incidentally the legal explanation is also of great relevance to the next
section which is that on allegations of 'torture'.
The use of live ammunition by the I.D.F. has undoubtedly resulted in the
lawful deaths (and wounding 950 ) of many Palestinians. The fatal use of
live ammunition can be attributed to two distinct types of forces
connected to the state of Israel. The first are shootings by the overt
members of the Israeli Police, Border Police and I.D.F.. The second
which has occurred since the beginning of the intifada , involved
specialist covert units of the I.D.F. (known in Hebrew as Mista'arvim)951
and the Police. The vast majority of fatal shootings were by overt
security forces occur in 'everyday' situations within the hostile and
potentially dangerous environment of the West Bank. However since
the revelations of the workings of undercover units going by the names
949 William O'Brien puts the number of Palestinians shot dead by Israeli security
forces between December 1987 and May 1989 at 431. O'Brien W. The Conduct of Just
and Limited War. (Praeger. New York. 1981.).p238 B'tselem put the number of
Palestinians shot dead by Israeli security forces between the start of the intifada and
May 1990 at 630, including 138 victims under the age of 16. B'Tselem. The Use of
Firearms by the Security Forces in the Occupied Territories. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem.
July 1990.). p4.
950 However the same organisation also reported that many of the injuries to
Palestinian youths suggested that soldiers had shot intending to maim rather than to kill
National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and
Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New York.1988.).
p22.
951 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p7. 306
of 'Shimshon' , 'Cherry' (I.D.F.) and 'Gideon' (Police) amongst others, it
is the use of lethal force by covert units that has provided the most
controversy. Their methods, targeting and the orders and guidelines by
which they work have all come under criticism from human and civil
rights groups and it is of no surprise then that they constitute much of
the assessment952 . Other notorious uses of deadly force include the
killings in the 1990s of 'wanted' or 'masked men', including those
'wanted' suspects hiding in surrounded buildings.
The Legalities
In legitimising their use of deadly force whilst on duty, members of the
Israeli security forces operating within both Israel and the West Bank
can point to two possible justifications. The first was the claim that they
were acting in 'self-defence' (which was until 1992 combined with the
legal defence of 'necessity'), the second was to cite the defence of
'justification'. The latter could also be used to justify the use of non-
lethal force up until 1992, when the legal defence of 'self-defence' was
formally split from the 'defence of necessity', the latter of which could
only be used to justify the use of non-lethal force.
The exact wording of self-defence has changed since 1967 when existing
piece of enabling legislation -Section 18 of the Criminal Code 1936- read:
"An act or omission which would otherwise be an offence may be excused if the
person accused can show that it was done or omitted to be done only in order to
avoid consequences which could not otherwise be avoided, and which if they had
followed would have inflicted grievous harm or injury to his person or to his
honour or his property or to the person or honour of others whom he was bound to
protect or to property placed in his charge:
Provided that in so acting he did no more than was reasonably necessary for that
purpose, and that the harm inflicted by the act or omission was not
disproportionate to the harm avoided."953
952 See B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories
(B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli
Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York.
1993.).
953 "A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if he does or omits to
do the act under any of the following circumstances, that is to say:- 307
The Criminal Code of 1936 was replaced wholesale in 1977 by the Penal
Law which enabled a member of the security forces to cite Section 22. It
stated:
"A person may be exempted from criminal responsibility for an act or omission if
he can show that it was only done or made in order to avoid consequences that
could not otherwise be avoided and which would have inflicted grievous injury or
harm to his person, honour or property, or to the person or honour of others whom
he was bound to protect, or to the property placed in his charge:
Provided that he did no more than was reasonably necessary for that purpose, and
that the harm caused by him was not disproportionate to the harm avoided."954
This in turn was altered on 18 March 1992.55
 Section 22 of the Penal
Law (Amendment No. 37) declared that:
"A person shall not bear criminal responsibility for an act or an omission if he
acted in the way that he did against an assailant in order to ward off an unlawful
assault, which placed his own or another's life, liberty, person or property in
danger of harm; however, a person shall not be deemed to be acting in self-defence
if he brought about the said assault by his improper behaviour, while foreseeing
the possible developments"956
Whilst Section 22(b) added that the 'defence of self-defence' could not be
invoked "if in the circumstances of the case the act or omission were
not reasonable in order to prevent harm"957.
(a) in execution of the law;
(b) in obedience to the order of a competent authority which he is bound by law to obey,
unless the order is manifestly unlawful. Whether an order is or is not mainfestly
unlawful is a question of law". Section 19 'Justification'. The Criminal Code Bill 1936
Draft Ordinance The Palestine Gazette 25th Spetember 1936. pp973-1066. p979.
954 A slightly different translation is cited by B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover
Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). p23. They note
that this also contained the rules on the 'defence of necessity'.
955 Date given by Stein Y. in interview with this author. B'Tselem, Jerusalem. May-
June 1995.
956 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p23. The law now differentiate between 'self-defence' and the
'defence of necessity' which is now contained in section 22(a).
957 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p23. 308
These rules of self-defence emphasised the requirements of
proportionality between the act committed in self-defence, and the
harm that it sought to prevent, as well as between the requirement that
the offender had no other way to prevent the danger, and the
requirement that the act was no more than required to prevent the
danger958.
The second legal means by which members of the security forces could
attempt to defend their use of deadly force is known as the 'defence of
justification'. This can be used by members of the Israeli security forces
if they accidentally killed those whom they were attempting to arrest,
that is in order to prevent their escape, or in executing the law, such as
dispersing a riot. Section 19a of the Criminal Code Ordinance No.74 of
1936 legitimised such actions between 1967-1977. It stated that:
"A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if he does or omits
to do an act
(a) in execution of the law;"
(b) in obedience to the order of a competent authority which he is bound to obey,
unless the order is manifestly unlawful"
"Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful is a question of law"959.
In addition Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrests and Searches)
Ordinance, 1924, established that: "If a person liable to arrest resists, or
attempts to evade arrest, the person authorised to arrest him may use all
reasonable means necessary to effect the arrest" 960 . However despite
later amendments 961 , it was Supreme Court Justice Agranat's ruling in
958 Also applied to the 'defence of necessity'. B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover
Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). p24.
959 Section 19a of the Criminal Code Ordinance No.74 of 1936 p.g. Supp. 2, 1936
p285. Also Shacher who stated that "A person is not criminally responsible for an act
or ommision if he does or omits to do an act.... (a) in execution of the law;" Shachar Y.
The Use of Deadly Force in Enforcing the Law: Gold in the Light of History. Israeli Law
Review Vol 26 (3 )1992. pp319-354 p321.
960 Also Arrest of Offenders and Searches Ordinance 1924, No 4 of 1924 , P.G. 1924
p462. Section 1 2 originally numbered 9. This section survived in original form in
Criminal Procedure (arrests and searches) Ordinance, [New version} 1969, sec 19(2
L.S.I. [N.V.]30 , at 34)] Shachar Y. 'The Use of Deadly Force in Enforcing the Law: Gold
in the Light of History. Israeli Law Review. Vol 26. (3) 1992. pp319-354. p322.
961 Section 24 of the Penal Law exempts from criminal liablilty a person who
committed an act "in executing the law' or in obeying an order given by a competent
authority which he must obey by law "unless the order is manifestly illegal". 309
the Gold v Attorney General of 1953 that has been used as a benchmark
in such cases962 . The ruling established that even in the absence of
alternative means to effect a lawful arrest, deadly force could be
employed only where the arrest was pursuant to the commission of a
felony. i.e. a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than three
years 963 (this extra requirement however, has no practical effect on
this analysis of 'terrorist' offences).
The legal situation changed on February 8, 1990 when in the case of
First Sgt. David Ankonina v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Chief Justice
Shamagar added limitations to the conditions permitting the use of force
established in the Gold case. Instead of the mechanical formula which
simply required the suspicion of a felony, basing his judgement on the
notion of necessity contained within Section 22 of the Penal Law at the
time 964 , Justice Shamagar laid down three prior and necessary
conditions for the successful use of this defence by members of the
security forces; the arrest must be legal and made in connection with a
dangerous felony and that there was no other way to make the
arrest965.
The requirement that the arrest was legal meant that a reasonable basis
for suspicion was required, anchored in facts, in circumstances and in
information, rather than mere guesswork 966 . The requirement that the
attempted apprehension was for a dangerous felony, meant that
members of the security forces could: "not use live fire unless the
danger posed by the suspect was proportionate to the drastic character
962 Shachar Y. 'The Use of Deadly Force in Enforcing the Law: Gold in the Light of
History. Israeli Law Review. Vol 26. (3) 1992. pp319-354. p319. Citing 7. P.D. 1126.
963 Shachar wrote "A felony punishable by...imprisonment for more than three
years" is a felony as defined by the Interpretation Law [Interpretation Law, 1981, sec.
3 (35.L.S.i.370): "This definition of felony has been in force since at least 1945"ftn
93]" , and not a serious felony. It was precisely of such a "felony" that Agranat J.
spoke of in Gold". Shachar Y. 'The Use of Deadly Force in Enforcing the Law: Gold in the
Light of History. Israeli Law Review. Vol 26. (3) 1992. pp319-354. p350.
964 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p2.
965 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p27.C.A.57/53 P.D. 7 1126.
966 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p27. Citing the words of the court itself, although no reference
was given.
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of the measures taken" 967 . As for the requirement that there was no
other way to effect the arrest, this condition dovetailed with the
requirement that the attempted apprehension was for a dangerous
felony. In other words in addition to requiring a reasonable proportion
between the offence one was trying to prevent and the means taken
toward that end, another condition was added, according to which lethal
action was not taken unless it was essential to take it, because more
moderate means have proved fruitless and the result could not be
prevented in another way968 . According to Justice Shamagar:
"The reasonableness of the means is determined according to the factual
circumstances of each event, and in this respect, tested methods of operation,
utilising stages, have been developed primarily in the relevant orders. The
methods are, in the first place, a warning given by voice or by sign; second,
expressing the intention to take more decisive action, including the use of
firearms, this by means of firing warning shots in the air; and finally -and only
finally- aimed fire, but even then in a manner calculated to reduce the degree of
bodily harm"969.
Shamagar then noted that these limitations do not apply if "a grave
immediate danger" was posed to the official or to the person he was
protecting, although such a use of lethal means could then be justified
in terms of the law on 'self-defence'970.
To help the security forces out with the complex legal situation, the I.D.F
and the police train their people and issue them with both oral
instructions, orders and written rules of engagement (or R.O.E.).
Although they vary slightly between the different parts of the security
forces, and may change in response to incidents and political initiatives
the I.D.F.'s rules of engagement in are according to Deputy Judge
Advocate General, Col. David Yahav: "in accordance with Israeli
967 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p29.
968 Justice Shamagar in the Ankonina case cited by B'Tselem. Activity of the
Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). p29-
30. (No other reference given).
969 Justice Shamagar in the Ankonina case cited by B'Tselem. Activity of the
Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). p30.
(No other reference given).
970 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p30. 311
criminal law, with the rulings of the Supreme Court, and have been
approved by the I.D.F. Judge Advocate General and the Attorney
General's Office"971.
The Application Of The Various Definitions Of (State
Terrorism. 
Above and beyond the questions of political motivation, and the
involvement of an organisation the key questions for this examination
and assessment of shootings by state agents is, 'What was the intent of
the perpetrator?' (just as it should be for those analysts studying
insurgent groups), the identification of which helps one establish the
legality of the action which is crucial to the application of my
definition. Here it should be remembered that because of the potential
problems of impartiality that surround the State's willingness to
enforce its own laws against its own security personnel, this thesis does
not merely look at the output of the legal system such as convictions in
order to assess any action. Instead it concentrates on the input i.e. does
the action fulfil the criteria. A process which takes us back to the issue
of intent.
Yet as well as inferring policies from patterns of practice they are
sometimes formally adopted and documented. It is here that the role of
the security forces and decisions to prosecute and the judicial results
are useful. For although the various rules of engagement are based
upon the conception that they are: "in accordance with Israeli criminal
law, with the rulings of the Supreme Court, and have been approved by
the IDF Judge Advocate General and the Attorney General's Office"972,
sometimes they are not. Indeed R.O.E. and orders which encourage
illegal activities by members of the security forces constitutes possibly
the strongest evidence for the existence of acts of state terrorism.
971 I.D.F. Deputy JAG Col. David Yahav, letter to Middle East Watch. Middle East
Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians.
(Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p147.
972 I.D.F. Deputy JAG Col. David Yahav, letter to Middle East Watch. Middle East
Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians.
(Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p147. Also "opening fire shall be justified
according to the general principle of the Penal Law". Paragraph 5 of affidavit from then
Deputy Chief of Staff E.Barak to H.C.J. B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in
the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). p22. 312
Therefore reports such as those made by the U.S. Department of State's
1988 Country Report on Israel, which assert that the guidelines issued to
the I.D.F., "were often not followed" and that "[s]oldiers frequently used
gunfire in situations that did not present mortal danger to troops,
causing many avoidable deaths and injuries' 973 , cannot be simply taken
as indicating illegal acts. However when coupled with an I.D.F.
reservist's claim that it was made clear to them that it was unlikely that
any proceeding would be taken against them for overuse of force, at
least if the force was not recorded on television974 , they do strongly
suggest that some of the shootings were illegal, and therefore
potentially terrorist. This said, Middle East Watch noted that the official
written rules of engagement given to soldiers in the occupied
territories are "for the most part" consistent with its law enforcement
procedure975 ; whilst on many occasions soldiers have shot the targeted
individuals only after they had drawn a gun or opened fire, a point
supported by the fact that a number of Israeli soldiers have been shot
dead in the process of attempting to arrest dangerous suspects976.
It is of course impossible to examine all of the thousands of shootings
that have resulted in deaths and woundings within the West Bank and
Israel. It is for this reason that the focus of this assessment will be on
the evidence put forward as to why some of the fatal shootings were
illegal and therefore potentially terrorist according to this author's
definition, starting with the defence of justification.
973 U.S. Department of State Country Report 1988, p1377 in O'Brien W. Law and
Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p239.
974 Ronit Matalon "The Wild West". Haartz March 11 1988 in Israeli League for Human
and Civil Rights. Reports on the Violations of Human Rights in the Territories during the
Uprising. Cited by National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied
West Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild.
New York.1988.). p21. Also "On my first day [of service] , I heard that during an
officers' meeting aquestion had been put to the commander about what was permitted
and what was forbidden. And also , about what would happen to someone who opened
fire. The answer to the question was "I've been here for nine months, hundreds of shots
have been fired, tens of people have been wounded, and nobody has been brought to
trial".Ronit Matalon 11 March 1988 Ha'aretz Cited by Al-Haq Punishing The Nation:
Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising. Dec.1987-Dec.1988.  (South
End Press. Boston. 1990.). p11.
975 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p11.
976 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p9-10. I.D.F. put the
number of soldiers killed in occupied territories from the beginning of the intifada up
until may 31, 1993 at 37. (no other reference given) 313
Prior to the Ankonina judgement in 1990, the Israeli security forces
could shoot (to wound) anyone they suspect of committing a felony977,
in accordance with the 'defence of justification'. Therefore genuine
attempts to arrest suspects in this manner would not be classified as
state terrorism under this author's definition for the victim of this
politically motivated violence would not be an innocent victim in
accordance with this author's definitional requirements, instead he
would be a genuine suspect, and the action would be legal.
Following Justice Shamagar's comments in the Ankonina case this
rather permissive 'defence of justification' was changed in 1990 so that
this 'shoot to stop a suspected felon' policy would no longer be in force.
Instead of simply requiring the suspicion of a felony, Justice Shamagar
laid down three prior and necessary conditions for the successful use of
this defence by members of the security forces; the arrest must be legal
and made in connection with a dangerous felony and that there was no
other way to make the arrest978 . The practical expression of such a
legal arrest using live ammunition was a three stage procedure in
which the suspect was given a verbal warning to stop. If this failed a
shot could be fired into the air followed if necessary by the use of live
ammunition against the suspect's legs. The first two stages could only be
skipped over in situations of self-defence when the victim posed an "a
grave immediate danger" to the official or to the person he was
protecting.
This said, critics have claimed that this was still too permissive, in that
the legal term "dangerous felony" could be seen to include membership
or activity in a banned organisation, or hurling stones in a way that
endangers lives. If so then as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
noted: "virtually any Palestinian fleeing the army is potentially liable
to be shot on suspicion of membership or activity in the PLO, or stone-
977 Shachar wrote "A felony punishable by...imprisonment for more than three
years" is a felony as defined by the Interpretation Law [Interpretation Law, 1981, sec.
3 (35.L.S.i.370): "This definition of felony has been in force since at least 1945"ftn
93]" , and not a serious felony. It was precisely of such a "felony" that Agranat J.
spoke of in Gold". Shachar Y. 'The Use of Deadly Force in Enforcing the Law: Gold in the
Light of History. Israeli Law Review. Vol 26. (3) 1992. pp319-354. p350.
978 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. May 1992.). p27.C.A.57/53 P.D. 7 1126. 314
throwing" 979 , and it would therefore be "all but impossible to prove that
such an assumption was 'unreasonable' in the circumstances"980.
However this author takes the view that the notion of necessity
contained within the legal 'defence of justification' after the Ankonina
trial required more than this, and that any genuine shootings to wound
Palestinians even on the grounds of reasonable suspicion of
"membership or activity in a hostile organisation", violated the
principle of proportionality required as expressed by the judge in terms
of the three stage procedure.
This thesis therefore takes the view that since 1990 only the use of live
ammunition by the Israeli security forces which genuinely aimed at the
legs of a person, genuinely suspected of a dangerous felony who looked
that they would almost immediately pose a threat of harm to others,
would be legal under the 'defence of justification'. So the question to be
answered becomes 'Is there any evidence to suggest that Israeli security
forces carried out shootings which were not in accord with either this
new legal defence or the laws of self-defence?'. The answer to which is
'yes'. For example after examining of the use of force by I.D.F.
undercover units vis-a-vis mainly wanted and masked men since 1988,
Middle East Watch have claimed that "there is a shoot-to-kill policy in at
least a subset of cases" 981 and a closer scrutiny of these reveals strong
evidence of illegality.
979 Letter from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to Yitzhak Shamir (10 March
1988) Footnote 13 Al-Haq Punishing The Nation: Human Rights Violations During the
Palestinian Uprising. Dec.1987-Dec.1988 .(South End Press. Boston. 1990.). p40.
980 Letter from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to Yitzhak Shamir (10 March
1988) Footnote 13 Al-Haq Punishing The Nation: Human Rights Violations During the
Palestinian Uprising. Dec.1987-Dec.1988 .(South End Press. Boston. 1990.). p40. The
lawyers claim should not be seen as an outlandish statement in light of the Attorney
general's statement that he considered "probably all" of the residents of the Gaza Strip
as members of the P.L.O. See B.Tselem Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied
Territories and the Mass deporation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June
1993.) p48.
981 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p12.Middle East Watch
also offer evidence which suggests that use of force in violation of the law routinely
goes unpunished. With cover-ups extending from the rank-and-file to the senior
military establishment, and relying on the acquiescence of the government of
Israel"Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). pl. To the extent that it
is more the exception than the rule that special- force soldiers who wrongfully kill
Palestinians are punished.Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations
Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). 315
The first of these "subset of cases" is Middle East Watch's claim that
undercover agents deliberately failed to fire at the legs of fleeing
suspects and ended up hitting unarmed Palestinians in the upper body.
Middle East Watch's claim that this has occurred in a "significant
number" of cases, and cite a former first lieutenant who said:
"what everyone does is fire to stop the person, and then later, if necessary, say
that they had fired at the legs and missed. No one can give you a hard time for not
being a good shot"982.
An example of this appeared at the trial of a commander of a so called
'Shimshon' undercover unit who told his troops to aim at torso in
contradiction of the defence of justification983 . Middle East Watch add
depth to their claim with evidence that in "many" of this "significant
number" of cases the victims have suffered multiple gunshot
wounds 984 , which tends to support the idea that the perpetrators had
not attempted to arrest the victim in accordance with the arrest
procedure laid down in the Ankonina case. As for whether such actions
would constitute state terrorism in accordance with this author's
definition, the answer could be 'yes', but only if the intent of any
members of the security forces perpetrating such illegal acts was to
deter other people from stone throwing or protesting, thus fulfilling
the definitional requirement that the intention of the act was to modify
the behaviour of others.
Other incidents involving the use of deadly force which would be illegal
and potentially terrorist in accordance with my definition would be any
incidents before or after the Ankonina case, in which the security
forces killed suspects effectively in custody, neither threatening his
p27. Such factors raise the issue of where exactly responsibility should lie for such
acts once again.
982 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p17.
983 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p17., 163-7. The trial
occurred in 1991-2.
984 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p13. 316
captors nor attempting to escape985 . Middle East Watch have suggested
that this type of killings have occurred both before and after 1990986.
Middle East Watch also suggested that there have been cases including
well-planned ambushes987 , in which the suspects have been shot dead
without first being given an opportunity to surrender when the
situation would have allowed 11988 . Indeed this human rights
organisation went as far as suggesting that senior members of the
security forces have targeted individual Palestinians for
assassination98 9 . Such killings which could not be justified in
accordance with either the laws on self-defence or justification (after
the Ankonina judgement) would also include those incidents of
undercover forces who opened fire without warning against suspects
who were either entirely unarmed or else carried "cold weapons" in a
way that did not threaten others990 . Strong evidence that such actions
have occurred come in the allegations made by the Israeli press that in
February 1993 the I.D.F. modified its R.O.E. so that the term "mortal
danger" included any visual contact between armed Palestinians and
I.D.F. personnel, meaning, apparently, that any Palestinian carrying a
firearm could be shot dead on sight991 . This problem appears to have
985 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p13.
986 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p153-58.
987in which security forces could have effected an arrest but made little or no attempt
to do so"Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p12.
888 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p16.
989 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p14.
990 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p12.
991 Israel Radio in English, March 31 1993 as reported in FBIS, cited by Middle East
Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians.
(Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p43. The same could be said of the allegation
that on March 30 1993 the Israeli Cabinet approved new rules of engagement which
authorized soldiers to shoot armed Palestinians on sight, regardless of whether they
were preparing to fire their weapons when sighted. Israel Radio in Hebrew, March 30
1993, as reported in FB1S, March 31 1993. Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli
Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York.
1993.). p45-6. Also the district commander of Nablus said on Israeli television in
March 1992 stated "Anyone carrying a weapon is in fact a potential attacker, and
from our point of view he is a danger. In light of that, as long as he has a weapon, we'll
hit him" C.Haberman, 'Killings of Palestinia Suspects Raise Questions about Israeli
Army Agents" The New York Times April 12 1992. Whilst in May 1992 the commander 317
been repeated within orders given to soldiers by senior officers that
encourage them to carry out illegal acts. For example a former sergeant
in an elite infantry unit in 1991-2 is quoted as having said:
"The unit commander said we were going to lay an ambush an that the objective was
to 'stick' the person... To 'stick' means to kill. There is no doubt about that. That is
the term we use in Lebanon all the time. It means to shoot to kill. That is what
everyone in the briefing room understood..."992.
Likewise a Company commander of the Givanti infantry brigade said on
I.D.F. radio broadcast February 9 1993:
"My entire company is involved at this point in the hunt, in the pursuit after the
terrorists walking around here... .They are forces whose aim is to clash, to come
into contact, to charge and to eliminate the terrorists; this is the only thing they
are doing, and this is the sole thing they are preoccupied with"993.
Similarly, many of the R.O.E. and orders which were introduced to deal
with 'masked' and 'wanted' men constitute evidence of illegal actions by
members of the (usually undercover) security forces. It is true that
some masked activists were involved in violent activity, including the
torture and execution of suspected collaborators, enforcing commercial
strikes, barricading and closing streets or stoning Israeli vehicles, but
others were guilty of nothing more than spray-painting political
slogans on public walls or participating in marches 994 . Thus contrary
of Israel's central region which includes the West Bank is reported to have said : "When
somebody carries in a clear way a weapon or holds a pistol in his hand, he poses a
danger to life, and he will be shot without warning". Maj. Gen Danny Yatom "Israel
Asserts Armed Palestinians Will Be killed Without Warning" New York Times. May 7
1992. Both Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted'
and Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p46.
992 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p14.
993 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p15 They also note a
Sergeant in one unit southern command who said that regional commanders sent a
bottle of champagne each time one of the thirteen wanted persons identified by the
General in charge of the southern command was shot. The Sergeant also recalled the
General as having said "I believe that if these thirteen were to die the intifada would be
over. At least, we would have quiet for six months". Middle East Watch. A License to
Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch.
New York. 1993.). p15
994 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.).p23. 318
to the impression gathered by the soldiers who testified to I.D.F.
investigators and to military courts that they believed they were
supposed to kill masked activists 995 , 'masked' individuals could
constitute a danger in the form of a concrete assault which warranted
the use of deadly force in self-defence996.
In contrast when the undercover Israeli forces went after the so called
"wanted" suspects they automatically knew that the individual was
suspected of something, and usually something serious in that the
official wanted list contained only a fraction of all Palestinians sought
by the authorities. According to the I.D.F. the list included "armed, hard
core terrorists, who do not adhere to any code of law [and] have engaged
in terror attacks" 997 , and in their own words the I.D.F. assumed that the
'wanted' Palestinian "would not hesitate to open fire if engaged"998.
However as Middle East Watch point out, to label someone as a 'terrorist'
does not change the legal standards on police practices that govern
efforts to apprehend them 999 . Thus contrary to the impression gathered
by many soldiers 1000 , a wanted (or masked) person could constitute a
danger in themselves, even when have been labelled as "wanted"
because they were suspected of having committed dangerous felonies.
The "wanted" victim of a fatal shooting must have posed an immediate
995 During 1989, soldiers were instructed to open fire at any masked Palestinian they
encountered. Indeed some testified to IDF investigators and to military courts that they
believed they were supposed to kill masked activists.Middle East Watch. A License to
Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch.
New York. 1993.).p61
998137selem Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem May 1992.). p24. B'Tselem for example argue that the recent introduction
by the I.D.F. to their ROEs of quasi legal terms such as "wanted persons" "masked
individuals" "special units" etc. have no legal foundation or validity unless they
conform to the relevant provisions of the criminal law Indeed they go as far as claiming
they were "invented to justify the use of live ammunition". B'Tselem Activity of the
Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem. Jerusalem May 1992.). p23
997 I.D.F. response to B'Tselem Activity of the Undercover Units p110 cited by Middle
East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked
Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p24.
998 I.D.F. response to B'Tselem Activity of the Undercover Units p113 cited by Middle
East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked
Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p24.
999 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p25.
1000During 1989, soldiers were instructed to open fire at any masked Palestinian
they encountered. Indeed some testified to I.D.F. investigators and to military courts
that they believed they were supposed to kill masked activists.Middle East Watch. A
License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and Masked Palestinians. (Human
Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). 319
and imminent threat of grievous harm to life at the time of the incident
to justify the use of deadly force in self-defence. Likewise if the soldiers
defence was that he had intended to shoot to wound whilst attempting an
arrest in accordance with the defence of justification, there would have
had to be a warning, and any shooting would have had to have been
aimed at the legs with only enough live ammunition to stop the suspect.
Further evidence of the execution of such illegal shootings lies in the
accounts that agents of the Shin Bet warned the families of 'wanted'
suspects that unless their relative turn themselves in, these suspects
faced death at the hands of the special forces as Middle East Watch1001.
It can also be seen in the tactic introduced by the Rabin government
following the killing of undercover soldiers in separate incidents in
August 1992 10°2 . After sealing off and emptying the neighbourhoods in
which suspects were thought to be hiding, the Israelis then asked the
suspect to surrender and if s/he failed to do so, they attacked the
suspected hideout from a distance with rockets, launched grenades,
machine guns and other heavy ordnance 1003 . Again it is difficult to see
how these killings could be justified under the laws of self-defence or
justification. Therefore, if this author's interpretation of Israeli law is
correct, and the aim of such state violence was to deter others, such
1001 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p9.
1002 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p5-6.
1003 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and
Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p6. It has also been
claimed that the inhabitants of targeted buildings were not found in many cases, that
certain suspects have been shot after they have surrendered. Taylor notes two
incidents the first on 26 August 1992 in Jenin., the second on 14 January 1993 in Al-
Jdayda village, near Jenin. Taylor T. Missiles and Dynamite: The Israeli Military
Forces Destruction of Palestinian Homes with Anti-tank Missiles and High Explosives.
(Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1993.). p68. That demolitions have been carried out even though the
suspect had surrendered. These have occured in Gaza rather than the West Bank. Taylor
notes only 4 in the West Bank. Taylor T. Missiles and Dynamite: The Israeli Military
Forces Destruction of Palestinian Homes with Anti-tank Missiles and High Explosives.
(Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1993.).p67-68. For the latter claim see Taylor T. Missiles and
Dynamite: The Israeli Military Forces Destruction of Palestinian Homes with Anti-tank
Missiles and High Explosives. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1993.). p6.. In a study of fifteen
assaults between September 1992 and April 1993, B'Tselem noted that forty-nine
houses were demolished and in only seven of the assaults were "wanted" persons found
to be hiding. Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted'
and Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p6. Citing B'Tselem
House Demolitions during Operations Against Wanted People. (B'Tselem. Jersualem. May
1993). No page reference given. 320
illegal actions would constitute acts of terrorism in accordance with this
author's definition.
The next issue to be addressed within this assessment is how do these
various allegations fair in relation to the other definitions of state
terrorism. All the uses of such violence to make arrests would qualify
under the U.K.'s Prevention of Terrorism Act's definition for it merely
required that the violence was used for "political ends" (the issue of do
those carried out in self-defence, is more debateble , but must also be
seen in the same way, as they are targetted for political reasons).
Similarly all would qualify under the definition derived from Israel's
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinace for it merely required that the
threats or "acts of violence were calculated to cause death or injury to a
person" whether legal or not. In contrast all the uses of deliberate
deadly violence would only qualify under Stohl and Lopez's definition if
the simultaneous aim was to send a message to an audience. This was
because the other criteria within their definition required that the
purpose of the violence was "to create fear and/or compliant behaviour
in a victim" which would be impossible if the intention had been to kill
the individual. The idea that the security forces hoped to deter others is
quite plausible and no doubt some such actions have occurred and only
these would be labelled as state terrorism.
Interestingly the two remaining definitions both required that the
State's violence was carried out by covert operators, which rules out
many of the shootings by Israeli forces, although many remain. The
other demands made by the U.S. definition is that the violence was
premeditated and it was carried out against non-combatants. If one
allows for the fact that many of the shootings occurred at an instant in
response to events, this could leave only those incidents in which
undercover security forces killed either suspects in custody or in
ambushes 1004, or when the suspects were not given an opportunity to
surrender when they could have been as was suggested in regards to
the killings of wanted and masked men. The issue the becomes were
these victims non-combatants?. The answer given here is 'yes' for the
Israeli's have decided to apply the law rather than the laws of war. As a
1004 Middle East Watch. A License to Kill. Israeli Operations Against "Wanted' and 	 321Masked Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch. New York. 1993.). p13.
result it can be said that only these shootings would constitute acts of
terrorism in accordance with the U.S. definition.
As for whether any of the undercover shootings qualify under Schmid
and Jongman's definition, the issue of shooting certainly qualifies on
the basis of the repeated nature of the action (with the exception of the
first one). Those shot were also human beings and undoubtedly those
carried out to enforce an arrest (if not others) "served as message
generators". More problematic is the question of intent and whether
those to whom the message was sent was the main target and not the
victim. Schmid and Jongman explicitly state that assassinations do not
equal terrorism. It is on the basis that the killings of Palestinians in
order to make arrests were at most simultaneously aimed to deter others,
as well as to injure or kill the individual victim, that all the killings
cannot qualify for Schmid's definition which demands that the main
aim being the sending of a message. Those done in self-defence surely
do not fulfil Schmid and Jongman's definitional requirement in that the
main target is obviously the victim.
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Torture
A History. 
Unlike all of the other activities under review Israel has not produced
legislation which authorises a counter-terrorist policy called 'torture',
although according to some critics this is the actual outcome of other
pieces of its legislation. Here the focus is on the allegations of torture
during interrogation rather than during the period of incarceration
that follows sentencing by a court.
A few allegations of torture and ill treatment of Palestinian political
detainees began to appear three or four years after the 1967 occupation
of the West Bank 1005 . Then in June 1977 a report by the Sunday Times
'Insight' team1006 brought such allegations into the headlines of the
Western press. Based upon a review of dozens of files the Sunday Times
alleged that interrogators -especially those from the Shin Bet - used
methods such as confinement in small specially constructed cells1007,
repeated cold showers, beatings and electric shock to extract
information 1008 . Furthermore the Sunday Times claimed that it
constituted "systematic torture" for it "was organised so methodically
that it could not be dismissed as a handful of 'rogue cops' exceeding
009 .orders" 1 Whilst during the period 1977-79, the US consulate in
Jerusalem send 40 cables which reported the following practices.
Namely prolonged beatings; confinement in extremely small specially
constructed cells; hanging by the hands or feet; 'refrigeration' and
exposure to extremely hot temperatures; forced sleeplessness and food
deprivation; shackling in awkward positions; long periods of standing
with arms raised or in physically uncomfortable positions 1010 . In one
1005 B'Tselem. The lnterogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p32
1006 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. The Bitter Year Arabs Under
Israeli Occupation in 1982 . (American-Arab Anti -Discrimination Committee.
Washington DC. 1983.). p15.
1007 Phillips M. 'Torture for "Security". Unpublished paper. Al-Haq. Ramallah.1994.
p30.
1008 B'Tselem. The lnterogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p32
1009 Sunday Times cited by Phillips M. 'Torture for "Security". Unpublished paper.
Al-Hag. Ramallah.1994. p30
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of these cables sent in 1978 the Vice-Consul Alexandra Johnson reported
that "the post has assembled a body of first hand testimony indicating
that Israeli torture of Arab prisoners may be a systematic practice"1011.
During the 5 or 6 years following the Sunday Times report such
allegations were rarely made apparently because of the restraints
personally ordered by Prime Minister Begin 1012 , although allegations
that the police and I.D.F. used violence at the places of detention rather
than during interrogations were made 1013
 By 1984 the number of
allegations recorded by human rights groups and Palestinian lawyers
increased 1014 , and even Israel itself tried and convicted an Israeli
police interrogator for torturing a Palestinian teacher who had been
detained at Fara'a prison in the previous year1015.
However allegations of torture once again made the headlines of the
Western press following the publication of a report by a commission set
up by Israel itself following criticism of the 'Nafsu Affair' 1016 and the
'No. 300 Bus Affair' 1017 . The report of the Landau Commission set up to
investigate the role of the Shin Bet within these two scandals,
concluded that confessions it presented in court between 1967 and 1971
were obtained legally and in good faith. In contrast to the situation from
1971 onwards when the Shin Bet began to lie consistently to the courts,
1010 Phillips M. 'Torture for "Security". Unpublished paper. Al-Haq. Ramallah.1994.
p31. See reports on cables in Journal of Palestine Studies Vol IX No 2 Winter 1980
p80-117.
1011 Jerusalem 3239 cable cited by Phillips M. 'Torture for "Security". Unpublished
paper. Al-Haq. Ramallah.1994. p30-31.
1012 B'Tselem. The lnterogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p32.
1013 B'Tselem. The Interogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p32.
1014 B'Tselem. The Interogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p32.
1015 Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights reported that they were convicted of
grevious bodily harm. No name. Cited by American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee. Report on Israeli Human Rights Practices in the Occupied Territories for
1984. (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. Washington DC 1985.).p13-14.
101 6 In the so called Nafsu affair, a Cirassian Israeli army officer succesfully appealed
against his conviction for treason on the grounds that his original confession had been
extracted by force. His acquittal in May 1987, prompted the Landau report which was
set up in June 1987.
1017 This involved the beating to death of 2 Palestinians who had just been captured
after hijacking an Israeli bus, April 1984, and the scandal surrounding a subsequent
cover up.
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denying that it had used physical force to extract confessions1018 . More
controversially the Landau Commission agreed with the Shin Bet" s
position that without some form of physical pressure "effective
interrogation is inconceivable" 1019 , and therefore made
recommendations about the use of "moderate physical pressure" against
those suspected of hostile terrorist activity (H.T.A.). The
recommendations of the report were formally adopted by the Knesset on
8 November 1987 1020 and that has kept Israel's interrogation practices
under close scrutiny ever since.
Since then various human rights groups have made allegations
regarding Israeli interrogation techniques. For example in 1990 the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights noted "numerous and credible
reports of torture and ill-treatment" 1021 , The Israeli human rights
group B'Tselem produced a report based on interviews with 41 people
who had been interrogated by the Shin Bet between 1988 and 19901022.
Although not one of the sample was found guilty or even suspected of
serious 'hostile terrorist activity' to whom Landau envisaged its use1023,
many were accused of activities such as stone throwing, or raising the
Palestinian flag etc. B'Tselem found that:
1018 B'Tselem. The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p23.
1019 Paragraph Para 2.37 of the Landau Commission Report cited by B'Tselem. The
Interogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment "Moderate Physical
Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p24.
1020 Walfish A. 'Cabinet to Set Up Watchdog Group Over Shin Bet' Jerusalem Post. 9
Novemebr 1987. Cited by Phillips M. 'Torture for "Security". Unpublished paper. Al-
Hag. Ramallah.1994. p38.
1021 Lawyers Commitee for Human Rights Critique of U.S. State Department's annual
review of human rights in the Occupied Territories" Mid 1991 cited in B'Tselem. The
Interogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Follow Up to March 1991. B'Tselem
Report. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1992.). p39.Whilst in early 1990 Israel itself
sentenced two Shin Bet agents to 6 months imprisonment for "causing death by
negligence" by beating Khaled Sheikh 'Ali to death during his interrogation in Gaza
Central Prison in December 1989. B'Tselem. The Interrogation of Palestinians During
the Intifada: Ill-treatment "Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. March 1991.). p43.
1022 B'Tselem. The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.).
p106.
1023 B'Tselem. The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Follow Up to
March 1991. B'Tselem Report. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1992.). p8.
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"Virtually all our sample were subject to; verbal abuse, humiliation and threats of
injury; sleep and food deprivation; hooding for prolonged periods; enforced space,
hands bound behind the back and legs tied ("al Shabah"); being bound in other
painful ways (such as the "banana" position); prolonged periods of painful
confinement in small, specially constructed cells (the "closet" or "refrigerator"
and severe and prolonged beating on all parts of the body, (resulting sometimes in
injuries requiring medical treatment)" 1024•
Other methods included the use of violence by collaborators planted in
detention cells. B rTselem estimated that during the intifada some 1,600
per year would undergo intense interrogation, "including some
combination of the practices" described above1025.
In 1991 Amnesty complained that torture or ill-treatment was "virtually
institutionalised" 1026  After studying scores of affidavits and
testimonies from a variety of detainees, lawyers and local human rights
groups and sometimes even medical reports and the results of official
investigation Amnesty concluded that the substantive evidence
available indicated the existence of a clear pattern of systematic
psychological and physical ill-treatment, constituting torture or other
forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment", inflicted upon
detainees during the course of investigation. Methods used on "a
systematic scale" included:
"hooding with a dirty sack, sometimes wet, which often hinders breathing, and
sleep and food deprivation while held in solitary confinement. Also typically used
are prolonged bondage in plastic or metal handcuffs usually in painful positions (a
practice called shabah) and being confined in a very small and darkened cells
referred to as "closets" or "coffins", as well as in small cold cells called
"refrigerators'. Beatings all over the body, often severe and sometimes
concentrated on sensitive areas such as the genitals, are also inflicted with
relative frequency. Other methods include burning with cigarettes; prolonged
1024 B'Tselem. The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.).
p106.
1025 B'Tselem. The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: III-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.).
p107.
1026 Amnesty International. Israel aand the Occupied Territories (Amnesty London.
July 1991.) B'Tselem. The Interogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Follow Up to
March 1991. B'Tselem Report. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1992.). p39. 326
denial of access to toilets; verbal abuse an threats of various kinds; and forms of
sexual harassment particularly with women detainees" 1O27
The U.S. State department in a report issue in early 1992, noted that
international, Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups published
detailed credible reports of torture, abuse and mistreatment of
Palestinian detainees in prisons and detention centres in the previous
year. It also use the term "credible" to describe the Palestinian Human
Rights Information Centre's allegation of eight cases of electric shock
in Hebron military headquarters mainly in April 1991
Finally the Palestinian human rights group Al-Haq interviewed 708
people in a random who had been detained by the Israeli's between 1988
and May 1992. From this they concluded that 855 of those Palestinians
taken into custody were subject to "torture or ill-treatment", a figure
that rises to 94% for those interrogated 1029. They suggested that 6.8% of
the 234 interrogated detainees in the sample received electric
shocks1030.
The Legalities. 
According to the Landau Commission "effective interrogation of
terrorist suspects is impossible without the use of means of
1027 Amnesty Intenational Israel and the Occupied Territories: The Military justice
System in the Occupied territories: Detention, Interrogation and Trial Procedures.
(London:Amnesty International July 1991) cited by B'Tselem. The lnterogation of
Palestinians During the Intifada: Follow Up to March 1991 B'Tselem Report. (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. March 1992.). p38. Also allegations from some of the 15 Jewish settlers in
the Underground Organization September 1994, milder pushing, but sacks over head,
verbal abuse, being shoved food, medical deprivation. B'Tselem. Torture During
lnterogations. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. 1994.). pl 2.
1028citing "Backgrounder:" State department Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1991: Israeli and the Occupied Territories (U.S. Information Service:
American consulate General, Jerusalem). Also Palestinian Human Rights Information
Centre. Israel's Use of Electric Shock Torture in the Interogation of Palestinian
Detainees (PHRIC. Jerusalem. December. 1991). B'Tselem. The Interogation of
Palestinians During the Intifada: Follow Up to March 1991 B'Tselem Report. (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. March 1992.). p40.
1029 Phillips M. 'Torture for "Security". Unpublished paper. Al-Haq. Ramallah.1994.
p11 and for details of the West Bank only see p 51
1030 Phillips M. 'Torture for "Security". Unpublished paper. Al-Haq. Ramallah.1994.
p13.
1028.
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pressure u 1031 .
 The pressure under which members of the Shin Bet had
put those suspected of hostile terrorist activity or political subversion
were characterised by "cases of criminal assault, blackmail and
threats" 1 0 3 2. Moreover the Commission went on to say that: the
interrogator who employed such measures could justly claim "that he
was obeying the orders of his superior and these orders were not
clearly illegal" 1033; and moreover that:
"Interrogation of this kind is permissible under the law as we interpreted it and
we think that a confession thus obtained is admissible in a criminal trial, under
the existing rulings of the Supreme court"1034
More specifically the Landau Commission noted that:
"the great evil of Hostile Terrorist Activity justifies countermeasures such as the
need to act in the sense of Sec[tion] 22 [of the Israeli Penal Code] not only when the
perpetrator of (terrorist) activity is actually imminent, but also when it exists
potentially such that it is liable to occur at any time" 1035W
The Commission wrote that the means of pressure should: "principally
take the form of non-violent psychological pressure through a vigorous
and extensive interrogation, with the use of stratagems, including acts
of deception". However, the Commission also noted that: "when these do
not attain their purpose, the exercise of a moderate measure of physical
pressure cannot be avoided" 1036 . It then attempted to limit the effect of
1031 Paragraph 4.6 of Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of
Interrogation of the General Securtiy Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity'
(Israel Government Press Office. 30 October 1987).
1032 Paragraph 4.20 of Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of
Interrogation of the General Securtiy Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity'
(Israel Government Press Office. 30 October 1987).
1033 Paragraph 4.20 of Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of
Interrogation of the General Securtiy Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity'
(Israel Government Press Office. 30 October 1987).
1034 Paragraph 4.6 of Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of
Interrogation of the General Securtiy Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity'
(Israel Government Press Office. 30 October 1987).
1035 Paragraph 4.13 of Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of
Interrogation of the General Securtiy Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity'
(Israel Government Press Office. 30 October 1987).
1036 Paragraph Para 4.7 of the Landau Commission Report cited by B'Tselem. The
lnterogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment "Moderate Physical
Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p25. 328
this by writing that: "the pressure must never reach the level of
physical torture or the maltreatment of the suspect or grievous harm to
his honour that deprives him of his human dignity" 1037
The Landau Commission did not address the issue of whether the law
prior to the introduction of the Criminal Code 1977 legalised the use of
such "moderate physical pressure". However the difference between
Section 18 of the Criminal Code 1936 and Section 22 of the Penal Code
1977 is negligible in this respect. The former read:
"An act or omission which would otherwise be an offence may be excused if the
person accused can show that it was done or omitted to be done only in order to
avoid consequences which could not otherwise be avoided, and which if they had
followed would have inflicted grievous harm or injury to his person or to his
honour or his property or to the person or honour of others whom he was bound to
protect or to property placed in his charge:
Provided that in so acting he did no more than was reasonably necessary for that
purpose, and that the harm inflicted by the act or omission was not
disproportionate to the harm avoided" 1038
This was replaced in 1977 by the Penal Law, Section 22 of the latter
stated:
"A person may be exempted from criminal responsibility for an act or omission if
he can show that it was only done or made in order to avoid consequences that
could not otherwise be avoided and which would have inflicted grievous injury or
harm to his person, honour or property, or to the person or honour of others whom
he was bound to protect, or to the property placed in his charge"
1037 Paragraph Para 3.16 of the Landau Commission Report cited by B'Tselem. The
lnterogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment "Moderate Physical
Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p26.
1038 "A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if he does or omits
to do the act under any of the following circumstances, that is to say:-
(a) in execution of the law;
(b) in obedience to the order of a competent authority which he is bound by law to obey,
unless the order is manifestly unlawful.
Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful is a question of law"Section 19
'Justification' The Criminal Code Bill 1936 Draft Ordinance pp973-1066. The Palestine
Gazette 25th Spetember 1936. p979 . 329
Provided that he did no more than was reasonably necessary for that purpose, and
that the harm caused by him was not disproportionate to the harm avoided."1039
This in turn was altered on 18 March 1992 1040 . Section 22(a) of the
Penal Law (Amendment No. 37.) stated that an individual was exempted
from criminal responsibility if s/he carried out an act or acts:
"which were immediately necessary in order to prevent the danger of grievous
harm to his or another's life, liberty, person or property, stemming from a given
situation provided he had no other way to prevent it and that the harm he caused
was not disproportionate to the harm he wished to prevent".1041
In contrast there are various reasons put forward as to why the use of
moderate physical pressure has not be legalised as Landau claimed. One
is a narrower interpretation of necessity. Professor Kremintzer for
example claimed that one reason to reject the acceptance of this
interpretation is that the paragraph is qualified by there being no
other way to deal with the situation, another is that the use of pressure
is not proportionate to the evil which we want to prevent 1042 . Critics
have also cited Article 277 of the Penal Code 1977 which specified that:
"a public servant who does one of the following is liable to imprisonment for three
years: (1) uses or directs the use of force or violence against a person for the
purpose of extorting from him or from anyone in whom he is interested a
confession of an offence or information relating to an offence; (2) threatens any
person, or directs any person to be threatened, with injury to his person or
property or to the person or property of anyone in whom he is interested for the
purpose of extorting from him a confession of an offence or any information
relating to an offence".
1039 A slightly different translation is cited by B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover
Units in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). p23. They note
that this also contained the rules on the 'defence of necessity'.
1040 Stein Y. Interview with this author. B'Tselem, Jerusalem. May-June 1995.
1041 B'Tselem. Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories
(B'Tselem. Jerusalem. May 1992.). p23. The law now differentiate between 'self-
defence' and the 'defence of necessity' which was now contained in section 22(a).
1042 Professor Kreminitzer cited in a debate. Public Committee Against Torture in
Israel. Moderate Physical Pressure: Interrogation Methods in Israel. (Symposim
Following the Landau Commision Report. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel.
Jerusalem. 1990.). p16 330
This latter law applies to all those living in Israel itself as well as Israeli
citizens in the occupied territories are subject to Israeli law irrespective
of the identity of the victim 1043 . It has also been argued that any
confessions obtained in such a manner would be deemed in admissible.
Unfortunately for the critics, Article 9 of Military Order No.378 states:
"a Military Court is authorized to deviate from the laws of evidence for
special reasons which shall be recorded, if it seems necessary to do
son1044
The Application Of The Various Definitions Of (State) 
Terrorism. 
Before attempting to assess the allegations of torture in relation to the
six definitions it is useful to note that for various authors -including
two-thirds of the 120 academics who answered my questionnaire- the
use of torture constitutes terrorism by those in power. This however
does not mean that the respondents would have labelled the practices
allegedly carried out by Israeli security forces as torture.
The first important question to be answered in applying my definition
is whether the acts of torture are illegal. Here the author is considering
the interpretation given by the Landau Commission rather than the fact
that Israel has also signed and ratified the Convention Against Torture
and Other Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, the Universal
Declaration of Human Right; the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Right; the Geneva Conventions IV, all of which outlaw
torture 1045 . Unfortunately the assessment is not helped by the fact that
1043  B'Tselem. The Interogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p17.
1044 B'Tselem. The lnterogation of Palestinians During the Intifada: Ill-treatment
"Moderate Physical Pressure" or Torture?. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. March 1991.). p18.
1045 Israel signed the C.A.T. 22 October 1986 and ratified it on 4 August 1991.
Article 2 dclared: "1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction. 2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture. 3. An order from a superior officer or a public
authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture." Israel signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Right 19 Dec 1966, and ratified it on 18
August 1991, Article 7 of which states; "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degradinent or punishment."Article 5 of the U.D.H.R. states "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 331
the issue is far from clarified, and until the H.C.J. rules on the issue the
easiest way of addressing the question is to examine both the potential
answers in terms of Israeli law. Although if one does take the view that
Article 35 of the 0.C.S.R. introduced the G.C.I.V. into the region of the
West Bank on 7 June (before it was rescinded on 22 October 1967) then
any such use of torture would definitely be illegal for it breachs
Articles 31 and 32 1046 . However if the G.C.I.V. were in place during
these few months, any torture that occurred in the West Bank could
qualify for this author's label. However even then the intention of the
torturer would have had to have also been to deter others in order for
this use of violence qualify. It is theoretically possible that the Israeli's
might want to deter stone throwers for example by this form of
violence, but it is highly unlikely given the relative difficulty of
capturing and torturing the individual as opposed to simply giving
them a beating, or inflicting pain via the use of rubber bullets etc..
If the Landau Commission was correct in claiming that the defence of
necessity in the 1977 (and presumably the 1936, and 1992) versions of
the criminal law had legalised this use of violence, then such acts of
torture would probably not constitute state terrorism in accordance
with this authors' definition because the use of 'moderate physical
pressure' would only be legal when used to acquire information (to find
the elusive ticking bomb!). It seems highly unlikely that the torturer
could possess the dual aim of gathering information and deterring
others on the odd occasion that necessity arose. Any individual member
of the security forces carrying out torture purely for this latter reason
would be acting illegally and his or her actions would therefore qualify
as an act of terrorism in accordance with this author's definition.
punishment". In terms of customary international law, Article 6(b) of the Nuremburg
Principles declared "deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied teritory" as a "war crime", it also declares that "ill-
treatment" of civilians of an occupied region as such. Alternatively torture may be
covered by article 6(c) which puts "other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population" under the title Crime against Humanity.
1046 Article 35 of the 0.S.C.R 1967 stated: "35. A military court and the
administrative service of a military court shall apply the provisions of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War of 12 August 1949 in
all that relates to judicial proceedings, and in case of conflict between this Order and
the said Convention, the provisions of the convention shall prevail". Commission on
human rights 26th sesson, Report of the Special Working Group of Experts Established
Under Resolution 6 (X0(V) of the Commission on human rights" UN/E/CN.4/1016/
Add.3. p17. 332
Likewise if Landau was wrong, and the 'defence of necessity' did not
legalise the use of 'moderate physical force' once the suspect was in
custody, then all of the violent practices noted would be illegal and
could therefore constitute acts of (state) terrorism in accordance with
this author's definition. However even then, such actions would qualify
only if their aim was to influence a larger target audience. Again it is
theoretically possible that the Israeli's might want to deter stone
throwers for example by this form of violence, but it is highly unlikely
given the relative difficulty of inflicting pain in this way.
Whatever the legality of the policy "moderate physical pressure", its use
by the Israeli state qualifies for the label of terrorism in accord with
the British definition for the Prevention of Terrorism Act. This is
because the British P.T.A. requires merely the "use of violence for
political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of
putting...any section of the public" i.e. the victim in fear". It is difficult
to deny that the aim of such force is to strike fear into the suspect so
that they will give up certain information. It is on this basis that acts of
"moderate physical pressure" constitute acts of terrorism in accordance
with Stohl and Lopez's definition for even when the torture accidentally
leads to death it fulfils the requirements of being a "purposeful act or
threat of violence" designed "to create fear and/or compliant behaviour
in a victim" of the act or threat1047 . Similarly the use of torture by
Israel's security forces would constitute acts of terrorism in accord with
the definition derived from Israel's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance,
for it requires only acts of violence that are calculated to cause death or
injury to a person.
Whether the Israeli actions fulfil the U.S. definition is more debatable.
Putting the requirement of being "usually" intended to influence an
audience to one side, Shin Bee's use of "moderate physical pressure' is
certainly "premeditated and politically motivated violence". The debate
is where the victim is a non-combatant target and whether Shin Bet
1047 Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The
State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport. Conecticut. 1984.).pp3-10.p7. 333
agents are clandestine agents 1048 . If the answer is 'yes' to both then the
actions qualify as acts of terrorism under the U.S. definition. This of
course depends on one's view of non-combatants and clandestine. The
answer to the first of these two questions can be considered as 'yes' on
the grounds that Israel applies the laws of the land rather than the laws
of war (and even if it had applied the latter the suspect has
surrendered). The answer to the second can be considered yes, either on
the grounds that Shin Bet is not legally constituted in Israeli law, or on
the basis of individual accountability for the members of Shin Bet use
false names. Otherwise the answer is no if either of these answers to
these latter questions is 'no'.
The question of the clandestine nature of the perpetrator is also
important to the application of Schmid and Jongman's definition which
requires that the perpetrator of the politically motivated violence is
"(semi-) clandestine". The author's view that the Shin Bet fulfil these
criteria is even stronger here. However the use of 'moderate physical
pressure' in order to extract vital information from suspected terrorists
does not meet Schmid's demand that the main use of the violence is to
generate a message to others, for surely the main intention is to gain
information. It is possible that the torturers carrying out such action
for other reason such as sending a message to stone throwers etc. by
this form of violence, but as already noted this is highly unlikely.
1048 U.S. State Department. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993. (Department of State
Publication 10136, Office of the Secretary Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism.) states "For purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant" is
interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the
incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks
on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military
hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe or
elsewhere". 334
Deportations. 
A History.
Deportation (or 'expulsion' or 'exile') is generally defined as the
compulsory departure of an individual from the country of which he or
she is a national, and implies the compulsory loss of that person's
national right 1049 . The policy of deportation was introduced into
Palestine by the British who deported Arabs to the Seychelles and Jews
to Africa (including members of the Irgun in 1944) 1050 . However it was
through its incorporation of a newer piece of Mandate legislation -that
of the D.E.R. 1945- that the Israeli's introduced the policy of deportation
into Israel 1947, and into the West Bank twenty years later.
Generally speaking up until 9 November 1969 deportations of
inhabitants of the West Bank were carried out across the bridges of the
River Jordan. After this date, the Jordanian authorities prevented such
deportations, and from then on the Israeli's took the deportees to the
Arava -the desert between the Dead Sea and Eilat- where they were
dispatched across the border near to a Jordanian army or police station
in the East Bank. Then from 1974 the deportees were sent into
Lebanon1051.
Since 1967 the Israelis have deported two distinct groups for 'counter-
terrorist' reasons. The first are those political leaders who the Israeli's
deem to have been active in fomenting acts of civil disobedience or
encouraging 'terrorist' action i.e. incitement 1052 . The second are those
1049 Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza.
(Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man). Ramallah.1986) Occasional Paper No. 2 1986. p2.
1050 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deporation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993) p15. Unfortunately
B'Tselem do not explain under which piece of legislaton this was carried out. O'Brien
notes that two future prime ministers of Israel were deported, namely Ben-Gurion and
Shamir. O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p256.
1051 The whole paragraph is based upon Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied
Territories 1967-82. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p105-6. If it
were not for the fact that the Israeli's dispute the status of the administered territory
of the West Bank the view that those who were deported were only moved from one
part of Jordan to another, might be credible.
1052 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories 1967-82. (Manchester
University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p104. Maj. Gen (Res.). Gazit former Coordinator
of activities in the Territories, noted that israel "employed deportation against those 335
'terrorists' imprisoned for very long periods whose release the Israelis
believe would entail a serious security risk 1053 . Many of the latter had
signed an agreement to leave country for ever, in return for a
shortened prison sentence 1054 . This classification of those deportations
undertaken in order to 'counter-terrorism' into two groups is in line
with Israeli views on the topic. In contrast, Palestinian sources
complain that the Israeli's deport inhabitants of the West Bank who
cannot prove they are native for one reason or another including
Israel's refusal to issue identity cards to those concerned 1055 . This
deportation of 'infiltrators' was omitted because it is considered to be the
equivalent of a state deporting aliens rather than the nationals of the
land over whom the state claims the authority to rule.
Between September 1967 until early 1970 organisers of protests,
petitions and strikes against both the annexation of East Jerusalem and
changes in the educational, religious and legal systems were
who were involved or tried to be involved, in political activity" Ha'aret, January 17,
1992 cited by B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and
the Mass Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p28. He
also wrote that in September 1967, an order prohibiting incitement in the West Bank
was published. The order barred "the holding of a procession or a meeting without the
permission of the Military Commander, prohibited the raising of flags and political
symbols without authorization, and banned the printing and/or publication of an
announcement, placard, photograph, pamphlet or any printed matter with political
significance, without permission from the Military Comander"..."Thus was created the
legal foundation for the various punitive measures. The first was punitive exile" Gazit
S. The Stick and the Carrot. (Hebrew) p275. cited by B'Tselem. Deportation of
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass Deportation of December
1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p29.
1053 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories 1967-82. (Manchester
University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p104.
1054 Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza.
(Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man). Occasional Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p1.
1055 An examination of the military orders catalogued by the J.M.C.C. reveals that
Military Order 207 of 24 January 1968 required everyone to present an identity card
when asked by a member of the security forces. Rabah J. and Fairweather N. Israeli
Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-1992. (2nd.Ed. Jersualem
Media and Communications Centre. Jersualem. 1995.). p28. According to Hilterman,
Military Order No.329 of 1969, the 'Order Concerning Prevention of Infiltration (West
Bank)', regulate the status of Palestinians who are said to have entered the area from
outside without having obtained a permit to do so from the Israeli authorities.
Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. (Al-Haq
(Law in the Service of Man). Occasional Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p20. According
to Al-Haq on 17th August 1988, three Trade Union leaders were issued with
deportation orders while in administrative detention in Ansar III along with 22 others.
All of them were "accused retroactively" of membership in popular committees which
were not allowed outlawed until 18 August the following day. Al-Haq Punishing The
Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising. Dec.1987-Dec.1988
.(South End Press. Boston. 1990.). pl 25. 336
depor ted 1056 . In the initial period "a large number" of political
activists 10 5 7
 were deported from the West Bank for their purported
allegiance to Jordan. Those who publicly expressed opposition to Israeli
rule in the administered territories were also targeted, including
schoolteachers and principles who protested against censorship of
textbooks or organised strikes 1058 . Rekhess and Susser estimate that
such deportations from the West Bank decimated both the pro-Jordanian
elite and the radical activists 1059 . Following a period of calm on the
West Bank from 1970 to 1973, the deportations were resumed with the
renewal of the strikes and protests, only to die down again following the
public outcry, at both home and abroad, that surrounded the deportation
of two mayoral candidates in the April 1976 West Bank municipal
elections before the Supreme Court could actually hold a scheduled
hearing on the matter 1060 . In contrast to over eleven hundred people
being expelled during the first decade 1061 , between 1977 to 1979 there
1056 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories 1967-82. (Manchester
University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p104.
1057 B'Tselem citing Ha'aretz January 17 1992.B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians
from the Occupied Territories and the Mass Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. June 1993.). p18.
1058 Cited by Ha'aretz January 17 1992. B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from
the Occupied Territories and the Mass Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. June 1993.). p18. Also In the words of Shlomo Gazit Gazit former
Coordinator of activities in the Territories: "We employed deportation against those
who were involved or tried to be involved, in political activity. We did not want to deal
with political activists in Court. That would embarrass us. It was inconvenient for us,
so we decided to get rid of them, and it proved itself. After a few deportations the
level of political activity declined". Cited by Ha'aretz January 17 1992. B'Tselem.
Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass Deportation of
December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p28.
1059 Paper by Rekhess and Susser of the Shiloah Centre for Middle Eastern Studies,
Tel Aviv University. December 1974, on the effects of deportation, cited by Cohen E.
Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories 1967-82. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p104.
1060 The two, Dr Ahmed Hamzi el-Natshe and Dr Abdul Aziz Haj-Ahmed, were
deported on 27 March. Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories 1967-
82. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.). pl 04.
1061 B'Tselem have a list of figures of punitive deporations of Palestinian residents of
the Occupied Territores1967-6,1968-22, 1969-37, 1970-3 -785, 1974-96, 1975-
40, 1976-3, 1977-0, 19780, 1979-1, 1980-3, 1981-0, 1982-0, 1983-0, 1984-1,
1985-29, 1986-10, No 19787 mentioned, 1988-32, 1989-26, 1990-0, 1991-8,
1992-415 The data are taken from reply of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon to a
parliamentary interpellation by MK Mordechai Virshuvsky: "How many deportation
orders against residents of the territories] were issued in the period [from the Six day
waruntil December 1982]?" Knesset Record Vo195, 1983 p1145. The data relate not to
actual deportations, but to orders issued. Data for 1982-87 are taken from PHIRIC
press release; "A History of Expulsion" December 17, 1992, and reflect the number of
actual deportations. The data applying to the period from the start of the Intifada are 337
were no deportations, chiefly because of the opposition of the Prime
Minister Menachem Begin 1062 . In 1979 his government replaced the
D.E.R. within Israel itself, with the 'Emergency Powers (Detention) Law'
which did not allow for deportation. Since then until September 1984
when Yitzhak Rabin, the then Defence Minister in the National Unity
Government, revived the use of the policy in the West Bank only a
handful of deportations from the administered areas were carried
out 1063 . Although Hofnung suggests that during this period of a Likud
government "the authorities began turning a blind eye towards
punishment meted out by Israeli settlers on the local population" and
numerous military units used methods interpreted as collective
punishments 1064 . In a cabinet session on 4 August 1985, the Israeli
government decided to revive deportation along with "other long-
dormant measures" in order to "clamp down on terrorism and
incitement in the administered areas." 1065 . According to the then
Minister of Defence Yitzhak Rabin:
"Those who are caught preparing, organising or carrying out terrorist acts -those
people ought to be brought to court. But for those who instigate and call for
participation in terror, even though they themselves are not active, administrative
detention or deportation are the most effective means to cope with them, and I will
not hesitate to use these measures. Not on a large scale, but mainly as a
deterrent"1066
provided by B'Tselem. B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied
Territories and the Mass Deporation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June
1993.). p17 Ftn 15 . For other estimates see Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli
Occupied Territories 1967-82. (Manchester University Press. Manchester.
1985.).pl 06.; Al-Haq Punishing The Nation: Human Rights Violations During the
Palestinian Uprising. Dec.1987-Dec.1988 .(South End Press. Boston. 1990.).pl 24.;
O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.).
p255.
1062 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied territories and the Mass
Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). pl 8.
1063 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied territories and the Mass
Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p18.
1064 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.
Aldershot. 1996.). p265.
1065 Jerusalem Post. 5 Aug.1985. Cited by Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy
In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. (Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man). Occasional
Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p1.
1 0 66 Jerusalem Post. 23 Aug 85. Cited by Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy
In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. (Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man). Occasional
Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p85. 338
B i t-selem estimated that more than 1,000 Palestinians were deported in
the first twenty years of Israel's occupation of the territories. The
outbreak of the intifada led to an increase in the number of
deportations and the government stated its intention to expel persons
leading the uprising 1067 . With the marked increase in the use of
deportations during the intifada came an increase in the number of
appeals and protracted hearings on petitions submitted to the High
Court of Justice by deportation candidates. In light of these, the security
establishment began questioning the effectiveness of deportations as a
deterrent. As a result of this questioning, and the failure to come up
with any acceptable means of reducing the number of appeals against
them, the use of deportation orders declined. In between August 1988
and January 1991 no orders were carried out 1 0 6 8, and only 66
deportations were carried out within the slightly longer period of
December 1987 to December 17 1992, whilst eleven deportation orders
were rescinded and replaced by administrative detention orders in
August of 1992 1069 . However on December 17 1992 Israel deported 415
individual Palestinians of the occupied territories 1070 , 280 of whom
were residents of the West Bank 1071 . Sixteen of whom the Israelis
admitted were mistakenly deported 1072 . Finally it is worth noting
Hofnung's observation that despite Settler violence "no Jewish settler
1067 National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank
and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New
York.1988.). p61. The N.L.G. go on to note the explusions of 10 trade unionists,
journalists, students and businessmen who it said were uprising organisimg, citing P.
Bennis 'Dual Power Emerging in Israel's Occupied territories' Frontline. Aug. 1. 1988.
p13.
1068 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deporation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p19.
1069 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deporation of December 1992.  (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.) p20.
1070 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deporation of December 1992.  (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.) p20.
1071 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
peporation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p7.
1072 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deporation of December 1992.  (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p54.
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has ever been deported from the Territories" 1073, whilst no residents of
Israel have been deported during this whole period 1967-19941074.
The Legalities. 
Israel's deportations of residents (as opposed to aliens 1075) from both
Israel and the West Bank were authorised by Regulation 112 (and 108) of
the D.E.R. until the Emergency Powers Act (Detentions) 1076
 abolished
the practice within Israel in 1979.
In addition in 1992 the Order Concerning Temporary Deportations
(Emergency Provisions) (Judea/Samaria) (No.1381) was issued by which
280 residents of the West Bank were deported within a group of 415
'personal' orders. However whilst this new enabling legislation was
later deemed "null and void" by the H.C.J. the deportations were not, for
the military order had also authorised 'temporary deportation orders'
under Regulation 112(1) 1077 . The latter of which declared that:
"The High Commissioner of Palestine shall have power to make an order under his
hand (hereinafter in these regulations referred to as a "Deportation Order") for
the deportation of any person from Palestine. A person in respect of whom a
1073 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.
Aldershot. 1996.). p264.Although he notes that in a few cases, restriction orders have
been issued against Jewish settlers, who were then not allowed to enter a defined area
or particular town.
1074 Based upon Hofnung's claim that no one had been deported since 1954. Hofnung M.
Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth. Aldershot. 1996.). p264.
1075 According to Hilterman, Military Order No.329 of 1969, the 'Order Concerning
Prevention of Infiltration (West Bank)', regulate the status of Palestinians who are said
to have entered the area from outside without having obtained a pent to do so from the
Israeli authorities.Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy In the Occupied West Bank
and Gaza. (Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man). Occasional Paper No. 2.
Ramallah.1986.). p20.
1076 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deporation of December 1992.(B'Iselem. Jerusalem. June 1993). p16.
1077 B'Tselem Deportaion of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deporation of December 1992. (Jerusalem. June 1993.) p p44. In addition nearly a
month later an amendment No 1384 in the West Bank cancelled Section 49(a) of the
former and gave the appeals committee authority to determine if its proceedings would
be held in camera. B'Tselem Deportaion of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories
and the Mass Deporation of December 1992. (Jerusalem. June 1993.) p75 and generally
for opinions that the Order was illegal. 340
Deportation Order has been made shall remain out of Palestine so long as the Order
remains in force" 1078
The only limitation to which was provided by Regulation 108, which
read that such:
"An order shall not be made by the High Commissioner [today the Israeli Minister
of Defence] or by a Military Commander, as the case may be, if he is of the opinion
that it is necessary or expedient to make the order for securing the public safety,
the defence of Palestine, the maintenance of public order or the suppression of
mutiny, rebellion or riot"1079
As noted earlier the legality of Israel's policy of deportation has been
challenged both on the grounds that the incorporation of D.E.R. into
both Israel and the West Bank was illegal, and because Article 9(1) of
the Jordanian constitution outlawed deportation of the native
inhabitants from the West Bank 1080 . In addition its use in the West
Bank has been challenged on the grounds that it is "generally agreed"
that the prohibition of deportation in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention "should be interpreted strictly as prohibiting all
deportations, whatever the reasons" 1081 . Whilst Article 6(b) of the
Nuremberg Principles declared "deportation to slave labour or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory" as a
"war crime".
In the deportation process, formal charges are not brought against the
deportee and no trial is held 1082 . There is however, both a right to
appeal to an appeals board and to appeal as well as to the High Court of
Justice. The recommendations of the former 'military objections
1078 Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza.
(Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man).Occasional Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p10.
1079 Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza.
(Al-Ha q (Law in the Service of Man).Occasional Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p9. As
amended until 2nd March 1945.
1080 See second Kawasme case noted by Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada' and the
Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p54.
1081 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P256.
1082 Al-Haq. Punishing A Nation: Human Rights Violations During The Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p126. 341
committee' are not binding 1 083 ,
 and the H.C.J. merely seeks to ascertain
whether the commander has stayed within the limits of the powers
granted by law 1084 . There is no right to see evidence on which the
expulsion order is based 1085 , and at no point does the Court publicly
inquire into the substance of the allegations. Instead it merely addresses
the question of whether it was issued in good faith. Writing in December
1988, Al-Haq wrote that the H.C.J. has not overturned a single
deportation order1086.
The Application Of the Various Definitions of (State) 
Terrorism. 
'Counter-terrorist' deportations fulfil many of the qualifications
necessary to gain the label of state terrorism under this author's
definition. As with all the various acts under scrutiny within this
chapter they involve the use or threat of violence. Secondly there
seems little doubt that the Israeli defence forces, police and Shin Bet
constitute either organisations in themselves, or form part of the
organisation known as the State of Israel. Following this, one must ask
'is the act of deportations politically motivated?'. The answer is 'yes', for
even if one disputes that all laws are politically motivated and reflect
political choices, then surely one would acknowledge that those used to
counter (political) terrorism are.
However the fulfilling of these three criteria does not automatically
make the actions of a state terrorist, for the policy of deportation is
authorised by the Defence (Emergency) Regulations. Although here it is
1083 Al-Haq. Punishing A Nation: Human Rights Violations During The Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p126.
1084 Al-Haq. Punishing A Nation: Human Rights Violations During The Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p126.
1085 N.L.G. cite J.Hiltermann, 'Israel's Deportation Policy in the Occupied West Bank
and Gaza' Palestine Yearbook of Internatonal Law'. Vol. 3. pl 34. ppl 82-83. National
Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza:
Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New York.1988.). p62.
Similarly Al-Haq wrote, "[B]oth the defendant and his or her lawyer are routinely
denied access to it , this making its refutation an impossible task". Al-Haq. Punishing A
Nation: Human Rights Violations During The Palestinian Uprising (December 1987-
December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p126.
1086A1-Haq. Punishing A Nation: Human Rights Violations During The Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p126. 342
worth noting that it is "generally agreed" that the prohibition of
deportation in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention "should be
interpreted strictly as prohibiting all deportations, whatever the
reasons" 1087 and as such any deportations which occurred in the West
Bank during June-October 1967 would be illegal if one believed the
G.C.I.V. were in force then. As a result any such deportations would
qualify for this author's label of state terrorism for the aim of such
actions was also to deter others.
As for the period October 1967- May 1994, when deportation was
definitely legal it would be also necessary to show that the State's
violence was either, retrospective in its effects; so vague as to be
unavoidable; based on ascribed criteria such as skin colour which one
could not possibly change; or did not allow the victim to prove their
innocence at a judicial trial. Deportation under the D.E.R. fulfils the
latter criteria. The individual victim of this non-judicial measure has
not been 'punished' in the classical sense of the term, for the State has
no intention of bring the victim to trial in order to prove their guilt. In
this way s/he will have been the arbitrary victim of the State's violence
based merely on the 'opinion' of the relevant Israeli commander of the
area, and qualifies for the attachment of the label "innocent" for they
could not avoid the actions of the State.
Here it is worth noting that if there have been any retrospective
deportations, as was allegedly the case with both the three
administrative detainees in Ansar III who were deported after being
"accused retroactively of membership in popular committees" 1088 on
17 August 1988; and the three who were deported before their
deportation orders were issued during the mass deportation 1089
 of
December 1992, these too could constitute state terrorism precisely for
that reason that they were retrospective. The Association of Civil Rights
in Israel also claimed that the Order Concerning Temporary
Deportations (Emergency Provisions) (Judea/Samaria) (No.1381) 1992
was not published before the mass deportation of 415 individuals were
1087 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) .
 P256.
1088,41-Ha q. Punishing A Nation: Human Rights Violations During The Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p125.
1089 B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the Mass
Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June 1993.). p49. 343
carried out under it 1090 . Finally it is worth noting their claim that
since 1980 the D.E.R. does not apply to Israel and therefore any
deportation of individuals from gaols or detention camps within Israel
were illegal as allegedly occurred during the mass deportation in
December 19921091.
In addition to these various requirements the final hurdle that needs to
be cleared by all of the examples, is that the act of politically motivated
violence must have been designed to influence the behaviour of others
or as the definition puts it, "wider than the immediate 'innocent'
victim(s)". Again if one is not convinced that all laws aim to do this then
this criterion is surely fulfilled by Rabin's statement that he would not
hesitate to use deportations "as a deterrent" 1092 . It is on the basis of
fulfilling each stage of the process of applying the definition that
deportations carried out in accord with the D.E.R. that Israel's counter-
terrorist deportations can be described as acts of state terrorism
according to this author's definition.
So what about the other definitions, do deportations qualify as acts of
state terrorism in accordance with them?. The U.K.'s Prevention of
Terrorism Act merely requires that the violence be politically
motivated, which it is. Stohl and Lopez's definition requires that the
intent of the political violence was to place a victim and/or audience in
fear. Even if one does not agree with the claim that all of a State's laws
do, it certainly seems to be the case with this counter-terrorist policy, a
fact implicitly acknowledged by Rabin who said that he would use
deportations "as a deterrent" 1093 The policy would also qualify under
the definition derived from Israel's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance,
as the means of deportation imply a threat of acts of violence calculated
1090 A.C.R.I cited by B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied
Territories and the Mass Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tseiem. Jerusalem. June
1993.). p80.
1091 A.C.R.I cited by B'Tselem. Deportation of Palestinians from the Occupied
Territories and the Mass Deportation of December 1992. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. June
1993.). p80.
1092Jerusalem Post. 23 Aug 85. Cited by Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy
In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. (Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man). Occasional
Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p85.
1093Jerusalem Post. 23 Aug 85. Cited by Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy
In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. (Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man).Occasional
Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p85. 394
to cause injury or death to those resisting the deportation. Alternatively
one could claim that deportation is not implicitly intended to contain
such violence, but consistency would then demand that kidnappings
carried out by insurgents would not qualify.
However such deportations carried out by Israel in accordance with the
laws in force in either Israel or the West Bank do not constitute acts of
terrorism under either Schmid and Jongman's definition of terrorism,
or that held by the U.S. State department. This is because deportations
are carried out overtly by the Israeli state, which means that this threat
of political violence does not meet the requirement of being carried out
by either sub-national groups or (at least semi-) clandestine agents.
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Demolitions and Sealings of Buildings.
A History. 
The policy of demolishing buildings from which insurgent violence
emanated was introduced into Palestine by the British during the Arab
Rebellion 1094
 of 1936-39. Israel authorised demolitions by
incorporating the same legislation used by the British -the D.E.R.1945-
via article 11 of the Law and Administrative Ordinance of 1948. When
Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967 it soon authorised and employed
demolitions in the face of P.L.O. activities 1095 under the same piece of
legislation, despite the fact that Article 53 of the G.C.I.V. prohibited the
destruction of property "except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations" 1096 . Although prior to
this, the Israelis had carried out demolitions in these areas (and other
parts of neighbouring Arab states 1097 ) as part of its cross border
counter-terrorist raids.
However whilst the legislation has remained constant, both the
'provocation' deemed necessary for its use, and the extent of its usage
has varied over the years. Between 1967 and the mid-1970s the practice
of demolitions was widespread 1098 . In the first year of Israeli rule,
several uninhabited villages of the Jordan Valley were either
completely or partially destroyed, as a means of preventing terrorists
using them as a base for an attack, or for storing arms 1099 . At least 1,000
1094 Drawing legal authority from Article V(5) of the Palestine (Defense) Order in
Council 1931, the British used home demolitions against Arabs. Simon D. 'The
Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale Journal of International
Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 . pp1-79. p8.
1095 Teveth S. The Cursed Blessing (London. Weindenfeld and Nicolson. 1970) p243-45
Cited by O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge.
London.1991.). p243.
1096 As quoted by Welchman L. Israel's Demolition and Sealing of Houses in the Ocupied
Palestinian Territories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1993. Occasional Paper No.11.). p22.
1097 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge.
London.1991.). p243.
1098 No detailed records are provided. Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights
Violations During the Palestinian Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End
Press Boston.1990.). p133.
1099 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p96. According to the Israeli Information Centre, ."Houses
have been demolished in the areas after belligerent acts were perpetrated by persons in
them. But there is no Israeli policy of demolishing villages as Arab propaganda argues". 346
houses were demolished as a form of punishment during the first decade
of the occupation 11 °°. The punitive or preventative reasoning
distinguishes such 'counter-terrorist' demolitions from those
demolitions of illegally constructed buildings which some suggest have
been used as a means of punishing Palestinians generally 1101.
In contrast to this initial period, the demolitions carried out between the
late 1970s and the introduction of the 'iron fist' policy in 1985, were
"largely confined" to cases in which Israeli soldiers or settlers have
been killed or wounded in armed attacks by Palestinians 1102 . This
resulted in no more than an average of 20 demolitions a year 1103
 in the
West Bank and Jerusalem between 1979-84. Estimates for the total
number of houses demolished within all of the administered territories,
vary according to the source. For example, a 1978 report by the I.C.R.C.
stated that 1,224 buildings had been demolished or sealed since 1967- a
figure shared by the Jerusalem Post' 104, whilst B'Tselem 1105 put the
figure for the number of complete demolitions or sealings of houses
between 1967 and 1978 at more than 1,200. Israeli government statistics
for the period 1967 to 1981, put the figure for houses demolished or
Israel Information Centre. Human Rights in the Administered Areas. (Israel Information
Centre Information Briefing. August 1976.). p16.
1100 Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press Boston.1990.).p133.
According to the Israeli Information Centre, "houses are only demolished, then , to
penalize acts of terrorism, as is , indeed, authorized by valid local law, if they have
been used as terrorist bases". They put the figure at "a few hundred" after 8 years.
Israel Information Centre. Human Rights in the Administered Areas. (Israel Information
Centre Information Briefing. August 1976.). p16.
1101 B'Tselem. Demolition and Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure In the West
Bank and Gaza Strip During The Intifada. (2nd. ed. B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August 1992.).
p37.
1102 Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press Boston.1990.). p134.
1103 B'Tselem's figures are 18,30,24,35,12,2 for the 6 years 1979-1984. B'Tselem
Demolition and Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure In the West Bank and Gaza Strip
During The Intifada. (2nd. ed . B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August 1992.). pl 5.
1104 I.C.R.C. Annual Report. 1978. cited by Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli
Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.).p97. Up to
1977, 1224 homes had been destroyed under this policy. (excluding East Jerusalem and
the destroyed villages). Jerusalem Post 28 October 1977 cited by Metzger J., Orth M.
and Sterzing C. This Land is Our Land: The West Bank Under Israeli Occupation. (Zed.
London. 1983). p69.
1105 B'Tselem. Demolition and Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure In the West
Bank and Gaza Strip During The Intifada. (2nd. ed B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August 1992.).
p15.
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sealed at 1,265 houses 1106 . Such figures however contrast greatly with
one estimate 1107
 that put the total in approximately the same period at
more than 20,000. This leaves one able to agree with B'Tselem 's claim
that there is no Israeli or Palestinian source capable of providing an
accurate and updated figure for houses demolished and sealed as a
punitive measure in the occupied territories' 108
Following the introduction of the 'Iron Fist' in May 1985, the policy of
punitive demolitions was reinvigorated, although this time it was by
accompanied by the more discriminate measure of sealing individual
rooms (as well as whole houses) with cemented bricks or metal plates.
Partial sealing was generally used when the 'terrorist hide-out' was
either one apartment in a house tenanted by number of families having
no connection with terrorism, or when the bulldozing or dynamiting of
a house was rendered infeasible, for example because it might render a
neighbouring one unsafe 1109 . The policy of demolitions reached a peak
,011soon after the start of the intifada 1 which was accompanied by a
substantial reduction in the percentage of discriminating (partial)
sealings 1111 . As William O'Brien put it: "[i]ri combating the intifada the
1106 N.L.G. cite 'Peres Hits back at Premier on Demolition of Arab Houses' Jerusalem
Post. Nov 24 1981. National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-
Occupied West Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers
Guild. New York.1988.). p65.
1107 Tanber wrote "Israeli has either blown up or sealed shut more than 20,000
Palestinian houses in the occupied teritory since 1967". Tanber G.J. Life Under Israeli
Occupation. (National Association of Arab Americans. Washington DC.1981.). p3. N.L.G.
cite same figure from their 1978 report National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of
Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers
Guild (National Lawyers Guild. New York.1978.)p65. National Lawyers Guild.
Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza: Report of the
National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New York.1988.). p65.
1108B'Tselem. Demolition and the Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip During the Intifada. (2nd. Ed. B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August 1992.).
p10.
11 09 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester
University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p96.
1110 Simon D. 'The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale
Journal of International Law. 19(1) Winter.1994. pp1-79. p7. He seems to base his
view on figures provided by B'Tselem. Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories 1992-3. (B'tselem. Jerusalem. 1994.).
1111 Al-Haq note that only 2% of buildings were sealed since 1987 and the culmination
of their research as opposed to 47% of all cases prior to 1987. Al-Haq Punishing The
Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising. Dec.1987-Dec.1988 .
(South End Press. Boston. 1990.). p135. 348
Israeli's have usually destroyed whole houses" 1112 . Between December
1987 and July 1989 there were 252 complete demolitions or sealings in
the West Bank alone 1113 .
The substantial increase in the number of 'demolition orders' of one
type or another during the intifada was partially due to the fact that
the Israeli's introduced a more permissive rationale. Previously it
appears that there were only two criteria for demolishing or sealing off
a house, namely the presence of either sabotage material or the
saboteur, in the house 1114 . Following the outbreak of the intifada the
qualifying threshold of violence was generally reduced and on some
occasions even eliminated. For example, in late January 1989 the
Minister of Defence stated before the Knesset Security and Foreign
Affairs Committee: "[w] e demolish the house of every person who
confesses to throwing stones"111 5 . Whilst Al-Haq reported that
demolitions have been used against those suspected of incitement1116.
On the 22 March 1989 Ha'aretz reported that according to official
sources, "the homes of wanted persons were demolished". A situation
which according to B'Tselem 1117 had been going on over the course of
1988 (see section on shootings). Interestingly Hofnung noted that "no
house of a Jewish settler has ever been blown up or sealed" 1118 . Whilst
within Israel itself "houses belonging to citizens convicted of the most
serious security offenses", have neither been demolished nor sealed
1112 O'Brien cites U.S. Department of State, Country Reports, 1988. p.1381;Country
Reports, 1989, p1437.0'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO.
(Routledge. London.1991.). p243.
1113 B'Tselem. Demolition and Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure In the West
Bank and Gaza Strip During The Intifada. (2nd. ed. B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August 1992.).
p17.
1114 Cohen cites Interview with Major Tzvi Bar-El. (10 mar 1977); M.E.R. 1967-70).
p360. Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester
University Press. Manchester. 1985.). p96.
111 5 B'Tselem cite Yossi Verter Hadashot, January 25 1989. B'Tselem. Demolition
and the Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip During
the Intifada. (2nd. Ed. B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August 1992.). p30.
1116 Al-haq has documented at least 16 such cases in the villages of Bidya, Beita and
Silat Harethiya, and they write that they have no record of its use previously.AI-Haq
Punishing The Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising.
Dec.7987-Dec.1988 .(South End Press. Boston. 1990.). p135.
111 7 Article by On Nir in Ha'aretz March 22. 1989 cited by B'Tselem. Demolition and
the Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip During the
Intifada. (2nd. Ed. B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August 1992.). p31.
1118 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.
Aldershot. 1996.). p264.
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(including that of the person who killed Prime Minister Rabin, which
falls outside of the period under scrutiny)1119.
The Legalities. 
In terms of legislation, demolitions (and sealing) of buildings made in
order to both 'punish' or to 'prevent' acts of terrorism 1120
 are
authorised within both Israel and the West Bank by Article 119(1) of
the Defence Emergency Regulations 1121 . It states:
'A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the Government of
Palestine of any house, structure or land from which he has reason to suspect that
any firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or
incendiary article illegally thrown, detonated, exploded or otherwise discharged,
or of any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or
street the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have
committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or been
accessories after the fact to the commission of, any offence against these
Regulations involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court offence; and
when any house, structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military
Commander may destroy the house or the structure or anything in or on the house,
the structure or the land"1122.
In practice the first step in the procedure is the confiscation of the
structure or the land by order of the Military Commander. Although it is
only after an order of forfeiture has been issued that the demolition or
1119 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.
Aldershot. 1996.). p264.
1120 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.).p96. There are of course other reasons for demolitions
including those of illegal structures which even Israeli oficials acknowledge is linked to
their efforts to control the Intifada. Al-Haq cite Jerusalem Post, 16 November 1988.
Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation :Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising
(December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press Boston.1990.). p133.
1121 Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston. 1990.).pl 37.
According to Simon these modified and enhanced the previous Emergency Regulations of
1931 and 1936 Simon D. 'The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Teritories'.
Yale Journal of International Law. 19(1) Winter.1994. pp1-79. p15.
1122 Simon D. 'The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale
Journal of International Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 . pp1-79. p1 5. 350
sealing of the property on the land can occur. The process allows for
the possibility for the Defence Minister to remit the forfeiture, thus
creating at least in theory a period of time in which the person whose
house is to be demolished may appeal to the Minister of Defence1123
and, since 1971, ultimately to the High Court of Justice 1124 . However
because the whole effect of demolition was based on its immediacy this
did not necessarily occur. The importance of the element of speed was
expressed by the Co-ordinator of Government Administration in the
West Bank, Brigadier-General S. Gazit, when he wrote:
"The effectiveness of the blowing-up of houses lies in the fact that it is an
immediate punishment and if we want to deter somebody, we cannot stop and wait
for the normal, legal machinery... .If we want to deter terrorists the effects must be
seen immediately by the population. Employing these Regulations, we have the
possibility of doing this immediately" 1125
1123 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.).p102. However she goes on to say that due to the essence of
immediacy in the deterrence process, the reality is that "There is no right of appeal",
and cites Dayan's answer to the Knesset 13 February 1968 to that effect (see Footnote
158).
1124 Israel decided in 1971 to apply to the Occupied Territories some of the
guarantees of personal rights found in Israeli domestic administrative and constitutional
law. Meir Shamgar presented the legal policy as a commitment to "basic principles of
natural justice as derived from the system of law existing in Israel" Shamagar M.
'Observance of International Law in the Administered Teritories'. Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights 1. (1971) pp262-277. p266-7. Simon D. 'The Demolition of Homes in
the Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale Journal of International Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 .
pp1-79.p21. The court has decided 94 home demolition cases since it began to
adjudicate the pactice in 1979 (up until June 1991). It overruled 3. Simon D. 'The
Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale Journal of International
Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 . pp1-79. p4.
1125 Gazit S. Israel's Policy in the Administered Territories, 7 969.p5 cited by
Playfair E. Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitve Measure in the Israeli
-occupied West Bank. (Al-Haq/ Law in the Service of Man. Ramallah. Occassional Paper
No 5.1987.).p17. Al-Haq note that in The Jerusalem Post of 20 June 1988, the Military
commander of the Central area (which includes the entire West Bank ), General Amram
Mitzna, stated that demolitions were being used because they were a "powerful
deterrent action to signal and clarify that we will do everything and take all measures
to stop this phenomon of petrol bombs" Al-Haq Punishing The Nation: Human Rights
Violations During the Palestinian Uprising. Dec.7 987-Dec.7 988 .(South End Press.
Boston. 1990.).p139. Playfair noted that "In the High Court decision of Sahwil -v- the
Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region the judges ruled that demolition is "...an
unusual punitive action whose main purpose is to deter[the] performance of similar
acts" HCJ 434/79Sahwil -v- the Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region34(7 ) PD
464. Playfair E. Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitve Measure in the Israeli
-Occupied West Bank. (Al-Haq/ Law in the Service of Man. Ramallah. Occassional Paper
No 5.1987.). p20. 351
In order to minimise the disturbance, such demolitions are usually
carried out at night or during a daytime curfew. A closed military area
is declared and until 1979 (if not until recently), occupants were
typically given anything between half an hour to two hours to pack up
and leave 1126 . Following the demolition or total sealing of the house,
the forfeited land is frequently declared a 'closed area', which no one
can enter or leave without permission, and the family may not even be
allowed to remain on the land1127
After a legal challenge by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel in
July 1989 the High Court restricted the immediacy of demolitions (but
not sealings). Basing their ruling upon the right to be heard in Israeli
law, the H.C.J. stated that unless there were operational military
needs 1128 , the army would have to include in the demolition order:
"a warning which gives the recipient an opportunity to choose an attorney and
appeal to the military commander within a specified period of time, after which, if
he so desires, he will be given another specified period of time in which to appeal
to the High Court of Justice, all before the order is carried out" 1 129,
1126 Simon puts the date at 1979. Simon D. 'The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli
Occupied Teritories'. Yale Journal of International Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 . pp1-79.p
Playfair E. Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitve Measure in the Israeli
-Occupied West Bank. (Al-Haq/ Law in the Service of Man. Ramallah. Occassional Paper
No 5.1987.). p5-6.
1127 Playfair E. Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitve Measure in the Israeli
-occupied West Bank. (Al-Haq/ Law in the Service of Man. Ramallah. Occassional Paper
No 5.1987.). p7.
1128 Is this the same as Al-Haq's comment on an early case August 1988 where IDF
allowed appeal in all but ' exceptional circumstances'. "these "exceptions are so broad
that they could be offered in justification of virtually every case of demolition which
has so far occurred"Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the
Palestinian Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press.
Boston.1990.).p138.ACRI case v Commander of Central Command 43(2) P.D.
529(1989) most orders have undergone judicial review.
1129 B'Tselem. Demolition and the Sealing of Houses As a Punitive Measure in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip During the Intifada. (2nd. Ed. B'Tselem. Jerusalem. August
1992.). p12-13. B'tselem state that in the case of a house sealing , after the sanction
has been approved by the legal advisor, it may be carried out immediately. In the case
of demolition , the family must be allowed to appeal the decision... [once informed] the
family may then appeal the decision within 48 hours before the military commander of
their area...lf the commander rejects the appeal, the family has an additional 48 hours
to appeal to the HCJ...only one has been accepted. "The High Court...only examines the
legality of the decision. In other words , did the commander act in a reasonable manner
and base his decision on a sound factual foundation?" B'Tselem. House Demolition and
Sealing as a Form of Punishment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (Follow up Report.
B'Tselem. Jersualem. November 1990.). p5-6 352
Thus although the ruling merely restricted the demolition of homes
without prior notice to urgent cases, the Court has reviewed almost all
demolition orders since this decision. A fact which has resulted in a
striking decrease in the annual number of applications and a
corresponding decrease in the implementation of demolitions1130
Regulation 1 19 therefore authorises a demolition once the military
commander is satisfied that an offence has been committed, even prior
to the arrest of a suspect never mind their conviction by a court. Whilst
Israel is keen to emphasise that "[n]o such action is taken" unless there
is "a direct connection between the building and terrorist or other
violent activities"113 1, and that this punitive measure is directed
personally only against the person who has been culpable of the
commission of a certain offence' 1 3 2 . However in reality: "Nile
language of the regulations allows, in effect, for the demolition of any
building in an area in which an inhabitant has committed a security
offense" 1133 . Indeed legally there need be no connection between the
offender and the property demolished or sealed, in that it is merely
situated within the area. Whilst demolitions of the suspect's house,
rather than the building where the offence took place, has occurred on
a number of occasions despite the fact that the suspect had already been
killed by the security forces themselves!
1130After comparing the number of demolitions in the 12 months preceding the
decision and the following 12 months Simon estimated a decline of 69%.Simon D. 'The
Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale Journal of International
Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 . pp1-79. p36.
1131 Military Advocate General of I.D.F. Dov-Shefi T. 'The Reports of the U.N.
Special Commitees on Israeli Practices in the Territories-A Survey and Evaluation' in
Shamgar M. (ed.). Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel
1967-1980. (Alpha Press. Jerusalem. 1982.). pp285-334. p301.
1132 The Attorney General M. Samagar is reported to have said "demolition of houses
is a punitive measure, according to local law, which is directed personally only against
the person who has been culpable of the commission of a certain offence", speaking at
Symposium on Human Rights held at Tel Aviv University on July 1-4, 1971, reported
in IYHR 1 971 p380. Cited by Welchman L. Israel's Demolition and Sealing of Houses in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1993. Occasional Paper
No.11.). p31.
1133 Benvenisti M., Abu-Zayed Z. and Rubenstein D. The West Bank Handbook: A
Political Lexicon. (The Jerualem Post. Jerusalem. 1986.). p86.
1134 Writing in 1989 B'tselem claimed to know of at least 7 cases in which a family's
home was sealed or demolished after the suspected family member was killed by
security forces while committing the act which later formed the basis for the
demolition or sealing. B'Tselem. Demolition and the Sealing of Houses As a Punitive
1134.
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It is such reasoning which has led to demolitions been termed a
collective punishment. Indeed this idea of punishment was 'admitted' by
the High Court in the case of Daghlas and other -v- the Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria :
"The aim of the regulation is "to achieve a deterent effect" (HCJ 126/83, 434/70),
and such an effect should naturally apply not only to the terrorist himself, but to
those surrounding him, and certainly to family members living with him (HCJ
126/83). He should know that his criminal acts will not only hurt him but are apt
to cause great suffering to his famlly'1135"
Moshe Dayan, the first Minister of Defence to implement the policy in
the West Bank, preferred the term 'anisha svivatit' meaning literally
"vicinity" or "surrounding" punishment 1136 . The problem, of course,
was how broad the category of guilt should be. In 1969 there was a noted
increase in the categories of the guilty, a policy which came to be
known as 'neighbourhood punishment', i.e. punishing local residents
who either saw or knew in advance of terrorist activities and who failed
to report incidents or give evidence about them afterwards1137.
The Application Of The Various Definitions Of (State) 
Terrorism. 
As previously noted in the assessment of the policy of deportation, the
fact that violence is committed for a political purpose by an
organisation does not automatically make the act one of a state terrorist,
for the policy of demolition, like that of deportation, is authorised by the
Defence (Emergency) Regulations. However unlike the latter policy,
demolitions could still be legal during the period that the G.C.I.V. were
in place within the West Bank because Article 53 prohibited the
Measure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip During the Intifada. (2nd. Ed. B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. August 1992.). p26.
1135 Playfair E. Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitve Measure in the Israeli
-occupied West Bank. (Al-Haq/ Law in the Service of Man. Ramallah. Occassional Paper
No 5.1987.). p39.
1136 Simon D. 'The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale
Journal of International Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 . pp1-79. p58.
1137 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p91. 354
destruction of property "except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations"1138.
Legalised deportations could still fulfil the qualifying criteria demanded
by my definition, in that the individual victim of this non-judicial
measure has not been 'punished' in the classical sense of the term; the
State had no intention of bring the victim to trial in order to prove their
guilt. In this way s/he will have been the arbitrary victim of the State's
violence based merely on the 'opinion' of the relevant Israeli
commander of the area, and qualifies for the attachment of the label
"innocent" for they could not have avoided the actions of the State.
Although this decision to label such acts in this way is far more
emotionally acceptable when the property demolished by the Israeli's
does not belong to the perpetrator, as the D.E.R. allows.
The final hurdle that needs to be cleared by all of the examples, is that
the act of politically motivated violence must have been designed to
influence the behaviour of others or as the definition puts it, "wider
than the immediate 'innocent' victim(s)". The State's desire to deter
others through its use of this administrative punishment was expressed
by Brigadier-General S. Gazit, whilst Co-ordinator of Government
Administration in the West Bank, when he wrote:
"The effectiveness of the blowing-up of houses lies in the fact that it is an
immediate punishment and if we want to deter somebody, we cannot stop and wait
for the normal, legal machinery....If we want to deter terrorists the effects must be
seen immediately by the population. Employing these Regulations, we have the
possibility of doing this immediately"1139
It is on the basis of fulfilling each stage of the process that demolitions
carried out in accord with the D.E.R. that Israel's counter-terrorist
demolitions can be described as acts of state terrorism according to this
author's definition. The comments of Gazit also provide the basis for
labelling any illegal demolitons which occurred in the West Bank
1138 As quoted by Welchman L. Israel's Demolition and Sealing of Houses in the Ocupied
Palestinian Territories. (Al-Haq. Ramallah. 1993. Occasional Paper No.11.). p22.
1139 Gazit S. Israel's Policy in the Administered Territories, 1969. cited by Playfair
E. Demolition and Sealing of Houses as a Punitve Measure in the Israeli -occupied West
Bank. (Al-Haq/ Law in the Service of Man. Ramallah. Occassional Paper No 5.1987.).
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during the period that the geneva Convention was in force. Any
demolitions which were not absolutely necessary at the time for
military purposes would have been illegal.
Do demolitions qualify as acts of state terrorism in accordance with the
other proposed definitions?. The U.K.'s Prevention of Terrorism Act
merely requires that the violence be politically motivated, which it is.
Stohl and Lopez's definition require that the intent of the political
violence was to place a victim and/or audience in fear. Even if one does
not agree with the claim that all of a State's laws do, it certainly seems to
be the case with this counter-terrorist policy, a fact implicitly
acknowledged by both the comments of Gazit and the H.C.J. which
suggest that this criteria has been met.
The policy of demolitions would not however qualify under the
definition derived from Israel's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.
This is because the process of demolitions does not involve a use of
violence directed against persons as the Israeli derived definition
requires. Similarly, such demolitions carried out by Israel in
accordance with the laws in force in either Israel or the West Bank do
not constitute acts of terrorism under Schmid and Jongman's definition
of terrorism, for it required that the victims were human. even without
this demolitions would not have qualified because they are carried out
overtly by the Israeli state, which means that this threat of political
violence does not meet the requirement of being carried out by
clandestine agents which would also mean they would not be labelled as
terrorism by the U.S. definition.
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Administrative Detentions.
A History. 
Administrative detention which is also known as 'preventative
detention', or 'detention without charge' or tria1 1140 has been defined
as:
"the internment of individuals by administrative proceedings -that is, not on the
basis of conviction and sentence by a criminal court following regular criminal
proceedings, nor on the basis of a judicial order of arrest issued with a view to
initiate such proceedings. Administrative detention is the confinement of
individuals by the administrative authority according to an administrative
process".1141
The administrative detention of both Arabs and Jews 1142 was carried out
in Palestine under the British Mandate, indeed on 29 June 1946 -a day
which would become known as "Black Sabbath" 1143- 2,718 people were
detained in this way. Initially Regulation 111 of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations 1945 enabled any military commander to take
anyone into administrative detention for up to a year, although in 1946
the limitation on the duration was annulled 1144. The provisions of this
later piece of legislation were incorporated into Israeli law in 1947, and
1140 Playfair E. Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the
Service of Man. Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1 .). p1. Also Al-Haq. Punishing a
Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising (December 1987-
December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p128. B'Tselem. Detained Without
Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the
Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.). For the term 'detention without
charge' see National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West
Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New
York. 1988.). p51.
1141 Hadar Z. 'Administrative Detentions Employed By Israel' Israeli Yearbook of
Human Rights Vol. 1 (1971). pp283-289. p283. Also cited by Israel National Section of
the Internationl Commission of Jurists. The Rule of Law in the Areas Administered by
Israel. (ICJ. Tel Aviv. 1981.).p71
1142 B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied
Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.).
p20
1143 B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention
Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem .
p21.
1144 B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention
Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem .
p19.
in the Occupied
October 1992.).
in the Occupied
October 1992.).	 357
were used in 1951 against ultra-orthodox Jews suspected of intention to
commit a terrorist act 1145 , and in 1956 against Israeli Arabs1146.
Twenty years later, Israel authorised this policy within the West Bank
via both Article 67 of the Order Concerning Security Regulations (the
annex to Proclamation No 3), and the D.E.R. which constituted the law on
the same day 1147.
According to the Israel authorities, an administrative detention order
could only be issued only for reasons of state or public security. In the
words of Israel's Attorney General:
"It should be emphasised that administrative detention is not intended as
punishment for violations committed, but rather to prevent the perpetration of
illegal acts by the individual concerned..."1148.
Thus according to this Attorney-General, Israel resorted to such an
administrative measure:
"only in those circumstances where normal judicial procedures cannot be followed
because of the danger to lives of witnesses or because secret sources of information
cannot be revealed in open court..."11.49
1145 B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied
Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.).
p24.
1146 B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied
Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.).
p26.
1147 Article 2 of Proclamation No.2 stated that: "The law which existed in the area
on 7 June, 1967 shall remain in force to the extent that it does not contain anything
incompatible with this Proclamation, any other Proclamation or Order which will be
enacted by me, and subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment
I.D.F. Government in the Area.".Yahav cites Collection of Proclamations, Orders and
Appointments (Judea and of Smaria), 1967.p3. Yahav D. (ed.). Israel, The "Intifada'
and the Rule of Law. (Israel Ministry of Defense. Tel Aviv. 1993.). p51. If one disputes
this the D.E.R. was introduced on 20 February 1968 via The (military) Order
Concerning Interpretation (Additional Protocol) (No.5) (Judea and Samaria) (No.224)
1968 explicitly stated that the Defence Regulations are valid 20 February 1968
J.Rabah and N.Fairweather Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West
Bank 1967-1992 (Jersualem Media and Communications Centre. Second Edition.
Jerusalem. 1995.). p30
1148 Public statement of Attorney General 26 January 1986, cited by Al-Haq.
Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising (December
1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p129
1149 Public statement of Attorney General 26 January 1986 cited in O'Brien W. Law
and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.1991.).p250. Israel's
Attorney General Itzhak Zamir issued guidelines in 1982 saying "Administrative 358
Therefore typically such orders were "issued against leaders or
members of terrorist organisations"1 1 50 According to Al-Haq during
the first thirteen years of the occupation, the Israeli authorities
consistently resorted to the administrative detention of Palestinian
residents of the West Bank in lieu of providing them with formal
charges and fair trials 1151 . 137selem estimated that there were 1,261
Palestinian residents of the occupied territories in administrative
detention in the spring of 1970, with over 220 of them having been held
for over a year 1152 . In 1971 the former figure is estimated to have
dropped to 445 and hovered at around 40 a year between 1973 and
1977 1153 . In the early 1980s the practice was discontinued and the last
detainee -Ali Awwad al-Jammal- was finally released on 2 March 1982
after serving six years and nine months without charge 1154 . Although
according to Playfair this drop in the use of administrative detentions
coincided with an increase in the use of 'house arrests' that is similar
administrative orders that confined the victim to their house or
village1155.
detention is meant not as a punitive but only as a preventative measure 	 Where
there is sufficent good evidence for a conviction in such proceedings this will not by
itself justify administrative detention". (No other reference) Playfair E.
Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the Service of Man.
Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.).pp13-14
11 50 Public statement of Attorney General 26 January 1986 cited by Al-Haq.
Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising (December
1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). p129. Also cited by O'Brien
W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.1991.).p250. See
also Israel Information Centre who wrote,"Only those who took part in terrorist
actions or gave aid to terrorists may be detained under Regulation 111 of Mandatory's
Emergency Regulations of 1945", Israel Information Centre. The Administered Areas.
(Israel Information Centre Information Briefing 10. Jerusalem. September. 1973.).p21
11 51 Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). pl 28.
1152 B'Tselem cite Knesset Record VoL57 pp 1472, 1867. B'Tselem. Detained Without
Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the
Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.). p26
1 153 B'Tselem cite Hofnung M. Israel - Security Needs vs. The Rule of Law, 1948-
1991 (Jerusalem, 1991.).(Hebrew.) p318 B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial.
Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada.
(Jerusalem. October. 1992) p26
1154 He was then placed under house arrest until February 1984. Playfair E.
Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the Service of Man.
Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.). p4.
1155 Playfair E. Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the
Service of Man. Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.). p5.These other admistrative
orders are not examined here for generally speaking the same rules apply to the
labelling. 359
Then on the 4 August 1985 the Israeli cabinet decided to revive the use
of the policy, albeit in a slightly amended form 1156 , along with other
strong measures "to clamp down on terrorism and incitement" 1157 as
part of what would be known as the 'iron fist' strategy 1158 . Between
August 1985 and 9 December 1987, at least 316 Palestinians from the
occupied territories were administratively detained; of these, 74 were
still interned when the intifada began 1159 . By 1990 the number of
Palestinians estimated to be held under administrative detention1160
ranged from 3,000-4,000 to 6,000. Whilst the Knesset member Dedi
Zucker using the 'conservative' figure of 1,900 administrative detainees,
noted that this meant "one out of every 200 men over the age of 18" from
the Occupied Territories was imprisoned without charge or tria11161
The Legalities. 
The Law in Israel. 
Until 1980, Article 111 of the D.E.R. authorised administrative detentions
within Israel. It stated:
1156 Regional Commanders of the rank of colonel or above were given this right, and
district commanders could now issue detention orders for 96 hours which could be
extended by the regional commander, no longer subject to automatic review.
1157 Playfair E. Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the
Service of Man. Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.). p1.
1158 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p249.
1159 Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). pl 28.
Also O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge.
London.1991.). p249. He cites Al-Haq Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations
During the Palestinian Uprising December 7987-December 1988. (Law in the Service of
Man. Ramallah. 1988.). p212.
1160 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge.
London.1991.). p250. Although in his footnote no. 158 p269, he writes that Al -Haq
estimated detainees at 3-4,000. Punishing a Nation:Human Rights Violations During the
Palestinian Uprising December 1987-December 1988. (Law in the Service of Man.
Ramallah. 1988.). pp346-47. Hilterman estimated 6,000. Hilterman J.R. 'Human
Rights and the Mass Movement: The First Year of the Intifada' Journal of Palestine
Studies 18 (1987). p130. The U.S. State department reported a peak of 2,600 in
September 1988. Country Reports, 1988, p1379.
11 61 Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising (December 1987-December 1988). (South End Press. Boston.1990.). pl 31-2.
Citing Letter of Dedi Zucker to Israeli Bar asociation and the heads of the country's law
faculties on 18 May 1988, reported by Jerusalem Post.19 May 1988. 360
'A Military Commander may by order direct that any person shall be detained for
any period not exceeding one year in such place of detention as may be specified
by the Military Commander in the order"1162.
This wording was limited only by the conditions contained within
Regulation 108, which stated that a such a detention order1163:
"shall not be made by the High Commissioner or by a Military Commander
	 in
respect of any person unless the High Commissioner or Military Commander is of
the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to make the order for securing the
public safety, the defence of Palestine, the maintenance of public order, or
suppression of mutiny, rebellion or riot"1164.
The other relevant part of the Regulations dealing with administrative
detentions was section 111(3) which allowed any member of the Israeli
police force or I.D.F. to arrest, and convey to the place of detention
specified in the order, any person in respect of whom a order has been
made in accordance with Regulation 111(1) 1165 . Also, Section 111(8)
allowed the Military commander to delegate any powers relating to the
11 62 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town. 1984.).p62. "A Military
Commander is, according to Regulations 2 and 6 [of the DER], an officer appointed for
any area or place by the Chief of the General Staff, with the approval of the Minister of
Defense. ....At any time the Chief of the General Staff may himself exercise the powers
or duties vested in or imposed upon a Military Commander. There are four Military
Commanders in Israel besides the chief of the General Staff: they are the Generals of
the three regional Commands, into which the country is divided, and the General who is
the Commander of the Navy in respect of the territorial waters and the ports of Israel"
Hadar Z. 'Administrative Detentions Employed By Israel' Israeli Yearbook of Human
Rights Vol. 1(1971). pp283-289. p284
1163As well as a restriction order (Regulation 109), a police supervision order
(Regulation 110) or deportation order (Regulation112).
1 164 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p62.
11 65 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). Regulation 111(5) made
the detainee liable to arrest for committing various offences listed in 111(7). These
included not only failing to obey the order 111(7) (a), or breaking the penal code, but
also other offences such as 'shouts or makes unnecessary noise within a place of
detention' 111(7)(d).
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Regulation 1166 . These legal powers were circumscribed by a series of
carefully drawn rules and established practices1167.
The broad language of the regulation remained until 5 March 1979
when it was replaced by the 'Emergency Powers (Detention) Law' 5739-
1979 (or E.P.D.L.). This piece of legislation altered the legal basis for
administrative detentions. For the purpose of this assessment the most
substantial change was contained within Section 2(a). It demanded that
the Minister of Defence had to have "reasonable cause to believe" that
reasons of state or public security required the detention. According to
Rudolph this provided an "objective" basis of judicial review to the new
appeals procedure. 1168 The other changes worth noting were 'merely'
alterations to either the issuing of orders 1169 , the length of the
1166 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p71.
1167 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town. 1984.). p72. The 'Correlating
Instructions while Executing the Defence [Emergency] Regulations' issued by General
Staff required the Chief of Staff's approval for all preventative (i.e. non investigative)
'administrative detentions' and the approval of the Chief of the Department of the
General Staff that would be used as the first stage in an investigative process Rudolph
H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and Israel: A
Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.). p72. See B.Bracha B. 'Restriction
of Personal Freedom Without Due Process of Law According to the Defence (Emergency)
Regulations 1945' Israel Yearbook of Human Rights Vol. 8 1978 pp296-323. p307. Then
the 'Instructions of the Attorney General' which provided merely a guide to the Chief of
Staff and Military Commanders directed that such administrative detentions had to be
of a preventative rather than punitive nature', as well as demanded that there was no
less severe alternative. Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights
in South Africa and Israel: Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town.1984). p73.
See Instructions of the Attorney General 21.927 para 3 and 10a, 10b. These included
internal army orders which limited the authority to issue an administrative detention
order to the Chief of General Staff and the Military Commanders of Israel's three
regional commands and the Commander of the Israeli Navy. Hadar Z. 'Administrative
Detentions Employed by Israel' Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights Vol.1.(1971). pp283-
289. p284. However only the former had the authority to detain an individual without
trial for periods exceeding one month. B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative
Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem.
Jerusalem. October 1992.). p10. Each had power for up to 6 months; a detention for a
period longer than this required Chief of Staff's approval. Except for East Jerusalem
where it was three. Rudolph H. 'The Judicial Review of Administrative Detention Orders
in Israel' Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol. 14. 1984. pp148-181. p150). In
addition the Military Commanders could only exercise their powers following an
advisory committee's recommendation to that effect. Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism
and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta
and Co. Cape Town.1984.). p72.
11 68 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and
Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town.1984.). p97.
11 69 For example, Section 2 (a) limited the issuing of an order solely to the Ministry
of Defence rather than to its Military Commanders, with the exception of the Chief of 362
detention 1170 and the (non-judicial) appeals procedure 1171 . Finally in
1982 the 'Instructions of the Attorney General' to the Chief of Staff and
Military Commanders, directed that such administrative detentions had
to be of a preventative rather than punitive nature', as well as
demanding that there was no less severe alternative1172.
Within The West Bank.
Here administrative detention was initially authorised by both Article
67 of the Order Concerning Security Regulations (1967) which came as
an annex to Proclamation No 3, and Article 111 of the D.E.R. Writing in
1971, Hadar, claimed that administrative detentions were not effected
under the said Regulation 111 within the territories administered by
Israel. Instead they were effected in the Territories under the Order
Concerning Security Instructions 1173 . Article 67(1) of the 0.C.S.R.
stated:
Staff who was given the authority to detain someone for 48 hours in section 2(c).
Shetreet S. 'A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law'. Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights. Vol.14. 1984. ppl 82-220. p186.
1170 Section 2 (b) limited the period of detention to a maximum of 6 months (though
this could be renewed) and Section 4 stipulated that detainees be brought before the
President of an Israeli District Court within 48 hours of arrest and subsequently at
least once every three months the latter in accordance with Section 5(a). Shetreet S.
'A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law'. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights.
Vol.14. 1984. pp182-220. p186.
1171 The legally binding decision of the President of an Israeli District Court could then
be appealed to the Israeli Supreme court. S'Iselem. Detained Without Trial:
Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada.
(B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.). p10. It was obligated to quash the detention
order if "it has been proved to him that the reasons for which it was made were not
objective reasons of state security or public security or that it was made in bad faith
or from irrelevant considerations"(section 4(c)). However whilst there was now a
right to attend the hearing on appeal the detainee's side could be excluded from hearing
evidence on grounds of state or public security. Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and
Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa and Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and
Co. Cape Town .1984.). p99.
1172 Rudolph H. Security, Terrorism and Torture. Detainees Rights in South Africa
and Israel: A Comparative Study (Juta and Co. Cape Town .1984.).p73. See
Instructions of the Attorney General 21.927 para 3 and 10a, 10b.
1173 Hadar Z. 'Administrative Detentions Employed by Israel'. Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights. Vol.1 1971. pp283-289. p287. 363
"A military commander, or whoever is authorized to do so on his behalf, may direct
by an order that a person shall be held in a place of detention which the military
commander shall designate in the order"1174
In May 1970 'Military Order No.378 (Judea /Samaria)' contained a new
0.S.C.R. which specifically changed Regulation 111(4) in order to bring
it in line with (Article 78(2) of) the Fourth Geneva Convention 1175 . The
new 0.C.S.R. incorporated Regulation 111(1) verbatim 1176 . The article
which now authorised administrative detention was Article 87, part a of
which stated that:
"A Military Commander, or any person authorized by him in that behalf, may
order direct that a person shall be detained in such place of detntion as may be
specified in the order"1177.
This authority was limited by Article 84A which declared that, "No
Military commander may exercise (this) authority unless he believes it
to be necessary for definitive security reasons"1178 . Although all
detentions automatically went to appeals board after a period of six
months, and after 1971 could be appealed to the H.C.J. 1179 . Since 1970
1174 United Nations Special Working Group of the Human Rights Commission Report.
UN/E/ CN.4/1016. p29
1175 Israel National Section of the International Commission of Jurists. The Rule of
Law in the Areas Administered by Israel. (ICJ. Tel Aviv. 1981) p72. Article 78(2) of
the G.C.IV. said "This [detention] procedure shall include the right of appeal for the
parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the event of
the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six
months, by a competent body set up by the said power". Cited by Cohen E. Human Rights
in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press. Manchester. 1985.).
p123. From now on the detainees detention was automatically reviewed every six
months regardless of whether they had appealed.
1176 Cohen E. Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University
Press. Manchester. 1985.). p122.
1177 Interestingly the Israeli ICJ adds the requirement of reasonableness. "Where the
Regional Commander has reasonable ground for believing that the detention of a person
is necessary for reasons of regional or public security, he may, by an order signed by
himself, order the detention of that person, for the duration of the period stated
therein, which shall not exceed a period for six months."Israel National Section of the
Internationl Commission of Jurists. The Rule of Law in the Areas Administered by
Israel. (ICJ. Tel Aviv. 1981).p72.
1178 Playfair E. Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the
Service of Man. Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.). p12.
1179 Israel decided in 1971 to apply to the Occupied Territories some of the
guarantees of personal rights found in Israeli domestic administrative and constitutional
law. Meir Shamgar presented the legal policy as a commitment to "basic principles of
natural justice as derived from the system of law existing in Israel" Shamagar M. 364
the legislation authorising administrative detentions contained within
the 0.C.S.R. has been amended on numerous occasions 1180 . For example
in January 1980 Military Order No.815 brought the relevant powers into
line with the E.P.D.L. which had just been introduced into Israe11181,
most notably the concept of 'reasonableness'. These new provisions
specified grounds on which administrative detention orders could be
made, introduced a new judicial review procedure, restricted delegation
of powers and made other refinements to the law 1182 . However in
March 17th 1988, three months after the beginning of the intifada, the
I.D.F. suspended the liberal changes which had followed the 1978 Camp
David accords contained within the 1980 order, and issued 'Military
Order Concerning Administrative Detainees (Temporary Provisions)
(No. 1 229)(Judea Samaria)' which reinstated the status quo ante 1183.
'Observance of International Law in the Administered Teritories'. Israeli Yearbook of
Human Rights Vol.1.(1971) p266-7. Also Simon D. 'The Demolition of Homes in the
Israeli Occupied Teritories'. Yale Journal of International Law. 19(1) Winter.1994 .
ppl -79. p21.
1180 Other amendments include Military Orders 1 254 (7 September 1988), 1270 (16
March 1989), 1283 (13 September 1989), 1299 (16 March 1990), 1315A (23
September 1990) and 1351 (17 March 1991). For most of these see Rabah J. and
Fairweather N. Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank. 1967-
1992. (2nd.Ed. Jersualem Media and Communications Centre. Jersualem. 1995.).
11 81 Playfair E. Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the
Service of Man. Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.). p10.
11 82 Playfair E. Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the
Service of Man. Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.). p11. Now Military
commanders of the three regions could implement orders and detainees had to be
brought before a (military rather than district) judge within 96 hours. B'Tselem.
Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the
Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.). p11. These were to
be subsequently reviewed every 3 months. Al-Haq. Punishing a Nation :Human Rights
Violations During the Palestinian uprising (December 1987-December 1988.). (South
End Press Boston.1990.).p130, also National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians
in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National
Lawyers Guild. New York.1988.). p53. Appeal was to the president of a military court
and then to the HCJ. B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the
Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem .
October 1992.). pl 1. According to NLG this provided a limited form of judicial review;
the judge could quash the case if he was persuaded by the defence that these "were not
objective reasons of state security" or were "made in bad faith or from irrelevant
conditions" National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West
Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New
York.1988.). p51-52. Although the defence did not have the right to be told of the
grounds for the internment or to see the evidence.
11 83 Once again, individual military commanders of the rank of Colonel and above were
authorised to issue administrative detention orders. Whilst the obligation to bring a
detainee before a military judge within 96 hours (and subsequently) was cancelled, and
detainees were allowed to appeal only to an advisory board which could make only non
binding recommendations. Although a short time later this appeals board was replaced 365
This also meant a return to the so called "incommunicado detentions"
where families were prevented from confirming that their relatives
had been detained.
Other changes worth noting include Military Order No.1281 of August
1989 for it allowed the maximum period of detention to be increased
from 6 to 12 months, although judicial review was required after six
months. This maximum period of detention was then reduced back to 6
months 1184 via an amendment contained within Military Order 1361,
which came into effect on 25th December of 1991. Of course it should be
noted whatever the formal maximum duration of the enabling Military
Order, there was nothing to stop an individual's administrative
detention order from being renewed ad infinitum. Indeed in some cases
renewals have continued for years without the accused ever being
informed of the charges against them, for example All Awwad al-
Jammal was released on 2 March 1982 after serving six years and nine
months without charge1185.
As in Israel the broad powers were in practice moderated by other
regulations, these include internal army orders, including the
Instructions of the Attorney General to the Chief of Staff and Military
Commanders Orders 1186 . The latter provide that the order must be
again by a military judge empowered to confirm or revoke such an order. National
Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza:
Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New York.1988.). p52
Citing Ha'aretz March 20 1988 and G. Frankel 'Israeli Army Allows Press Inspection of
Detention Center for Palestinians' Washington Post June 3 1988 pA21. B'Tselem.
Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the
Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem . October 1992.). p11
11 84 B'Tselem. Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied
Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada. (B'Tselem. Jerusalem. October 1992.).
p11. Also M.O. 1236 (June 13 1988) the right of appeal to a single judge was
substituted to appeal to 3 judge panel.
1185 He was then placed under house arrest until February 1984. Playfair E.
Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank. (Law in the Service of Man.
Ramallah. 1986. Occasional paper No 1.). p4. Another example is the physicist Tayseer
al-Aruri, who was detained from April 1974 to January 1978. O'Brien W. Law and
Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.).p250. He cites
National Lawyers Guild. Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and
Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild. (National Lawyers Guild. New York.1978.).
pp80-81.
1186 Instructions of the attorney general no 21,927 para 10(a), 10(b)120. Cohen E.
Human Rights in the Israeli Occupied Territories. (Manchester University Press.
Manchester. 1985.). p123. 366
preventative not punitive and there is no other option available but to
preventatively detain the individual.
The Application Of The Various Definitions Of (State) 
Terrorism. 
As previously noted in the assessment of the policy of deportation and
demolitions, the fact that violence is committed for a political purpose
by an organisation does not automatically make the act one of a state
terrorist, for the policy of administrative detention, like that of
demolition and deportation, is authorised by law. The legal act of
violence used in enforcing administrative detentions as authorised by
either the D.E.R.. E.P.D.L. or 0.C.S.R. of 1967 or 1970 could however
qualify for the label of terrorism on the grounds that there is no
intention of taking the victim to trial where he or she could prove their
innocence. The individual victim of this non-judicial measure has not
been 'punished' in the classical sense of the term, instead the
administrative detainee will have been the arbitrary victim of the
State's violence based merely on the 'opinion' of the relevant Israeli
commander of the area, and qualifies for the attachment of the label
"innocent" for they could not avoid the actions of the State.
The final hurdle that needs to be cleared by all of the examples, is that
the act of politically motivated violence must have been designed to
influence the behaviour of others or as the definition puts it, "wider
than the immediate 'innocent' victim(s)". The State's desire to deter
others through its use of this administrative punishment was expressed
in 1985 by the then Minister of Defence Yitzhak Rabin:
"Those who are caught preparing, organising or carrying out terrorist acts-those
people ought to be brought to court. But for those who instigate and call for
participation in terror, even though they themselves are not active, administrative
detention or deportation are the most effective means to cope with them, and I will
not hesitate to use these measures. Not on a large scale, but mainly as a means to
deterrent"1187
1187Jerusalem Post. 23 August 1985. Cited by Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation
Policy In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. (Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man).
Occasional Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p85. 367
It is on the basis of fulfilling each stage of the process that
administrative detentions carried out in accord with either the D.E.R.,
E.P.D.L., 0.C.S.R. of 1967 or 1970 can be described as acts of state terrorism
according to this author's definition.
The question then becomes do administrative detentions qualify as acts
of state terrorism in accordance with the other proposed definitions?.
The U.K.'s Prevention of Terrorism Act merely requires that the
violence be politically motivated, which it is. Stohl and Lopez's
definition require that the intent of the political violence was to place a
victim and/or audience in fear. Even if one does not agree with the
claim that all of a State's laws do, it certainly seems to be the case with
this counter-terrorist policy, a fact implicitly acknowledged by Rabin
who said that he would use administrative detentions "as a
de terrent" 1188.
The policy would also would qualify under the definition derived from
Israel's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, as administrative detentions
imply a threat of acts of violence calculated to cause injury or death to
those detained. One could of course say that detention is not implicitly
intended to contain such violence but consistency would then demand
that kidnappings carried out by insurgents would not qualify.
However such administrative detentions carried out by Israel in
accordance with the laws in force in either Israel or the West Bank do
not constitute acts of terrorism under either Schmid and Jongman's
definition of terrorism or that of the U.S. State department. This is
because detentions are carried out overtly by the Israeli state, which
means that this threat of political violence does not meet the
requirement of being carried out by either sub-national groups or (at
least semi-) clandestine agents demanded by both definitions.
1188Jerusalem Post. 23 Aug 85. Cited by Hiltermann J.R. Israel's Deportation Policy
In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. (Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man).Occasional
Paper No. 2. Ramallah.1986.). p85. 368
Curfews
A History. 
With its decision to incorporate the British made Defence Emergency
Regulations of 1945. Israel authorised the use of curfews for security
purposes within Israel. Twenty years later the Israeli armed forces
occupied the West Bank, and introduced the Order Concerning Security
Regulations and the D.E.R., and in one of their first acts declared a 24
hour curfew via 'Proclamation No. 1' (June 7 1967). This was only
gradually lifted1189.
Since the early 1970s curfews have constituted an important part of
Israel's 'counter-terrorism' policy within the region 1190 . As a counter-
terrorist policy curfews are used for two main reasons. Firstly, they are
seen as a speedy means of restoring order when breaches of the peace
occur during demonstration. Secondly, they are considered an effective
method in the investigation of terrorist attacks by providing the
conditions in which searches and arrests can be made as quickly as
possible with the minimum of disturbance of the population 1191 . The
use of curfews became particularly widespread since the late 1970s1192,
although they probably peaked during the intifada. For example during
the first year of the intifada at least 1,600 curfews were imposed with at
least 400 prolonged of them in force for twenty-four hours for between
3-40 days 1193 . According to Al-Haq: "[w]ith few exceptions, on any
given day at least 25,000 Palestinians have been involuntarily confined
to their homes" 1194. Or as the J.M.C.C. put it, every Palestinian in the
1189A1-Haq Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising
-December 1987-December 1988. (South End Press Boston.1990.). p159.
1190 Especially since 1983 according to O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War
With the PLO. (Routledge. London.1991.). p245.
1191 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO (Routledge.
London.1991.). p246.
1192 Al-Haq Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising -December 1987-December 1988. (South End Press Boston.1990.). p159.
Starting in the mid-1970s, the curfew was widely usd as a means of collective
punishment in response to disturbances of the peace and demonstrations." Benvenisti M.
, Abu-Zayed Z. and Rubenstein D. The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon. (The
Jerualem Post. Jerusalem. 1986.). p85.
1193 Al-Haq Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising -December 1987-December 1988. (South End Press Boston.1990.). p154.
1194 Al-Haq Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising -December 1987-December 1988. (South End Press Boston.1990.). p155. 369
occupied territories had spent an average of approximately ten weeks
under in house curfew for the period 9 December 1987 - 31 December
1990 1195 . Between 12-15 November 1988, the period of the declaration of
an independent Palestinian state, over one million people were put
under curfew including entire Gaza strip 1 196 During the so called 'Gulf
War Curfew' the West Bank was placed under some sort of curfew during
the period 17 January - 31 March, including a total curfew for the first
three weeks 1197 . Interestingly, Hofnung noted that "even in cases
where settlers have initiated punishment raids on Arab towns curfews
have not been imposed on Jewish settlements" through the period under
scrutiny 1 198
The I..t5,.
Throughout the period under scrutiny, curfews could be introduced in
both Israel or the West Bank by the use of Article 124 of the D.E.R. which
stated that:
"A military commander may by order require every person within any area
specified in the order to remain within doors between such hours as may be
specified in the order, and in such cases, if any person is or remains out of doors
within that area between such hours without a permit in writing issued by or on
behalf of the military commander or some person duly authorised by the military
commander to issue such permits, he shall be guilty of an offence against these
Regulations".
Whilst within the West Bank curfews could also be introduced using
another piece of legislation. Between 1967-1970, Article 69 of the 0.C.S.R.
enabled:
1195 Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre 'No -exit' Israeli Curfew Policy in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (J.M.C.C. Jerusalem. June 1991). pi.
1196 Al-Haq Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising -December 1987-December 1988. (South End Press Boston.1990.). p155.
1197 Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre 'No -exit' Israeli Curfew Policy in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (J.M.C.C. Jerusalem. June 1991). p60.
1198 Hofnung M. Democracy, Law and National Security in Israel. (Dartmouth.
Aldershot. 1996.). p264. Indeed his comments are not limited to the period 1967-1994. 370
"A military commander may by an order require any person within an area
described in the order to remain at home during those hours without a written
permit issued by the military commander or on his behalf shall be guilty of an
offence against this Order" 1199.
In May of 1970 a new 0.C.S.R was introduced into the West Bank via
Military Order No. 378, Article 89 of which stated:
"A Military Commander may by order require any person within the area indicated
in the order to remain within doors during such hours as may be specified in the
order. Any person found out of doors within the said area during such hours
without a permit in writing issued by or on behalf of the Military Commander,
shall be guilty of an offence under this Order"1200
In January 1988 this power to issue curfews was devolved to senior
military officers1201.
The Application Of The Various Definitions of {State) 
Terrorism. 
The legal imposition of a curfew in which the residents of a given area
are given notice that it is illegal to step outdoors does not qualify for
this author's definition of terrorism, on the grounds that the victim of
the State's legal violence could avoid the imposition of violence by
modifying his or her behaviour, by declining to go out and break them.
As for the other definitions, the threat of violence inherent with the
introduction of a curfew fulfils the limited requirements of the British
definition, for the purpose of this political violence is to put a section of
the public in fear. It also fits Stohl and Lopez's definition for the
purpose of the violence enforcing the curfew policy is to "create fear
1199 United Nations Special Working Group of the Human Rights Commission Report.
UN/E/ CN.4/1016. p31
1200 Shamagar M. (ed) Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel
(Alpha Press, Jerusalem. 1982) Appendix C. Security Provisions Order (Consolidated
Version 1980) No.378. p488.
1201 Shalev C. 'The Price of Insurgency: Civil Rights in the Occupied teritories'.
(published under the auspices of the West Bank Database Project: Tel Aviv. 1988) p35.
Cited in Al-Haq Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian
Uprising -December 1987-December 1988. (South End Press Boston.1990.). p170. 371
and/or compliant behaviour" in a "victim of the threat". Similarly the
threat of violence inherent in the imposition of a curfew constitutes
terrorism in accordance with the Israeli derived definition for this
demands that the threats of violence are calculated to cause death or
injury to a person. Unless one believes that this is non-inherent within
the threat of violence which enforces it.
It does not however qualify for the label in accordance with either the
American definition or that belonging to Schmid and Jongman, because
the Israeli forces enforcing the curfew do not constitute the clandestine
or at least semi-clandestine forces required by these two definitions.
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Chapter 7
Israeli Counter-terrorist Actions Abroad.
There are a number of difficulties in producing an assessment of the
State's use of violence outside its area of domestic jurisdiction, above and
beyond the demands of each of the definitions which are to be applied to
such actions. The first difficulty is that of content, for even when it has
been decided that it is Israeli counter-terrorist actions which involve
violence that constitute the focus of this analysis, there is a problem of
deciding exactly which actions to examine. This problem was identified
by William O'Brien, who carried out an assessment of Israel's war with
the P.L.O. from the point of view of international law, when he wrote:
"Israel has carried out thousands of counterterror attacks on the PLO. It would
take a large contingent of military historians, international lawyers and moralists
to evaluate these attacks"1202
So whilst this part of the thesis applies different criteria than O'Brien,
like him it overcomes the problem of content by examining only a
selection of incidents. This does not mean however, that the thesis will
simply reproduce all of the incidents examined by O'Brien contained
within the chapter of his book entitled "War-conduct Law in
Counterterror Actions" 1203 . The reasons for not simply examining just
those the events analysed and assessed by O'Brien in his book Law and
Morality in Israel's War With the PLO, are numerous. The first, is that
some of the events examined by O'Brien occurred before June 1967, the
starting date of this analysis. Secondly, an analysis of all of the post
1967 incidents examined by O'Brien would be rather tedious for the
reader, in that there would be a great deal of repetition in the
1202 He evaluates them "in terms of their compliance with the standards of legitimate
military necessity". O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO.
(Routledge. London. 1991.). p149.
1203 chapter entitled "War-conduct Law in Israeli Counter Terrorist Actions" O'Brien
W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.).p148-
172.
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assessment of essentially similar events 1204 . This latter position was
that broadly held by Arend and Beck whose assessment of "forcible state
responses to terrorism" contained within their book entitled
International Law and the Use of Force made reference to O'Brien's
work 1205 . The limited selection of events analysed here is however
larger than that examined by Arend and Beck, and this is despite the
fact that their analysis includes counter-terrorist actions carried out by
states other than Israe1 1206 . Thirdly, this exclusion of numerous
"essentially similar events" simultaneously creates space for a
consideration of counter-terrorist actions which O'Brien failed to
address for one reason or another. Including, although not restricted to,
events that occurred after his book was published in 1991.
The second difficulty in producing an assessment of the State's use of
violence outside its area of domestic jurisdiction is the reliability of the
claims that Israel has engaged in such acts. It would be both extremely
time consuming and difficult -if not impossible- to assess the validity of
each of the descriptions of the events that Israel is said to have
committed, many of which operate within the 'twilight zone' of
undercover work. Luckily the question of validity is not as important as
it could be seeing that the aim of this section is merely to 'test' some
definitions of the term terrorism. This said, the author has attempted to
minimise any inaccuracies by taking detail on alleged incidents from
books and articles written on the work of the Israeli security forces that
are far from hostile to Israel. Indeed most are sympathetic 1207 with the
1204 Almost all of the uses of force mentioned by O'Brien in his chapter entitled "War-
conduct Law in Israeli Counter Terrorist Actions" are directed at combatant targets.
Whilst he fails to examine the Beirut airport incident. O'Brien W. Law and Morality in
Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.).p148-172.
1205 Most notably in the section entitled "Military strikes against terrorist states',
Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter
Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).pl 52.See examples examined on pages 148-155.
1206 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). See examples examined on pages 1 48-
155.
1207 For example, in his introduction Katz wrote, "Originally, this book was conceived
as a testament to the unheralded courage of the Israeli National Police Border Guards in
their battle against Palestinian terrorism and more specifically, for the brilliant
counter-terrorist/guerilla campaign their outnumbered and over-whelmed forces
performed in Lebanon in the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion". Katz S.M. Guards
Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990).
p11. He also dedicates the book to the Border Guards Northern brigade and notes "the
assistance of the Israeli national Police" amongst others. His book was also scrutinized
of the Israeli Military Censor. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against 374
most 'hostile' being those produced by the writers on international law,
and a B.B.C. journalist. The works upon which this chapter of the thesis
are based are Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of
Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm 1208; Black I. and Morris B.
Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence 1209;
Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service 1 2 1 0 ; Katz S.M. Guards Without
Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism 1211 ; Melman Y. and Raviv D.
Every Spy a Prince 1212 ; O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War
With the PLO 1 2 13 ; Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and
Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East 1214 ; Falk R.A. 'The Beirut Raid and
the International Law of Retaliation' 1215 ; Blum Y.Z. 'The Beirut Raid and
the International Double Standard: A Reply to Professor Richard A.
Falk' 1216 ; Bowett D. 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force'1217
and the B.B.C. television serial and accompanying book by Peter Taylor
entitled States of Terror 1218.
The third difficulty in producing an assessment of the State's use of
violence outside its area of domestic jurisdiction is that unlike the
actions which are committed within a state's area of domestic
jurisdiction, there are no obvious classifications for these acts. This
thesis must therefore produce some and it proposes to adapt those
Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). pl 2-13. This latter point is also true of
Black and Morris' book and they note that the bulk of it had been read over by retired
intelligence officers. Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of
the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).pvii.
1208 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).
1209 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).
1210 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service.(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).
1 211 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990.).
1212 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.)
1213 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.)
1214 Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle
East. (Syracuse University Press. 1987.).
1215 Falk R.A. 'The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation'. American
Journal of International Law. Vol. 63. 1969. pp415-443.
1216 Blum Y.Z. 'The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard: A Reply to
Professor Richard A. Falk'. American Journal of International Law. Vol. 64. 1970.
pp73-105.
1217 Bowett D. 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force'. American Journal of
International Law. Vol. 66 (1).pp1-36.
1218 Taylor P. States of Terror. (B.B.C. Books. London. 1993.). 375
produced by Arend and Beck in their aforesaid assessment of "forcible
state responses to terrorism". 1219 Their four-fold classification reads:
"a. abductions of suspected terrorists;
b. assassinations of particular terrorists;
c. military strikes against terrorist bases; and
d. military strikes against states allegedly involved in terrorism".
This classification of "forcible state responses to terrorism" needs some
adaptation, for without it their categories are a little too precise, in that
at least two of them (the middle two) can be read as excluding apriori,
the idea that Israel may have made military strikes of one form or
another against 'illegitimate targets'. So although the classifications are
being adapted on these grounds the new wording should not be taken to
imply apriori that Israel has made such attacks on illegitimate targets,
it merely allows for the possibility. The new albeit artificial, and not
necessarily mutually exclusive classifications are:
a. abduction attempts;
b. attempts on the lives of individuals;
c. military strikes against bases and property;
d. other military strikes.
However before such an analysis will be undertaken it is useful to note
that unlike other definitions identified in the conceptual part of the
thesis, none of the following rely upon "actually existing international
law", for as already noted in the chapter entitled 'A Legalistic Approach'
such an approach produces more problems than this. Indeed even if one
accepted that the United Nations legal regime on the issue was the only
one to exist and that it bound non-members, the problems are manifold
and are worth being reminded of. Firstly one would have to decide
whether Israel's use of force against those struggling to achieve self-
determination was legal per se, in light of the claim that international
law forbids this. Perhaps the most famous piece of which is the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States In Accordance with the
1219 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN 	 376
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).p147.
Charter of the United Nations, passed without opposition by the General
Assembly in 1970. It stated that "every state has the duty to refrain from
any forcible action which deprives peoples...of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence".
Secondly, one would have to decide whether the goal of the P.L.O., or
later Hamas, or Islamic Jihad was ever the "violent overthrow" of
Israe1 1220 . This is important if one takes the view that Article 2(4)
allows the use of force by a State in response to an attack which
threatens its the "territorial integrity" or "political independence".
Even if the answer was 'Yes', then the question to be answered would be
whether the cross border attack by Palestinian fedayeen was of
sufficient intensity to be termed "an armed attack" in line with Article
51 of the U.N. Charter. As Levenfeld noted:
"The definition of "armed attack" is crucial because Israel's resort to self-defence
is legal under the U.N. Charter as interpreted above only if a fedayeen raid
constitutes an "armed attack". 1221
Brownlie for example claimed that fedayeen-like cross-border raids do
not constitute an 'armed attack' under Article 51, especially if such
attacks are 'isolated or sporadic' 1 2 2 2 . However just to show the
complexity of the matter is worth noting that Brownlie also noted that a
"co-ordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of irregulars,
with obvious or easily proven complicity of the government of the State
1220 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p7.
1221 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p16.
1222 Brownlie 'International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands' International and
Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol 7. 1958. p731 cited by Levenfeld B. 'Israel's
Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern
International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48.
p16.Similarly Garcia-Mora noted that there is an "almost total absence" of a conviction
among governments that the activities of armed bands constitute an armed attack, thus
justifying measures of self - defence under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Garcia-
Mora M. International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against
Foreign States. (1962). p129 cited by Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics
in Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p16. 377
from which they operate", would constitute such an "armed attackth 1223.
In addition one would surely have to consider the decisions of the
Security Council. After studying U.N. Security Resolutions on the issue
of Israeli incursions into Lebanon in response to fedayeen attacks
between 1968-78, Levenfeld concluded that:
"The message of the Security Council in dealing with Israeli exercises of its
alleged right of self-defence or reprisal is clear: they are completely unlawful. No
amount of fedayeen activity can justify the resort by Israel to armed force since
fedayeen activities do not constitute armed attacks"1224
Then their are the other requirements demanded by customary
international law before any response can be said to be legal including
the immediacy and intensity (or proportionality) of the State's violent
reply. According to Levenfeld one explanation for the Security
Council's arrival at such a conclusion is that it considers each particular
use of force in isolation, and refuses to take into account justifications
based on broader political or military contexts, presumably on the
grounds that this permits a faster and easier judgement because
complicating factors are ignored 1225 . This approach rejects, ab initio,
any argument proffered by Israel based on the broader context of an
accumulation of prior fedayeen attacks. Events not immediately
preceding the Israeli resort to force are simply not part of the equation
1223 Brownlie 'International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands' International and
Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol 7. 1958. p731 cited by Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-
Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International
Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p16.
1224 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48.p19. Levenfeld also noted that "In the decade from 1968 to
1978, the specfic question of Israeli counter-fedayeen activities directed at Lebanon
was the subject of eleven Security council resolutions. These eleven resolutions
condemn israel for violating the territorial integrity of Lebanon or for engaging in
forbidden militry reprisals'. Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in
Lebanon; Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law. Vol. 21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p17. O'Brien complained that: "For
those for whom international law is deduced from the resolutions of organizations like
the Security Council and the official pronouncemts of states, Israel's 1982 Lebanon war
was not a permissible exercise of the rights of self defence"O'Brien W. Law and
Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p145.
1225 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p18. 378
examined by the Security Counci1 1226 . Levenfeld also notes a second
underlying operating principle of the Security Council, which operates
neatly in conjunction with the first. That is its strict application of
notions of proportionality 1227
. The practical result of this is that an
organised Israeli military action "will always appear disproportionate to
a lone, preceding fedayeen attack" 1228
 .
Finally those who would like to include some or all of actually existing
international law in identifying the acts of state terrorism, would also
have to address the issue of the applicability of particular treaties even
when they have been signed and ratified by the party concerned. Here
the author is thinking about Israel's refusal to say that the Geneva
Convention applies to their 'occupation' of the West Bank, rather than
the actual application of it, which contains as many problems as this
author's identification of an illegitimate target.
So after reminding the reader as to the practical problems of the main
alternative school of thought, the thesis goes on to apply the 6
definitions to the counter-terrorist actions of Israel, committed abroad,
starting with attempts by Israel to abduct individuals.
1226 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisa l Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p19.
1 227 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p19.
1228 Levenfeld B. 'Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon; Self-Defense and
Reprisal Under Modern International Law'. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.
21. (1) 1982. pp1-48. p19. 379
Abduction Attempts. 
According to Arend and Beck abductions of alleged terrorists have been
attempted on at least four occasions in the post-Charter period, thrice by
Israel and once by the United States (the so called Achille Lauro
incident) 1229 . This section examines in detail all of the three Israeli
abductions mentioned by Arend and Beck for this reason, but also
because the three can be used as analogies for the detention of
thousands of Lebanese men detained and abducted to Israel (and south
Lebanon) 1230
 following 'Operation Peace in Galilee' in June and July of
1982, which incidentally Arend and Beck did not notice. According to
Black and Morris, those Lebanese considered guilty of activity in a
guerrilla organisations were sent to the big Ansar detention centre,
south-east of Sidon. By August 1982 it contained an estimated 10,000
prisoners 1231 . The Shin Beit often appeared to be carrying out arrests
at random in the hope of gleaning some information on the guerrillas.
Whilst the local population saw this as an attempt to terrorise and cow
them1232.
The first of the three main incidents is said to have ocurred on 10
August 1973. It is then that the Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief
of Staff David Elazar were given permission to intercept a civilian
Middle East Airlines flight from Lebanon to Iraq1233 by the Prime
Minister GoIda Meir, in the belief that the aircraft contained the
commander of the P.F.L.P. Dr. George Habash and his operations Chief,
Wadi Haddad 1234 . According to Katz, Israeli leaders had long maintained
1229 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).pl 47/148. In the accompanying footnote
(no.94.)they also mention the F.B.I.'s arrest of an alleged Lebanese Shi'ite terrorist
Fawaz Younis in international waters as he 'voluntarily' boarded a vessel there.
1230 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p395.
1231 Black and Morris note that this is an Amnesty International estimate (but don't
give any more details). Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History
of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p397.
1 232 Black and Morris cite The Times of the 7,12,14 March 1985. Black I. and Morris
B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish
Hamilton. London. 1991.). p397.
1 233 Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle
East. (Syracuse University Press. 1987.). p49.
1234 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p49. 380
a personal vendetta against the Marxist Habash 1235 . While Katz himself
notes that "[t]he IDF had tried, and failed, to take care of Habash on
previous occasions" 1236 . The unmarked 1237
 Israeli Air Force (or I.A.F.)
Mirage IIICs and F-4Es forced the civilian airliner to land in Israel with
its 81 or so passengers 1238 . However on landing it was found that the
plane did not contain any terrorists and following their initial
interrogation the passengers and crew were allowed to fly on. The
Israeli delegate to the U.N. Security Council claimed that Israel's actions
were permitted by the laws of self-defence. However the Security
Council unanimously condemned the forcible Israeli action1239.
On 4 February 1986, Israel embarked upon a similar unsuccessful
attempt to capture Habash, when Israeli F-16's intercepted 1240
 a Libyan
Airlines jet en route to Damascus and compelled it to land in Israe11241.
Again the Israel's justified such forcible action in 'self-defence'. This
time the U.S. were unable to accept the draft Security Council resolution,
which they claimed implied that the interception of aircraft was wrong
242per se 1	 .
1235 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p49.
1236 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers:lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p50. Alo notes that they aimed to kill him during an operation in
Tripoli, Northern Lebanon. p49.
1237 Posner wrote that the Israeli warplanes did not have markings. Posner S. Israel
Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East. (Syracuse
University Press. 1987.).p49.
1238 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms
and Armour. London. 1990.).p49. Posner put the total at 74 passengers and 7 crew,
and mentions only Mirage warplanes. Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and
Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East. (Syracuse University Press. 1987.).p49. Arend
and Beck put the total at 90 persons, Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and
the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 48.
1239 Arend and Beck cite UNSCOAR 1738. Mtg. 35. UNDoc: S/PV. 1738 (1973). Arend
A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter
Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p148.
1240 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p399.
1241 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).p149. Also Katz S.M. Guards Without
Frontiers:Israels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990).p49;
and Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston.
1990.).p398 -9.
1242 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).p149. Based on the comments of US.
Ambassador V. Walters. UN Doc. S/PV 2655.corr.1. Feb 18. 1989.1112-113. 381
Before dawn on 28 July 1989, twelve members of Israel's Sayeret Markal
(the reconnassance unit of General Staff) in combat fatigues were
landed by helicopter at the home of Sheikh Abdul Karim Obe'id, a senior
Muslim cleric 1243 . According to Katz the Israeli's claimed that the
Sheikh was commander of fundamentalist group Hezbollah ('the party
of god') in southern Lebanon, and was personally behind "dozens of
terrorist attacks" 1244 . Arend and Beck similarly wrote that the Israeli's
initially said he was responsible for passing "war materiel to the
Hezbollah fighters in Southern Lebanon" and sheltering those who had
committed attacks 1245 . Obe'id was later accused of being an "inciter" and
of being a "planner of attacks against Israel" 1246 . The Sheikh was
abducted along with two other men from his house and a neighbour of
his was killed 1247 •
 According to Katz, the raid sent a message to
Hezbollah that Israel would not tolerate car bombings and shootings of
Israeli soldiers 124 8.
As a result of this incident Egypt accused Israel of "state terrorism"1249.
Meanwhile following "prior off-the-record-consultations", the Security
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 638 which condemned
unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction 1250 , but did not
specifically mention the abduction of Sheikh Obe'id.
1243 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).p150. It was Katz who mentioned the
combat fatigues. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism.
(Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p204.
1244 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990.). p204.
1245 Arend and Beck cite "Israeli Commando 's Seize leader of Pro-Iran Group in
Lebanon" New York Times. July 29. 1989. 4 Coll .Arend A.C. and Beck R.J.
International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge.
London. 1993.).p150
1246 Arend and Beck cite 'Free Shiek, Group warns, Or Americans will die' New York
Times. July 31. 1989. A2 Co1.1 . Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the
Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).pl 50.
1247 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).pl 50.
1248 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers:lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p205.
1249 Arend and Beck cite 'Israel Dismisses Criticism. New York Times. July 30. 1989.
6, Col 5.Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the
UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 50.
1250 Arend and Beck cite UN Doc. S/PV.2872, July 31. 1989. and
S/RES/638(1989).Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force:
Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 50. 382
The Aroplication of the Various Definitions of (State) 
Terrorism. 
In contrast to many of the other actions under examination within this
second part of the assessment of Israel's counter-terrorist actions,
Israel's actions are rather openly acknowledged, even if some of them
were carried out by covert means. There seems little dispute that both
the successful and unsuccessful attempts to kidnap alleged leaders of
'terrorist groups' were carried out for political motives by an
organisation- that is known as the State of Israel. Slightly more debate
surrounds the nature of the intended target and the purpose of the act.
If one accepts the Israeli view that Habash, Haddad and Sheikh Obe'id
were involved in the production of attacks on Israel (and this author
does) then all of them constitute legitimate targets, and for this reason
their abduction cannot constitute an act of state terrorism using my
definition. This said consistency would then require that attempts by
Palestinian organisations to kidnap Israeli leaders and soldiers would
not constitute acts of terrorism for the same reason.
Once this conclusion has been arrived at the question over whether the
intent of the Israelis in abducting each of the three was merely to
remove them, or to send a message to others (as Katz suggested was the
case with Sheikh Obe'id 1251 N) no longer affects this author's answer.
Nevertheless the question of intent is still important in regards to some
of the other definitions or to my definition, if one does not accept that
Israel genuinely believed that Sheikh Obe'id passed "war materiel to the
Hezbollah fighters in Southern Lebanon", sheltered those who had
committed attacks 1252
 or planned attacks against Israe1 1253 . For
example if one did not believe Obe'id was a combatant and one believed
that Israel aimed to use Sheikh Obe'id as a swop for Israeli soldiers, as
1251 The raid sent a message to Hezbollah that Israel would not tolerate car bombings
and shootings of Israeli soldiers. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers:lsraels War
Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p205.
1252 Arend and Beck cite "Israeli Commando 's Seize leader of Pro-Iran Group in
Lebanon" New York Times. July 29. 1989. 4 Co11.Arend A.C. and Beck R.J.
International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge.
London. 1993.). p150.
1253 Arend and Beck cite 'Free Sheikh, Group warns, Or Americans will die' New York
Times. July 31. 1989. A2 Co1.1 . Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the
Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 50. 383
has been suggested 1254 , then his abduction would constitute an act of
state terrorism in accordance with my definition.
As for the abductions by Israel of 10,000 Lebanese, such actions do not
constitute state terrorism under this author's definition if these people
were members of guerrilla organisations, and were treated as such. The
practice of Israel seems to support this even if their words do not. As
William O'Brien put it in regards to the P.L.O.: "[n]o belligerent status
was recognised, but some of the central features of the 1 3 [.0.]W regime
were incorporated into Israeli treatment of captured PLO fedayeen
" 1255 . Including visits by the Red Cross.
If however some of the 10,000 were not known to be fedayeen and were
taken to guarantee the 'good' behaviour of those remaining in Lebanon,
i.e to terrorise and cow the remaining civilians in Lebanon 1256 , then
such actions would constitute acts of state terrorism for the aim of the
Israelis was to modify the behaviour of others. However if some of
10,000 were not known to be fedayeen but were taken simply to be
interrogated in the hope of gaining information then such actions
could not constitute acts of state terrorism for the aim of the Israelis was
to simply gain information not to modify the behaviour of others.
Likewise if some of the 10,000 were taken to face criminal charges for
acts against the Israelis they had committed in or from Lebanon (except
of course 'war crimes') then such actions could constitute acts of state
terrorism if the aim of the Israelis was to modify the behaviour of
others. This is because Israel has as little right to enforce its law in
Lebanon unless of course Israel established its rule within the West
Bank, as it did in the West Bank.
1254 Katz wrote "When the Sayaret Mat'kal commandos abducted Sheikh Obe'id, it was
to gain them an added leverage in the stalled and frustrated efforts to bring their men
home". Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers:Israds War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p205.
1255 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p200.
1256 Black and Morris cite The Times of the 7,12,14 March 1985. Black I. and Morris
B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish
Hamilton. London. 1991.). p397. 384
Do these abductions qualify as acts of terrorism in accordance with the
other proposed definitions? The use of violence involved in kidnapping
the alleged leaders of terrorist groups and the 10,000 Lebanese satisfies
the demand of the Prevention of Terrorism Act that the use of violence
was political as well as its option requirement that it was for the purpose
of putting "any section of the public in fear". It is on the latter basis
that it fulfils Stohl and Lopez's demand that the purposeful act of
violence aimed to create fear or compliant behaviour in the victim. On
this occasion the aim was to instil fear in the victims themselves, if not
other members of the Palestinian groups.
The attempted kidnappings can only be seen to have avoided the
application of the label terrorism in accordance with Israel's P.T.O. if
one accepts that the use of violence involved in any kidnap was not
"calculated to cause death or injury to a person or to threats of such acts
of violence". It would be surprising to see this interpretation being
applied by Israeli law in regards to the abductions committed by sub-
state groups. Therefore here, as in the section on arrests within the
areas administered by Israel, the use of force by Israel is assumed to
contain the threat of injury to those who resist it. It is for this reason
that the various abductions are seen to fit the Israeli definition.
Unless one comes to a different conclusion on the nature of the victims
than this author already has, each of the three named kidnappings do
not qualify in accordance with the U.S. definition because it requires
that the premeditated, politically motivated violence be perpetrated
against "non-combatant" targets. Moreover the U.S definition also
required that such violent actions were carried out by clandestine
agents, and only the first attempt to abduct Habash and Haddad matches
this criteria. The requirement of being perpetrated by clandestine
actors, also makes it easy to see why the abduction of 10,000 Lebanese
could not be labelled as acts of terrorism in accordance with the U.S.
definition, for presumably the vast majority of the 10,000 were taken by
regular army units rather than via undercover forces. However if any
of the 10,000 were not genuinely considered to be combatants by the
Israelis and were taken by clandestine actors, for the purpose of
guaranteeing the 'good' behaviour of others in Lebanon and were thus
taken in order to terrorise and cow the remaining civilians in
385
Le b an o n 1257 such acts would qualify for the label terrorism in
accordance with the U.S. definition.
With Schmid's definition the question of labelling is more problematic.
Firstly there is the question of the repeated nature of the action, which
seems to be evident (with the exception of the first abduction), in that
the Israeli armed forces have undertaken violent actions on previous
occasions against all of the groups involved, and they have also
undertaken kidnappings on a number of occasions. Secondly there
needs to be evidence to suggest that the Israeli forces involved in the
kidnapping were clandestine, or at least semi-clandestine. This author
has yet to come across any in the case of Sheikh Obe'id, but it does seem
to be the case in the first attempted kidnapping of Dr. George Habash,
and Haddad, for according to Posner, the Israeli warplanes did not have
markings 1258 . This requirement probably rules out most of the 10,000
Lebanese taken. Taking this to be so, the question to be answered
becomes whether the direct targets of violence -Sheikh Obe'id and any
of the 10,000 Lebanese taken by semi-clandestine agents- were the main
target, or was their use primarily that of a message generator?.
Here there is the problem of proving the intent of the perpetrator that
hinders any attempt to identify an act of terrorism. It seems that the
Israeli's had targeted Habash on a number of occasions (including
attempts to kill him), but now they seemed to want him alive or were
unprepared to kill the rest of the airline passengers to get him. This
may suggest that Habash may have been used to generate a message to
other members of the P.L.O. or even wider Palestinian audience, but it is
equally as credible to suggest they wanted him for intelligence. It is
because of this uncertainty that Israel will be given the benefit of the
doubt and it will be said that this act does not fit Schmid's definition.
Likewise if any of the 10,000 captured by covert forces, were taken for
intelligence reasons they too could not qualify for Schmid's label.
However if any of the 10,000 were taken by clandestine actors,
primarily for the purpose of guaranteeing the 'good' behaviour of
1257 Black and Morris cite The Times of the 7,12,14 March 1985. Black I. and Morris
B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish
Hamilton. London. 1991.). p397.
1258 Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle
East. (Syracuse University Press. 1987.). p49. 386
others in Lebanon then such actions would qualify for Schmid's label
for they were taken in order to terrorise and cow the remaining
civilians in Lebanon l 259.
1259 Black and Morris cite The Times of the 7,12,14 March 1985. Black I. and Morris
B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish
Hamilton. London. 1991.). p397. 387
b) Attempts On The Lives of Individuals. 
There seems to be little doubt that since 1967, if not before, the Israeli
state has sent members of its security forces abroad with the aim to kill
people for counter-terrorist purposes. Indeed it has been suggested that
the Israeli's were engaged in such life threatening activities prior to
their occupation of the West Bank in June 1967. According to
Deacon 1260 , the tactic of using "unofficial assassination squads" were
launched as early as 1956 the year in which Colonels Hafaz and Mustafa
-allegedly the Egyptian Military Intelligence controlling officers of the
Palestinian fedayeen - were killed. Deacon also suggests that the Israelis
were the first Secret Service in modern times to use the tactical weapon
of the letter-bomb 1261 . An early example of this was 'Operation
Damocles' 1262 , in which Israel sent letter bombs to German scientists
working on ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical and
biological payloads for the Egyptians in the early 1960s and their
families1263.
Since 1967 Israel has allegedly been involved in attempts to kill many
individuals abroad, and it is worth describing all of those that this
author has come across because many of them are strikingly similar to
methods normally labelled as terrorism when committed by sub-state
groups. In the days following the Israeli's victory in the June 1967 war,
Sayeret Haruv, an elite paratroop reconnaissance force of the I.D.F.'s
Central Command, was given the order to seize (or perhaps even kill)
Yasser Arafat and attempted to do so in Jordan on a number of
1260 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p222/223. He
goes on to say that some of the unofficial assassination squads include 'The Avengers'
'Masada'- named after the great rock on the edge of the Judean Desert where the
Zealots made their last great stand against the Romans-; 'Squad 101' [also sometimes
designated 'Squad 1001' as a confusion tactic); the 'July Unit' and 'Wrath of God',
usually more irreverently called 'WOG'. p222.
1261 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p224
1262 In the campaign against German scientists, there were a few injuries and much
intimidation. Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston.
1990).p122. Melman and Raviv note that two Mossad agents sent to Switzerland
"Their task was to frighten the daughter of Paul GOrka , one of the German scientists
working on Egypt's missile project. They told Heidi GOrka there could be dire
consequences if her father did not leave Cairo at once". Me!man Y. and Raviv D. Every
Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.). pl 24.
1 263 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
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occasions 1264
. According to Melman and Raviv, the Israeli attempt to
kill Yasser Arafat in mid-December of 1967 was the seventh time that
the Israeli's had failed to ensnare the P.L.O. leader 1265 . A Israeli
magazine Ha'olam Hazeh (This World) has also claimed that Mossad had
been trying to assassinate Arafat since the mid-1960's but never did
because the "opportunity never arose" 1266 . Whilst the Israeli daily
Yediot Aharonet quoted a book published in Egypt which claimed that
Mossad had made several attempts on life of Arafat including (attempted
poisonings) in the Far East in 1978, Romania in 1979, and after the 1982
invasion of Lebanon1267.
The next incident which falls within the period considered in this
analysis is the allegation that in July 1970 the Israeli's set out to kill Dr.
Wadi Haddad the military leader of Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (or P.F.L.P.) in his Beirut apartment, although the planned
rocket attack failed1268 . This was followed in July 1972 by "the first big
strike" by the Israeli 'avenger squads' in retaliation for the attack on
Lydda (or Lod 1269 ) airport 1270 . After being secretly put ashore in
Beirut, two Mossad agents wired a radio-controlled bomb to the car of
the P.F.L.P.'s public relations officer in the city, whom Israel believed
was the organiser of this attack 1271 . Ghassan Kanafani who was also a
1264 The phrase "perhaps even kill" is a result of Katz's next sentence which reads,
"Arafat, not then as famous as today, had slipped through Israeli hands in East
Jerusalem and the affluent city of Ramallah in 1967 and his capture [or murder] was
given serious priority'. [his brackets] Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels
War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p195.
1265 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston.
1990.)p169. Israel devised a philosophy that only leaders of small terrorist groups
would be targetted. Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin.
Boston. 1990.). p398
1266 Cited by Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism.
(Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p195.
1267 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). pl 95.
1268 Deacon merely describes it as an aborted attempt. Deacon R. Israeli Secret
Service.(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p227. In contrast Black and Morris claim
that the Israeli's launched a rocket attack at his Beirut appartment. Black I. and Morris
B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish
Hamilton. London. 1991.). p272.
1269 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p35.
1270 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p228. He puts
the date 8th July 1972.
1271 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p229. Katz
described him as "a member of the PFLP's Central Command and one of the planners of 389
poet, novelist and intellectual, and according to Katz, a member of
P.F.L.P.'s central command 1272 , was killed as he started his car, as was
his seventeen year-old niece, who happened to be with him 1273 . Soon
after this incident a letter bomb injured Bassam Abu Sherif who had
been ordered to take over Kanafani's role 1274 . According to Katz, such
attacks were not declared as official Israeli policy, but they served as
effective reminders to the P.F.L.P. that they were not immune from the
long arm of Israeli justice1275.
The number of strikes by Israel against specific individuals can be seen
to have escalated dramatically following the killing of Israeli athletes
by 'Black September' at the Munich Olympic games in 1972. According to
Black and Morris, the Munich massacre marked a turning-point in
Israel's war against Palestinian terrorism. The Israeli Prime Minister
GoIda Meir decided that the time had come for wholesale vengeance, not
just for its own sake, but as a deterrent 1276 . Whilst Melman and Raviv
have claimed that "the mission was not to capture anyone. It was out-
and-out revenge -to terrorise the terrorists" 1277 . She authorised the
Mossad to assassinate the leaders of Black September, or at least those
deemed directly responsible for Munich 1278 . During the ten months
the Lod airport massacre"Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israels War Against
Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990).p35.
1272 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p35
1273 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p229.
1274 Deacon puts the attack at one or two days later. Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service.
(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p229, whilst Black and Morris put it several days
later. Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p272. In contrast Katz puts it a six
weeks later. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism.
(Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p36.
1275 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p36.
1276 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p272.
1277 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p186.
1278 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p272. Katz wrote that according to
foreign sources, Mossad was required to obtain the personal go-ahead from Prime
Minister Meir who chaired a secret tribunal chaired by Meir, Defence Minister Moshe
Dayan and Foreign Miniser Yigal AlIon, before any attempt was made on the life of a
Black September leader and, according to Katz other foreign sources, the authorization
for every operation was obtained from . Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels
War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p40. 390
following Munich, at least nine men associated by the Israelis with
Palestinian terrorism were killed in violent circumstances 1279 . This
whole series of events would become to be known as the 'War of the
Spooks' 1280 as the P.L.O. in turn killed Israeli agents1281.
It can be suggested that the start of this period is marked by a bomb
explosion in an Arab book shop in Paris, on 4 October 1972. According to
Deacon this was planted by an 'avenger squad' named 'Masada', although
Israel denied all knowledge 1282 . Twelve days later Wadal Adel
Zvaiter 1283 , the P.L.O.'s representative in Rome and a well known
writer 1284 , was shot dead in the city, by what Katz described1285 as two
unobtrusive men standing in lobby of block of flats, who'd been driven
by blonde female in a Fiat 125. According to Deacon, Zvaiter was held
responsible for the bomb explosion aboard an El Al flight the previous
August, and considered involved in the Munich massacre 1286 . Katz
similarly claimed that he was believed to be mastermind behind several
unsuccessful attempts to blow El Al planes in the air as well as being
"Black September's operations chief in Italy" 1287 . However following
his enquiries for the B.B.C. television series "States of Terror", the
investigative journalist Peter Taylor claimed that Zvaiter "was not, as
1279 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p273. Peter Taylor on the B.B.C.
Progammme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993 said, "The Mossad, Israel's
secret intelligence service became state assassin"and ten [Palestinians] were killed
across Europe and Middle East in a year.
1280 "But Arafat's Fatah could not stand by and let the Mossad wipe out the PLO's
leadership. Fatah struck back at a cafe in Brussels, where Zadok Kaffir was meeting an
agent. It was the beginning of what would be known as the 'war of the spooks'. B.B.C.
Progammme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993.
1281 Deacon wrote "In this period Arab 'liquidators' disposed of at least three Mossad
agents by killings which were made to look like accidents". Deacon R. Israeli Secret
Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p233
1282 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p231. He
suggests that it was not Israel.
1283 Deacon uses this spelling and describes him as a Palestinian poet. Deacon R.
Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p231. Katz called him Wael
Zwaite r. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms
and Armour. London. 1990). p36.
1254 B.B.C. Progammme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993.
1285 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p41. He says that it was a red Fiat, Taylor says it was a green
one. Taylor P. State of Terror. (B.B.C. Books. London. 1993.) pl 8.
1286 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p231.
1287 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p41. He also claimed that a[n unamed] Beirut newspaper
described him as "one of our best combatants" after his death. 391
far as we can ascertain, in any way involved with Munich or perhaps
even with terrorism"1288.
On 8 December 1972 Dr. Mahmoud Hamshari, described as "the PLO's
representative in Paris" 1289 , "another Black September chier 1290 who
was also linked to an aborted raid on Ben Gurion airport 1291 , was killed
by a telephone bomb in his apartment in Paris. 1292
 Disguised as a
telephone engineer, an Israeli agent had managed to fit explosives in
the ear piece of his telephone following the 'accidental' damage of
telephone wires leading to Hamshari's apartment by 'plumbers'1293.
This was subsequently activated by a high pitched buzz once Hamshari
answered the telephone 1294 . However yet again Peter Taylor "found no
evidence that Hamshari was directly involved in Munich"1295.
On 25 January 1973, Hassain Abad Al-Chir, allegedly Palestinian link-
man with the KGB in Cyprus was killed by radio bomb planted by Mossad
team in Olympic Hotel in Nicosia 1296 . On 6 April 1973, Dr. Basil Al-
1288 B.B.C. Progammme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993. To which
Yariv [who he] Yariv replied "Well, as far as I can remember, there was some
involvement on his part in terrorist activities, not in operation, but in terrorist
activities, supplying, helping, that is support activities."Yariv " Well, you must
remember the situation. Activity went on, on their part. The only way we, the only
way we thought we could stop it -we didn't have any interest in going around killing
people, we had an interest in stopping the activity- was to kill people in leadership
roles. It worked, in the end it worked"
1289 B.B.C. Programme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993. Katz similarly
called him the PLO's official representative in France. Katz S.M. Guards Without
Frontiers: Israels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p41
1290 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service, (Hamish Hamilton, London,1979), p232.
According to Katz, he was Black September's second in command in Paris. Katz S.M.
Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London.
1990). p41.
1291 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p42.
1292 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p232. Died 9
January 1973.Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism.
(Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p42.
1293 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p42.
1294 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p42.
1295 B.B.C. Progammme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993.
1296 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p232/233.
Also Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p273. Katz notes that on 24 January
1973, Abd el Hir, allegedly the Black September station chief in Cyprus and K.G.B.
agent was killed after ultra sonic radio transmitter set off explosive devices in the 392
Kubaissi, a professor at the American University in Beirut, was shot
dead at point-blank range in Paris 1297 . According to Deacon, he was
believed to have been one of the organisers of explosives supplies for
the Arab terrorists. 1298
 Whilst Katz claimed that his responsibilities
included maintaining a proper state of preparedness of Black
September's vast arsenal, overseeing communications, and supervising
safe houses 1299 . In the early hours of 12 April 1973, Mousa Abu Zaiad, a
senior Black September terrorist , was killed by an incendiary device in
his hotel room in Athens" 1300 . According to foreign sources the Israelis
hinted that it was a Mossad operation1301.
Then in the middle of the month, Mohamed Yusif Najar, Kemal A'dwan
and Kamal Nasser were all killed by the Israelis as part of Operation
'Springtime of Youth'. Described as Mossad' s biggest and most
successful 'avenger squad' operation 1302 , According to Katz the
operation:
"had four primary objectives which included the destruction of the headquarters
of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the el-Fatah
office responsible for operations in Israel proper. The principal targets, however,
were three top Black September officers: Mohamed Najer (also known as Abu
Yusef), the el-Fatah and Black September operations and intelligence genius
behind most of their terrorist attacks world-wide, including the assassination of
Jordanian Prime Minister Tal, the Munich massacre and the Bangkok fiasco; Kamal
Aidwan, a senior el-Fatah officer responsible for running terrorist cells in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and Kamal Nasser, the official spokesman for the
mattress of hotel bed in Olympic Hotel. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israels War
Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p43.
1297 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service.(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p233
1298 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p233.
1299 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p43.
1300 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p45-46. Interestingly he notes that Salameh was planning a
major operation in Cyprus, in response to the mistaken Israeli downing of a Libyan
passenger aircraft on 21 February 1973. Deacon notes that on 9 April Mossad killed
Zaiad Muchasi, the new Palestinian link-man with the KGB, with a bomb. Deacon R.
Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p233. This has not been
placed in the main text for fear it is actually the same person as Mousa Abu Zaiad.
1301 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p46.
1302 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.).p233. 393
Palestinian Liberation Organisation and a high-ranking Black September
officer." 1303
Conveniently all three lived in two adjacent blocks of flats in
Beriut 1304 . Since the start of the month Mossad agents had arrived at a
number of hotels over a number of days under forged passports from
various European countries 1305 . They reconnoitred the target and
landing spot for the joint Mossad -I.D.F. commando raid 1306 against
Black September. On the night of the attack these agents covered the
landing of the 8 commandos at Ramlet-el-Beida and provided them with
the cars to make the journey to Beirut 1307 . Once at there target the
Israelis "dressed in a combination of civilian clothing, female drag, and
hippie garb of the Woodstock generation" succeeded in silencing the
terrorists guarding the blocks of flats and eliminating the three men on
their list1308.
On 28 June 1973, Muhammad Boudia, believed to be Black September's
operations chief in Europe 1309 was blown up by a bomb placed in his
car in Paris 1310 . Then on 21 July 1973, Ahmed Bouchiki a Morrocan
waiter at a health farm 1311 was mistakenly shot dead in a street in
Lillehammer, Norway by a man and woman from Mossad 1312. The
Israelis had mistaken him for Ali Hassan Salameh, whom the Israeli's
believed was the terrorist leader responsible for the Munich
1303 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p44.
13 04 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p44.
1308 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p234.
1308 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p41 He says it was against Black September.
130 7 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p234.
1308 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p44-45.
1 3 08 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p46.
1310 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p275. Katz S.M. Guards Without
Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p46.
1311 One terrorologist writing a book on Carlos the Jackal described the victim as "a
Moroccan disc jokey with a connection to AI-Fatah", and in a later report as "the PLO
representative in Scandanavia". Smith C. Portrait of a Terrorist. (Andre Deutsch.
London. 1976. (no page refernce). Cited by Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service. (Hamish
Hamilton. London.1979.) .p243.
1312 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service.(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p242 394
massacre 1 3 1 3 . Six Israeli operatives were captured by the
authorities 1314
The killings of specific individuals can be seen to have declined
significantly following the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's 1315 order to
Mossad to cease the 'assassination' of Palestinian terrorists in
September 1974, although they did not come to an end. The head of PLO
office in Paris was killed by the Israelis on 4 January 1977 according to
Deacon 1316 , and Salameh who the Israeli's considered as the terrorist
leader responsible for the Munich massacre 1317
 was finally killed by
the Israelis in Beirut on 22 January 1979. He was blown up as he was
driven past a Volkswagen Golf containing explosives which had been
parked and detonated by a male and female operative disguised as a
British tourist and spinster respectively1318.
On 9 October 1981, Maghd Abu Shrar, PLO Information Minister in Rome,
was killed by an explosion in room 319 of the Flora Hote1 1319 . According
to Katz "speculation and certain facts" implicate Mossad. Notably a
mysterious and unusual delivery of an extra pillow was made to his room
even though Abu Shrar always slept with only a blanket1320.
On 14 February 1988, "the Israelis went into action" 1321
 again. Mahmed
Tamimi, Marwan (gall, and Mahmad Bahias were killed in Cyprus. All
three have been described as sporting the rank of colonel in Al-Fatah
1313 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service.(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p238.
1314 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p276.
131 5 Katz cites O'Ballance E. Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism
(Presido Press. San Rafael. 1979.).p230. Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's
War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London. 1990). p50.
1316 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service.(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p249.
1 317 Deacon R. Israeli Secret Service.(Hamish Hamilton. London.1979.). p238.
1318 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p51. He also claims that the renewal of the tactic was due to a
change in government. Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History
of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p277.
1319 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p58-9.
1 3 20 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p59.
1321 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p390.
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1322 . Whilst Black and Morris describe Qiali, as a colonel on the P.L.O.'s
military council, Buhais as an official of the P.L.O.'s Occupied Homelands
Office and Tamimi as the head of one of Fatah' s most important
operational and intelligence branches, known as Committee 77. He was
also believed to be personally responsible for planning the killing of
six Israeli settlers at Beit Hadassah in 1980 and for a grenade attack on
Israeli soldiers at the wailing wal1 1323 in October 1986. Once again
Israel publicly denied any involvement.1324
In the evening of 15 April 1989 approximately thirty members of
Sayeret Mat ikal landed on a tourist beach near Tunis aboard rubber
dinghies 1325 . The advance party of seven Mossad operatives using false
Lebanese passports 1326 were awaiting on the shore. They had rented
two Volkswagen minibuses and a Peugeot station wagon 1327 . Two of the
vehicles "packed with troops in civilian clothes, holding their Uzi sub-
machine guns and pistols between their legs, drove to the target" and
waited. Their job was to jam the phones and to protect the main
mission' 328 . The whole operation was co-ordinated from the
communications systems on board an Israeli Boeing 707, which had
pretended to be an El-Al flight1329 . Eventually Abu Jihad went to bed.
The house was stormed and Abu Jihad, 2 bodyguards and driver were
1322 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990.). p63.
1323 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p468.
1324 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990.). p63.
1325 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p396. Katz puts the figure at 30-40 he also notes Flotilla 13 commandos. Katz S.M.
Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London.
1990.). p189.
1326 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p470. Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every
Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.). p395.
1327 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston.
1990).395. Katz described the vehicles as Peugeot 305, 2 Volkswagen Minibuses. Katz
S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour.
London. 1990.). p192.
1328 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p396.
1329 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p396.
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killed 1 330. Katz suggests that the commandos would have worn black
Nomex coveralls 1331 , and he notes reports that some wore the uniforms
of Tunisian National Guards 1332 . The Israelis said that Abu Jihad had
planned attack on civilian bus in the Negev desert near the Dimona
nuclear reactor in March in which three people were killed, and scores
of other terrorist attacks 1333 . Whatever Abu Jihad's political functions,
he was known by the Israelis as the man responsible for the 1978
Country Club raid and a number of recent terrorist actions, as well as
the chief P.L.O. co-ordinator with the leaders of the intifada 1334 . It has
been suggested that this was the fourth attempt on his life1335.
According to Melman and Raviv, the Israelis could have kept the entire
matter secret, but "it would not then have had the desired deterrent
effect". Therefore official Israeli sources provided two American news
outlets, N.B.C. Television and the Washington Post, with "fairly complete
accounts of what the Mossad and the army had done" 1336W They also
note that Aman (military intelligence) commander Sharak was quoted
in that week's issues of the official army magazine Ba-Machaneh (In
Camp), as saying: "[a]nyone directing terrorism is a suitable target for
elimination' 1337 . In contrast Black and Morris declared that Israel
followed its usual practice and refused to admit officially that it was
responsible for the killing. Yet even they went on to say that "the
denials convinced no one", and when, contrary to normal practice, the
censor permitted for publication press reports about the victim and the
operation, Black and Morris note that: "this was universally taken to
1330 Amend and Beck cite O'Brien 'Reprisals, Deterrence and Self Defence in Counter
terror Operations' Va. J. of Int'l L. 1990 p462 . Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International
Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).
p150.
1331 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990.). p190.
1332 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armou r. London. 1990.). p190.
1333 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p470.
1334 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . ID168.
1335 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism.
	 (Arms
and Armour. London. 1990.).p193. The others being in 1978,1980,1982.
1336 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p397
1337 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p397-8
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imply confirmation" 1338 . Black and Morris also claimed that what
mattered was "the message had been sent": a combination of Israel's
long and deadly arm with the useful addition of encouraging fear and
suspicion of spies and traitors in Palestinian ranks1339.
Israel did not formally participate in the Security Council meeting
which condemned the attack and accused Israel of it which in
Resolution 611, of 25 April 1988 1340 . It has also been suggested that less
than six months earlier the Israelis made an unsuccessful attempt to kill
Abu-Jibril the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine -General Command 1341 . In 1989 the Mossad was also alleged to
have mounted a campaign against scientists building rockets for Iraq
and Egypt1342.
Finally within this particular classification it is worth noting that on
February 16 1992, two Israeli helicopter gunships attacked a seven
vehicle motorcade in Southern Lebanon. The Shrite Imam and leader of
the Hezbollah, Sheikh Abbas Musawi, his wife, six year old son, and five
bodyguards were killed in the rocket assault 1343 . The Israeli
government publicly admitted its action 1344 . Israeli Defence Minister
Moshe Arens called Musawi a "man with lots of blood on his hands"1345
1338 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p470-1. Arend and Beck similarly
wrote, "Israel's involvement was broadly conceded, even by Israel's supporters"Arend
A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter
Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).p150. In their footnotes Arend and Beck wrote
that "although Israel did not officially admit responsibility, the assassination was
nonetheless an Israeli operation" O'Brien 'Reprisals, Deterrence and Self Defence in
Counter terror 'Operations Va. Journal of international Law 1990. p462.
1339 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p471-2.
1340 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p151.
1341 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism.	 (Arms
and Armour. London. 1990.). pl 98-202.
1342 Black and Morris cite Davar, 28 April 1989.Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret
Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London.
1991.).P503.
1343 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p151.
1944 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p150.
1345 Arend and Beck cite Israeli Raid Kills Hezbollah Leader ' Washington Post Feb 17
1992 al, col 4. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force:
Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p151. 398
and Hezbollah a "murderous, terrorist organisation 1346 characterised
his state's forcible action against Sheikh Musawi as both "an attack
intended to hurt Hezbollah" 1347
 and "a message to all the terrorist
organisations [that] whoever opens an account with us will have the
account closed by us" 1348 . Interestingly Arend and Beck note
suggestions that although Sheikh Musawi was killed, the mission's
original aim may have been to kidnap Musawi and bring him trial in
Israel or exchange for an Israeli P.O.W. believed held by the Hezbollah
1349 • According to one account, the operation went wrong when the
missiles intended to take out the vehicle carrying his bodyguards hit
Musawi's car 1350 . In this case then this example could be placed within
the section on attempted abductions. Although Palestinian spokeswoman
Hanan Ashrawi asked rhetorically: "To use the air force and state policy
to kill women and children, that's not terrorism?" 1351 , there was no
discussion of the incident at the Security Counci11352.
The Application of the Various Definitions of (State) 
Terrorism. 
Unlike the assessment of kidnappings by Israel, any discussion of its
killing of individuals is "inherently problematic" in so far as many of
these actions have typically remained unacknowledged by their
1346 Arend and Beck cite Israelis Kill Chief of Pro-Iran shiites in South Lebanon' N.Y.
Times Feb 17 1992. A9, col 1.Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use
of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 51.
1347 Arend and Beck cite Israeli Raid Kills Hezbollah Leader ' Washington Post Feb 17
1992 al, col 4. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force:
Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 51.
1848 Arend and Beck cite Israelis Kill Chief of Pro-Iran shiites in South Lebanon' N.Y2.
Times Feb 17 1992. A9, col 2. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use
of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p151.
1849 'Murder by Mistake?', Newsweek. Mar.20. 1992.p6. cited by Arend A.C. and
Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm.
(Routledge. London. 1993.). p151.
1350 'Murder by Mistake?', Newsweek. Mar.20. 1992. p6. cited by Arend A.C. and
Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm.
(Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 51-152.
1351 H. Ashrawi cited by Arend and Beck. Israelis Kill Chief of Pro-Iran Shiites in
South Lebanon' N.Y2. Times Feb 17 1992. A9, col 2. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J.
International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge.
London. 1993.). pl 52.
1352 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 52. 399
perpetrators 1353
. Following this comment by Arend and Beck, the
immediate question becomes, 'Does each definition requires this open
acknowledgement?'. This author's definition does, but only to the extent
that if the target audience does not know who carried out such an
attack, then it cannot receive any message that the terrorist is trying to
send. It is of course possible for the terrorist to make its responsibility
known to the audience whose behaviour it intends to modify, without it
being made known to the wider world. This author does not know
whether this was the case in all of the incidents noted above, although
it does seem that the Israeli's made the fact know to the wider world in
the case of Musawi and Boudi and Zaiad, and Abu-Jibril, the latter two
out of choice.
As for the rest of the incidents under scrutiny it may just be that Israel
is happy not openly admitting its involvement in individual incidents,
for such an approach would enable it to avoid the international
condemnation of its actions which would follow such a confession.
Ironically support for this view can be seen in the general comments
made by the then Defence Minister Moshe Arens "whoever opens an
account with us will have the account closed by us" 1354 , for it can be
seen as indicating a willingness to be associated with such actions
without taking the blame, a kind of plausible responsibility (rather
than the usual plausible deniability!). Taking the words used by Katz's to
describe the killings during the 'War of the Spooks', such attacks were
not declared as official Israeli policy, but they served as effective
reminders to the P.L.O. that they were not immune from the long arm of
Israeli justice 1355 . The assessment therefore will take the view that the
Israeli's (and Palestinians) made it clear to each other for without this
the War of the Spooks should not have continued for so long.
This issue aside, the majority of the acts examined above do not
constitute acts of terrorism according to this author's definition because
of the non-innocent nature of the targets, that is the victims are
1353 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p150.
1354 Arend and Beck cite Israelis Kill Chief of Pro-Iran shiites in South Lebanon' N.Y2.
Times Feb 17 1992. A9, col 2. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use
of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). p151.
1355 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p36.
generally considered to be legitimate targets and therefore the actions
cannot constitute acts of terrorism. Again this relies upon an
acceptance of Israel's views. As for the killing of the 'innocent'
seventeen year-old niece of Kanafani and the 'innocent' wife and child
of Sheikh Musawi, both of these constitute 'acceptable' collateral
damage, if the Israelis genuinely believed that Kanafani was a member
of the P.F.L.P.'s central command 1356 , or that Sheikh Musawi was "man
with lots of blood on his hands"1357.
There are of course exceptions and debatable points here. There seems
little doubt that the Moroccan waiter Boudia was not a legitimate target
and therefore the attack on him was (potentially) terrorist even by this
author's definition. However this attack against this illegitimate target
does not constitute state terrorism because the Israelis genuinely
believed they were targeting a combatant and this author takes the view
that it is the intent which is important. Consistency would of course
mean that similar attacks on innocents mistakenly made by sub-state
groups would avoid the terrorism label. Whilst the attacks against
scientists building rockets for Iraq and Egypt in 1989 do not constitute
state terrorism, for the scientists constitute legitimate targets when at
work, they would do so if threats of violence were made against their
families, as allegedly occured during Israel's campaign against
scientists working for the Egyptians in the early 1960's1358.
Perhaps the most debatable killings within the selection noted above
are those of Zvaiter and Hamshari. This is not simply due to the fact that
the investigative journalist Peter Taylor claimed that Zvaiter "was not,
as far as we can ascertain, in any way involved with Munich or perhaps
even with terrorism" 1359
 and he "found no evidence that Hamshari was
directly involved in Munich" 1360 following his enquires for the B.B.C.
television series "States of Terror". The debate is not a question of who
1356 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p35.
1357 Arend and Beck cite Israeli Raid Kills Hezboltah Leader ' Washington Post Feb 17
1992 al, col 4. Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force:
Beyon d the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.). pl 51.
1358 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston.
1990.).P124
1359 B.B.C. Programme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993.
1360 B.B.C. Programme: States of Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993. 401
does one believe, the B.B.C.'s investigative reporter or the Israelis,
instead it results from comments made by the then special advisor on
terrorism to the Israeli Prime Minister's. In reply to Taylor's comments
that he could not find any evidence of Zvaiter's involvement with
Munich or perhaps even with terrorism, General Yariv said that
Zvaiter was involved "not in operations, but in terrorist activities,
supplying, helping, let us say 'support' activities" 1361 . Moreover in
reply to Taylor's comment that Hamshari's involvement in P.L.O.'s
activities was " very broad. ..He could have been a politician. He could
have been a writer, a thinker, a supporter", General Yariv said "That,
yes, but he was in a leadership position", and that justified his
killing1362.
Yariv's statement raises the question of how does one define a (non-)
combatant, and where or how to draw the line. As already noted within
the conceptual part of the thesis this author allows attacks on the
leadership of the enemy organisation, but only if the victim helped to
order attacks or helped supply, train or arm the armed forces. Thus a
line has to be drawn somewhere in terms of actions rather than mere
membership or support. O'Brien took a similar view when he wrote:
"a purely political figure -e.g., a treasury minister or the equivalent - is not a
military target. A defence minister might be a military target. A chief executive
who, like the President of the United States, is commander -in -chief of the armed
forces, might be considered a military target. However, the general practice of
belligerents and conventional wisdom has tended to raise a blanket moral
presumption against assassination without too much attention to these
distinctions" 1363
Again it is because the author gives the benefit of the doubt to Israel on
the status of the victims and accepts that they are considered to be
legitimate targets, that their killing cannot constitute acts of terrorism
1361 Yariv quoted by Taylor P. States of Terror. (B.B.C. Books. London. 1993.).p20.
1362 Yariv quoted by Taylor P. States of Terror. (B.B.C. Books. London.
1993.).p20.This differs slightly from the wording in B.B.C. Progammme: States of
Terror, BBC1. 24 November. 1993 where Yariv replied "Well, as far as I can
remember, there was some involvement on his part in terrorist activities, not in
operation, but in terrorist activites, supplying, helping, that is support activities".
1363 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p168. 402
in accordance with my definition. The immediate question to be
answered then becomes 'Do these killings qualify as acts of terrorism in
accordance with the other proposed definitions?'.
The use of violence involved in killing the alleged leaders of terrorist
groups satisfies the P.T.A.'s demand that the use of violence is for
political ends. The use of violence involved in killing individual
terrorists satisfies Stohl and Lopez's demand that the purposeful act of
violence aimed to create fear or compliant behaviour in the victim. On
this occasions the aim was to instil fear in other members of the
Palestinian groups. Taking the words used by Katz's to describe the
killings during the 'War of the Spooks', such attacks were not declared
as official Israeli policy, but they served as effective reminders to the
P.L.O. that they were not immune from the long arm of Israeli
justice' 3 6 4 . Indeed in a chapter in which he uses the same
definition 1365 , Stohl described Mossad' s assassinations of Palestinian
agents in Cyprus, Algeria, Norway, Athens, Beirut and Paris as "a highly
effective technique of political terrorism" 1366
All of the killings noted above, with perhaps the exception of the
accidental killing of Sheikh Musawi, qualify for the label of terrorism
using the definition derived from Israel's P.T.O. . This is because they
were all, "calculated to cause death or injury to a person".
Generally speaking with perhaps the exception of Hamshari, Zvaiter
and Boudia such killings do not qualify in accordance with the U.S.
definition because it requires that the premeditated, politically
motivated violence be perpetrated against non-combatant 1367 targets. It
1364 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers: lsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990). p36.
1365 Stohl clearly notes that by such terrorism he meant: "The purposeful act or
threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or
audience of the act or threat"Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in
Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence
and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p43.
1366 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p53.
1367 U.S. State Department. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993. (Department of State
Publication 10136, Office of the Secretary Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism.) states " For purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant" is
interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the 403
is impossible to say however whether the U.S. definition allows for
collateral damage. However even if it did not and the wife and child of
Sheikh Musawi constituted non-combatants, their deaths would still not
qualify for the labels of terrorism, because the killings were made from
Israeli helicopters, not by clandestine agents. The use, however, of
covert agents to plant the bomb on Kanafani's car which killed him and
his innocent niece would qualify for the U.S label. So if Zvaiter and
Hamshari (or any of the others were considered to be non-combatants)
then their killing by covert Israeli forces would qualify for the label in
accord with the U.S. definition.
As for Schmid' and Jongman's definition the repeated nature of the
action is surely evident even prior to the 'War of the Spooks'. There is
evidence that in all but the attack of Sheikh Musawi and perhaps some
of the attempts on the life of Yasser Arafat that the Israeli forces
involved were operating in a clandestine, or at least semi-clandestine
manner. For example Operation Springtime of Youth and the attack on
Abu-Jihad involved the use of civilian clothing, whilst others such as
the planting of bombs would have required the deception used by sub-
state terrorists.
The question then to be answered becomes were the numerous direct
targets of violence the main targets, or were they to be used primarily
as a message generator? Here the problem of proving the intent of the
perpetrator hinders any attempt to identify an act of terrorism. In
terms of the killing of Abu-Jihad it is very difficult to say that he was
not the main target of the attack even if it is plausible to claim that the
aim was also to send a message as Black and Morris claimed. Therefore
this assassination along with other attempts on the lives of Arafat and
other leaders could not be labelled as terrorism in accordance with
Schmid and Jongman's definition. As for the killing of those involved in
the Munich massacres it appears difficult to say that the sending of a
message to other Palestinian groups was the main reason for the attacks
and not revenge. Such individual attempts on the lives of specific
incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks
on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military
hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe or
elsewhere".
individuals do not seem to fulfil the requirements of Schmid and
Jongman ts definition.
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C. Military Strikes Against Bases and Property:
There is little doubt that there are far more acts that could be included
in this section than there are in any, if not all, of the other categories,
especially if one included the use of artillery and incursions. The aim
here is to examine a number of them just as William O'Brien did in his
chapter 'War-conduct Law in Israeli Counterterror Action'1368.
However whilst this assessment will examine most of those examined by
O'Brien it will not be limited to just these, primarily because certain
events have occurred after O'Brien published his work, but also because
an analysis of all of his post 1967 incidents would involve a great deal of
repetition in the assessment of essentially similar events1369.
The first event to be examined is Israel's large scale attack involving
tanks and air support from both helicopters and aircraft 1370
 against
P.L.O. positions in Karameh, Jordan on 21 March 1968. The aim of the
I.D.F. was according to William O'Brien "to surround Karameh and kill or
capture the bulk of the fedayeen " 1371 . The attack followed the deaths of
two Israelis and the wounding of 28 children on a school bus 1372 which
hit a mine in the Negev three days earlier. The Israeli operation was not
as much of a success as the Israelis had hoped despite their capture of
the town and their claim to have killed 150 terrorists 1373 . Many of the
fedayeen escaped including Arafat1374 , while the Fatah troops, who
1368 Chapter entitled "War-conduct Law in Israeli Counter Terrorist Actions" O'Brien
W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p148-
172.
1369 Specifically these are the cross border raids at Karameh, Es Salt, Post Munich
Massacre Attacks of September 7-17, 1972, Israeli Operations following Kiryat
Shemona, "Preventative" Air Raid, December 2, 1975, The Litani Operation, Israeli-
PLO Hostilities July 10-14, 1981; Air Raid on PLO Headquarters, Tunis, Assassination
of Khalil El Wazir/Abu Jihad, Israel's Conduct of Counterterror Operations.
1370 Bowett D. 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force'. American Journal of
International Law. Vol. 66 (1).ppl -36. p11.
1371 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p152.
1372 Statement of Prime Minister Eshkol, quoted by Tekoah (Israel), 1401st mtg. p6
cited by O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . p151-22.
1373 Bowett D. 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force'. American Journal of
International Law. Vol. 66 (1).pp1-36. p35.
1374 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p152.
fought in uniforms in organised units 1375 , caused many Israeli
casualties. According to O'Brien, the Israelis claimed, "with persuasive
evidence" that Karameh's normal population had largely been displaced
by the time of the battle 1376 , although it included "some remaining
non-combatant and civilian targets" 1377 . Despite their pleas that they
were carrying out action to defend the inhabitants of their territory
and that the attacks from Jordanian territory broke the existing
ceasefire agreements, the Israeli's were unanimously condemned by the
Security Council. In Resolution 248 it condemned the reprisal as illegal
and disproportionate1378.
Israel carried out an air raid "against two terrorist bases in the [Es] Salt
area" 1379
 of Jordan on 4 August 1968, following a series of "intensive
fedayeen terrorist attacks" in the West Bank and Israe1 1380. Basing his
estimate on reports of the funerals of the raids, Israel's Tekoah
estimated that the 34 dead consisted of 28 Palestinian fedayeen, an Iraqi
officer, a Jordanian officer and four Jordanian soldiers 1381 . In
Resolution 256 the Security Council rejected Israel's claims of self-
defence and unanimously condemned the reprisal as illegal and
disproportionate1382.
Following the killings of eleven Israeli athletes at the Olympic village
in Munich on 5 September 1972, Israel carried out a series of incursions
into the Lebanon and Syria. Two I.D.F. company strength armour
incursions, supported by helicopters were launched into Lebanon on
September 7 1972, against P.L.O. targets up to one mile into Lebanon. The
1375 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) .
 P151.
1376 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991). p152.
1377 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P153.
1378 Bowett D. 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force'. American Journal of
Interna tional Law. Vol. 66 (1).pp1-36. p35.
1379 The words of Israel's Tekoah (1434th mtg) p8 cited by O'Brien W. Law and
Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p154.
1380 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P153.
1381 The words of Israel's Tekoah (1437th mtg) p10 cited by O'Brien W. Law and
Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p154.
1382 Bowett D. 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force'. American Journal of
International Law. Vol. 66 (1).pp1-36. p35. 407

Dayan also warned that if Lebanon did not control the P.L.O. Israel would
continue its raids until all of southern Lebanon was a desert' 390 • The
Israeli raids were directed against villages from which the P.L.O. had
launched their attack against Kiryat Shemona. Houses believed to have
had a P.L.O. connection were dynamited 1391 , civilian casualties appear
to have been minima11392.
In early December of 1975 the I.A.F. launched a number of
"preventative" air raids 1393 . According to O'Brien the December attacks
on P.L.O. bases located in refugee camps did not appear to be primarily
based on specific military/security necessities but were carried out to
make a political point. They came in the wake of a series of U.N. actions
designed to support the P.L.O. and to enhance its position in U.N.
debates 1394 . One of these -that which occurred on December 5- caused
large scale civilian damage 1395 . The Security Council condemned the
raids as particularly disproportionate and indiscriminate1396.
Israel and the P.L.O. engaged in cross-border hostilities in Lebanon in
July of 1981, following Begin's re-election, and the P.L.O.'s conventional
build up 1397 . On 10 July Israel bombed and strafed P.L.O. anti-aircraft
gun emplacements and a convoy of vehicles mounted with Katyusha
O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.).
p157.
1390 This warning was cited by Naffah (Lebanon), 29 U.N. SCOR (1766th mtg.). See
New York Times "Dayan Says Raids Against Lebanon Will Be Continued" April 14, 1974.
p1 .col. 8; p3 col 3-6 cited by by O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the
PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p156.
1391 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P157.
1392 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P157.
1393 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991) . P158.
1394 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991) . P158.
1395 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P158.
1396 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
19913- P158.
1397 Washington Post. 'Israeli Fear of Guerilla Buildup Triggered Beirut Strike'.
Washington Post. July 25. 1981. A18. Cols. 1-6. Cited by O'Brien W. Law and Morality
in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). p161-2. 409
rocket launchers, to which the P.L.O. responded 13 9 8 . Four days later the
I.A.F. attacked P.L.O. ammunition dumps and training bases on the
Mediterranean coast of southern Lebanon, leaving 6 P.L.O. and Lebanese
villagers dead and 35 wounded. Then on the 16th following a P.L.O. reply
the I.A.F. attacked a regional headquarters of the P.F.L.P. near Damour;
an Arab Liberation Front headquarters south of Sidon; various training
and terrorist departure bases south of Tyre; and three bridges used by
the P.L.O. over the Zaharani river 1399 . Finally, in what O'Brien
describes as "one of the most controversial actions in Israel's war with
the PLO", the I.A.F. attacked Fatah and D.F.L.P. headquaters in Beirut in a
heavy half-hour air raid on July 17, 1981, following a Katyusha rocket
attack on Nahariya 1400 . The Lebanese government put the casualties at
300 dead and 800 wounded. Concurrently the Israeli's launched air
strikes and naval artillery at more bridges and roads in southern
Lebanon. This attack on the infrastructure caused serious petrol
shortages since the main refineries were in the south 1401
 and fighting
continued until a cease-fire was announced on July 24. The raid on
Beirut was unanimously condemned by the Security Council in
Resolution 490 of July 21, 1981.1402
On 1 October 1985, Israeli fighter planes bombed the headquarters of
the P.L.O. in Tunis 1403
 in retaliation for the killing of three Israeli's on
a yacht in Nicosia by the P.L.O.'s Force 17. According to Posner "the
Israelis had managed to aim their bombs with pinpoint accuracy",
demolishing P.L.O. offices at Arafat's seven-acre complex, located in the
Haman Shatt suburb just twelve miles southeast of Tunis, "while leaving
private Tunisian homes just a few feet away virtually untouched".1404.
The result was 75 killed, including 60 P.L.O., with 40-60 injured
1398 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p162.
1399 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P162.
1400 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P163.
1401 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . P163.
1 402 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.) . p165-6.
1403 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p453.
1404 Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle
East. (Syracuse University Press. 1987). p213. 410
a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
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phrase ex-HTA (Hostile Terrorist Activity)
according to Israeli figures. Tunisian sources said the dead included a
larger number of civilians 1405 . Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir said at
the time of the bombing that the Tunis raid was: "a warning that Israel
will retaliate and fight against terrorist acts against its citizens" 1406
The attack was condemned by the Security Council Resolution 573.1407
On 27 February 1988 a limpet mine in Limassol harbour disabled the
ship Al-Awda. The PLO had just spent around $750,000 to buy the old
Greek car ferry 1408 the Sol Phryne so that it could take 131 Palestinian
exiles, (whom Katz describes as former terrorists 1409 ) to the shores of
Israel to dramatize their demand for a homeland. This was to be an Arab
version of the Exodus, the freighter that brought over four thousand
Jewish survivors of the Nazi concentration camps to British-ruled
Palestine in 1947, only to be forced back to Europe by an embarrassed
Britain, and it was for this reason that the ship was renamed it Al-Awda
, the "Return" 1410 . The Palestinians "correctly blamed Israel" 1411 , but
all that Defence Minister Rabin would say was: "Nile State of Israel
decided it was compelled not to let them achieve their purpose, and we
do that in whatever ways seem suitable" 1412.
The ?triplication of the Various Definitions of (State) 
Terrorism. 
1405 Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli
Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.). p454.
1406 Posner cites Jerusalem Post International edition. 21 Feb. 1987. Posner S. Israel
Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East. (Syracuse
University Press. 1987). p214.
1407 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London.
1991.). p166.
1406 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy
p387.
1409 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiers:
Armour. London. 1990.). p63. Uses the
participants.
1410 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p387.
1411 Me!man Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p387.
1412 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p391.
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It is because most of the attacks noted in this section were apparently
carried out against legitimate military targets, that they cannot be
labelled as acts of terrorism in accordance with this author's definition.
Again this relies upon an acceptance of Israel's views. As in the
previous section the issue of the roles of the leadership of the P.L.O.
comes up. This author's definition does allow for attacks on the
leadership of the enemy organisation, but there is a question of
whether the bases constituted legitimate targets in that people there
were involved in the P.L.O. attacks or helped supply, train or arm them,
for a line has to be drawn somewhere in terms of actions rather than
mere membership or support, a view endorsed by O'Brien. The possible
exceptions, therefore, to the general statement made here, that the
attacks were carried out against legitimate military targets, are those
carried out on the infrastructure of the Lebanon, the attack on Al-Awda.
and those which occurred on the night of April 12-13, when Israel's
Defence Minister Moshe Dayan appeared to call for countervalue attacks
on locales from which PLO fedayeen operated1413.
In terms of the possible exceptions, the status of the infrastructure
depends upon the context. For example if the intention of Israel was to
stop the movements of P.L.O. forces on these particular roads then they
would constitute legitimate targets (here it should be noted that
consistency would require that similar purposive P.L.O. attacks on the
infrastructure of Israel could not be labelled as acts of terrorism). If,
however, the intention of such attacks was to get the Lebanese
government to do something about the P.L.O. then they would constitute
illegitimate targets as they performed no particular military function at
the time of the attack. Due to the fact that the author has no real
evidence to suggest the latter, the author's position is to go along with
O'Brien's opinion that these were legitimate targets and to give the
benefit of the doubt to Israel. As a result this author's label cannot be
attached to these attacks.
As for the second possible exception, once again there is the issue of
whether it constituted a legitimate target. This would depend on
whether the Israeli's believed that the people who were to board it
1413 O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 412
1991.). p156.
would be armed, or would resume their terrorist activities once they
arrived in Israel. Only then would the Al-Awda constitute a legitimate
target. However if this were to be the case then surely the Israeli's
would have intercepted or destroyed the ship when it was full of these
people at sea. The Al-Awda is therefore considered to be an illegitimate
target. However before the attack on it can be considered to be an at of
Israeli state terrorism a few more questions need to be answered. The
first of which is whether Israel was responsible for it, for unlike the
rest of the strikes against bases or property noted the forces carrying
out the attack were not obviously Israeli. The importance of this issue is
that my definition does require an open acknowledgement, but only to
the extent that if the target audience does not know who carried out
such an attack then it cannot receive any message that the terrorist is
trying to send. It is of course possible for the terrorist to make its
responsibility known to the audience whose behaviour he or she wants
to modify, without it being made known to the wider world. This seems to
be the situation in the attack on Al-Awda in that the Defence Minister
Rabin declared: "The State of Israel decided it was compelled not to let
them achieve their purpose, and we do that in whatever ways seem
suitable" 1414. The attack can therefore be seen as an act of state
terrorism in that it was directed at an illegitimate target with the
intention of detering any other similar forays by Palestinian groups.
The third example also seems to qualify for this author's label as Dayan
declared that Israel's objectives were "political, not military". Moreover
he said:
"We made all the villagers aware that.. ..it is their business to go to their
government and tell them they have to take care no terrorists cross the border into
Israel. That was the message"1415.
The next question to be answered is 'Do these attacks qualify as acts of
terrorism in accordance with the other proposed definitions?'. The use
of violence involved in all the attacks on the alleged terrorist bases
1414 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).
p391.
1415 Quoted in 29 U.N.SCOR (1766th mtg). p22See New York Times "Dayan Says Raids
Against Lebanon Will Be Continued" April 14, 1974. p1 .col. 8; p3 col 3-6 cited by
O'Brien W. Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO. (Routledge. London. 1991.). 	 413
p157.
satisfies the demands of the P.T.A. definition that the use of violence
was for political ends. In addition they all satisfy Stohl and Lopez's
demand that the purposeful act of violence aimed to create fear or
compliant behaviour in the victim. Usually the aim was to instil fear in
other members of the Palestinian groups, but in the case of Dayan's
statement it was the Lebanese villagers and government.
All of the killings noted above, with perhaps the exception of the
attacks on Lebanon's infrastructure or the Al-Awda, qualify for the
label of terrorism using the definition derived from Israel's P.T.0.. This
is because they were all, "calculated to cause death or injury to a
person".
With perhaps the exception of the attack on the Al-Awda , and the
attacks on the villagers in April of 1973 these attacks do not not qualify
under the U.S. definition because it requires that the premeditated,
politically motivated violence be perpetrated by clandestine agents. As
for these possible exceptions again it comes down to the issue of
whether the U.S. would consider either a legitimate target and I would
suggest not. Therefore these attacks would qualify for the label of
terrorism in accordance with the U.S. definition.
With perhaps the exception of the attack on the Lebanese villagers in
April of 1973 these attacks do not not qualify under Schmid and
Jongman's definition mainly because it requires that the violence be
perpetrated by clandestine agents. The clandestine attack on the Al-
Awda could not qualify as their definition demands "human victims".
The attack on the Lebanese villagers satisfies their demand and Dayan's
words make it clear that the main purpose of the raid was to send a
message to the Lebanese government and people. In this way only this
act could be labelled as state terrorism using Schmid and Jongman's
definition.
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d) Other Military Strikes 
Although Arend and Beck claim that the only prominent military strike
to be launched against a state purportedly linked to terrorist activity
has been the 1986 raid by the United States 1416 , it is easy to see how
particular actions of Israel can be included within this section. The first
reason is that after I.D.F. commandos 'struck Beirut Airport on 28
December 1968, Israel was accused of state terrorism. During Operation
"Tshura" (or 'Gift'), Israeli troops descended from six helicopters whilst
two hovered above 1417 , and detained 1500 onlookers 1418
 in the
terminal, whilst others proceeded to blow up 13 civilian planes 1419 , in
retaliation for attack on an El Al passenger plane in Athens two days
earlier in which an Israeli engineer was killed 1420 . On 31 December the
Security Council unanimously passed a resolution condemning Israel
for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under
the Charter1421.
Perhaps less obvious an example of counter-terrorist actions to include
within this section is Israel's air strike upon Iraq's nuclear reactor near
Baghdad in 1981, which itself had been preceeded by the destruction of
two cores for Iraq's Tammuz nuclear reactors which were awaiting
141 6 Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).p154.
1417 Falk R.A. 'The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation'. American
Journal of International Law. Vol. 63. 1969. pp415-443. p415.
141 8 Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle
East. (Syracuse University Press. 1987.).p238.
1418 Katz S.M. Guards Without Frontiersgsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and
Armour. London. 1990).p38. Katz noted the name of the operation. Melman Y. and Raviv
D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston. 1990.).pl 80. Posner puts the figure
of aeroplanes hit at 14. Posner S. Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden
Diplomacy in the Middle East. (Syracuse University Press. 1987.).p238., as do Black
and Morris, but interstingly they say that the original aim was just three or four. Black
I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United History of the Israeli Intelligence.
(Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p264.
1420 Falk R.A. 'The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation'. American
Journal of International Law. Vol. 63. 1969. pp415-443. p416. Also Black and Morris
in contrast says it was a response to the killing of an El Al engineer by the P.F.L.P. in
Athens two days earlier. Black I. and Morris B. Israel's Secret Wars: The United
History of the Israeli Intelligence. (Hamish Hamilton. London. 1991.).p264. In contrast
Katz says it was in response to the hijacking of El Al airliner to Algiers. Katz S.M.
Guards Without Frontiersgsraels War Against Terrorism. (Arms and Armour. London.
1990).p38.
1421 Falk R.A. 'The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation'. American
Journal of International Law. Vol. 63. 1969. pp415-443.p417. 415
shipment from La Seyne sur Mer in France which the French blamed
on Mossad 1422 . Whilst the inclusion of both on the basis that Israel
wanted to prevent this Arab state (and others 1423 ) from developing an
offensive nuclear capability could be criticised on the grounds that
nuclear weapons are not normally labelled as terrorism, good denotative
grounds can and have been made for such a claim 1424 because Israel
declared they would have been used against Israel and its population
centres 1425 . In addition Israel's attack on the reactor has been
described as an act of state terrorism by a leading academic in the
fieid1426.
1422 Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin. Boston.
1990.).p253.
1423 Begin cited by Melman Y. and Raviv D. Every Spy a Prince. (Houghton Mifflin.
Boston. 1990.).p251"The prime minister, as a result, established a new doctrine:
Israel would not permit any Arab state to develop an offensive nuclear capability".
1424 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p48.
1425 'Israeli and Iraqi statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant' reprinted in Shipler,
'Israeli jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor; Attack condemned by US and Arab Nations'
N. Y. Times, June 9, 1981. col. 6. cited by Arend A.C. and Beck R.J. International Law
and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm. (Routledge. London. 1993.).p71.
1426 Stohl labelled Israel's destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 as an act
of state terrorism, on the basis that "The bombing raid had.... a wider audience than the
immediate victim of the raid". That is, it sent a message to both the Iraqis and other
Arab neighbours about Israel's position on the development of nuclear capability. Stohl
M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The
State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p45. 416
The Application f the
	 Definitions of	 tate
Terrorism. 
Like the assessment of killings by Israel, the attack on the nuclear
reactors at La Seyne sur Mer in France is problematic in so far the
action was not acknowledged by the perpetrators. This author's
definition does requires this open acknowledgement, but only to the
extent that if the target audience does not know who carried out such an
attack then it cannot receive any message that the terrorist is trying to
send. It is of course possible for the terrorist to make its responsibility
known to those whose behaviour he or she would like to modify, without
it being made known to the wider world. This author does not know
whether this was the case in the attack on the nuclear reactors at La
Seyne stir Mer. Israel's responsibility was however obvious in the case
of the attack on Beirut airport and the Iraqi reactor in 1981.
The issue then is were these attacks carried out on legitimate targets?.
This author will accept that the nuclear reactors are dual purpose and
therefore are legitimate targets. This of course would make Israel's
nuclear reactor in the Negev desert a legitimate target. As for the
civilian airliners these are not legitimate targets. So whilst the attacks
on the various nuclear targets could not constitute acts of terrorism for
they were launched against legitimate targets, the attack on the civilian
airliners at Beirut airport constitutes an act of state terrorism because
of this and the fact the politically motivated Israelis were attempting to
send a message to the Lebanese government to stop allowing the P.F.L.P.
to organise in its own territory.
Do these attacks qualify as acts of terrorism in accordance with the
other proposed definitions?. The nature of the target does not affect
either that of Stohl and Lopez or that derived from the U.K.'s Prevention
of Terrorism Act. The use of violence involved in hitting the nuclear
reactor and cores satisfies the P.T.A.'s demand that the use of violence is
for political ends. As for Stohl and Lopez's definition, Stohl himself
described Israel's attack on the reactor as an act of state terrorism1427,
1427 Stohl labelled Israel's destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 as an act
of state terrorism, on the basis that "The bombing raid had.... a wider audience than the
immediate victim of the raid" it sent a message to both the Iraqis and other Arab 417
in a chapter in which he clearly wrote that by terrorism he meant:
"[t]he purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or
compliant behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act or
threat" 1428 The use of violence involved in blowing up such property
satisfies Stohl and Lopez's demand that the purposeful act of violence
aimed to create fear or compliant behaviour in the victim and /or target
audience, on this occasion the Iraqi leadership and other Arab nations
contemplating such actions
The attack on the nuclear cores and that on Beirut airport cannot be
labelled terrorism in accordance with Israel's P.T.O. as they were not
"calculated to cause death or injury to a person or to threats of such acts
of violence" because they were carried out against property. More
debatable is whether the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor fits as it
included the people building it. However these could be considered
collateral damage and therefore this does not qualify under the Israeli
definition.
The U.S. definition first of all requires that the premeditated, politically
motivated violence be perpetrated against non-combatant targets, and
that a message is (sometimes) sent, all of which are fulfilled by the
attack on civilian aircraft at Beirut airport. Unfortunately the Israelis
carried out the operation overtly and it therefore does not meet the
criteria of being carried out clandestine agents. The attack on the
nuclear cores at La Seyne sur Mer was carried out by covert operators
but this do not qualify as an act of terrorism in accordance with the U.S.
definition because the nuclear cores are here considered to be
legitimate targets.
The attack on Beirut airport could not fulfil the qualifying criteria
demanded by Schmid and Jongman's definition because it was carried
out overtly, unlike the attack on the nuclear cores in France. The
author is ignorant of whether the attack on the Iraqi reactor was
neighbours about Israel's position on the development of nuclear capability. Stohl M.
'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The
State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press.
Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p45.
1 428 Stohl M. 'International Dimensions of State Terrorism' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A.
(eds.). The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression.
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Conneticut. 1984.). pp43-58. p43. 418
carried out by unmarked planes. The attack on the nuclear core could
not qualify because it did not involve an attack on "human victims" as
required by Schmid and Jongman's definition, whilst if any were killed
in the attack on the nuclear reactor (and they were not considered as
collatoral damage) the attack would still not qualify as it was very
difficult to say that the main target of the attack were the Arab
governments rather than the reactor itself.
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Chapter 8.
Conclusion. 
"A consideration of state terrorism allows us to examine the problem [of
insurgency terrorism] from a different and rather less familiar perspective. In
doing so we will see more clearly some of the considerations inherent in the term.
We will also, and more importantly, develop a more sophisticated notion of the
nature of terrorism. By 'peeling' away the complications arising out of our
everyday view of terrorism as the activity of a secret or underground society, we
can better come to look at terrorism as a process, and attempt to identify the
particular kind of acts that characterise it".
M. Taylor.1429
As noted within the introductory chapter the aim of this thesis was to
investigate the concept of state terrorism, and in doing so it hoped to
raise, if not answer, several important questions and issues surrounding
the production of any definition of terrorism (including state
terrorism). It was also believed that by rigorously applying this
author's definition (and various others) to a generally unknown
quantity, the thesis would highlight the advantages and disadvantages
of each (and the parts thereof), as well as the problems of applying any
definition of terrorism. Thirdly, the thesis aimed to further the cause of
knowledge by accurately describing the legalities of various aspects of
Israel's counter-terrorist policies since the day troops were sent into
the West Bank in 1967.
Starting with the last of the three aims, there seems little doubt that the
section has provided a unique legal description of particular counter-
terrorist policies followed by Israel in the West Bank and Israel over the
period 1967-1994, and a detailed history of Israeli counter-terrorist
actions abroad. Indeed most of the legal descriptions (at least in English)
of the policies appear to deal only with one or two of types of action in
1 429 Taylor M. The Terrorist. (Brassey's Defence Publishers. London. 1988.). p40.
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either Israel or the West Bank and not over such a long period of time. It
also appears that the Ph.D. has also achieved much of the main aim, in
that the examination of the notion of state terrorism from a number of
approaches, not only resulted in a working definition of the concept,
but it also led the author to disregard various alternative approaches to
the notion of state terrorism and terrorism, and moreover to suggest
elements that must be included in any useful definition of terrorism.
In regards to the former this included the rejection of the legalistic
approach because of the inconsistencies inherent in existing
international law, and a rejection of labelling any act of terrorism in
accordance with the political ends sought. As for things that must be
included within a deinition of terorism, it is suggested that the element
of physical force or violence must be present in terms of an act or
threat of such. If it is to be of any use to the political analyst the
element of 'politics' must be included to distinguish such violence from
that used by criminals and crazies, to use Hacker's terms. Thirdly, it is
useful to distinguish organised or planned acts of political violence
from essentially similar purposive violence carried out spontaneously
during everyday life, riots or inter-communal violence by individuals
or 'groups' which are temporary in nature. This author did this by
insisting on the presence of an organisation. Then, if terrorism is to be
used as a pejorative term one must make a distinction as to its victims by
the inclusion of some term be it civilian, non-combatant or innocent.
This is often overlooked by scholars but without its inclusion it is
impossible to make a distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate'
acts of political violence except by reference to the political ends
sought, rather than the means. Without this it is also very difficult to
distinguish acts of terrorism from essentially similar acts of politically
motivated violence that go by the name of war. This said, the concept of
legitimate targets is the soft underbelly' of any definition of terrorism,
as many belligerents widen the notion by making reference to the ends
sought rather than the role of the individual in aiding the enemy's
military forces. However the problem of defining (il)legitimate targets
in relation to producing a definition of terrorism also affects the
production of a definition of 'war' as a term used to describe acceptable
acts of political violence. Thus to ditch the use of the 'terrorism' on
these grounds, is to ditch the use of the term 'war' to denote an
acceptable means of fighting political conflicts. Finally unless one 421
simply wants to term all acts of political violence which target
legitimate victims as 'war' and all those which hit illegitimate targets as
war crimes, then a way must be found of distinguishing terrorism
(which is essentially a war crime) from the rest of the war crimes
which target illegitimate victims. The method suggested is by
introducing the idea of 'victim-audience' differentiation. That is
generally speaking terrorism unlike massacres or genocide involves
the killing of innocents in order to modify the behaviour of an
audience larger than the immediate victims. Of most importance
perhaps, is the conclusion that when attempting to define the term
terrorism (or other types of political violence) it is necessary to think
of it in relation to forms of political violence.
As for the second aim of the thesis, the application of the various
working definitions to the counter-terrorist activities of Israel between
1967 and 1994 revealed a number of problems pertaining to each
definition. Undoubtedly the easiest of the six to apply was that contained
within the U.K.'s Prevention of Terrorism Act, this was because all it
required was that the act of violence in question was politically
motivated. Unfortunately this meant that it was a rather blunt
instrument which labelled all of the counter-terrorist activities under
consideration both at home and abroad, as acts of terrorism. In this way
it can be seen as essentially a 'pacifists' definition which labelled all
acts of (political) violence as equally reprehensible. It would also mean
that other labels such as 'war' 'war crimes' or 'genocide' would become
meaningless.
Almost as easy to apply, and almost as indiscriminate a tool for the
political analyst, was the definition derived from Israel's Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance. This was because it required that the threats or
"acts of violence" (and not necessarily political violence) were
calculated to cause injury or death or injury to a person, rather than to
property. As such it was far too inclusive, with only the acts of
demolition from the chapter dealing with counter-terrorist acts at home
escaping its application. Whilst in terms of Israel's actions abroad, the
only actions not to be labelled as terrorism were those attacks on the
infrastructure in Lebanon, the Iraqi nuclear plant and equipment, and
the mining of the Al-Awda .
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Stohl and Lopez's definition was also far too embracing it that it
required that the aim of the threat or act of violence was to create fear
or compliant behaviour in a target be it the victim or audience. As far as
the political analyst is concerned, in terms of assessing the actions of a
state within the areas it administers, their definition is slightly more
discerning than the U.K.'s definition, in that it could distinguish
terrorism from murder or genocide for example, but little else. Indeed
almost all of the counter-terrorist activities to which it was applied both
at home and abroad, constituted acts of terrorism under Stohl and
Lopez's definition, as would any other law or act of war. The only
exception were certain types of fatal shootings where the aim was
simply to kill.
Of the three definitions derived from existing legislation that contained
in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 265f(d), and used by the
Office of the Co-ordinator for Counterterrorism in the production of the
US Department of State's 'Patterns of Global Terrorism', was the most
discriminating. However it could be argued that it was too
discriminating it that most of the activities under review failed to
constitute acts of (state) terrorism in that they were carried out by overt
forces of the State. This tradition of labelling terrorism in accordance
with the nature of the perpetrators 'dress sense' is quite a popular one
within the literature on terrorism. In terms of labelling the actions of
the State it is at its most appealing in regards to the actions of a state
abroad, for it creates a level playing field in terms of warfare, albeit one
that in practice favours the norms of established powers who wrote the
rules of warfare. 1430
 Whilst in terms of the violent actions of the State
carried out within its area of jurisdiction, it is more attractive than the
other pieces of legislation in that it seems to cover the illegal activities
of the State, which then introduces covert actors such as 'death squads'
to carry out its work. It may even be possible to say that it covers some
of the legal actions of the State, notably those carried out by its secret
police, as the application to the activities of Shin Bet revealed.
1430 for Fotion and Elfstrom the deception inherent in fighting without a uniform is not
in itself immoral, it is only deception relative to the standards established by
establishment powers. For them: "[t]he moral problems covering the use of organised
destructive force will remain the same whether employed by military or neo-military
organisations"Fotion N. and Elfstrom G. Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War.
(Routledge, Kegan and Paul. London. 1986.). p213. 423
Its disadvantage is that it fails to address the uses of violence by the
State when it introduces legislation which makes it impossible for the
victim to be 'not guilty' and to escape its violence. Thus it would not for
example label the classical administrative act of sending political
dissidents to Siberia (or in this case Jordan or Lebanon) as a act of state
terrorism, as the treatment of deportation and administrative detention
revealed. Nor would it ever label the State's shooting of demonstrators
by overt members of the State's security forces - be they police or
soldiers - as state terrorism. The application of the U.S. definition to the
section on shootings (and arrests) also showed the limitations of terms
like 'premeditated' as a means of distinguishing terrorism from other
forms of political violence. The latter application also showed the
problem of using the term non-combatant in regards to the State's use
of violence at home. Overall the limitations of the definitions derived
from national counter-terrorist legislation is unsurprising given the
fact they were produced for a specific purpose by politicians.
Schmid and Jongman's definition also suffers from the problem of
requiring the perpetrators of terrorist acts to be clandestine, although
they loosen (if not end) this requirement by making it semi-clandestine
(whatever that is). Like that of Stohl and Lopez, the U.S. State
Department and Israel, Schmid and Jongman's definition does not
require the violence to be politically motivated. So whilst that did not
affect the application which was to politically motivated acts of
violence, their comprehensive definition could be criticised for being
too inclusive in that one would have to label criminal gangs as
terrorists along with insurgent groups and the State. Finally because it
requires that the victims be "human", their definition excludes attacks
upon property.
As for this author's definition, it is more precise than his 1991 version
which required:
"the deliberate threat or use of violence for political purposes by either non state
actors or the state abroad, when such actions are intended to influence the
victim(s) and/or target(s) wider than the immediate victim(s); or the use of such
purposive violence by the state within its own borders when such actions either
424
fail to allow the victim prior knowledge of the law and/or distinguish between the
innocence and the guilt of the individual victim"1431
in that it gives more examples. (In this sense from a purely personal
point of view this is both pleasing in that it suggests I was working on
the right lines when producing it, but it is still a little disappointing in
that I did actually believe the literature and questionnaire would
produce far more drastic alterations to my definition).
In terms of applying this author's latest definition, the biggest problem
is the fact that a great deal more work has to be done in explaining the
legal-constitutional background for each act and the legalities
pertaining to each, in absolute terms, but especially in relation to the
requirements of each of the other definitions tested. However once done
it is far more subtle means of differentiating between the various
counter-terrorist policies acts than any of the other definitions with
perhaps the exception of Schmid and Jongman's (although it is of
course far easier for this author to apply his model than any of the
others in that he does not know exactly what they meant by each of its
constituent parts).
However despite this and the relatively favourable response 1432 to an
easier version of it by academics in the field 1433 , at the end of the
1431 Sproat P.A. 'Can The State Be Terrorist?' Terrorism: An International JoumaL
Vol. 14.(1). Jan-Mar 1991. pp19-29. p25.
1432 For the earlier version see Appendix A. This fares well in comparison to the 33%
(19) of 58 respondents who stated that they found Schmid's definition of terrorism
acceptable. Although here it should be pointed out that in all 81% of the respondents
found Schmid's definition partially or fully acceptable, for in addition to a
straightforward 'yes or no' answer to the question "Do you find the above definition
acceptable", Schmid and Jongman had included the option of the answer "Not entirely".
Alternatively "Almost two-thirds of the respondents could not, or not entirely agree
with this definition"Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to
actors, Authors, Concepts, DataBases, Theories and Literature (SWIDOC. Amsterdam.
1988).p2-3. Perhaps the comparison is unfair in that this author excluded those who
did not reply from the percentages unlike Schmid and Jongman. In this way the results
would be 40% (Or 48/120) replied 'Yes' , or 42% (51/120) replied 'No' and 17.5%
(21) did not answer.
1433 In reply to question 12 which asked "Do you find the following 'universal'
definition of terrorism acceptable?", 52% of those 99 answers indicated "No", the
other 48% stated "Yes" . The definition was, terrorism is: "the deliberate threat or
use of violence for political purposes by either non-state actors anywhere or the state
outside its area of jurisdiction when such actions are intended to influence a target(s)
wider than the immediate non-combatant victim(s); or the use of such purposive
violence by the state (when it claims) the authority when its actions are either illegal 425
process, the author is not totally convinced that one should actually use
it. This surprising conclusion is not so much a criticism of his own
definition, for it still appears to be the best definition of (state)
terrorism, in that its problems seem less than the others as chapter 5
revealed. (There are of course some problems in addition to the
'emotional' one which relates to the difference between those actions he
believes it should cover, from what it actually does label as terrorism).
The reluctance to recommend the use of his own comprehensive
definition of political terrorism is a result of greater scepticism about
the field of terrorism studies since starting the reading for the thesis.
This itself is a result of the fact that in practice the issue of definition of
the word terrorism, even when relating to the sub-state variety, is not
taken anywhere near as seriously as it should be in the field of
terrorism studies. This inadequate treatment of the words used to
describe political violence by the field of terrorism studies is of course
not the only area of 'political science' which has an inadequate lexicon,
although academia is far less 'guilty' of sloppy thinking than those in
the media and formal political debate. However as a whole 'academics' in
the field of terrorism studies act in a way which gives great credence to
Herman and G. O'Sullivan's description of their role in the service of
powerful vested interests in their book The Terrorism Industry: The
Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terrorism. 1434 This is
because in practice the most common uses of the term 'terrorism'
appears to be three-fold. The first is its use as a political device by
which to condemn the political violence of those one does not like.
Much, if not most of the time, this means no definition, although
sometimes one is produced to suit one's purpose (interestingly these are
the two approaches taken by politicians in legislating against
terrorism). The second, is its use as a rather blunt instrument by which
to label all acts of insurgent violence (although in practice it usually
means labelling the actions of those one does not like in this manner).
or legal but fail to allow the individual victim the opportunity to avoid such violence
through the secret, vague or indiscriminate nature of the enabling legislation".
1434 Here they constitute sometimes willingly, sometimes unwittingly, an aspect of
the 'terrroism industry', a cultural industry which manufactures, refines and packages
for distribution, information, analysis and opinions in a topic called 'terrorism' in the
interests of certian Western groups and states.Herman E.S. and O'Sullivan G. The
Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terrorism.
(Pantheon. New York.1989.) generally. 426
Only occasionally is the term terrorism used to denote a special form of
violence in which the real target (or audience) is not those immediate
'innocent' victims, and in this way terrorism could be seen as a
particular form of illegitimate violence related to, if not a subset of, war
crimes which also target innocents. It was on this level that this
author's working definition was based.
It is because of the infrequency by which the term is used by academics
in this way, coupled with their general reluctance in practice (as
opposed in theory), to try and apply their definition of terrorism to the
actions of the State, that this author is strongly tempted to recommend
ditching the use of any definition of 'terrorism' (including his own). A
view taken by other authors including R. White 1435 .
So rather than taking a great deal of time over why or how this author's
definition may be improved, questions that would surround the
'innocent' nature of the victim, and the exact relationship of the victim
and the target, the issue becomes one of is there any point in attempting
to save it, for to do so would only legitimise the continued use the term
(sub-state) terrorism.
The main reason then for not recommending people to ditch his own
definition along with all others, is the realisation that academia (and
other vested interests) will continue to use the term. The author
therefore recommends the use of his definition and especially its
production process to other authors in the field. For if nothing else it
may convince others to think about what they are writing about more
carefully, or even to produce a better definition. Another reason not to
ditch the idea of state terrorism altogether (although it may mean
ditching this author's definition) is that a credible case can be made out
for the production of a word which means acts of state violence which
do not fit the requirements the rule of law. This was not the approach of
this author, for he attempted to see if the State could perpetrate acts
which were essentially the same as those committed by sub-state groups.
Nevertheless a case could be made for producing a word to mean
illegtimate State actions and that this word should be 'state terrorism'.
1 435 In reply to question 12 R. White wrote"There should be no use of the term.
"Terror" and "terrorism" are too controversial. Why not just use :"state violence" and
"insurgent violence"?". 427
This is based upon the idea that the term terrorism is often used to refer
to a great range of actions of insurgents of which the author
disapproves. The existing terms such as human rights abuses, violations
of international law, the laws of war, are all a bit too precise, whilst
repression or oppression do not convey the fear that some of these
arbitrary acts of State instil.
As for the problems surrounding the application of any definition,
along with consistency, and that of defining each element, for example
'innocent', the main one is that of intent and proving who the real
target audience was. This problem affects all definitions of terrorism
and was highlighted particularly well by the application of Schmid and
Jongman's definition, which insisted that the audience be the main
target.
Finally then, it is worth recalling Raphael's comments "that the
results of a conceptual inquiry sometimes seem disappointingly
meagre". For him:
"The clarification of concepts is like cleaning the house. When you have cleaned
the house, there is not much to be seen for your work. You have not acquired any
new possessions, though you will have thrown out some things that are not wanted
and are just a nuisance. What you will have at the end of it is a tidier house, in
which you can move around more easily and in which you can find things when you
need them." 1436
Using this analogy it is possible to see terrorism an ornament which no
one has never seen as a whole. Like an archaeologist this housekeeper
has created an multi-coloured object out of the many fragments that
were lying around in the untidy house that is the lexicon of politics. At
present he procrastinates over whether to throw the ornament out,
after spending several years putting it together. A view which is
encouraged by the fact that most other housekeepers believe it could
not be multi-coloured or take such a shape, because they have written
or read about only one particular (political) colour, and one dimension.
1436 Raphael D.D. Problems of Political Philosophy (2nd.ed. Macmillan
Basingstoke.1990.). p20. He goes on to say, "The analogy is apt in another repect also.
Cleaning the house is not a job that can be done once and for all. You have to do it every
week" p20. 428
Moreover this housekeeper thinks it may merely distract us from
seeing, polishing and repairing the more valuable objects in the house.
However the housekeeper also knows despite the fact that the ornament
itself may appear in Raphael's words "disappointingly meagre", the
processes involved in doing this particular household chore was useful,
in that he has learnt many things about the variety of materials he
came across and new skills have been developed. Moreover others
(including those who believe that terrorism is a one dimensional, red
object) may learn from reading about it1437.
1437 The housekeeper's dilemma can be seen to be supported by the concluding words
of a student who had written an (American) thesis on the topic "it is often easier to
identify that which is not terrorism than to attempt to label exactly that which
is"Hoffman R.P. Terrorism A Universal Definition (Claremont Graduate School. Ph.D.
1984). p197. 429
Appendix A. 
The Questionnaire.
It was because this author's reading of the literature on the topic of
'terrorism' continued to contribute so little of value to the debate on the
nature of the concept of state terrorism, that a pointed questionnaire
was designed and sent to various academics. The authors to who the
questionnaire was sent were taken from a number of sources. One group
of authors consisted of those who had written in Terrorism: An
International Journal from the first edition in 1978 until the end of
1993. Initially the starting and finishing dates had been determined by
the nature of the BIDS 1438 computerised database which had been used
to retrieve such information. Unfortunately it goes back only as far as
1981 and did not include articles published in the same journal
following its change in title to Terrorism and Conflict Studies. The
parameters of this initial group were extended in both directions
following the decision to try to publish the results as an article in itself.
The second group of authors was also taken a leading journal in the
field, Terrorism and Political Violence. Initially the names were taken
from a hand made list of articles which had appeared from its first
edition in 1987 until 1991, but this finishing date was also expanded to
include all editions up to the end of 1993.
The third and fourth group consisted of authors who had specifically
written on the topic of state terrorism. The first of these was produced
by requesting 'hits' in both the social science citations index and arts
and humanities of the BIDS database, using the 'keywords/words in a
title' facility which was available only after 1991. This produced all
articles with any of the following terms in the title to be retrieved. That
is, 'state terror', 'state terrorist', 'state terrorism; 'regime terror'; 'regime
terrorist', 'regime terrorism', 'government terror', 'government
terrorist', 'government terrorism', 'governmental terror',
'governmental terrorist', 'governmental terrorism', 'terror from above',
'terrorism from above', 'terror by public authority', 'terrorism by
1438 Bath Information and Data Services (BIDS). 	 430
public authority', 'institutional terror', 'institutional terrorism',
'institutional terrorist', 'government repression', 'governmental
repression' and 'state repression' 1439 . The final group consisted of both
authors who had written books with the words 'state' and one of the
following - 'terror', 'terrorism', 'terrorist' in the title gathered from
both UK and US books in print on the 26 January 1993 and 28 January
1993 respectively, and/or who had written chapters within these books.
This sample taken from all four sources was then scaled down to a viable
size by the use of a number of filters. The first was that the journal
reference had to have been recorded as an 'article' as opposed to an
'editorial', 'discussion',' interview' or 'note'. A qualification which was
primarily imposed for qualitative reasons. The second was that the
articles had to be written in English. This was introduced primarily as a
means of keeping the response rate high following the retrieval of a
significant number of articles in French on the revolutionary 'reign of
terror' which occurred in France in 1789. A similar motive lay behind
the third filter which demanded that each author of such an article had
to have an 'academic' address 1440 . The presumption being that such
authors would be more sympathetic to a questionnaire from a Ph.D.
student than those who worked for or within governments, their
agencies or private firms would be. The fourth filter was that authors
who were known to be students were to be excluded because it was felt
that many such authors would have changed universities. This enabled
the exclusion of this author whose article 'Can the State be Terrorist?'
which had been published in Terrorism : An International Journal in
1991 had otherwise fulfilled all the previous qualifying criteria 1441•
Following the testing of a pilot version, the questionnaires were sent
out in batches throughout the period November 1993-May 1995, with a
1 439 Via the use of an asterisk which enabled a search for a word with a number of
possible word endings. i.e. the word 'terror* would produce 'hits' for both terror,
terrorist, terrorists, terrorism, likewise 'government*' could produce government,
governments, or governmental.
1440 Whenever a problem arose over the addresses (especially the computer generated
ones) they were produced in accordance with either and /or the 19th edition of the
World List of Universities (International Association of University, Stockton Press, NY.
1992), Faculty White Pages 7991 (Gale Research Inc. Detroit 1991) and 14th edition of
American University and College (American Council in Education. Walter de Gryter. NY,
1992).
1441 My article 'Can the State be Terrorist?' Terrorism : An International Journal.
Vol. 14(1). 1991. pp19-29 qualified within the first of the four sources. 431
second questionnaire being sent to those who did not reply to the first
request. At the end of this process, the author had received 120
responses to the 247 questionnaires. In addition to 4 replies whose
names could not be traced or which specifically requested the
anonymity which this author had offered, the other 116 respondents to
the questionnaire according to their replies or original addresses were:
J.Adelman, M.Anderson, N.Ben-Yehuda, G.Bowen, C.Brockett, H.Brosius,
P.L.Buchanan, D.Carmichael, J.Cauley, M.H. Chang, N.Chomsky,
R.L.Clutterbuck, R.Cohen-Almagor, R.R.Corrado, R.Crelinsten,
M.Crenshaw, Y.Dinstein, R.L.Dowling, R.Drake, W.Enders, W.L.Eubank,
R.S.Ezekiel, R.F Farnen, E.Fattah, J.E.Finn, L.S.Frazier, A.Geifman,
A.George, T.Goertzel, F.Gregory, A.Guelke, J.Hart, W.A.Hazelton,
E.S.Herman, C.Hewitt, F.Homer, R.E.Howard, M.Hughes, R.Israeli,
K.Jeffrey, C.W.Kegley, G.Kieh, B.Kiernan, R.P.B.Laan-Bouma,
T.Lewellen, M.Lippman, F.Lopez-Alves, R.R.Ludwikowski,
L.J.Macfarlane, L.J.Martin, K.D.Mathur, W.Maley, J.McCamant,
C.McCauley, M.Mozaffari, R.R.Miller, M.J.Murray, M.Nisan, K.L.Oots,
J.J.Paust, J.Petras, D.Pion-Berlin, D.Pluchinsky, R.M.Pockrass, J.M.Post,
D.Premo, G.H.Quester, J.M.Rabbie, A.Roberts, K.G.Robertson, B.Rolston,
J.I.Ross, A.P.Rubin, S.Ryan, S.E.Salmony, M.Salwen, B.Saper, J.Scarpaci,
B.A.Scharlau, F.Schiff, D.E.Schmitt, A.P.Schmid, D.Scott-Palmer,
S.K.Shernock, P.Sigmund, S.Sloan, J.Smith, J.Smyth, R.Solo, J.W.Soule,
E.Sprinzak, H.W.Stephens, M.Stohl, D.Tal, M.Taylor, H.Tittmar, K.Toloyan,
E.Tompkins, M.Tugwell, C.Vanderpool, C.A.Watson, C.A.Wege, G.Weimann,
L.Weinberg, S.L.Wiener, R.F.Weisfelder, F.Wheeler, R.White, T.White,
P.Wilkinson, J.W.Williams, S.Woy-Hazelton, J.Wright, C.H.Yaeger,
A.Yoder, J.Zuliaka.
The Quantitative Answers. 
In response to question 1, which asked 'Can acts, carried out directly by
the agents of those in power, ever be labelled acts of 'terror' or
'terrorism'?, 3% answered with an outright "No", an overwhelming 86%
of those 118 respondents indicated "Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or
'terrorism", 7% replied "Yes, but only as acts of 'terror", a figure
which was only one percent more than the percentage of respondents
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who answered "Yes but only as acts of terrorism" 1442 . Here it should be
noted that the total sum of all the percentages made in answer to each
individual question may not necessarily equal one hundred. This is
because all of the figures have been rounded up or down to the nearest
percentage, with the exception of those half percentages which are left
the same.
Question 2 was concerned with the use of labels. It specifically asked
'What words would you use to label acts of direct 'terror/ism ?
(excluding support/sponsorship of insurgents) e.g. 'state terror',
'regime terrorism', 'terror from above', 'governmental terrorism',
'repression' etc.?' . Over 60 answers were received of which this author
would describe 26 as credible 'labels'. 1443
Of these credible labels the most popular was that of 'state terror' chosen
by 49 authors, a fact that could at first glance be seen to give weight to
those who like Provizer and Quester believe that it is not profitable to
collapse these two distinct phenomena into a single category. Yet this
finding must be tempered by two things. Firstly only 8%(4) of the 49
authors who accepted the label 'state terror' had answered 'Yes, terror
only' in response to question 1, 'Can acts, carried out directly by the
agents of those in power, ever be labelled acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism'?.
Ninety percent(44) of those who had accepted the label state terror had
already ticked the box marked 'Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or
'terrorism' 1444 . Secondly the question was 'biased' in favour of use of
the term, in that 'state terror' was cited as an example of a label that
one might use along with four others. The reasoning being that some
respondents to the pilot questionnaire had not understood the meaning
of the word 'label' when the question not included examples. Support for
1442 Eight ticked the box entitled "Yes,but only as acts of 'terror'. Three of the replies
to question 1 were 'no', 101 indicated "Yes, either as acts of 'terror' or 'terrorism', 6
indicated that it was acceptable to label 'acts carried out directly by the agents of
those in power' 'only as acts of 'terrorism". Two of the 120 were left blank.
1443 Obviously the term credible is rather subjective, examples of those labels
excluded include: assasination, torture, genocide, hijacking, state violence, official
covert warfare, abuse of power, state coercive powers, terrorism from below, war
crimes, human rights violations, police state, military despotism, vigilantes,
paramilitary, reprisals, bad. This latter one may have been a referece to my question.
1444 The remaining respondent who constituted the other 2% indicated that he would
only accept the use of the term 'state terror' in reference to the external actions of the
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the claim that the inclusion of the examples may have influenced the
outcome is that a number of authors answered the question by either
referring to "all of the above" or simply underlining some or all of the
given examples.
Given this inherent bias it was not surprising that two of these other
four labels were joint second in these rankings. The labels
'governmental terrorism' and 'repression' were cited by 27 authors
along with the label 'state terrorism' which had not been given as an
example. The other two of the five examples 'regime terrorism' and
'terror from above' came in fifth and sixth in these rankings with 26
and 18 citings respectively. As for the rest of the 26 credible labels
identified by this authors questionnaire, these were 'terrorism' (4
citations), 'political terrorism' (2), and the rest ('terror', 'governmental
strategies of terrorism', 'elite strategies of terrorism', 'state based
terrorism' ,'regime of terror', 'government terrorism', 'governmental
terror', 'government terror', 'oppression', 'state repression',
'government repression', 'elite repression' 'political governmental
terrorism', 'legal terrorism', 'legitimised terrorism', legitimised terror',
'institutionalised terror', 'official terrorism') were cited only once.1445
Of the 119 responses to the question 3, 'Do you think that it is helpful or
a hindrance to study such acts alongside terror/ist acts carried out by
insurgent groups?' (which includes three answers given by one
respondent) only 10% claimed that it was a hindrance to study such acts
alongside terror/ist acts carried out by insurgent groups, with an
overwhelming 66% saying that it was helpful. The remaining 24% of
the responses were split between those who replied "neither" or "both".
If this latter group is removed so that the figures are solely those who
expressed a preference one way or another, the percentage of those
who believe that it is helpful or a hindrance to study the two
phenomena together rise to 87% and 13% respectively
1445 Examples of the less credible definitions also cited by one author unless
otherwise stated include: 'reprisals', 'counter-terrorism reprisals' 'state sanctioned
terrorism'(2), 'state directed international terrorism', 'military despotism',
'totalitarianism', 'death squads', 'human rights violations', 'war crimes'. This is not all
the answers given, there are other answers including sentences which are even less
credible as labels.
1446 To question 3, 78 replies indicated that it was helpful to study 'terror/ist' acts
carried out by agents of those in power alongside 'terror/ist' acts carried out by
insurgent groups,12 indicated that it was a hindrance, 9 indicated that it was neither a
1446.
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Question 4 asked "Have you ever written on the topic of direct
'terror/ism' by those in power?" to which 115 authors replied. Of these
63% answered "Yes", with a corresponding 37% sayingIt also"No"1447.
allowed space for those who replied "Yes" to note the definition that
they had used. However of the large number who wrote in this space
only 30 or so 1448 of these answers could reasonably be said to contain a
definition, and many of these left a lot to be desired. These are:
"state approves secretly the use of deadly force against a collective,
general target". (Ben-Yehuda N.).
"state terrorism is a system of arbitrary acts of violence committed by a
government toward its own people to more easily rule over and
dominate them". (Bowen G.).
"life threatening violence meant to not just eliminate its direct victims
but also to terrorize others into acceptable behaviour". (Brockett C.).
"The application of extreme physical and psychological coercion on
target populations in order to promote actor's objectives. Terror/ism is
considered to be a form of war". (Buchanan P.L.).
help nor a hindrance and 20 replies indicated that it was in some respects both a help
and hindrance. Two of the 120 were left blank.
1 447 Seventy three of the responses to question 4 answered 'Yes" and a corresponding
42 replied "No". Five respondents failed to answer the question.
1 448 Ultimately this is a matter of opinion. In addition there a a few authors who make
references to other definitions elsewhere where the answer is not so clear. N.
Chomsky for example notes 'The definitions given in the US codes, the US Army
Handbooks, international conventions (e.g. the UN General Assembly Resolution of
1986),and adds the relevant section from the US Code. Here an: "act of terrorism'
means an activity that -(A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life
that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, or that would
be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of
any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping."(United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 98th Congress, Second Session,
1584, Oct. 19, volume 2; par. 3077, 98 STAT. 2707; West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn.), before writing "Not perfect, but it will do".R.R. Ludwikowski , J.J.Paust and A.
Roberts make reference to definitions in articles but their choices are not clear. Ross
writes that "With some minor adjustments, I like Schmid's 1983 definition" but he does
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"An incident(s) involving the premeditated use, or threat of use, of
extra-normal violence or force to gain a political objective through
intimidation or fear". (Cauley J.).
"The combined use and threat of violence, planned and prepared in
secret, against one group of targets (victims; targets of violence) in
order to compel compliance or allegiance from a separate group(s) of
targets (targets of demands, explicit or implicit) and to impress a wider
audience (target of attention)." (Crelinsten R.).
"Terrorism is an act of violence intended to terrorize (inspire terror)".
(Dinstein Y.).
"commission of (or threat to commit) acts of unlawful violence with a
view to influencing the political behaviour of citizens
(Approximately)". (George A.).
"general dictionary : a mode of governing or opposing government by
intimidation. (I have sometimes used the CIA and US army definitions of
terrorism, which are just windy elaborations of the basic definition)".
(Herman E.S.).
"Violent actions against individuals and groups by agents acting on the
direction of the regime in power" (Kieh G.).
"Deliberate use of violence against non-combatants (in war) or civilians
(in peacetime) to influence political behaviour or deter political action
by civilians or their leaders" (Kiernan B.).
"An "action of violence of which the psychological effects are out of
proportion to the purely physical results" (Raymond Aron), carried out
to produce certain political consequences". (Maley W.).
"arbitrary governmental violence used with the intent of intimidating
opposition". (McCamant J.).
"The use of systematic violence to intimidate a population to accept the
power of corporate and political elites". (Petras J.).
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"Acts collectively intended to produce a psychological state of fear and
uncertainty within the general population". (Premo D.).
"Acts in legal "time of peace" which, if committed when the law of war
applied, would be "war crimes". (Rubin A.P.).
"Illegal acts (defined by state/civil codes) unleashed upon the citizenry
when the latter are usually denied due process of civil courts, thereby
subject to military courts and military law". (Scarpaci J.)
"acts or threats of violence directed at the public at large to achieve
political ends".	 (Schiff F.).
"Terrorism is an anxiety -inspiring method of repeated violent action,
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby- in contrast to
assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.
The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message
generators. Threat -and violence- based communication processes
between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets
are used to manipulate the main target audience(s), turning it into a
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending
on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily
sought" 1449
 (Schmid A.P.) also used by Scharlau B.A.1450
"terror is the large-scale and arbitrary use or credible threat of severe
physical force by organs of government against conforming as well as
non conforming individuals or groups, which is felt as
incomprehensible fear". (Shernock S.K.).
"Actions on the threat of actions, normally violent and hurtful, other
than those imposed with due process for the legitimate enforcement of
1449 Schmid A.P. and Jongman A.J. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actions,
authors, concepts and databases. (SWIDOC. Amsterdam. 1988.).p28
1450 Scharlau wrote 'Schmid/Jongman, 1988. This occurs in an article (still awaiting
completion) on international relations and terrorism'. 437
the law, that have the effect of creating fear or "terror" in a
population" (Solo R.).
"terrorism is the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear
and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act or
threat" Stohl and Lopez's definition was cited by Howard 1451 , one of the
anonymous replies 1452 , and Hart J. 1453 . Another author cited:
Michael Stohl's "the purposeful act or threat of violence designed to
create fear and compliance by the victims and other observers of this
coercive behaviour". (Weisfelder R.F.).
"aggression". (Tittinar H.).
"Terror is the use of (or threat of use) physical or non-physical force
and coercion to influence or control the actions of others. It is
frequently designed to disrupt on going social reality and expectations".
(Vanderpool C.).
"government orchestrated or tolerated (but knowingly) actions against
its own citizens who received no legal protection or due process".
(Watson C.A.).
"premeditated violence to create a climate of terror; directed at a wider
audience than immediate victims; inherently involves attacks on
random and symbolic targets, including civilians; seen by society in
1451 Howard declared "I wrote an article on Kenya in Schlapentokh et al. I used the
Stohl + Lopez definition, which I still find satisfactory' "Howard refers to Stohl M. and
Lopez G.A. 'Introduction' in Stohl M. and Lopez G.A. (eds.). The State as Terrorist:
The Dynamics of Global Violence and Repression. (Greenwood Press. Westport.
Conecticut. 1984.).pp3-10.p7-8. Howard R.E. 'Repression and State Terror in Kenya
1982-1988' in Bushnell P.T., Shlapentokh V., Vanderpool C.K. and Sundriam J. (eds.)
State Organized Terror (Westview Press. Oxford. 1992.).pp77-98.p78.
1452 An anonymous author who wrote 'See attached from a (text) book .... I've used
other definitions but this gives a sense of my perspective', uses Stohl and Lopez "the
purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a
victim and /or audience of the act or threat"
1453 Hart J. wrote"The editors- Michael Stohl + George Lopez provided their own
definition which I found reasonable". Reference to Hart J.A. 'U.S. Interventions in Latin
America since World War II' in Stohl. M and Lopez G.A. Terrible Beyond Endurance
(Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut.1988) pp59-84.p60. Stohl's definition is that
found within Stohl M. 'National Interests and State Terrorism in International affairs'.
Political Science. Vol. 369.July 1984.). 438
which they occur as extra-normal, causing feelings of outrage;
normally used as weapon to influence or control political behaviour".
(Wilkinson P.).
Question 5 was split into four parts, labelled a, b,c, and d. Question 5a
asked "Do you think that such 'terror/ist' violence by those in power is
historically earlier, more recent, just as recent than such violence by
insurgents?", to which 115 authors replied. Thirty-seven percent ticked
the box marked 'earlier'. Three percent indicated that it was "more
recent" than such violence by insurgent groups, and 23% percent
indicated than it was 'just as recent' a phenomenon. The remaining 36%
ticked the box marked that labelled "cannot say".1454
In answering the question 5b which asked "Do you think that such
'terror/ist' violence by those in power occurs more, less, or just as
frequently in today's world than by insurgents?", 48% of the 118
respondents answered "more frequently" with only 12% answered "less
frequently", 17% indicated "just as" frequently and 23% "cannot
say".1455
Question 5c asked "Do you think that such 'terror/ist' violence by those
in power has occurred more, less, just as often throughout history?". To
which 55% of the 121 replies (including one author who marked three
boxes) indicated "more often", compared to only 4% "less often".
Thirteen percent answered "just as" often throughout history and 25%
answered "cannot say")-456
Question 5d was "Do you think that such 'terror/ist' by those in power is
more, less, or just as important an area of study than such violence by
insurgents?", to which 119 responded. Of these 27.5% who indicated that
1454 Forty three respondents to question 5(a) indicated that they believed such
'terror/ist' violence by those in power is historically "earlier than" such violence by
insurgents, 4 indicated that they believed such 'terror/ist' violence by those in power
is historically "more recent" and 27 indicated that is "just as recent" as such
insurgent violence. Forty one indicated that they could not say one way oranother, and
5 failed to answer the question.
1455 Fifty-seven respondents to question 5(b) answered "more frequently" with only
14 answering "less frequently", 20 answered "just as" frequently and 27 answered
'cannot say'. Two were left blank.
1456 Sixty-seven replies to question 5(c) indicated "more often", compared to only 5
"less often", 16 answered 'just as' often and 30 answered 'cannot say'.Three left the
boxes blank. 439
it was "more important", only 3% claimed that it was "less important",
and 62% indicated that state terror/ism is "just as" important an area of
study than such violence by insurgents. The remaining 7.5% ticked the
box labelled 'cannot say' •1457
Question 6 read "Would you say that more, less or just as much, academic
work has been done on 'terror/ist 'violence by those in power than on
that by insurgents?". Only 10% of the 117 respondents indicated that
they believed that "more" academic work has been done on the topic of
"terror/ist' violence by those in power than on that by insurgents"
while two thirds indicated that they believed that less academic work
has been done on the topic of "terror/ist' violence by those in power
than on that by insurgents". Seven percent indicated that "just as"
much had been done, and 16% had ticked the box entitled "cannot
say" 1458
After listing twenty one separate things which authors had labelled (or
implied) as 'state terrorism', Question 7 asked "Would any of the
following (without reservations) constitute such 'terror/ism". It also
left space for the respondents to make comments following a secondary
question "Are there any qualifications you would like to add to enable
such phenomena to constitute 'terror/ism?'. Despite the comments made
within the space provided and beside the list, the quantitative results
are as follows. For simplicity's sake the items will be listed with the
quantitative answers given next to them as both a percentage of the
potential 120 respondents and as an absolute number:
Genocide 67% (80)
Torture 67% (80)
The possession of nuclear weapons 7.5% (9)
The possession of biological weapons 8% (10)
1457 Seventy four of the 119 respondents to question 5(d), indicated that state
terror/ism is "just as" important an area of study than such violence by insurgents.
Only 3 claimed that it was "less important", compared to 33 who indicated that it was
"more important" . The remaining 9 ticked the box labelled 'cannot say'and one
questionnaire was left blank.
1458 Seventy eight of the replies to question 6 indicated that they believed that less
academic work has been done on the topic of "terror/ist' violence by those in power
than on that by insurgents". In contrast only 12 indicated that they believed that more
academic work has been done on the topic, with 8 indicating that "just as" much had
been done, and 19 ticking the box entitled "cannot say".Three were left blank.
The possession of chemical weapons 9% (11)
The threat to use nuclear weapons 24% (29)
The threat to use biological weapons 23% (28)
The threat to use chemical weapons 23% (28)
The use of nuclear weapons 23% (28)
The use of biological weapons 27%(32)
The use of chemical weapons 27.5%(33)
Coercive diplomacy 9%(11)
Acts of violence that deliberately target the enemy's non-combatants
65% (78)
Assassination of political leaders 67% (80)
War crimes 38% (46)
Death squads 87% (104)
The 'disappeared' 83% (100)
Repression 29%(35)
Violations of international law 9% (11)
Human rights violations 34% (40)
1-1:klage.t 13% (1.6)
In reply to question 8, "Can counter-terrorism ever be labelled as
'terror/ism", 11% of those 108 respondents answered "No", and a
corresponding 89% answered "Yes" 1459•
Question 9 asked "Can legal acts of violence carried out by those in
power within the area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled as
'terror/ism'?". Sixteen percent of the 105 replies indicated "No", 84%
answered "Yes" 1460.
Question 10 asked "Can illegal acts of violence carried out by those in
power within the area of domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled
'terror/ism' ", to which 114 answers were received. Three percent of
these indicated "No", the other 97% of the replies were "Yes" 1461.
1459 Ninety six of 108 respondents answered "Yes", with only 12 answering "No".
Twelve respondents failed to answer this question.
1460 Eighty eight respondents to question 9, indicated that 'legal acts of violence
carried out by those in power within the[ir] area of domestic jurisdiction' can 'be
labelled as 'terror/ism' , 17 indicated that they could not. Fifteen failed to reply to this
question.
1 461 To question 10, 111 indicated that 'illegal acts of violence carried out by those
in power within the area of domestic jurisdiction' can never 'be labelled 'terror/ism' .
Three indicated that they could not, and 6 failed to answer. 441
Whilst in response to question 11 which asked, "Can acts or threats of
violence carried out directly by agents of one power outside its area of
domestic jurisdiction ever be labelled 'terror/ism'?", 5% of the 114
replies indicated "No", with the corresponding 95% indicating "Yes"
1462.
Finally in reply to question 12 which asked "Do you find the following
'universal' definition of terrorism acceptable?", 52% of those 99
nyes,,1463 .answers indicated "No", the other 48% stated 	 The definition
was, terrorism is:
"the deliberate threat or use of violence for political purposes by either non-state
actors anywhere or the state outside its area of jurisdiction when such actions are
intended to influence a target(s) wider than the immediate non-combatant
victim(s); or the use of such purposive violence by the state (when it claims) the
authority when its actions are either illegal or legal but fail to allow the
individual victim the opportunity to avoid such violence through the secret, vague
or indiscriminate nature of the enabling legislation".
Question 12 also allowed for the respondents to make comments on this
proposed definition by adding the secondary question, "What
alterations/qualifications would you want to add?". Section 2 which
contained only one question 13, also provided space for authors to:
"revise any of your answers; expand any of your answers, (e.g. those to
the 'closed' questions 1,2,5,6); or make any other comments or
suggestions on the topic"?. The most detailed of which are found within
the thesis especially in the chapters on the State and the conclusion.
1462 To question 11
directly by agents of
labelled 'terror/ism' 6
1463 To question 12
failed to answer.
, 108 indicated that 'acts or threats of violence carried out
one power outside its area of domestic jurisdiction' could 'be
indicated that they could not. Six failed to answer.
, 48 replied 'Yes' and 51 respondents replied 'No'. Twenty one 442
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